Hawthorne – Grand Canyon
Flight / Schedule
Hawthorne – Grand Canyon
Aircraft
Swearingen SA227 Metro IIIRegistration
N343AE
MSN
AC554
Year of Manufacture
1983
Operator
Skylink CharterDate
September 29, 2002 at 09:13 AM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Crash Location
Hawthorne California
Region
North America • United States of America
Coordinates
33.9128°, -118.3426°
Crash Cause
Human factor
Narrative Report
On September 29, 2002 at 09:13 AM, Hawthorne – Grand Canyon experienced a crash involving Swearingen SA227 Metro III, operated by Skylink Charter, with the event recorded near Hawthorne California.
The flight was categorized as charter/taxi (non scheduled revenue flight) and the reported phase was takeoff (climb) at a airport (less than 10 km from airport) crash site.
21 people were known to be on board, 0 fatalities were recorded, 21 survivors were identified or estimated. This corresponds to an estimated fatality rate of 0.0%.
Crew on board: 2, crew fatalities: 0, passengers on board: 19, passenger fatalities: 0, other fatalities: 0.
The listed crash cause is human factor. The airplane veered off the runway during a rejected takeoff, overran an airport sign, and impacted a hangar. The captain stated that during the after start checklist he moved the power levers to disengage the start locks on the propellers. Post accident examination found that the left propeller was still in the start lock position, while the right propeller was in the normal operating range. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the second-in-command (SIC) was the non flying pilot (NFP). After receiving their clearance, the PF taxied onto the runway and initiated the takeoff sequence. The SIC did not set and monitor the engine power during takeoff, as required by the company procedures. During the takeoff acceleration when the speed was between 40 and 60 knots, the captain released the nose gear steering control switch as the rudder became aerodynamically effective. When the switch was released, the airplane began immediately veering left due to the asymmetrical thrust between the left and right engine propellers. The PIC did not advise the SIC that he had lost directional control and was aborting the takeoff, as required by company procedures. The distance between where the PIC reported that he began the takeoff roll and where the first tire marks became apparent was about 630 feet, and the distance between where the marks first became apparent and where the airplane's left main landing gear tire marks exited the left side of the runway was about 220 feet. Thereafter, marks (depressions in the dirt) were noted for a 108-foot-long distance in the field located adjacent to the runway. Medium intensity tire tread marks were apparent on the parallel taxiway and the adjacent vehicle service road. These tread marks, over a 332-foot-long distance, led directly to progressively more pronounced marks and rubber transfer, and to the accident airplane's landing gear tires. Based on an examination of tire tracks and skid marks, the PIC did not reject the takeoff until the airplane approached the runway's edge, and was continuing its divergent track away from the runway's centerline. The airplane rolled on the runway through the dirt median and across a taxiway for 850 feet prior to the PIC applying moderate brakes, and evidence of heavier brake application was apparent only a few hundred feet from the impacted hangar. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions was found with the propeller assemblies, nose wheel steering mechanism, or brakes.
Aircraft reference details include registration N343AE, MSN AC554, year of manufacture 1983.
Geospatial coordinates for this crash are approximately 33.9128°, -118.3426°.
Fatalities
Total
0
Crew
0
Passengers
0
Other
0
Crash Summary
The airplane veered off the runway during a rejected takeoff, overran an airport sign, and impacted a hangar. The captain stated that during the after start checklist he moved the power levers to disengage the start locks on the propellers. Post accident examination found that the left propeller was still in the start lock position, while the right propeller was in the normal operating range. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the second-in-command (SIC) was the non flying pilot (NFP). After receiving their clearance, the PF taxied onto the runway and initiated the takeoff sequence. The SIC did not set and monitor the engine power during takeoff, as required by the company procedures. During the takeoff acceleration when the speed was between 40 and 60 knots, the captain released the nose gear steering control switch as the rudder became aerodynamically effective. When the switch was released, the airplane began immediately veering left due to the asymmetrical thrust between the left and right engine propellers. The PIC did not advise the SIC that he had lost directional control and was aborting the takeoff, as required by company procedures. The distance between where the PIC reported that he began the takeoff roll and where the first tire marks became apparent was about 630 feet, and the distance between where the marks first became apparent and where the airplane's left main landing gear tire marks exited the left side of the runway was about 220 feet. Thereafter, marks (depressions in the dirt) were noted for a 108-foot-long distance in the field located adjacent to the runway. Medium intensity tire tread marks were apparent on the parallel taxiway and the adjacent vehicle service road. These tread marks, over a 332-foot-long distance, led directly to progressively more pronounced marks and rubber transfer, and to the accident airplane's landing gear tires. Based on an examination of tire tracks and skid marks, the PIC did not reject the takeoff until the airplane approached the runway's edge, and was continuing its divergent track away from the runway's centerline. The airplane rolled on the runway through the dirt median and across a taxiway for 850 feet prior to the PIC applying moderate brakes, and evidence of heavier brake application was apparent only a few hundred feet from the impacted hangar. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions was found with the propeller assemblies, nose wheel steering mechanism, or brakes.
Cause: Human factor
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
2
Passengers On Board
19
Estimated Survivors
21
Fatality Rate
0.0%
Known people on board: 21
Operational Details
Schedule / Flight
Hawthorne – Grand Canyon
Operator
Skylink CharterFlight Type
Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Region / Country
North America • United States of America
