Beechcraft 200 Super King Air

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Phoenix Aviation - Kenya

In unclear circumstances, the aircraft struck obstacles. The left wing was partially torn off and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located along the Ngong race and golf course located about 7 km west of Nairobi-Wilson Airport. There were no casualties.

Bomac air

On August 20, 2020, about 1543 central daylight time, a Beech 200 airplane, N198DM, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Rockford, Illinois. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 positioning flight. The purpose of the flight was to relocation the airplane to the pilot's home base near Wayne, Illinois. The airplane was at Chronos Aviation, LLC (a 14 CFR Part 145 repair station) at the Rockford International Airport (RFD), Rockford, Illinois, for maintenance work. Preliminary flight track data showed the pilot initiated a takeoff from runway 19 at RFD. During the takeoff, the airplane departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The airplane came to rest on a flat grass field to the east of runway 19 on airport property. The airplane sustained fire damage and was fragmented from impacting terrain. A Federal Aviation Administration aviation safety inspector and an air safety investigator from Textron Aviation documented the accident site and the wreckage was recovered to a secure location for a future examination of the airframe and the two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-42 engines.

Private American

Engaged in an illegal flight, the twin engine airplane landed on a dirt road located about 35 km southwest of Brus Laguna. The nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest, damaged beyond repair. No one was found on site and a load of 806 kilos of cocaine was seized.

Private Colombian

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in an illegal flight carrying two pilots and a probable load of cocaine bags. En route, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a prairie located in a mountainous area near Iriona. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed.

TLC Air

On February 20, 2020, about 0600 central standard time, a Beechcraft B200 airplane, N860J, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lake Coleman, Texas. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The flight was conducted as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that the airplane was cleared for takeoff from Runway 35L at Abilene Regional Airport (ABI), Texas. Shortly after, the pilot was instructed to climb to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), then cleared to climb to 23,000 ft msl. The pilot reported to the controller that they encountered freezing drizzle and light rime icing during the climb from 6500 ft to 8,000 ft msl. As the airplane climbed through 11,600 ft msl, the pilot reported that they were having an issue with faulty deicing equipment and needed to return to the airport. The controller instructed the pilot to descend to 11,000 ft msl and cleared them direct to the ABI. The controller then issued a descent to 7,000 ft and asked if there was an emergency. The pilot stated that they “blew a breaker” when they encountered icing conditions, and that it was not resetting. The controller then instructed the pilot to descend to 5,000 ft and to expect the ILS Runway 35R approach. The controller gave the pilot a heading of 310°. Shortly afterwards the controller asked the pilot if they were turning to the assigned heading; the pilot responded that they were having issues with faulty instruments. When the controller asked the aircraft to report their altitude, the pilot reported that they were at 4,700 ft. The controller then instructed the pilot to maintain 5,000 ft. The pilot responded he was “pulling up”. There was no further communication with the pilot. Review of the airplane’s radar track showed the airplane’s departure from ABI and the subsequent turn and southeast track towards its destination. The track appeared as a straight line before a right turn was observed. The turn radius decreased before the flight track ended.

LifeMed Alaska

On January 16, 2020, about 0806 Alaska standard time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company B200 airplane, Lifeguard N547LM, sustained substantial damage when it impacted the waters of the Bering Sea while departing from the Thomas Madsen Airport (PADU), Unalaska, Alaska (Port of Dutch Harbor). The airplane was being operated by Aero Air, as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 instrument flight rules (IFR) air ambulance flight when the accident occurred. The airline transport pilot sustained minor injuries and the flight paramedic, and flight nurse were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the departure airport, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight departed Thomas Madsen Airport (PADU), Unalaska, Alaska (Port of Dutch Harbor), about 0756 destined for Adak, Alaska. According to the pilot, after checking the weather on the Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), he completed the before takeoff check list, back taxied for a runway 31 departure and initiated the takeoff roll. He said he recalled the winds being reported as 100° at 9 knots. As the airplane accelerated down the runway, he said the airspeed was about 75 knots at midfield and increasing. When the airspeed reached about 90 knots, he applied back pressure to the control yoke to initiate the takeoff and noted a brief positive rate of climb, followed by a sinking sensation. The airspeed rapidly decayed, and the stall warning horn sounded. In an effort to correct for the decaying airspeed, he lowered the nose and immediately noticed the airplane's lights reflecting off the surface of the water. He pulled back on the airplane's control yoke and leveled the wings just before impacting the ocean waters. The pilot stated there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. According to the medical crew, after a preflight briefing that included a brief discussion by the pilot of the planned downwind takeoff, the airplane door was shut, and the airplane taxied for departure. The crewmembers reported that, during the initial takeoff run the airplane acceleration appeared normal; however, the airplane seemed to remain on the runway longer than normal. One of the crewmembers reported that he felt the nose of the airplane lift from the surface of the runway before settling back down, which was followed by a second rotation and a substantial bump. The other crewmember reported that he felt the nose of the airplane lift off the runway, followed by a substantial bump as if the airplane struck something at the end of the runway. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted the ocean waters. After the airplane came to rest and began to fill with water, the crew removed the emergency exit, donned life preservers and inflated and deployed the life raft. They then exited the airplane one at a time through the over-the-wing emergency exit into the life raft. After casting off from the damaged and sinking airplane. They notified their communications center via cell phone of the accident and requested assistance. The contract weather observer on duty that witnessed the accident, reported that she first observed the airplane begin its takeoff roll on runway 31 at PADU, and noted that the pilot did not call via a radio for the current airport weather conditions. In an effort to provide the flight crew with current wind conditions, she made her way to the radio; however, by the time she was ready to transmit the airplane was already midfield on its departure roll. She stated that although it was still dark, it appeared that the airplane did not become airborne and exited the end of the runway. Concerned for the well-being of the occupants, she alerted first responders. The life raft was first reached by first responders within about 30 minutes. The closest official weather observation station was PADU Unalaska, Alaska. The local weather observer, call sign Dutch Weather, 0756 observation reported wind from 110° at 16 knots, gusting to 22 knots; 6 statute miles visibility in light rain and mist; overcast clouds at 1,400 ft; temperature 39° F; dew point 36° F; and an altimeter setting of 29.48 inches of mercury. Peak winds reported at time 0740 were 150° at 26 knots and 110° at 30 knots. A PADU 0757 observation reported wind from 110° at 20 knots, gusting to 28 knots; 6 statute miles visibility in light rain and mist; overcast clouds at 1,400 ft; temperature 39° F; dew point 36° F; and an altimeter setting of 29.48 inches of mercury. IFR takeoff minimums and (obstacle) departure procedures only allow for night departures at PADU off of runway 31. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and an underwater beacon. The CVR has been recovered and was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board's Recorders Laboratory for an audition.

WL Aviation

Parked at Fresno-Yosemite Airport, the twin engine airplane was stolen by a teenager aged 17. She lost control of the airplane that collided witht a fence and a building. The only occupant was uninjured and arrested. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Private Mexican

The twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a pasture located near Saint Jean, Haiti. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was engaged in an illegal flight (contraband) and the registration XB-PYB is false. Local authorities were looking for both Mexican pilots and a local involved in the illegal mission.

Keewatin Air

On 24 April 2019, the Keewatin Air LP Beechcraft B200 aircraft (registration C-FRMV, serial number BB979), equipped to perform medical evacuation flights, was conducting an instrument flight rules positioning flight (flight KEW202), with 2 flight crew members and 2 flight nurses on board, from Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International Airport, Manitoba, to Rankin Inlet Airport, Nunavut, with a stop at Churchill Airport, Manitoba. At 1814 Central Daylight Time, when the aircraft was cruising at flight level 250, the flight crew declared an emergency due to a fuel issue. The flight crew diverted to Gillam Airport, Manitoba, and initiated an emergency descent. During the descent, both engines flamed out. The flight crew attempted a forced landing on Runway 23, but the aircraft touched down on the frozen surface of Stephens Lake, 750 feet before the threshold of Runway 23. The landing gear was fully extended. The aircraft struck the rocky lake shore and travelled up the bank toward the runway area. It came to rest 190 feet before the threshold of Runway 23 at 1823:45 Central Daylight Time. None of the occupants was injured. The aircraft sustained substantial damage. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter activated. Emergency services responded. There was no fire.

Major Blue Air

Earlier in the afternoon the pilot was an uninvited guest at a private function that was held at the Matsieng Flying Club facility at Matsieng Aerodrome. In a statement, the Matsieng Flying Club reported that it was rumored that the pilot was involved in a domestic dispute earlier in the afternoon. At 2015LT the aircraft approached Matsieng Aerodrome from the direction of Sir Seretse Khama Airport and made a number of low level fly passes from different directions past the Club facilities next to the Air Traffic Control tower. An immediate evacuation of the club premises was ordered. The final extreme low level run by the aircraft along runway 36 resulted in an impact with the Matsieng Flying Club facility at ground level. The Club facility and Matsieng ATC tower was destroyed on impact. The post impact fire destroyed 13 parked vehicles. The emergency services of the Kgatleng District Council were on the scene within minutes to attend to the post-impact fire and distress. These response actions are to be commended. It is believed that the pilot had no permission to fly the aircraft involved. Sole on board, he was killed.

Air Tindi

At 0851 Mountain Standard Time on 30 January 2019, the Air Tindi Ltd. Beechcraft King Air 200 aircraft (registration C-GTUC, serial number BB-268) departed Yellowknife Airport (CYZF), Northwest Territories, as flight TIN503, on an instrument flight rules flight itinerary to Whatì Airport (CEM3), Northwest Territories, with 2 crew members on board. At 0912, as the aircraft began the approach to CEM3, it departed controlled flight during its initial descent from 12 000 feet above sea level, and impacted terrain approximately 21 nautical miles east-southeast of CEM3, at an elevation of 544 feet above sea level. The Canadian Mission Control Centre received a signal from the aircraft’s 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter and notified the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Trenton, Ontario. Search and rescue technicians arrived on site approximately 6 hours after the accident. The 2 flight crew members received fatal injuries on impact. The aircraft was destroyed.

Guardian Flight

The pilot of the medical transport flight had been cleared by the air traffic controller for the instrument approach and told by ATC to change to the advisory frequency, which the pilot acknowledged. After crossing the initial approach fix on the RNAV approach, the airplane began a gradual descent and continued northeast towards the intermediate fix. Before reaching the intermediate fix, the airplane entered a right turn and began a rapid descent, losing about 2,575 ft of altitude in 14 seconds; radar returns were then lost. A witness at the destination airport, who was scheduled to meet the accident airplane, observed the pilot-controlled runway lights illuminate. When the airplane failed to arrive, she contacted the company to inquire about the overdue airplane. The following day, debris was found floating on the surface of the ocean. About 48 days later, after an extensive underwater search, the heavily fragmented wreckage was located on the ocean floor at a depth of about 500 ft. A postaccident examination of the engines revealed contact signatures consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact and no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident examination of the airframe revealed about a 10° asymmetric flap condition; however, significant impact damage was present to the flap actuator flex drive cables and flap actuators, indicating the flap actuator measurements were likely not a reliable source of preimpact flap settings. In addition, it is unlikely that a 10° asymmetric flap condition would result in a loss of control. The airplane was equipped with a total of 5 seats and 5 restraints. Of the three restraints recovered, none were buckled. The unbuckled restraints could suggest an emergency that required crewmembers to be up and moving about the cabin; however, the reason for the unbuckled restraints could not be confirmed. While the known circumstances of the accident are consistent with a loss of control event, the factual information available was limited because the wreckage in its entirety was not recovered, the CVR recording did not contain the accident flight, no non-volatile memory was recovered from the accident airplane, and no autopsy or toxicology of the pilot could be performed; therefore, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined. Due to the limited factual information that was available, without a working CVR there is little we know about this accident.

Kalitta Charters - Kalitta Services

The airline transport pilot of the multiengine airplane was cleared for the VOR approach. The weather at the airport was reported as 400 ft overcast with 4 miles visibility in drizzle. When the airplane failed to arrive at the airport as scheduled, a search was initiated, and the wreckage was located soon thereafter. Radar data indicated that the pilot was provided vectors to intercept the final approach course. The last radar return indicated that the airplane was at 2,200 ft and 8.1 miles from the runway threshold. It impacted terrain 3.5 miles from the runway threshold and left of the final approach course. According to the published approach procedure, the minimum descent altitude was 1,100 feet, which was 466 ft above airport elevation. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane had impacted the tops of trees and descended at a 45° angle to ground contact; the airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire, thus limiting the examination; however, no anomalies were observed that would have precluded normal operation. The landing gear was extended, and approach flaps had been set. Impact and fire damage precluded an examination of the flight and navigation instruments. Autopsy and toxicology of the pilot were not performed; therefore, whether a physiological issue may have contributed to the accident could not be determined. The location of the wreckage indicates that the pilot descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach; however, the reason for the pilot's descent below MDA could not be determined based on the available information.

Private Venezuelan

By night, the pilot attempted to land in a prairie located in Blue Creek, west Belize. The airplane belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, almost broken in two. The pilot leaved the scene but was quickly arrested by the local police. It is believed that it was an illegal flight as the registration on the aircraft (YV3224) is wrong. It appears that the correct registration was YV3284.

Air Majoro

The twin engine aircraft departed Contamana Airport at 1128LT on a charter flight to Pucallpa, carrying 11 passengers and two pilots. Few minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 4,500 feet, the right engine lost power and failed. The crerw decided to return to Contamana but was able to transfer fuel from the left tank to the right tank to restart the right engine. Decision was taken to continue to Pucallpa at an altitude of 13,500 feet. At a distance of 42 km from Pucallpa, the crew started the descent when the right engine failed again, followed shortly later by the left engine. The captain declared an emergency and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a wooded area. All 13 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Malian Aéro Company

Following an uneventful cloud seeding mission over the region of Mopti, the pilot was returning to Bamako-Senou Airport. For unknown reasons, the aircraft made a belly landing and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the right side of runway 06/24. The pilot escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Corporate %26 Leisure Aviation

On 21 February 2017, the pilot of a Beechcraft B200 King Air aircraft, registered VH-ZCR (ZCR), and operated by Corporate & Leisure Aviation, was conducting a charter passenger flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria to King Island, Tasmania. There were four passengers on board. ZCR had been removed from a hangar and parked on the apron the previous afternoon in preparation for the flight. The pilot was first seen on the apron at about 0706 Eastern Daylight-saving Time. Closed-circuit television recorded the pilot walking around the aircraft and entering the cabin, consistent with conducting a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft. At about 0712, the pilot entered ZCR’s maintenance provider’s hangar. A member of staff working in the hangar reported that the pilot had a conversation with him that was unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot exited the hangar about 0715 and had a conversation with another member of staff who reported that their conversation was also unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot then returned to ZCR, and over the next 4 minutes he was observed walking around the aircraft. The pilot went into the cabin and re-appeared with an undistinguishable item. The pilot then walked around the aircraft one more time before re-entering the cabin and closing the air stair cabin door. At about 0729, the right engine was started and, shortly after, the left engine was started. Airservices Australia (Airservices) audio recordings indicated that, at 0736, the pilot requested a clearance from Essendon air traffic control (ATC) to reposition ZCR to the southern end of the passenger terminal. ATC provided the clearance and the pilot commenced taxiing to the terminal. At the terminal, ZCR was refueled and the pilot was observed on CCTV to walk around the aircraft, stopping at the left and right engines before entering the cabin. The pilot was then observed to leave the aircraft and wait for the passengers at the terminal. The passengers arrived at the terminal at 0841 and were escorted by the pilot directly to the aircraft. At 0849, the left engine was started and, shortly after, the right engine was started. At 0853, the pilot requested a taxi clearance for King Island, with five persons onboard, under the instrument flight rules. ATC instructed the pilot to taxi to holding point 'TANGO' for runway 17, and provided an airways clearance for the aircraft to King Island with a visual departure. The pilot read back the clearance. Airservices Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) data (refer to section titled Air traffic services information - Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast data) indicated that, at 0854, ZCR was taxied from the terminal directly to the holding point. The aircraft did not enter the designated engine run-up bay positioned near holding point TANGO. At 0855, while holding at TANGO, the pilot requested a transponder code. The controller replied that he did not have one to issue yet. Two minutes later the pilot contacted ATC and stated that he was ready and waiting for a transponder code. The controller responded with the transponder code and a clearance to lineup on runway 17. At 0858, ATC cleared ZCR for take-off on runway 17 with departure instructions to turn right onto a heading of 200°. The pilot read back the instruction and commenced the takeoff roll. The aircraft’s take-off roll along runway 17 was longer than expected. Witnesses familiar with the aircraft type observed a noticeable yaw to the left after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft entered a relatively shallow climb and the landing gear remained down. The shallow climb was followed by a substantial left sideslip, while maintaining a roll attitude of less than 10° to the left. Airservices ADS-B data indicated the aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 160 ft above ground level while tracking in an arc to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft’s track began diverging to the left of the runway centreline before rotation and the divergence increased as the flight progressed. Following the sustained left sideslip, the aircraft began to descend and at 0858:48 the pilot transmitted on the Essendon Tower frequency repeating the word ‘MAYDAY’ seven times in rapid succession. Approximately 10 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and 2 seconds after the transmission was completed, the aircraft collided with the roof of a building in the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct - Retail Outlet Centre (outlet centre), coming to rest in a loading area at the rear of the building. CCTV footage from a camera positioned at the rear of the building showed the final part of the accident sequence with post-impact fire evident; about 2 minutes later, first responders arrived onsite. At about 0905 and 0908 respectively, Victoria Police and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade arrived. The pilot and passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. There was significant structural, fire and water damage to the building. Additionally, two people on the ground received minor injuries and a number of parked vehicles were damaged.

Grant Aviation

Following an uneventful flight, the aircraft belly landed at Unalaska-Tom Madsen Airport runway 13/31. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest and was damaged beyond repair. All three occupants evacuated safely.

Eastern Air Express

The airline transport pilot reported that, before landing following an uneventful flight, he extended the wing flaps to the approach position and extended the landing gear; the gear indicator lights showed "3 green." After touchdown, he heard noises, and the airplane started to sink. After the airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway, he noticed that the landing gear handle was up. The pilot stated to the copilot, "How did the gear handle get up?" then placed the handle to the down position and the flight crew exited the airplane. The copilot reported that he was acting as an observer during the flight and that he also saw three green landing gear down-and-locked indicator lights before landing. The airframe sustained substantial damage from contact with the runway. All three landing gear were found in a partially-extended position. Skid marks from all three tires were observed on the runway leading up to the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies were damaged due to contact with the runway. The pressure vessel was compromised from contact with a propeller blade. The nose landing gear actuator was forced up, into the nose gear well and penetrated the upper nose skin. Examination of the landing gear components did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or malfunction. The skid marks leading to the wreckage and the partially-extended gear were inconsistent with the pilot's account that the gear handle was up after the airplane came to rest and was then lowered. The gear handle consisted of an electrical switch that required it to be pulled out of a detent before placing it up or down. There was no mechanical linkage between the gear handle and the landing gear, as the gear were driven by an electric motor. It is likely that the pilot realized that the gear were not extended just before touchdown and then tried to lower the gear, resulting in a touchdown with the gear only partially extended. The pilot reported that he had experienced several interruptions to his sleep the night before the accident. He also reported that he flew 7 legs on the day of the accident for a total of 5.2 hours, only eating a banana for breakfast during this time period. It is likely that the pilot's fatigue contributed to his failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before landing.

Royal Malaysian Air Force - Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia

The crew was completing a training flight from Kuala Lumpur-Subang Airport when on final approach to Butterworth Airbase, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, coming to rest against the perimeter fence. The aircraft was partially destroyed by impact forces and one crew member was killed while three other occupants were injured. Weather conditions were considered as good at the time of the accident.

Royal Flying Doctor Service - RFDS

On 13 December 2016, a Beech Aircraft Corporation B200, registered VH-MVL, conducted a medical services flight from Innamincka, South Australia (SA) to Moomba, SA. On board the aircraft were the pilot and two passengers. On arrival at Moomba at about 1250 Central Daylight-saving Time (CDT), the pilot configured the aircraft to join the circuit with flaps set to the approach setting and the propeller speed set at 1900 RPM. They positioned the aircraft at 150–160 kt airspeed to join the downwind leg of the circuit for runway 30, which is a right circuit. The pilot lowered the landing gear on the downwind circuit leg. They reduced power (set 600-700 foot-pounds torque on both engines) to start the final descent on late downwind abeam the runway 30 threshold, in accordance with their standard operating procedures. At about the turn point for the base leg of the circuit, the pilot observed the left engine fire warning activate. The pilot held the aircraft in the right base turn, but paused before conducting the engine fire checklist immediate actions in consideration of the fact that they were only a few minutes from landing and there were no secondary indications of an engine fire. After a momentary pause, the pilot decided to conduct the immediate actions. They retarded the left engine condition lever to the fuel shut-off position, paused again to consider if there was any other evidence of fire, then closed the firewall shutoff valve, activated the fire extinguisher and doubled the right engine power (about 1,400 foot-pounds torque). The pilot continued to fly the aircraft in a continuous turn for the base leg towards the final approach path, but noticed it was getting increasingly difficult to maintain the right turn. They checked the engine instruments and confirmed the left engine was shut down. They adjusted the aileron and rudder trim to assist controlling the aircraft in the right turn. The aircraft became more difficult to control as the right turn and descent continued and the pilot focused on maintaining bank angle, airspeed (fluctuating 100–115 kt) and rate of descent. Due to the pilot’s position in the left seat, they were initially unable to sight the runway when they started the right turn. The aircraft had flown through the extended runway centreline when the pilot sighted the runway to the right of the aircraft. The aircraft was low on the approach and the pilot realised that a sand dune between the aircraft and the runway was a potential obstacle. They increased the right engine power to climb power (2,230 foot-pounds torque) raised the landing gear and retracted the flap to reduce the rate of descent. The aircraft cleared the sand dune and the pilot lowered the landing gear and continued the approach to the runway from a position to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft landed in the sand to the left of the runway threshold and after a short ground roll spun to the left and came to rest. There were no injuries and the aircraft was substantially damaged.

Flight Development

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand passenger flight at night in instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near straight-in approach minimums for the runway. The pilot flew the approach as a non precision LNAV approach, and he reported that the approach was stabilized and that he did not notice anything unusual. A few seconds after leveling the airplane at the missed approach altitude, he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He then disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights. However, before he could turn on the landing lights, the runway became obscured by clouds. The pilot immediately decided to conduct a missed approach and applied engine power, but the airplane subsequently impacted terrain short of the runway in a nose-up level attitude. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely the pilot lost sight of the runway due to the visibility being at/near the straight-in approach minimums and that the airplane got too low for a missed approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. A passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing available shoulder harnesses. The passenger said that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses or told how to adjust the seats. The pilot sustained injuries to his face in the accident.

Air Nunavut

A Beech 200 Super King Air aircraft operated by Air Nunavut as flight 200, was on a training flight at Iqaluit, NU (CYFB) to upgrade a candidate to captain status. A VFR circuit was executed to simulate a flapless landing. While in the circuit, the crew experienced an actual communication failure on COM 1 while two other aircraft were inbound to Iqaluit. At the end of the downwind leg, a flap failure was simulated and the crew carried out the appropriate checklist. However, the landing checklist was not completed and the aircraft landed with the landing gear in the up position on runway 16. The aircraft skidded on the belly and came to a stop on the runway between taxiway A and G. The crew declared an emergency and evacuated the airplane with no injuries. The aircraft sustained damage to the belly pod and both propellers.

Border Security Force

Beechcraft Super King Air B-200 aircraft, VT-BSA belonging to BSF Air Wing was involved in an accident on 22.12.2015 while operating a flight from IGI Airport, New Delhi to Ranchi. The flight was under the command of a CPL holder with another CPL holder as Second-in-Command. There were ten persons on board including two flight crew members. As per the scheduling procedure of the Operator, the flying programme for 22.12.2015 was approved by the ADG (Logistics) on the recommendation of the DIG (Air) for VT-BSA on 21.12.2015. The programme included names of the flight crew along with the following sectors: from Delhi to Ranchi ETD 0800 ETA 1030 and from Ranchi to Delhi ETD 1300 ETA 1600. The task was as per instructions on the subject dated 23rd July 2015. As per the weight & load data sheet there were 8 passengers with 20 Kgs. of baggage in the aft cabin compartment. The actual take-off weight shown was 5668.85 Kgs as against the maximum take-off weight of 5669.9 Kgs. Fuel uplifted was 1085 Kgs. The aircraft was taken out of hangar of the Operator at 0655 hrs on 22.12.2015 and parked outside the hangar for operating the subject flight. At around 0745 hrs, the passengers reached the aircraft who were mainly technical personnel supposed to carry out scheduled maintenance of Mi-17 helicopter of the Operator at Ranchi. They were carrying their personnel baggage along with tools and equipment required for the maintenance. At around 0915 hrs the flight crew contacted ATC Delhi and requested for clearance to operate the flight to Ranchi. The aircraft was cleared to Ranchi via R460 and FL210. Runway in use was given as 28. At 0918 hrs the doors were closed and the flight crew had started carrying out the check list. After the ATC issued taxi clearance, the aircraft had stopped for some time after commencing taxiing. The pilot informed the ATC that they will take 10 minutes delay for further taxi due to some administrative reasons. The taxi clearance was accordingly cancelled. After a halt of about 6 to 7 minutes, the pilot again requested the ATC for taxi clearance and the same was approved by the ATC. Thereafter, the aircraft was given take-off clearance from runway 28. The weather at the time of take-off was: Visibility 800 meters with Winds at 100°/03 knots. Shortly after take-off and attaining a height of approximately 400 feet AGL, the aircraft progressively turned left with simultaneous loss of height. It had taken a turn of approximately 180o and impacted some trees before hitting the outside perimeter road of the airport in a left bank attitude. Thereafter, it impacted 'head on' with the outside boundary wall of the airport. After breaking the outside boundary wall, the wings impacted two trees and the aircraft hit the holding tank of the water treatment plant. The tail portion and part of the fuselage overturned and went into the water tank. There was post impact fire and the portion of the aircraft outside the water tank was destroyed by fire. All passengers and crew received fatal injuries due impact and fire. The ELT was operated at 0410 hours UTC (0940 hours IST). The fire fighting team reached the site and extinguished the fire. The bodies were then recovered from the accident site. 08 bodies were recovered from the holding tank of the water treatment plant and bodies of both pilots were recovered from the heavily burnt portion of the cockpit lying adjacent (outside) to the wall of the holding tank of the water treatment tank.

London Executive Aviation

G-BYCP was planned to operate a non-commercial flight from Stapleford Aerodrome to RAF Brize Norton with two company employees on board (including the pilot) to pick up two passengers for onward travel. The pilot (the aircraft commander) held a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL) and occupied the left seat and another pilot, who held an Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (ATPL), occupied the right. The second occupant worked for the operator of G-BYCP but his licence was valid on Bombardier Challenger 300 and Embraer ERJ 135/145 aircraft and not on the King Air. The pilot reported for work at approximately 0715 hrs for a planned departure at 0815 hrs but he delayed the flight because of poor meteorological visibility. The general weather conditions were fog and low cloud with a calm wind. At approximately 0850 hrs the visibility was judged to be approximately 600 m, based on the known distance from the operations room to a feature on the aerodrome. At approximately 0915 hrs, trees were visible just beyond the end of Runway 22L, indicating that visibility was at least 1,000 m and the pilot decided that conditions were suitable for departure. At 0908 hrs, the pilot called the en-route Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) on his mobile phone to ask for a departure clearance. He was instructed to remain clear of controlled airspace when airborne and call London Tactical Control Northeast (TCNE) on 118.825 MHz. The planned departure was to turn right after takeoff and intercept the 128° radial from Brookman’s Park VOR (BPK) heading towards the beacon, and climb to a maximum altitude of 2,400 ft amsl to remain below the London TMA which has a lower limit of 2,500 ft amsl. The aircraft took off at 0921 hrs and was observed climbing in a wings level attitude until it faded from view shortly after takeoff. After takeoff, the aircraft climbed on a track of approximately 205°M and, when passing approximately 750 ft amsl (565 ft aal), began to turn right. The aircraft continued to climb in the turn until it reached 875 ft amsl (690 ft aal) when it began to descend. The descent continued until the aircraft struck some trees at the edge of a field approximately 1.8 nm southwest of the aerodrome. The pilot and passenger were both fatally injured in the accident, which was not survivable. A secondary radar return, thought to be G-BYCP, was observed briefly near Stapleford Aerodrome by London ATC but no radio transmission was received from the aircraft. A witness was walking approximately 30 m north-east of where the aircraft struck the trees. She suddenly heard the aircraft, turned towards the sound and saw the aircraft in a nose-down attitude fly into the trees. Although she saw the aircraft only briefly, she saw clearly that the right wing was slightly low, and that the aircraft appeared to be intact and was not on fire. She also stated that the aircraft was “not falling” but flew “full pelt” into the ground.

Servicio Autónomo de Transporte Aéreo - SATA

For unknown reason, the twin engine aircraft landed hard. Impact caused the tail to separate. The aircraft lost its undercarriage then slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All five occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed. It seems the aircraft suffered an engine failure shortly before landing.

Gilleland Aviation

The airline transport pilot was departing for a repositioning flight. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." The airplane climbed to about 120 ft above ground level, and witnesses reported seeing it in a left turn with the landing gear extended. The airplane continued turning left and descended into a building on the airfield. A postimpact fired ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. Postaccident examinations of the airplane, engines, and propellers did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Neither propeller was feathered before impact. Both engines exhibited multiple internal damage signatures consistent with engine operation at impact. Engine performance calculations using the preimpact propeller blade angles (derived from witness marks on the preload plates) and sound spectrum analysis revealed that the left engine was likely producing low to moderate power and that the right engine was likely producing moderate to high power when the airplane struck the building. A sudden, uncommanded engine power loss without flameout can result from a fuel control unit failure or a loose compressor discharge pressure (P3) line; thermal damage prevented a full assessment of the fuel control units and P3 lines. Although the left engine was producing some power at the time of the accident, the investigation could not rule out the possibility that a sudden left engine power loss, consistent with the pilot's report, occurred. A sideslip thrust and rudder study determined that, during the last second of the flight, the airplane had a nose-left sideslip angle of 29°. It is likely that the pilot applied substantial left rudder input at the end of the flight. Because the airplane's rudder boost system was destroyed, the investigation could not determine if the system was on or working properly during the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane after he reported a problem with the left engine. The evidence also indicates that the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff, which included retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller. Although the pilot had a history of anxiety and depression, which he was treating with medication that he had not reported to the Federal Aviation Administration, analysis of the pilot's autopsy and medical records found no evidence suggesting that either his medical conditions or the drugs he was taking to treat them contributed to his inability to safely control the airplane in an emergency situation.

Air Loyauté

The twin engine airplane departed Lifou Airport on an ambulance flight to Nouméa-Magenta Airport, carrying two passengers and two pilots. On approach to Magenta Airport, the crew followed the checklist and lower the landing gears. As all three green light failed to came on the cockpit panel, the crew elected to lower the gears manually without success. The crew completed two low passes in front of the control tower and it was confirmed that the left main gear seems to be down but not locked. After a 45-minute flight to burn fuel, the crew completed the landing. Upon touchdown, both main landing gear collapsed while the nose gear remained extended. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All four occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Shortly after takeoff from Bahía Solano-José Celestino Mutis Airport, while in initial climb, the crew encountered engine problems. The captain attempted an emergency landing in a prairie. The aircraft landed gear up and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. While all three occupants escaped with minor injuries, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Kowzef S.A.

Owned by Grupo Kowzef (Federico Alejandro Bonomi), the twin engine aircraft departed San Fernando (Buenos Aires) at 1222LT on an executive flight to Carmelo, Uruguay. On approach to Carmelo-Zagarzazú Airport runway 35, the pilot encountered marginal weather conditions and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, he attempted a second approach under VFR mode. While completing a slight turn to the left in descent, the aircraft impacted the surface of the Río de la Plata and came to rest in shallow water some 10 km southwest of Carmelo Airport. The pilot and four passengers were killed and four other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Government of Haryana

On 25.03.2014, the operator received the travel programme for 27.3.2014, of Hon'ble Governor of Haryana from Chandigarh to Delhi. On 26.3.2014, the operations department took the flight clearances and filed the passenger manifest with the ATC and other concerned agencies. The flight plan was filed by a CPL holder, who is working as flight dispatcher with the Government of Haryana. The departure on 27.3.2014 was fixed at 1130 hrs. The cockpit crew reported at 1045 hrs for the flight. Pre flight medical examination including the breath analyzer test was carried out at 1100 hrs. The breath analyzer test for both the cockpit crew members was negative. Pre flight briefing among the crew members was carried out by using the documents prepared by the flight dispatcher. The aircraft was taxied under its own power from Haryana Government Hangar to bay no. D-2 in front of ATC building. No abnormality was observed or reported on the aircraft during this taxiing. The engines were shut down for passenger embarkation. As per the passenger manifest, in addition to the pilot and co-pilot there were 8 passengers. The baggage on board was approx. 50 lbs. There was 2100 lbs. of fuel on board. After boarding of the passengers, the aircraft engines were started at 1130 hrs. The aircraft was cleared for departure abeam „D<U+201F> link. The aircraft was taxied out via taxiway „D<U+201F>. After ATC departure clearance the aircraft was lined up for take-off. On clearance from ATC the take off roll was initiated and all the parameters were found normal. As per the pilot just before getting airborne some stiffness was found in rudder control as is felt in yaw damper engagement. The aircraft then pulled slightly to the left which as per the Commander was controllable. As per the pilot, the rotation was initiated at 98 knots. As per the DATCO the aircraft had lifted up to 10-15 feet AGL. The Commander has stated that after lift-off, immediately the left rudder got locked in forward position resulting in the aircraft yawing and rolling to left. The pilots tried to control it with right bank but the aircraft could not be controlled. Within 3-4 seconds of getting airborne the aircraft impacted the ground in left bank attitude. The initial impact was on pucca (tar road) and the wing has taken the first impact loads with lower surface metallic surface rubbing and screeching on ground. After the aircraft came to final halt, the co-pilot opened the door and evacuation was carried out. There was no injury to any of the occupants. The engine conditions lever could not be brought back as these were stuck. The throttle and pitch levers were retarded. The fuel shut off valves were closed. Battery and avionics were put off. Friction lock nuts were found loose. As per the Commander, after ensuring safety of passengers he had gone to cockpit to confirm that all switches were „off<U+201F>. At that time he has loosened the friction lock nuts to bring back the condition lever and throttle lever. However even after loosening the nut it was not possible to bring back these levers. Fire fighting vehicles were activated by pressing crash bell and primary alarm. Hand held RT set was used to announce the crash. RCFF vehicles proceeded to the site via runway and reported all the 10 personnel are safe and out of the disabled aircraft. Water and complementary agents (foam and dry chemical powder) were used. After fire was extinguished, the Fire Fighting vehicles reported back at crash bay except one CFT which was held at crash site under instruction of COO. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no fire barring burning of small patch of grass due coming in contact with the hot surfaces and oil. There was no injury to any of the occupants. The accident occurred in day light conditions.

Tanzanair - Tanzanian Air Services

En route to Zanzibar, while cruising at an altitude of 21,000 feet, the right engine failed. The pilot decided to divert to Arusha Airport when few minutes later, while passing 16,000 feet on descent, the left engine failed as well. The pilot attempted to ditch the aircraft into Lake Manyara. The aircraft belly landed and came to rest in shallow water, bent in two. All seven occupants were rescued by fishermen and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Myflug Air

On 4th of August 2013 the air ambulance operator Mýflug, received a request for an ambulance flight from Höfn (BIHN) to Reykjavík Airport (BIRK). This was a F4 priority request and the operator, in co-operation with the emergency services, planned the flight the next morning. The plan was for the flight crew and the paramedic to meet at the airport at 09:30 AM on the 5th of August. A flight plan was filed from Akureyri (BIAR) to BIHN (positioning flight), then from BIHN to BIRK (ambulance flight) and from BIRK back to BIAR (positioning flight). The planned departure from BIAR was at 10:20. The flight crew consisted of a commander and a co-pilot. In addition to the flight crew was a paramedic, who was listed as a passenger. Around 09:50 on the 5th of August, the flight crew and the paramedic met at the operator’s home base at BIAR. The flight crew prepared the flight and performed a standard pre-flight inspection. There were no findings to the aircraft during the pre-flight inspection. The pre-flight inspection was finished at approximately 10:10. The departure from BIAR was at 10:21 and the flight to BIHN was uneventful. The aircraft landed at BIHN at 11:01. The commander was the pilot flying from BIAR to BIHN. The operator’s common procedure is that the commander and the co-pilot switch every other flight, as the pilot flying. The co-pilot was the pilot flying from BIHN to BIRK and the commander was the pilot flying from BIRK to BIAR, i.e. during the accident flight. The aircraft departed BIHN at 11:18, for the ambulance flight and landed at BIRK at 12:12. At BIRK the aircraft was refueled and departed at 12:44. According to flight radar, the flight from BIRK to BIAR was flown at FL 170. Figure 4 shows the radar track of the aircraft as recorded by Reykjavík Control. There is no radar coverage by Reykjavík Control below 5000 feet, in the area around BIAR. During cruise, the flight crew discussed the commander’s wish to deviate from the planned route to BIAR, in order to fly over a racetrack area near the airport. At the racetrack, a race was about to start at that time. The commander had planned to visit the racetrack area after landing. The aircraft approached BIAR from the south and at 10.5 DME the flight crew cancelled IFR. When passing KN locator (KRISTNES), see Figure 6, the flight crew made a request to BIAR tower to overfly the town of Akureyri, before landing. The request was approved by the tower and the flight crew was informed that a Fokker 50 was ready for departure on RWY 01. The flight crew of TF-MYX responded and informed that they would keep west of the airfield. After passing KN, the altitude was approximately 800’ (MSL), according to the co-pilot’s statement. The co-pilot mentioned to the commander that they were a bit low and recommended a higher altitude. The altitude was then momentarily increased to 1000’. When approaching the racetrack area, the aircraft entered a steep left turn. During the turn, the altitude dropped until the aircraft hit the racetrack.

Osage Air

The accident pilot and two passengers had just completed a ferry flight on the recently purchased airplane. A review of the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder audio information revealed that, during the ferry flight, one of the passengers, who was also a pilot, was pointing out features of the new airplane, including the avionics suite, to the accident pilot. The pilot had previously flown another similar model airplane, but it was slightly older and had a different avionics package; the new airplane’s avionics and flight management system were new to the pilot. After completing the ferry flight and dropping off the passengers, the pilot departed for a short cross-country flight in the airplane. According to air traffic control recordings, shortly after takeoff, an air traffic controller assigned the pilot a heading and altitude. The pilot acknowledged the transmission and indicated that he would turn to a 045 heading. The radio transmission sounded routine, and no concern was noted in the pilot’s voice. However, an audio tone consistent with the airplane’s stall warning horn was heard in the background of the pilot’s radio transmission. The pilot then made a radio transmission stating that he was going to crash. The audio tone was again heard in the background, and distress was noted in the pilot’s voice. The airplane impacted homes in a residential neighborhood; a postcrash fire ensued. A review of radar data revealed that the airplane made a climbing right turn after departure and then slowed and descended. The final radar return showed the airplane at a ground speed of 102 knots and an altitude of 400 feet. Examination of the engines and propellers indicated that the engines were rotating at the time of impact; however, the amount of power the engines were producing could not be determined. The examination of the airplane did not reveal any abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the accident pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed during departure, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and subsequent impact with terrain, and that his lack of specific knowledge of the airplane’s avionics contributed to the accident.

ATSA-Aero Transporte - Asesoramientos Tecnicos

The twin engine aircraft departed Lima-Jorge Chávez Airport at 0625LT on a charter flight to Pias, carrying two pilots and seven employees of the Peruvian company MARSA (Minera Aurífera Retamas) en route to Pias gold mine. On approach to Pias Airport, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. Heading 320° on approach, the crew descended too low when the aircraft collided with power cables, stalled and crashed on the slope of a mountain located 4,5 km from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 9 occupants were killed.

Vilma Alimentos

The twin engine aircraft departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport at 0700LT on a flight to Juiz de Fora, carrying six passengers and two pilots. In contact with Juiz de Fora Radio, the crew learned that the weather conditions at the aerodrome were below the IFR minima due to mist, and decided to maintain the route towards the destination and perform a non-precision RNAV (GNSS) IFR approach for landing on runway 03. During the final approach, the aircraft collided first with obstacles and then with the ground, at a distance of 245 meters from the runway 03 threshold, and exploded on impact. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 8 occupants were killed, among them both President and Vice-President of the Vilmas Alimentos Group.

North Slope Borough

The pilot had worked a 10-hour shift the day of the accident and had been off duty about 2 hours when the chief pilot called him around midnight to transport a patient. The pilot accepted the flight and, about 2 hours later, was on an instrument approach to the airport to pick up the patient. While on the instrument approach, all of the anti-ice and deice systems were turned on. The pilot said that the deice boots seemed to be shedding the ice almost completely. He extended the flaps and lowered the landing gear to descend; he then added power, but the airspeed continued to decrease. The airplane continued to descend, and he raised the flaps and landing gear and applied full climb power. The airplane shuddered as it climbed, and the airspeed continued to decrease. The stall warning horn came on, and the pilot lowered the nose to increase the airspeed. The airplane descended until it impacted level, snow-covered terrain. The airplane was equipped with satellite tracking and engine and flight control monitoring. The minimum safe operating speed for the airplane in continuous icing conditions is 140 knots indicated airspeed. The airplane's IAS dropped below 140 knots 4 minutes prior to impact. During the last 1 minute of flight, the indicated airspeed varied from a high of 124.5 knots to a low of 64.6 knots, and the vertical speed varied from 1,965 feet per minute to -2,464 feet per minute. The last data recorded prior to the impact showed that the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of 68 knots, descending at 1,651 feet per minute, and the nose was pitched up at 20 degrees. The pilot did not indicate that there were any mechanical issues with the airplane. The chief pilot reported that pilots are on call for 14 consecutive 24-hour periods before receiving two weeks off. He said that the accident pilot had worked the previous day but that the pilot stated that he was rested enough to accept the mission. The chief pilot indicated he was aware that sleep cycles and circadian rhythms are disturbed by varied and prolonged activity. An NTSB study found that pilots with more than 12 hours of time since waking made significantly more procedural and tactical decision errors than pilots with less than 12 hours of time since waking. A 2000 FAA study found accidents to be more prevalent among pilots who had been on duty for more than 10 hours, and a study by the U.S. Naval Safety Center found that pilots who were on duty for more than 10 of the last 24 hours were more likely to be involved in pilot-at-fault accidents than pilots who had less duty time. The operator’s management stated that they do not prioritize patient transportation with regard to their medical condition but base their decision to transport on a request from medical staff and availability of a pilot and aircraft, and suitable weather. The morning of the accident, the patient subsequently took a commercial flight to another hospital to receive medical treatment for his non-critical injury/illness. Given the long duty day and the early morning departure time of the flight, it is likely the pilot experienced significant levels of fatigue that substantially degraded his ability to monitor the airplane during a dark night instrument flight in icing conditions. The NTSB has issued numerous recommendations to improve emergency medical services aviation operations. One safety recommendation (A-06-13) addresses the importance of conducting a thorough risk assessment before accepting a flight. The safety recommendation asked the Federal Aviation Administration to "require all emergency medical services (EMS) operators to develop and implement flight risk evaluation programs that include training all employees involved in the operation, procedures that support the systematic evaluation of flight risks, and consultation with others trained in EMS flight operations if the risks reach a predefined level." Had such a thorough risk assessment been performed, the decision to launch a fatigued pilot into icing conditions late at night may have been different or additional precautions may have been taken to alleviate the risk. The NTSB is also concerned that the pressure to conduct EMS operations safely and quickly in various environmental conditions (for example, in inclement weather and at night) increases the risk of accidents when compared to other types of patient transport methods, including ground ambulances or commercial flights. However, guidelines vary greatly for determining the mode of and need for transportation. Thus, the NTSB recommended, in safety recommendation A-09-103, that the Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical Services (FICEMS) "develop national guidelines for the selection of appropriate emergency transportation modes for urgent care." The most recent correspondence from FICEMS indicated that the guidelines are close to being finalized and distributed to members. Such guidance will help hospitals and physicians assess the appropriate mode of transport for patients.

Carde Equipment Sales

Witnesses reported that the airplane’s takeoff ground roll appeared to be normal. Shortly after the airplane lifted off, it stopped climbing and yawed to the left. Several witnesses heard abnormal sounds, which they attributed to propeller blade angle changes. The airplane’s flight path deteriorated to a left skid and its airspeed began to slow. The airplane’s left bank angle increased to between 45 and 90 degrees, and its nose dropped to a nearly vertical attitude. Just before impact, the airplane’s bank angle and pitch began to flatten out. The airplane had turned left about 100 degrees when it impacted the ground about 1,500 feet from the midpoint of the 10,000-foot runway. A fire then erupted, which consumed the fuselage. Review of a security camera video of the takeoff revealed that the airplane was near the midpoint of the runway, about 140 feet above the ground, and at a ground speed of about 130 knots when it began to yaw left. The left yaw coincided with the appearance, behind the airplane, of a dark grayish area that appeared to be smoke. A witness, who was an aviation mechanic with extensive experience working on airplanes of the same make and model as the accident airplane, reported hearing two loud “pops” about the time the smoke appeared, which he believed were generated by one of the engines intermittently relighting and extinguishing. Post accident examination of the airframe, the engines, and the propellers did not identify any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Both engines and propellers sustained nearly symmetrical damage, indicating that the two engines were operating at similar low- to mid-range power settings at impact. The airplane’s fuel system was comprised of two separate fuel systems (one for each engine) that consisted of multiple wing fuel tanks feeding into a nacelle tank and then to the engine. The left and right nacelle tanks were breached during the impact sequence and no fuel was found in either tank. Samples taken from the fuel truck, which supplied the airplane's fuel, tested negative for contamination. However, a fuels research engineer with the United States Air Force Fuels Engineering Research Laboratory stated that water contamination can result from condensation in the air cavity above a partially full fuel tank. Both diurnal temperature variations and the atmospheric pressure variations experienced with normal flight cycles can contribute to this type of condensation. He stated that the simplest preventive action is to drain the airplane’s fuel tank sumps before every flight. There were six fuel drains on each wing that the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the airplane dictated should be drained before every flight. The investigation revealed that the pilot’s previous employer, where he had acquired most of his King Air 200 flight experience, did not have its pilots drain the fuel tank sumps before every flight. Instead, maintenance personnel drained the sumps at some unknown interval. No witnesses were identified who observed the pilot conduct the preflight inspection of the airplane before the accident flight, and it could not be determined whether the pilot had drained the airplane’s fuel tank sumps. He had been the only pilot of the airplane for its previous 40 flights. Because the airplane was not on a Part 135 certificate or a continuous maintenance program, it is unlikely that a mechanic was routinely draining the airplane's fuel sumps. The witness observations, video evidence, and the postaccident examination indicated that the left engine experienced a momentary power interruption during the takeoff initial climb, which was consistent with a power interruption resulting from water contamination of the left engine's fuel supply. It is likely that, during the takeoff rotation and initial climb, water present in the bottom of the left nacelle tank was drawn into the left engine. When the water flowed through the engine's fuel nozzles into the burner can, it momentarily extinguished the engine’s fire. The engine then stopped producing power, and its propeller changed pitch, resulting in the propeller noises heard by witnesses. Subsequently, a mixture of water and fuel reached the nozzles and the engine intermittently relighted and extinguished, which produced the grayish smoke observed in the video and the “pop” noises heard by the mechanic witness. Finally, uncontaminated fuel flow was reestablished, and the engine resumed normal operation. About 5 months before the accident, the pilot successfully completed a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 pilot-in-command check flight in a King Air 90. However, no documentation was found indicating that he had ever received training in a full-motion King Air simulator. Although simulator training was not required, if the pilot had received this type of training, it is likely that he would have been better prepared to maintain directional control in response to the left yaw from asymmetrical power. Given that the airplane’s airspeed was more than 40 knots above the minimum control speed of 86 knots when the left yaw began, the pilot should have been able to maintain directional control during the momentary power interruption. Although the airplane’s estimated weight at the time of the accident was about 650 pounds over the maximum allowable gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds, the investigation determined that the additional weight would not have precluded the pilot from maintaining directional control of the airplane.

Construtora Meio Norte

Following an uneventful flight from Brasília, the pilot started the descent to Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport in poor weather visibility with heavy rain falls and turbulences. On final approach, the twin engine aircraft descended below the glide until it impact the slope of Mt Santo Antônio located 10,7 km short of runway 32. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.

Grupo Chicoil

The crew was performing a charter flight from Pointe Noire to Luanda with one passenger on board, the Mauritanian businessman Rashid Mustapha who was candidate to the Presidential elections in Mauritania in 2007. The pax called his bodyguard just before takeoff, asking them to be ready upon arrival at Luanda-4 de Fevereiro Airport. The twin engine aircraft departed Pointe Noire Airport at 2321LT for a 75-90 minutes flight to Luanda. Just before it started the descent, while cruising over the area of Caxito, some 50 km northeast of Luanda, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens at 0020LT. SAR operations were abandoned after few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the three occupants was found. It is possible that the aircraft crashed by night in the ocean off the Angolan coast but this was not confirmed as the wreckage was never found. Three years later, in March 2013, unconfirmed reports and rumors in Africa said that the aircraft never crashed anywhere and that Rashid Mustapha was in fact hostage by a terrorist group somewhere in Africa, but this was not confirmed by Officials in Mauritania or Angola. Without any trace of the aircraft, all hypothesis remains open.

THS Hélicoptères - Trans Hélicoptère Service

On final approach to Arlit Airport, the crew lost visual contact with the runway due to a sand storm. The aircraft was too low and hit the ground short of runway. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid over few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Blue Cross %26 Blue Shield of Iowa

The pilot of the Part 91 business flight filed an instrument-flight-rules (IFR) flight plan with the destination and alternate airports, both of which were below weather minimums. The pilot and copilot departed from the departure airport in weather minimums that were below the approach minimums for the departure airport. While en route, the destination airport's automated observing system continued to report weather below approach minimums, but the flight crew continued the flight. The flight crew then requested and were cleared for the instrument landing system (ILS) 31 approach and while on that approach were issued visibilities of 1,800 feet runway visual range after changing to tower frequency. During landing, the copilot told the pilot that he was not lined up with the runway. The pilot reportedly said, "those are edge lights," and then realized that he was not properly lined up with the runway. The airplane then touched down beyond a normal touchdown point, about 2,800 feet down the runway, and off the left side of the runway surface. The airplane veered to the left, collapsing the nose landing gear. Both flight crewmembers had previous experience in Part 135 operations, which have more stringent weather requirements than operations conducted under Part 91. Under Part 135, IFR flights to an airport cannot be conducted and an approach cannot begin unless weather minimums are above approach minimums. The accident flight's departure in weather below approach minimums would have precluded a return to the airport had an emergency been encountered by the flight crew, leaving few options and little time to reach a takeoff alternate airport. The company's flight procedures allow for a takeoff to be performed as long as there is a takeoff alternate airport within one hour at normal cruise speed and a minimum takeoff visibility that was based upon the pilot being able to maintain runway alignment during takeoff. The company's procedures did not allow flight crew to depart to an airport that was below minimums but did allow for the flight crew, at their discretion, to perform a "look-see" approach to approach minimums if the weather was below minimums. The allowance of a "look see" approach essentially negates the procedural risk mitigation afforded by requiring approaches to be conducted only when weather was above approach minimums.

MDTR Holdings

The pilot flew the airplane to a maintenance facility and turned it in for a phase inspection. The next morning, he arrived at the airport and planned a local flight to evaluate some avionics issues. He performed a preflight inspection and then went inside the maintenance facility to wait for two avionic technicians to arrive. In the meantime, two employees of the maintenance facility test ran the engines on the accident airplane for about 30 to 35 minutes in preparation for the phase inspection. The pilot reported that he was unaware that the engine run had been performed when he returned to the airplane for the local flight. He referred to the flight management system (FMS) fuel totalizer, and not the aircraft fuel gauges, when he returned to the airplane for the flight. He believed that the mechanics who ran the engines did not power up the FMS, which would have activated the fuel totalizer, thus creating a discrepancy between the totalizer and the airplane fuel gauges. The mechanics who performed the engine run reported that each tank contained 200 pounds of fuel at the conclusion of the engine run. The B200 Pilot’s Operating Handbook directed pilots not take off if the fuel quantity gauges indicate in the yellow arc or indicate less than 265 pounds of fuel in each main tank system. While on final approach, about 23 minutes into the flight, the right engine lost power, followed by the left. The pilot attempted to glide to the runway with the landing gear and flaps retracted, however the airplane crashed short of the runway. Only residual fuel was found in the main and auxiliary fuel tanks during the inspection of the wreckage. The tanks were not breached and there was no evidence of fuel leakage at the accident site.

Henry Broadcasting Nevada

The airplane just had undergone a routine maintenance and this was planned to be the first flight after the inspection. During the initial climb, the pilot observed that the airplane was drifting to the left. The pilot attempted to counteract the drift by application of right aileron and right rudder, but the airplane continued to the left. The pilot reported that, despite having both hands on the control yoke, he could not maintain directional control and the airplane collided into a building. The airplane subsequently came to rest on railroad tracks adjacent to the airport perimeter. A post accident examination revealed that the elevator trim wheel was located in the 9-degree NOSE UP position; normal takeoff range setting is between 2 and 3 degrees NOSE UP. The rudder trim control knob was found in the full left position and the right propeller lever was found about one-half inch forward of the FEATHER position; these control inputs both resulted in the airplane yawing to the left. The pilot did not adequately follow the airplane manufacturer's checklist during the preflight, taxi, and before takeoff, which resulted in the airplane not being configured correctly for takeoff. This incorrect configuration led to the loss of directional control immediately after rotation. A post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.