Swearingen SA227 Metro III

Aeronaves TSM

The crew was completing a training flight at Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport. After touchdown on runway 17, the airplane veered off runway to the left, lost its right main gear and came to rest about 600 metres from the runway threshold. All three crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Perimeter Aviation

On 02 November 2017, a Perimeter Aviation LP Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III (serial number AC-756B, registration C-FLRY) was operating as flight 959 (PAG959) from Gods River Airport, Manitoba, to Thompson Airport, Manitoba, with 2 flight crew members on board. When the aircraft was approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of Thompson Airport, the crew informed air traffic control that they had received a low oil pressure indication on the left engine that might require the engine to be shut down. The crew did not declare an emergency, but aircraft rescue and firefighting services were put on standby. After touchdown on Runway 24 with both engines operating, the aircraft suddenly veered to the right and exited the runway. The aircraft came to rest in snow north of the runway. The captain and first officer exited the aircraft through the left side over-wing emergency exit and were taken to hospital with minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The 406-MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate. The occurrence took place during the hours of darkness, at 1920 Central Daylight Time.

Aeronaves TSM

The twin engine aircraft departed Saltillo Airport on a night cargo flight to Puebla, carrying two pilots and a load of 550 kilos of various goods. En route, the crew declared an emergency and reported a low fuel condition before being cleared to divert to Tampico-General Francisco Javier Mina Airport. On final approach, both engines stopped and the aircraft descended into trees and crashed in a wooded area located 850 metres short of runway 31. Both pilots were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Key Lime Air

The airline transport pilot delayed his scheduled departure for the night cargo flight due to thunderstorms along the route. Before departing, the pilot explained to the flight follower assigned to the flight that if he could not get though the thunderstorms along the planned route, he would divert to the alternate airport. While en route, the pilot was advised by the air traffic controller in contact with the flight of a "ragged line of moderate, heavy, and extreme" precipitation along his planned route. The controller also stated that he did not see any breaks in the weather. The controller cleared the pilot to descend at his discretion from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 3,000 ft msl, and subsequently, the controller suggested a diversion to the northeast for about 70 nautical miles that would avoid the most severe weather. The pilot responded that he had enough fuel for such a diversion but concluded that he would "see what the radar is painting" after descending to 3,000 ft msl. About 1 minute 30 seconds later, as the airplane was descending through 7,000 ft msl, the controller stated, "I just lost you on radar, I don't show a transponder, it might have to do with the weather." About 40 seconds later, the pilot advised the controller that he intended to deviate to the right of course, and the controller told the pilot that he could turn left and right as needed. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that he was going to turn around and proceed to his alternate airport. The controller cleared the pilot direct to his alternate and instructed him to maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the instruction, and the controller then stated, "do you want to climb back up? I can offer you any altitude." The pilot responded that he would try to climb back to 3,000 ft msl. The controller then recommended a heading of 180° to "get you clear of the weather quicker," and the pilot responded, "alright 180." There were no further communications from the pilot. Shortly thereafter, radar data showed the airplane enter a right turn that continued through about 540°. During the turn its airspeed varied between 198 and 130 knots, while its estimated bank angles were between 40 and 50°. Examination of the wreckage indicated that airplane experienced an in-flight breakup at relatively low altitude, consistent with radar data that showed the airplane's last recorded altitudes to be around 3,500 ft msl. The symmetrical nature of the breakup, damage to the outboard wings, and damage to the upper fuselage were all signatures indicative that the left and right wings failed in positive overload almost simultaneously. All of the fracture surfaces examined had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. There was no evidence of pre-existing cracking noted at any of the separation points, nor was there evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Review of base reflectivity weather radar data showed that, while the pilot was maneuvering to divert to the alternate airport, the airplane was operating in an area of light precipitation that rapidly intensified to heavy precipitation, as shown by radar scans completed shortly after the accident. During this time, the flight was likely operating in clouds along the leading edge of the convective line, where the pilot most likely would have encountered updrafts and severe or greater turbulence. The low visibility conditions that existed during the flight, which was conducted at night and in instrument meteorological conditions, coupled with the turbulence the flight likely encountered, were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's maneuvering during the final moments of the flight was consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. The pilot's continued flight into known convective weather conditions and his delayed decision to divert the flight directly contributed to the accident. Although the operator had a system safety-based program, the responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was left solely to the pilot. Written company policy required completion of a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) before each flight by the assigned flight follower; however, a FRAT was not completed for the accident flight. The flight followers responsible for completing the FRATs were not trained to complete them for night cargo flights, and the operator's management was not aware that the FRATs were not being completed for night cargo flights. Further, if a FRAT had been completed for the accident flight, the resultant score would have allowed the flight to commence into known hazardous weather conditions without any further review. If greater oversight had been provided by the operator, it is possible that the flight may have been cancelled or re-routed due to the severity of the convective weather conditions present along the planned route of flight.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Following an uneventful flight from Pereira, the twin engine airplane was cleared to land on Bogotá-El Dorado Airport Runway 13L. Apparently, the aircraft bounced three times before landing firmly. After touchdown, it went out of control, veered off runway, lost its nose gear and came to rest in a grassy area. All 11 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Among the passengers was Juan Fernando Cristo, Minister for Internal Affairs.

CAE Aviation

The aircraft was involved in a maritime patrol flight over the Mediterranean Sea, carrying a crew of two and three members of the French Ministry of Defense. Shortly after takeoff from runway 13, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft banked to the right, hit a perimeter fence and crashed in a huge explosion on the Triq Carmelo Caruana Street. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All five occupants were killed. It was previously reported that the flight was performed on behalf of the EU Frontex Program but this was later denied by the Border Agency. The presence of all three French Officers was confirmed by the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian. It was also confirmed by the Government of Malta that this kind of flight was performed by the French Customs since five months, an official operation of surveillance to identify human traffic and narcotics routes in the Mediterranean Sea.

IBC Airways

The captain and first officer were conducting an international cargo flight in the twin-engine turboprop airplane. After about 40 minutes of flight during night visual meteorological conditions, an air traffic controller cleared the airplane for a descent to 7,000 ft and then another controller further cleared the airplane for a descent to 3,000 ft and told the flight crew to expect an ILS (instrument landing system) approach. During the descent, about 7,300 ft and about 290 kts, the airplane entered a shallow left turn, followed by a 45-degree right turn and a rapid, uncontrolled descent, during which the airplane broke up about 1,500 ft over uneven terrain. The moderately loaded cargo airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder (CVR) (although it previously had a CVR in its passenger configuration) nor was it required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. There were also no avionics on board with downloadable or nonvolatile memory. As a result, there was limited information available to determine what led to the uncontrolled descent or what occurred as the flight crew attempted to regain control of the airplane. Also, although the first officer was identified in FAA-recorded radio transmissions several minutes before the loss of control and it was company policy that the pilot not flying make those transmissions, it could not be determined who was at the controls when either the loss of control occurred or when the airplane broke up. There was no evidence of any in-flight mechanical failures that would have resulted in the loss of control, and the airplane was loaded within limits. Evidence of all flight control surfaces was confirmed, and, to the extent possible, flight control continuity was also confirmed. Evidence also indicated that both engines were operating at the time of the accident, and, although one of the four propeller blades from the right propeller was not located after separating from the fractured hub, there was no evidence of any preexisting propeller anomalies. The electrically controlled pitch trim actuator did not exhibit any evidence of runaway pitch, and measurements of the actuator rods indicated that the airplane was trimmed slightly nose low, consistent for the phase of flight. Due to the separation of the wings and tail, the in-flight positions of the manually operated aileron and rudder trim wheels could not be determined. Other similarly documented accidents and incidents generally involved unequal fuel burns, which resulted in wing drops or airplane rolls. In one case, the flight crew intentionally induced an excessive slide slip to balance fuel between the wings, which resulted in an uncontrolled roll. However, in the current investigation, the fuel cross feed valve was found in the closed position, indicating that a fuel imbalance was likely not a concern of the flight crew. In at least two other events, unequal fuel loads also involved autopilots that reached their maximum hold limits, snapped off, and rolled the airplane. Although the airplane in this accident did not have an autopilot, historical examples indicate that a sudden yawing or rolling motion, regardless of the source, could result in a roll, nose tuck, and loss of control. The roll may have been recoverable, and in one documented case, a pilot was able to recover the airplane, but after it lost almost 11,000 ft of altitude. During this accident flight, it was likely that, during the descent, the flight crew did regain control of the airplane to the extent that the flight control surfaces were effective. With darkness and the rapid descent at a relatively low altitude, one or both crewmembers likely pulled hard on the yoke to arrest the downward trajectory, and, in doing so, placed the wings broadside against the force of the relative wind, which resulted in both wings failing upward. As the wings failed, the propellers simultaneously chopped through the fuselage behind the cockpit. At the same time, the horizontal stabilizers were also positioned broadside against the relative wind, and they also failed upward. Evidence also revealed that, at some point, the flight crew lowered the landing gear. Although it could not be determined when they lowered the gear, it could have been in an attempt to slow or regain control of the airplane during the descent. Although reasons for the loss of control could not be definitively determined, the lack of any preexisting mechanical anomalies indicates a likelihood of flight crew involvement. Then, during the recovery attempt, the flight crew's actions, while operating under the difficult circumstances of darkness and rapidly decreasing altitude, resulted in the overstress of the airplane.

Aerocon - Aero Comercial Oriente Norte

Following an uneventful flight from Potosí, the crew started the descent to Sucre-Juana Azurduy de Padilla Airport Runway 05 in good weather conditions. After touchdown, at a speed of about 50 knots, the aircraft deviated to the left then pivoted 90° left, veered off runway and rolled for about 50 metres before coming to rest in a rocky ditch. There was no fire. All 10 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Perimeter Aviation

On 22 December 2012, the Perimeter Aviation LP, Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III (registration C-GFWX, serial number AC650B), operating as Perimeter flight PAG993, departed Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International Airport, Manitoba, at 1939 Coordinated Universal Time (1339 Central Standard Time) as a charter flight to Sanikiluaq, Nunavut. Following an attempted visual approach to Runway 09, a non precision non-directional beacon (NDB) Runway 27 approach was conducted. Visual contact with the runway environment was made and a circling for Runway 09 initiated. Visual contact with the Runway 09 environment was lost and a return to the Sanikiluaq NDB was executed. A second NDB Runway 27 approach was conducted with the intent to land on Runway 27. Visual contact with the runway environment was made after passing the missed approach point. Following a steep descent, a rejected landing was initiated at 20 to 50 feet above the runway; the aircraft struck the ground approximately 525 feet beyond the departure end of Runway 27. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter activated on impact. The 2 flight crew and 1 passenger sustained serious injuries, 5 passengers sustained minor injuries, and 1 infant was fatally injured. Occupants exited the aircraft via the forward right overwing exit and were immediately transported to the local health centre. The aircraft was destroyed. The occurrence took place during the hours of darkness at 2306 Coordinated Universal Time (1806 Eastern Standard Time).

Air Class Lineas Aéreas

The crew was performing a cargo flight from Montevideo to Buenos Aires on behalf of DHL. The aircraft departed runway 24 at Montevideo-Carrasco Airport at 1945LT and the crew was cleared to climb to FL080. While reaching a height of 4,500 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea at a speed of 570 knots which caused its disintegration off Flores Island. Few debris were found the following day floating on water but the main wreckage was localized two weeks later about one NM south of Flores Island. The CVR was found on 02AUG2012 but was unreadable as the content was concerning the last 30 minutes of the precedent flight. On 11FEB2013, fishermen found the cargo door in their fishnet. No trace of the cargo nor the crew was ever found.

Aerocon - Aero Comercial Oriente Norte

Following an uneventful flight from Santa Cruz-El Trompillo Airport, the crew started the descent to Trinidad-Jorge Heinrich Arauz Airport runway 14. On approach, the crew encountered poor visibility due to smoke coming from forest fires. In a visibility estimated between 300 and 500 feet, the aircraft descended too low, impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area located 8 km short of runway. The wreckage was found 3 days later. A passenger was slightly injured while 8 other occupants were killed.

Air Norway

After touchdown on runway 19R at Oslo-Gardermoen Airport, while decelerating to a speed of 60 knots, the aircraft deviated to the right. At a speed of 40 knots, it impacted a snow berm then rotated to the right and came to rest in deep snow with its both propellers and the nose damaged. All 11 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Línea Aérea Amaszonas

On approach to Rurrenabaque, following an uneventful flight from San Borja, the crew encountered problems with the landing gear which failed to lock down. As all three green lights were not ON on the cockpit panel, the Captain decided to divert to La Paz-El Alto Airport where rescue teams were alerted. After touchdown, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left before coming to rest in a grassy area. All eight occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Manx2

The aircraft departed Belfast City Airport (EGAC) on an international scheduled passenger service to Cork Airport (EICK). Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) were in operation at the destination. The aircraft carried out two ILS1 approaches, each followed by a missed approach. The aircraft then entered a holding pattern following which a third ILS approach was made to Runway (RWY) 17. The approach was continued below Decision Height (200 ft) and a missed approach was initiated. Approaching the runway threshold, the aircraft rolled to the left followed by a rapid roll to the right during which the right wingtip contacted the runway surface. The aircraft continued to roll and impacted the runway in a fully inverted position. The aircraft departed the runway surface to the right and came to rest in soft ground. A significant quantity of mud entered the aircraft through a fracture in the roof, partially filling the cabin. Six persons (including the two Flight Crew members) were fatally injured, four were seriously injured and two received minor injuries. The propeller blades on both engines were severely damaged; three of the four propeller blades on the right-hand engine detached during the impact sequence. Fire occurred in both engines after impact. These fires were extinguished expeditiously by the Airport Fire Service.

LC Busre

Following an uneventful flight, the twine engine aircraft approached Andahuaylas Airport and landed normally on runway 03. After touchdown, while decelerating to a speed of about 40 knots, the aircraft started to deviate to the left. The crew counteracted but the aircraft continued to the left, veered off runway, rolled through a grassy and eventually came down a four meters high embankment before coming to rest. While all 19 occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

LC Busre

Following an uneventful flight from Lima, the crew continued the approached while the aircraft was unstabilized. Upon touchdown on runway 07, the aircraft landed relatively hard then bounced three times when the crew retracted the landing gear. The aircraft slid on its belly for about 600 metres before coming to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Western Air

On Sunday December 20, 2009 at approximately 1700 UTC a fixed wing, multi engine, Fairchild SA-227AC Metro-liner III aircraft landed at Cap Haïtien Int’l Airport, Haiti, with its landing gear retracted. The pilot reported on two occasions whilst the aircraft was configured with flaps and gear extended, upon reduction in power preparing to land, the aircraft had a very high nose up attitude. The pilot further stated that after two go around, the decision was made to land the aircraft with its landing gear retracted. The aircraft landed on Runway 05. According to the pilot, the crew and all 19 passengers onboard suffered no injuries.

Airtex Aviation

On 9 April 2008, at 2325 Eastern Standard Time, a Fairchild Industries Inc. SA227-AC (Metro III) aircraft, registered VH-OZA, departed Sydney Airport, New South Wales on a freight charter flight to Brisbane, Queensland with one pilot on board. The aircraft was subsequently observed on radar to be turning right, contrary to air traffic control instructions to turn left to an easterly heading. The pilot reported that he had a ‘slight technical fault’ and no other transmissions were heard from the pilot. Recorded radar data showed the aircraft turning right and then left, followed by a descent and climb, a second right turn and a second descent before radar returns were lost when the aircraft was at an altitude of 3,740 ft above mean sea level and descending at over 10,000 ft/min. Air traffic control initiated search actions and search vessels later recovered a small amount of aircraft wreckage floating in the ocean, south of the last recorded radar position. The pilot was presumed to be fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. Both of the aircraft’s on-board flight recorders were subsequently recovered from the ocean floor. They contained data from a number of previous flights, but not for the accident flight. There was no evidence of a midair breakup of the aircraft.

Baires Fly

The crew was performing a positioning flight from Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport. Before departure, the captain switched off the Stall Alarm System for unknown reasons. Shortly after takeoff from runway 17, the climb gradient was small and landing gear were retracted at a very low altitude. The left wing stalled and struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft impacted ground, slid for few dozen metres, overran the runway and came to rest in a field. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sierra West Airlines

The airplane impacted a fence and terrain on short final during a visual approach to runway 27. The airplane was operated as a cargo airplane with two flight crewmembers by a commercial operator certificated under 14 CFR Part 135. The flightcrew worked approximately 18.75 hours within a 24-hour period leading up to the accident performing flights listed by the operator as either 14 CFR Part 91 or 14 CFR Part 135, all of which were in the conduct of company business. Of this total, 5.9 hours involved flying conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. The flight to the accident airport was for the purposes of picking up repair parts for another company airplane that received minor damage in which the flight crew was previously piloting in the 24- hour period. They were then going to fly back to the operator's home base on the same day, which would have had an estimated flying time of 2:45 hours. The captain said he was tired and that he and the first officer had not slept at any of the stops made during the period. The captain said that the company likes for the airplanes to return to their home base. The captain said that the company prefers an option for pilots to stay overnight if tired and he has stayed overnight on previous trips but only due to maintenance related reasons. The Aeronautical Information Manual states that acute fatigue affects timing and perceptional field performance.

Corporate Air - Australia

By night, the twin engine aircraft landed hard at Canberra Airport. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Dynamic Airlines

On 19 September 2005, the type F-Swearingen SA227-AC aircraft with registration PH-DYM was scheduled to make a charter flight from Rotterdam Airport to Birmingham Airport. Seventeen passengers and two cockpit crew members were on board. The planned departure time was 07.30 hours. The aircraft taxied to the beginning of runway 24 and lined up for take-off. During line-up, the speed levers for the engines were moved from taxi position to flight position. The nose wheel steering fault indicator lit up and the first officer, who was steering the aircraft, responded by saying that he had no nose wheel steering. The captain informed the first officer that he had forgotten to press the switch on the throttles, which activates the nose wheel steering system. The first officer then confirmed that he had nose wheel steering. With the engines in the low RPM range (taxi position, up to 70% of maximum RPM), the pilot can steer the aircraft using the rudder pedals while taxing. When the engines are operated in the high RPM selection (flight position, between 70% and 100% of the maximum RPM), the switch on the throttles, which activates the nose wheel steering system, must be pressed in during the first part of the take-off roll in order to be able to operate the nose wheel with the rudder pedal. At a speed around 50 knots, the switch which activates the nose wheel steering system is released. The aerodynamic forces of on the rudder are then sufficient to take over the steering from the nose wheel. Once take-off clearance was given by air traffic control, the first officer engaged power and started the take-off roll. He stated that once the nose wheel operating switch had been released, the aircraft almost immediately began moving towards the left hand side of the runway. He tried to use the brakes and the directional rudder, to return the aircraft to the centre of the runway. The aircraft had a speed of between 50 and 60 knots at that point. The crew rejected the take-off but could not prevent the aircraft ending up alongside the runway, on the left hand side. The captain stated that various forces influence the directional control of an aircraft during the take-off, such as wind, propeller wash, increasing air speed, etc. These forces necessitate steering corrections during the take-off. Only when the nose wheel steering system was disengaged the captain realized something was wrong. The grass area alongside the runway is lower than the runway and the ground was soft. The left landing gear sank in the soft ground first and, as a result, the aircraft decelerated heavily and the left landing gear broke off almost immediately. The tip of the left wing struck the ground. This caused a ground loop effect and turned the aircraft further left. As a consequence the right landing gear and the nose gear also broke off. Once the aircraft had come to a standstill, the captain switched off all onboard systems and cut off the fuel supply to the engines. Simultaneously, the first officer was given the task of evacuating the passengers. The passengers were calm and left the aircraft without problems via the left hand door at the front of the aircraft. A moment later, the airport fire service arrived at the location of the accident. One of the passengers was taken to hospital for a check-up; he was able to leave hospital the same morning. There was severe damage despite the relatively slow speed at which the aircraft left the runway.

Aero-Tropics Air Services

On 7 May 2005, a Fairchild Aircraft Inc. SA227DC Metro 23 aircraft, registered VH-TFU, with two pilots and 13 passengers, was being operated by Transair on an instrument flight rules (IFR) regular public transport (RPT) service from Bamaga to Cairns, with an intermediate stop at Lockhart River, Queensland. At 1143:39 Eastern Standard Time, the aircraft impacted terrain in the Iron Range National Park on the north-western slope of South Pap, a heavily timbered ridge, approximately 11 km north-west of the Lockhart River aerodrome. At the time of the accident, the crew was conducting an area navigation global navigation satellite system (RNAV (GNSS)) non-precision approach to runway 12. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and an intense, fuel-fed, post-impact fire. There were no survivors. The accident was almost certainly the result of controlled flight into terrain; that is, an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew was flown unintentionally into terrain, probably with no prior awareness by the crew of the aircraft’s proximity to terrain. Weather conditions in the Lockhart River area were poor and necessitated the conduct of an instrument approach procedure for an intended landing at the aerodrome. The cloud base was probably between 500 ft and 1,000 ft above mean sea level and the terrain to the west of the aerodrome, beneath the runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach, was probably obscured by cloud. The flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that, during the entire descent and approach, the aircraft engine and flight control system parameters were normal and that the crew were accurately navigating the aircraft along the instrument approach track. The FDR data and wreckage examination showed that the aircraft was configured for the approach, with the landing gear down and flaps extended to the half position. There were no radio broadcasts made by the crew on the air traffic services frequencies or the Lockhart River common traffic advisory frequency indicating that there was a problem with the aircraft or crew.

Airwork - New Zealand

The crew requested engine start at 2128 and Post 23 taxied for runway 23R at about 2132. The flight data recorder (FDR) showed that during the taxi a left turn through about 320° was made in 17 seconds. Post 23 departed at about 2136 with the first officer (FO) the pilot flying (PF). The planned cruise level was flight level (FL) 180 but the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) showed that in order to get above turbulence encountered at that level the crew requested, and were cleared by air traffic control (ATC), to cruise at FL220. The autopilot was engaged for the climb and cruise. There were 2 CVR references to the crew’s use of the de-icing system to remove trace or light icing from the wings. CVR comments also indicated that stars were visible, and that the aircraft’s weather radar was serviceable. At 2159 ATC cleared Post 23 to track from near New Plymouth very high frequency (VHF) omni-directional radio range (VOR) direct to Tory VOR at the northeast end of the Marlborough Sounds, and at 2206 ATC transferred Post 23 to Christchurch Control. The CVR recorded normal crew interaction and aircraft operation, except that climb power remained set for about 15 minutes after reaching cruise level in order to make up some of the delay caused by the late departure. At about 2212:28, after power was reduced to a cruise setting and the cruise checks had been completed, the captain said, “We’ll just open the crossflow again…sit on left ball and trim it accordingly”. The only aircraft component referred to as “crossflow”, and operable by a flight deck switch or control, was the fuel crossflow valve between the left and right wing tanks. The captain repeated the instruction 5 times in a period of 19 seconds, by telling the FO to, “Step on the left pedal, and just trim it to take the pressure off” and “Get the ball out to the right as far as you can …and just trim it”. The FO sought confirmation of the procedure and said, “I was being a bit cautious” to which the captain replied, “Don’t be cautious mate, it’ll do it good”. Nine seconds later the FO asked, “How’s that?”. The Captain replied, “That’s good – should come right – hopefully it’s coming right.” There was no other comment at any time from either pilot about the success or otherwise of the fuel transfer. During this time, the repeated aural alert of automatic horizontal stabiliser movement sounded for a period of 27 seconds, as the stabiliser re-trimmed the aircraft as it slowed from the higher speed reached during cruise at climb power. Forty-seven seconds after opening the crossflow, the captain said, “Doesn’t like that one mate… you’d better grab it.” Within one second there was the aural alert “Bank angle”, followed by a chime tone, probably the selected altitude deviation warning. Both pilots exclaimed surprise. After a further 23 seconds the captain asked the FO to confirm that the autopilot was off, but it was unclear from the CVR whether the captain had taken control of the aircraft at that point. The FO confirmed that the autopilot was off just before the recording ended at 2213:41. The bank angle alert was heard a total of 7 times on the CVR before the end of the recording. During the last 25 seconds of radar data recorded by ATC, Post 23 lost 2000 ft altitude and the track turned left through more than 180°. Radar data from Post 23 ceased at 2213:45 when the aircraft was descending through FL199 about 1700 metres (m) southeast of the accident area. Commencing at 2213:58, the ATC controller called Post 23 three times, without response. He then initiated the uncertainty phase of search and rescue for the flight. The operator had a flight-following system that displayed the same ATC radar data from Airways Corporation of New Zealand (ACNZ). The operator’s dispatcher noticed that the data for Post 23 had ceased and, after discussing this with ACNZ, he advised the operator’s management. There were many witnesses to the accident who reported noticing a very loud and unusual noise. Some, familiar with the sound of aircraft cruising overhead on the New Plymouth – Wellington air route, thought the noise was an aircraft engine but described it as “high-revving” or “roaring”. Witnesses A were located about 3 kilometres (km) south of the southernmost part of the track of Post 23 as recorded by ATC radar, and about 6 km south of the accident site. They described going outside to identify the cause of an intense noise. As they looked northeast and upwards about 45°, they saw an orange-yellow light descending through broken cloud layers at high speed. A “big burst” and 3 or 4 separate fireballs were observed “just above the horizon” about 5 km away. No explosion was heard. The biggest fireball lasted the longest time and was above the others. The night was dark and it had been drizzling. Witness B, almost 7 km to the northeast of the accident site, observed light and dark cloud patterns moving towards the northwest. She thought the moon caused the light variation; however moonrise was almost 3 hours later. This witness also first observed a fireball below the cloud at an elevation of about 6°. She described it as “a big bright circle” followed by 2 smaller fireballs that fell slowly. No explosion was heard. Witness C, who was less than 1000 m from the aircraft’s diving flight path, described seeing the nose section falling after an explosion “like a real big ball of fire”. The wings were then seen falling after a smaller fireball that was followed by a third small fireball. The witness said it was a still night, with no rain at that time, and the fireballs were observed below the lowest cloud. The fireballs illuminated falling wreckage and cargo. Witness D, also less than 1000 m from the accident site, described parts of the aircraft falling, illuminated by the fireball. Witnesses generally agreed that the first and biggest fireball was round and orange, and then shrank away. Descriptions of the smaller fireballs varied, but were usually of a more persistent, streaming flame that fell very steeply or straight down. A large number of emergency service members and onlookers converged on the accident area. Those who got within about 1000 m of the scene reported a strong smell of fuel. The first item of wreckage was located at about 2315. The main wreckage field was on hilly farmland 7 km northeast of Stratford at an elevation of approximately 700 ft.

IBC Airways

The pilot stated that the landing on runway 27 had initially been without incident. During the landing rollout, while the engines were in reverse and brakes were being applied, one of several deer which had entered the airport property, crossed the runway, and impacted the airplane's nose wheel. The impact threw the deer into the left propeller, and the propeller was detached and it punctured the fuselage.

Norcanair - North Canada Air

A Northern Dene Airways Ltd. Metro III (registration C-FIPW, serial number AC524), operating as Norcanair Flight KA1051, departed Stony Rapids, Saskatchewan, with two crew members and nine passengers on a day, visual flight rules flight to La Ronge, Saskatchewan. On arrival in La Ronge, at approximately 1410 central standard time, the crew completed the approach and landing checklists and confirmed the gear-down indication. The aircraft was landed in a crosswind on Runway 18 and touched down firmly, approximately 1000 feet from the threshold. On touchdown, the left wing dropped and the propeller made contact with the runway. The aircraft veered to the left side of the runway, despite full rudder and aileron deflection. The crew applied maximum right braking and shut down both engines. The aircraft departed the runway and travelled approximately 200 feet through the infield before the nose and right main gear were torn rearwards; the left gear collapsed into the wheel well. The aircraft slid on its belly before coming to rest approximately 300 feet off the side of the runway. Three of the passengers suffered minor injuries from the sudden stop associated with the final collapsing of the landing gear; the other passengers and the pilots were not injured.

Ryan Blake Air Charter

The aircraft was on a Domestic Charter flight (IFR) from Bloemfontein Aerodrome to George Aerodrome when the crew elected to execute an ILS approach for landing onto Runway 11. At 1,000 feet from the threshold of Runway 11 with the undercarriage selected down and at full flaps for landing at an IAS of 120kt when he advised the copilot that was the flying pilot at the time, to continue visually with the approach for Runway 11. Shortly thereafter they heard a loud impact sound and the right hand engine failed. The aircraft suddenly yawed and banked severely to the right and the flying pilot commented that they had experienced a bird strike on the right hand engine. The pilot-in-command immediately took over the controls and attempted to arrest the yaw to the right but the aircraft kept yawing to the right. He then made a blind transmission on frequency 118.9 MHz and called for a go-around. The co-pilot then selected full power on both engines retracted the undercarriage, whilst the pilot-in-command feathered the right-hand propeller. According to the pilot-in-command, the aircraft continued to yaw to the right and with the stall aural warning sounding with a loss of altitude, he pulled the left-hand engine stop and feather control and was committed to execute a forced landing on a cattle farm The pilot-in-command stated that aircraft was approximately just outside the boundary fence. Both wings collided with the gum poles of a telephone and wire fence causing extensive damage to the wings and fuselage under-surface. Both occupants sustained no injuries.

Aerotransporte Petrolero

Following an uneventful flight from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, the crew started the approach to Carepa-Los Cedros Airport, the copilot was the pilot-in-command. On final approach, the captain took over controls and continued the descent when the GPWS alarm sounded seven times. For unknown reasons, the captain failed to respond to this situation and did not proceed with any corrective actions. On short final, at a height of about 200 feet, one of the engine failed. The crew failed to follow the published procedures, causing the aircraft to stall and to crash about 100 metres short of runway 33. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

North Flying

At approximately 0630 hrs on 24 December 2002, the pilots arrived by car at Aberdeen Airport. With no requirement for their aircraft to transport mail on this occasion, it was decided to fly directly to their home airport in Denmark. The aircraft had been refuelled the previous day and the total fuel on board of 2,200 lb was sufficient for the flight; with no cargo on board, take-off weight was calculated as 12,000 lb (maximum take-off weight: 16,000 lb). The commander carried out an external inspection on OY-BPH while the co-pilot, who was the designated handling pilot for the flight to Denmark, submitted a flight plan. The weather at 0720 hrs was reported as follows: Surface wind 150°M/ 12 kt; visibility 2,500 metres in mist; cloud scattered 100 feet agl, overcast at 200 feet agl; air temperature +9°C; QNH 994 hPa. The runway was reported as wet and Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) had been in force at Aberdeen since 0633 hrs. OY-BPH, callsign 'Birdie Nine Two Four', was parked on Taxiway Bravo and the crew called for, and were given, start clearance at 0736 hrs by 'Ground Movement Control' on frequency 121.7 MHz. Then, following their after-start checks, the crew were cleared to taxi to 'Whiskey Five' for Runway 16 at 0740 hrs. During taxi, the crew were passed and correctly acknowledged the following clearance: "LEAVE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE CLIMBING FLIGHT LEVEL ONE FIVE FIVE SQUAWK SIX TWO FOUR ZERO". Then, at 0742 hrs as the aircraft approached 'Whiskey Five', the crew were transferred to 'Aberdeen Tower' on frequency 118.1 MHz. On the 'Tower' frequency, they were given line-up clearance for Runway 16. At 0743 hrs, the controller transmitted: "BIRDIE NINE TWO FOUR WITH A LEFT TURN DIRECT KARLI CLEAR TAKE OFF ONE SIX SURFACE WIND ONE SIX ZERO ONE TWO KNOTS". The crew correctly acknowledged this clearance. The controller watched the initial movement of the aircraft along the runway before transferring her attention to another aircraft, which was lining up. Shortly after, at 0746 hrs, she transmitted: "OY-BPH REPORT TURNING LEFT" but received no reply. About this time, a telephone message was received in the 'Tower' from a witness in front of the Terminal Building to the effect that an aircraft appeared to have crashed just south of the airfield. This witness had heard a "change in pitch" from the aircraft but had seen no flames prior to it disappearing from his sight: ATC personnel immediately activated their emergency procedures. For the reduced power take-off roll, with the flaps at ¼, the power was set by the commander. The crew considered that the performance of the aircraft was normal, with no unusual instrument indications. The calculated V1 and VR speeds (co-incident at 100 kt) were achieved and called by the commander and, at VR, the co-pilot rotated the aircraft to a pitch attitude of about 12° to 15° nose-up. As the aircraft left the ground, the co-pilot detected the aircraft 'yawing' to the right; almost immediately, he was also aware of a distinct smell of smoke. He called to the commander that he had an engine failure, called for maximum power and tried to maintain control by corrective aileron and rudder inputs. The commander felt the aircraft roll about 15° to the right and realised that there was a problem with the right (No 2) engine. He reached for both power levers and moved them forward. There were no audio or visual warnings associated with the apparent problem. The commander looked at the EGT gauges with the power levers fully forward and noted that the No 2 engine indicated about 600°C EGT, whereas the left (No 1) engine indicated greater than 650°C EGT (the normal maximum) and that its fuel 'Bypass' light was on. He retarded the No 1 power lever until the 'Bypass' light extinguished and noted the resultant EGT at about 630°C. He did not recall any other abnormal indications on the engine instruments but, later in the investigation, the commander recalled hearing a sound "like a compressor stall from the right engine". About this time, the co-pilot heard the automatic "Bank Angle" voice activate. As the aircraft continued to turn to the right, the co-pilot called that he "couldn't control the aircraft". The commander reached for and pulled No 2 engine 'Stop and Feather Control' but, almost immediately, OY-BPH struck the ground initially with the right wing. The aircraft slid along the surface of a field, through a fence and onto a road, before coming to rest. As it did so, the co-pilot was aware that the aircraft had struck a car, which was now at rest outside the right forward side of the cockpit. The co-pilot saw that the whole of the right wing was on fire and called this to the commander before evacuating out of the left door of the aircraft. As the copilot left, the commander pulled No 1 engine 'Stop and Feather Control' and activated both engine fire extinguishers before leaving the aircraft. Outside OY-BPH, the co-pilot went to the car to check if anyone was still inside; as he did so, he saw someone running away. With the intense fire and the car apparently empty, both pilots moved well away from the aircraft. At 0748 hrs, the co-pilot used his mobile phone to advise ATC of the accident and to request assistance. The local emergency services had been alerted at 0745 hrs by a member of the public, who reported a road accident; by 0753 hrs, the local fire service was on the scene. By 0754 hrs, the first AFS vehicle was on the scene and three further AFS vehicles arrived one minute later. A fifth vehicle arrived at 0800 hrs. The fire was quickly extinguished and the Fire Officer confirmed that all the aircraft and vehicle occupants had been located and that there had been no serious injuries. Following runway and taxiway inspections, the airport was re-opened at 0954 hrs.

Skylink Charter

The airplane veered off the runway during a rejected takeoff, overran an airport sign, and impacted a hangar. The captain stated that during the after start checklist he moved the power levers to disengage the start locks on the propellers. Post accident examination found that the left propeller was still in the start lock position, while the right propeller was in the normal operating range. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the second-in-command (SIC) was the non flying pilot (NFP). After receiving their clearance, the PF taxied onto the runway and initiated the takeoff sequence. The SIC did not set and monitor the engine power during takeoff, as required by the company procedures. During the takeoff acceleration when the speed was between 40 and 60 knots, the captain released the nose gear steering control switch as the rudder became aerodynamically effective. When the switch was released, the airplane began immediately veering left due to the asymmetrical thrust between the left and right engine propellers. The PIC did not advise the SIC that he had lost directional control and was aborting the takeoff, as required by company procedures. The distance between where the PIC reported that he began the takeoff roll and where the first tire marks became apparent was about 630 feet, and the distance between where the marks first became apparent and where the airplane's left main landing gear tire marks exited the left side of the runway was about 220 feet. Thereafter, marks (depressions in the dirt) were noted for a 108-foot-long distance in the field located adjacent to the runway. Medium intensity tire tread marks were apparent on the parallel taxiway and the adjacent vehicle service road. These tread marks, over a 332-foot-long distance, led directly to progressively more pronounced marks and rubber transfer, and to the accident airplane's landing gear tires. Based on an examination of tire tracks and skid marks, the PIC did not reject the takeoff until the airplane approached the runway's edge, and was continuing its divergent track away from the runway's centerline. The airplane rolled on the runway through the dirt median and across a taxiway for 850 feet prior to the PIC applying moderate brakes, and evidence of heavier brake application was apparent only a few hundred feet from the impacted hangar. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions was found with the propeller assemblies, nose wheel steering mechanism, or brakes.

Tadair

The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Barajas Airport at 0338LT on a cargo flight to Palma de Mallorca, carrying two pilots and a load of 1,340 kilos consisting of various goods. On a night approach to Palm Airport runway 24L, the crew completed a last turn when the aircraft stalled and struck the runway surface. Out of control, it veered to the right, collided with a lightning system and came to rest upside down in a grassy area. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

Aero Condor - Servicio de Transporte Aéreo Turistico - STAT

On November 28, 2000, at 0625 eastern standard time, a Fairchild SA227AC transport category airplane, N3107P, was substantially damaged while landing with an unsafe gear indication on the right main landing gear at the Trujillo International Airport, near Trujillo, Peru. The two commercial pilots aboard the cargo flight were not injured. The airplane was owned by Joda LLC, of Town and Country, Missouri, and was being operated as a cargo freighter by Aero Condor S.A., of Lima, Peru. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cargo flight for which a VFR flight plan was filed. The scheduled cargo flight originated from the Lima International Airport, near Lima, Peru, approximately 0530. The operator reported that the flight crew had reported a complete loss of hydraulic power prior to initiating the approach. The flight crew was not able to extend the right main landing gear due to a leak in a hydraulic line in the right landing gear well. The runway was foamed and the crew performed an emergency landing with the other two landing gears extended. Examination of the airplane by the operator revealed structural damage to the right wing and the underside section of the tail section of the airplane. The right engine and the 4-propeller blades for the right engine were also damaged. Both pilots were uninjured.

Merlin Express

The airplane landed wheels up after the instructor pilot failed to lower the landing gear. The instructor told the student to execute 'a no flap landing due to a simulated hydraulic pump failure.' The student established the airplane on the approach and called for the 'Emergency Gear Extension Checklist.' The instructor delayed extending the gear in accordance with the operator's flight standards manual, which stated that the landing gear should not be extended until the landing was assured. Later in the approach, when the gear warning horn stopped sounding, due to the student's movement of the power levers forward, the instructor removed his hand from the gear handle without extending the gear. The instructor stated that 'because [the student] had already called for the [Emergency Gear Extension] checklist once before, in a split second thought process, [he] mistakenly thought it had been completed.' Following the accident, the landing gear system was tested and found to operate normally. Review of the maintenance records revealed no uncorrected discrepancies. At the time of the accident, the instructor pilot was completing a 9-hour work day, and did not have a lunch break.

KAL Aviation

On final approach to Rhodes-Diagoras Airport, while on a cargo flight from Athens, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea one km short of runway. Both pilots were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Tango

While descending to Santa Fe-Sauce Viejo Airport by night, the crew was informed about poor weather conditions at destination. The visibility was estimated to be 30 metres in foggy conditions, well below minimums. As the crew elected to attempt an approach, he as cleared for and ILS approach to runway 03. On short final, the aircraft descended below the MDA and struck the ground 430 metres short of runway threshold. On impact, it lost its undercarriage and slid for another 180 metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aerosur

During the takeoff roll, the crew lost control of the airplane that veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All 20 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.

Ibertrans Aérea

After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest in a ditch. All 21 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Skylink Charter

After executing a missed approach at the Grand Canyon Airport, the pilots diverted to the Bullhead City Airport. The pilots reported that minimal icing conditions were encountered with about 1/8 inch of ice accumulating on the aircraft wings. The pilots stated they cycled the deice boots to shed ice. They did not observe ice on the propeller spinners, and they did not activate the engines' 'override' ignition systems, as required by the airplane's flight manual. Use of 'override' ignition was required for flight into visible moisture at or below +5 degrees Celsius (+41 degrees Fahrenheit) to prevent ice ingestion/flameouts. Subsequently, both engines flamed out as the airplane was on about a 3 mile final approach for landing with the landing gear and flaps extended. The aircraft was destroyed during an off-airport landing.

PenAir - Peninsula Airways - Alaska Airlines Commuter

According to passenger's accounts, the airplane was flying low and approached the runway at an angle. The airplane made a right turn and dragged the right wing on the runway's surface. The airplane landed hard and sheared off the right main landing gear and the nose gear. The weather reported by AWOS was 300 foot overcast with a visibility of 2.5 miles with fog. The Captain stated the airplane drifted to the left side of the runway due to the crosswind, and he executed a right turn to realign with the runway. The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the stall warning horn sounded as the First Officer called for the application of power.

Transportes Aéreos Neuquén

On final approach to Rincón de Los Sauces Airport, the aircraft struck the ground short of runway threshold. The left main gear collapsed and the airplane slid for few dozen metres then veered off runway and came to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Tamair

Two company pilots were undergoing first officer Metro III type-conversion flying training. Both had completed Metro III ground school training during the week before the accident. A company check-and-training pilot was to conduct the type conversions. This was his first duty period after 2 weeks leave. Before commencing leave, he had discussed the training with the chief pilot. This discussion concerned the general requirements for a co-pilot conversion course compared to a command pilot course but did not address specific sequences or techniques. The three pilots met at the airport at about 1530 EST on 16 September 1995. During the next 2 hours and 30 minutes approximately, the check-and-training pilot instructed the trainees in daily and pre-flight inspections, emergency equipment and procedures, and cockpit procedures and drills (including the actions to be completed in the event of an engine failure), as they related to the aircraft type. The briefing did not include detailed discussion of aircraft handling following engine failure on takeoff. The group began a meal break at 1800 and returned to the aircraft at about 1830 to begin the flying exercise. The check-and-training pilot was pilot in command for the flight and occupied the left cockpit seat. One trainee occupied the right (co-pilot) cockpit seat while the other probably occupied the front row passenger seat on the left side. This person had the use of a set of head-phones to listen to cockpit talk and radio calls. The aircraft departed Tamworth at 1852, some 40 minutes after last light. Witnesses described the night as very dark, with no moon. Under these conditions, the Tamworth city lighting, which extended to the east from about 2 km beyond the end of runway 12, was the only significant visual feature in the area. The co-pilot performed the takeoff, his first in the Metro III. For about the next 30 minutes, he completed various aircraft handling exercises including climbing, descending, turning (including steep turns), and engine handling. No asymmetric flight exercises were conducted. The check-and-training pilot then talked the co-pilot through an ILS approach to runway 30R with an overshoot and landing on runway 12L. The landing time was 1940. The aircraft had functioned normally throughout the flight. After clearing the runway, the aircraft held on a taxiway for 6 minutes, with engines running. During this period, the crew discussed the next flight which was to be flown by the same co-pilot. The check-and-training pilot stated that he was going to give the co-pilot a V1 cut. The co-pilot objected and then questioned the legality of night V1 cuts. The check-and-training pilot replied that the procedure was now legal because the company operations manual had been changed. The co-pilot made a further objection. The check-and-training pilot then said that they would continue for a Tamworth runway 30R VOR/DME approach and asked the co-pilot to brief him on this approach. The crew discussed the approach and the check-and-training pilot then requested taxi clearance. The aircraft was subsequently cleared to operate within a 15-NM radius of Tamworth below 5,000 ft. The crew then briefed for the runway 12L VOR/DME approach. The plan was to reconfigure the aircraft for normal two-engine operations after the V1 cut and then complete the approach. The crew completed the after-start checks, the taxi checks, and then the pre-take-off checks. The checks included the co-pilot calling for one-quarter flap and the check-and-training pilot responding that one-quarter flap had been selected. The crew briefed the take-off speeds as V1 = 100 kts, VR = 102 kts, V2 = 109 kts, and Vyse = 125 kts for the aircraft weight of 5,600 kg. Take-off torque was calculated as 88% and watermethanol injection was not required. The aircraft commenced the take-off roll at 1957.05. About 25 seconds after brakes release, the check-and-training pilot called 'V1', and less than 1 second later, 'rotate'. The aircraft became airborne at 1957.32. One second later, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot that the aircraft attitude should be 'just 10 degrees nose up'. After a further 3 seconds, the check-and-training pilot retarded the left engine power lever to the flight-idle position. Over the next 4 seconds, the recorded magnetic heading of the aircraft changed from 119 degrees to 129 degrees. The co-pilot and then the check-and-training pilot called that a positive rate of climb was indicated and the landing gear was selected up 15 seconds after the aircraft became airborne. The landing gear warning horn began to sound at approximately the same time. After 19 seconds airborne, and again after 30 seconds, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot to hold V2. Three seconds later, the check-and-training pilot said that the aircraft was descending. The landing gear warning horn ceased about 1 second later. By this time, the aircraft had gradually yawed left from heading 129 degrees, through the runway heading of 121 degrees, to 107 degrees. After being airborne for 35 seconds, the aircraft struck a tree approximately 350 m beyond, and 210 m left of, the upwind end of runway 12L. It then rolled rapidly left, severed power lines and struck other trees before colliding with the ground in an inverted attitude and sliding about 70 m. From the control tower, the aerodrome controller saw the aircraft become airborne. As it passed abeam the tower, the controller directed his attention away from the runway. A short time later, all lighting in the tower and on the airport failed and the controller noticed flames from an area to the north-east of the runway 30 threshold. Within about 30 seconds, when the emergency power supply had come on line, the controller attempted to establish radio contact with the aircraft. When no response was received, he initiated call-out of the emergency services.

Bearskin Airlines - Bearskin Lake Air Services

Bearskin flight 362, a Fairchild Swearingen Metro 23, departed Red Lake, Ontario, at 1300 central daylight saving time (CDT), with two pilots and one passenger on board, en route to Sioux Lookout on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. At approximately 30 nautical miles (nm) north of Sioux Lookout, the flight was cleared by the Winnipeg area control centre (ACC) for an approach to the Sioux Lookout airport. Air Sandy flight 3101, a Piper Navajo PA-31, departed Sioux Lookout at 1323 with one pilot and four passengers on board en route to Red Lake on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight. The pilot of Air Sandy 3101 reported clear of the Sioux Lookout control zone at 1326. No other communication was heard from the Air Sandy flight. At 1315 the Winnipeg ACC controller advised the Sioux Lookout Flight Service specialist that Bearskin 362 was inbound from Red Lake, estimating Sioux Lookout at 1332. At 1327, Bearskin 362 called Sioux Lookout Flight Service Station (FSS) and advised them they had been cleared for an approach and that they were cancelling IFR at 14 nm from the airport. At 1328, as Sioux Lookout FSS was giving an airport advisory to Bearskin 362, the specialist heard an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) emit a signal on the emergency frequencies. Moments later, the pilot of Bearskin 305, a Beechcraft B-99 in the vicinity of Sioux Lookout, advised the specialist that he had just seen a bright flare in the sky and that he was going to investigate. The pilot of Bearskin 305 stated that the flare had fallen to the ground and a fire was burning in a wooded area. A communications search was initiated to locate Bearskin 362, but the aircraft did not respond. A Search and Rescue aircraft from Trenton, Ontario, and an Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) helicopter were dispatched to the site. The source of the fire was confirmed to be the Air Sandy aircraft. The MNR helicopter noticed debris and a fuel slick on a nearby lake, Lac Seul. It was later confirmed that Bearskin 362 had crashed into the lake. (See Appendix A.) The two aircraft collided in mid-air at 1328 during the hours of daylight at latitude 50º14'N and longitude 92º07'W, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). All three persons on board the Bearskin aircraft and all five persons on board the Air Sandy aircraft were fatally injured.

Airlec

The aircraft has been chartered to transfer to Biggin Hill, UK, 17 people who suffered a bus accident two days ago. During the takeoff roll from Troyes-Barberey Airport, after a course of 1,100 metres, at a speed of about 100 knots, the right engine power dropped from 93% to 40%. In the meantime, the temperature of the right engine increased. As the aircraft was veered to the right, the captain decided to abort and started an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, rolled for about 150 metres, went through a fence and eventually collided with the localizer antenna. All 19 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.

Aerodinos

During the takeoff roll, the aircraft deviated to the right and eventually veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. All 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Fairchild Aircraft Corporation

The pilot was conducting a functional test flight and qualitative engineering evaluation of the airplane's longitudinal control during landing. During final approach to runway 12L, he reduced the engines to the flight idle positions and established 95 kias. He was unable to raise the nose of the airplane during the flare to arrest the descent rate and landed hard onto the runway. The airplane was taxied to the ramp and secured. No mechanical failure was found or reported.

Lone Star Airlines

The maintenance test flight was being flown following completion of airworthiness directive 87-02-02 requiring the mandatory replacement of all primary flight control cables. Following lift-off, witnesses observed the airplane start a rapid roll to the right until initial impact was made with the ground by the right wing tip. Examination of the wreckage revealed the a half turn in the routing of the replaced flight control cable was inadvertently omitted on both control columns which would result in the ailerons operating in reverse of the commanded input. The passenger was the quality control inspector who had inspected and signed off the maintenance performed. According to other company personnel, he had briefed the crew prior to the flight on the purpose of the test flight and the extent of the maintenance that the airplane had undergone. All three occupants were killed.

SkyWest Airlines - USA

SKW5569, N683AV, had been cleared to runway 24L, at intersection 45, to position and hold. The local controller, because of her preoccupation with another airplane, forgot she had placed SKW5569 on the runway and subsequently cleared US1493, N388US, for landing. After the collision, the two airplanes slid off the runway into an unoccupied fire station. The tower operating procedures did not require flight progress strips to be processed through the local ground control position. Because this strip was not present, the local controller misidentified an airplane and issued a landing clearance. The technical appraisal program for air traffic controllers is not being fully utilized because of a lack of understanding by supervisors and the unavailability of appraisal histories.

Comair

The pilot, a company check airman, and an FAA inspector were on board the aircraft for a checkride which was intended to reassess the pilot's competency. A maintenance test (aileron rigging) was to be performed in conjunction with the check ride. The first maneuver to be performed was a no-flap landing. All three pilots stated that the pilot had difficulty managing the aircraft while in the traffic pattern; airspeeds were too slow, and the pilot was constantly manipulating power. The pilot never called for the before landing checklist, and the aircraft touched down on the runway with the landing gear up. The check pilot stated that the landing gear warning horn came on briefly, but the pilot added power and silenced the horn. The FAA inspector was seated in a passenger seat for takeoff and landing, and was not aware that the landing gear was not extended.

SkyWest Airlines - USA

During arrival, the flight crew of SkyWest Airlines flight 5855 requested a VOR/DME-B approach to the Elko Airport, which was approved. As the approach continued, the flight crew reported over the Bullion VOR. Approximately 30 seconds later, the aircraft crashed. Impact occurred at the top of a mountain, about 100 feet before reaching the VOR station. Elevation of the crash site was about 6,460 feet; minimum published crossing altitude at the VOR was 7,000 feet. The airport was 4.1 miles from the VOR at an elevation of 5,135 feet.