Socata TBM-700

DGW Enterprises

Fiorenzo Valli

Renato Joner

After landing at Brasília-Nelson Piquet Airport, the single engine airplane went out of control and veered off runway. It went down into a ravine and came to rest into trees. All five occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot reported he encountered strong winds upon landing.

Kevin C. Scott

On August 20, 2021, about 1440 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700A airplane, N700DT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Urbana, Ohio. The pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Preliminary air traffic control information revealed the airplane was en route from the Erie Ottawa Airport (PCW), Port Clinton, Ohio, to the Cincinnati Municipal Airport (LUK), Cincinnati, Ohio. The airplane departed runway 9 at PCW and climbed to flight level 200 before beginning to descend. The airplane was southbound, descending to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), and established communications with the assigned terminal radar approach control controller. The controller cleared the pilot to descent to 10,000 ft msl and proceed direct to LUK. While descending through 12,100 ft msl, the airplane entered a left turn. The controller observed the left turn and asked the pilot if everything was alright; there was no response from the pilot. Radar contact was subsequently lost with the airplane. The controller’s further attempts to establish communications were unsuccessful. A witness, located about 2 miles south of the accident location, stated that he observed the airplane at a high altitude in a nose-dive descent toward the terrain. He reported the airplane was not turning or spinning; it was headed straight down. The witness observed no signs of distress, such as smoke, fire, or parts coming off the airplane, and he stated the airplane’s engine was at full throttle. The witness lost sight of the airplane as it descended behind some trees. The accident site was located 1.3 miles northwest of the last radar contact. The accident site showed the airplane impacted trees, two powerlines, and the terrain in a left-wing low attitude. The initial ground scar, located in a residential yard, contained separated components of the left wing. The airplane crossed a highway, struck trees and a ditch, and then continued into mature potato and soybean fields. The airplane wreckage was scattered at a distance of about 2,050 ft along a measured magnetic heading of 275°. According to acquaintances of the pilot, the pilot purchased the airplane about 9 days before the accident. Following the purchase, the pilot and a flight instructor completed several hours of ground school and 15.5 hours of dual instruction in the airplane.

N700AQ LLC

On October 3, 2019, about 0858 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700 airplane, N700AQ, collided with terrain while on an instrument approach to Capital Region International Airport (LAN), Lansing, Michigan. The commercial pilot, pilot-rated passenger, and 3 passengers were fatally injured. The remaining passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was owned by N700AQ LLC and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. The cross-country business flight departed Indy South Greenwood Airport (HFY), Greenwood, Indiana, at 0800. According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data that was transmitted from the airplane to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC), the flight departed runway 19 at HFY and turned northeast toward MAREO intersection where it turned north toward LAN. The airplane subsequently climbed to flight level 190 (19,000 ft pressure altitude). At 0834:24, the flight entered a cruise descent from flight level 190 and was progressively cleared down to 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). According to ATC communications, the pilot was provided radar vectors to join the localizer for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 10R approach at LAN. At 0853:03, the approach controller stated, "TBM zero alpha quebec, five miles from FAMLI, turn right, ah, right heading zero seven zero, maintain three thousand until established on the localizer, cleared the ILS one zero right." The pilot responded, "Zero seven zero, ah, we're cleared for the ILS ten right into, ah, Lansing." The ADS-B data indicated the airplane entered a right turn and joined the localizer inbound. At 0854:27, the approach controller stated, "TBM zero alpha quebec, contact Lansing tower one one niner point niner, good day." The pilot responded, "One nineteen ninety, seven hundred alpha quebec." At 0855:29, the airplane crossed over the outer marker (FAMLI) at 2,302 ft msl and continued to descend on the glideslope while established inbound on the localizer toward runway 10R. The airplane had a calculated true airspeed of 168 knots when it crossed over the outer marker. Between 0855:29 and 0857:45, the airplane continued to decelerate from 168 knots to 64 knots. At 0854:36, the pilot established contact with the Lansing tower controller and reported being established on the ILS Runway 10R instrument approach. At 0854:39, the tower controller stated, "Seven zero zero alpha quebec, Lansing, ah, tower, the winds are calm, one zero right cleared to land." The pilot responded, "Cleared to land, ah, ten right, seven hundred alpha quebec." There were no additional communications received from the pilot. At 0858:13, the tower controller attempted to contact the pilot over the tower frequency without success. A passenger was seriously injured and all five other occupants were killed.

William E. Patterson

The commercial pilot was conducting an instrument approach following a 3.5-hour cross-country instrument flight rules (IFR) flight in a single-engine turboprop airplane. About 1.6 miles from the runway threshold, the airplane began a climb consistent with the published missed approach procedure; however, rather than completing the slight left climbing turn toward the designated holding point, the airplane continued in an approximate 270° left turn, during which the airplane's altitude varied, before entering a descending right turn and impacting terrain. Tree and ground impact signatures were consistent with a 60° nose-low attitude at the time of impact. No distress calls were received or recorded from the accident flight. A postimpact fire consumed a majority of the cockpit and fuselage. Weather information for the time of the accident revealed that the pilot was operating in IFR to low IFR conditions with gusting surface winds, light to heavy snow, mist, cloud ceilings between 700 and 1,400 ft above ground level with clouds extending through 18,500 ft, and the potential for low-level wind shear and clear air turbulence. The area of the accident site was under AIRMETs for IFR conditions, mountain obscuration, moderate icing below 20,000 ft, and moderate turbulence below 18,000 ft. In addition, a winter storm warning was issued about 6 hours before the flight departed. Although the pilot received a weather briefing about 17 hours before the accident, there was no indication that he obtained updated weather information before departure or during the accident flight. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, the extent of the fire damage precluded examination of the avionics system. The airplane was equipped with standby flight instruments. An acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot had experienced an avionics malfunction several months before the accident during which the airplane's flight display went blank while flying an instrument approach. During that occurrence, the pilot used ForeFlight on his iPad to maneuver back to the northeast and fly the approach again using his own navigation. During the accident flight, the airplane appeared to go missed approach, but rather than fly the published missed approach procedure, the airplane also turned left towards to northeast. However, it could not be determined if the pilot's actions were an attempt to fly the approach using his own navigation or if he was experiencing spatial disorientation. The restricted visibility and turbulence present at the time of the accident provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's turning flight track and steep descent profile are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.

Sky West Aviation

The single engine aircraft departed Yao Airport at 1157LT on a leisure flight to Fukushima, carrying one passenger and one pilot. Few minutes later, the pilot reported an unexpected situation to ATC and was cleared to return to Yao. At an altitude of 17,200 feet and a speed of 150 knots, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a hilly and wooded terrain near the village of Yamazoe, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

4197802 Manitoba

The pilot reported that, during the preflight, it was snowing, and he wiped the snow that had accumulated on the wings off "as best as [he] could." He added that, while taxiing to the runway, "snow was falling heavily," and he observed "light accumulation of wet snow" on the wings. During the takeoff roll, he observed the snow "sloughing off" the wings as the airspeed increased. Subsequently, during the climb to about 150 ft above the ground, the airplane yawed to the left, and he attempted to recover using right aileron. He reported that he "could see a stall forming," so he lowered the nose and reduced power to idle. The airplane impacted the general aviation ramp in a left-wing-down attitude and slid 500 to 600 ft. The pilot reported on the National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report 6120.1 form that the airplane stalled, and he recommended "better deicing" before takeoff. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 27 minutes before the accident, the wind was 010° at 8 knots, 1/2-mile visibility, moderate snow, freezing fog, and sky condition broken at 500 ft above ground level (agl) and overcast at 1,500 ft agl. The airplane departed from runway 16. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aeronautical Information Manual stated, in part: "The presence of aircraft airframe icing during takeoff, typically caused by improper or no deicing of the aircraft being accomplished prior to flight has contributed to many recent accidents in turbine aircraft." The manual further stated, "Ensure that your aircraft's lift-generating surfaces are COMPLETELY free of contamination before flight through a tactile (hands on) check of the critical surfaces when feasible. Even when otherwise permitted, operators should avoid smooth or polished frost on lift-generating surfaces as an acceptable preflight condition." FAA Advisory Circular, AC 135-17, stated in part: "Test data indicate that ice, snow, or frost formations having thickness and surface roughness similar to medium or course sandpaper on the leading edge and upper surfaces of a wing can reduce wing lift by as much as 30 percent and increase drag by 40 percent." Included in the public docket for this report is a copy of a service bulletin from the airplane manufacturer, which describes deicing and anti-icing ground procedures. It stated, in part: During conditions conducive to aeroplane icing during ground operations, take-off shall not be attempted when ice, snow, slush or frost is present or adhering to the wings, propellers, control surfaces, engine inlets or other critical surfaces. This is known as the "Clean Aircraft Concept". Any deposit of ice, snow or frost on the external surfaces may drastically affect its performance due to reduced aerodynamic lift and increased drag resulting from the disturbed airflow.

Trustey Management Corporation

The airline transport pilot was landing at the destination airport after a cross-country flight in visual meteorological conditions. The tower controller stated that the airplane's landing gear appeared to be extended during final approach and that the airplane landed within the runway's touchdown zone. The tower controller stated that, although the airplane made a normal landing, he heard a squealing noise that continued longer than what he believed was typical. The pilot subsequently transmitted "go-around." The tower controller acknowledged the go-around and cleared the pilot to enter a left traffic pattern. The tower controller stated that he heard the engine speed accelerate while the airplane maintained a level attitude over the runway until it passed midfield. He then saw the airplane pitch up and enter a climbing left turn. The tower controller stated that the airplane appeared to enter an aerodynamic stall before it descended into terrain in a left-wing-down attitude. Another witness reported that he saw the airplane, with its landing gear extended, in a steep left turn before it descended rapidly into terrain. A postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of flight control, landing gear, or engine malfunction. An examination of the runway revealed numerous propeller slash marks that began about 215 ft past the runway's touchdown zone; however, there was no evidence that any portion of the airframe had impacted the runway during the landing. Additionally, measurement of the landing gear actuators confirmed that all three landing gear were fully extended at the accident site. Therefore, the pilot likely did not adequately control the airplane's pitch during the landing, which allowed the propeller to contact the runway. Due to the propeller strikes, the propeller was likely damaged and unable to provide adequate thrust during the go-around. Further, based on the witness accounts, the pilot likely did not maintain adequate airspeed during the climbing left turn, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

AG Plastics

The single engine aircraft departed Cannes-Mandelieu Airport at 1040LT bound for Courtrai-Wevelgem Airport, Belgium, with four passengers and one pilot on board. About one hour and 40 minutes into the flight, while cruising in IMC conditions at FL240, the aircraft start a quick descent to the right until FL149. Speed increased and the overspeed warning sound came on. Forty-five seconds after the start of the quick descent, the airplane initiated a climb with a rate of 10,000 feet per minute until it stalled at FL201, still in IMC conditions. The airplane then entered a dive and went into a flat attitude when it went out of clouds at an altitude estimated between 1,000 and 2,000 feet. This altitude was insufficient to the pilot to regain control and without external visual references, he lost control of the airplane that crashed in a wooded area. The pilot and a passenger were killed while three other passengers were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Gadsden Aviation

About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.

Shairplane

The single engine airplane departed Budel-Kempen Airport on a flight to Cannes-Mandelieu, carrying four passengers and one pilot. During initial climb, the pilot selected gear up and was attempting to retract the flaps when the engine failed. The aircraft lost height and crash landed in an open field, coming to rest on its belly 1,500 metres from the runway end. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Private German

The single engine aircraft departed Kiel-Holtenau Airport in the morning, carrying two passengers and two pilots, bound for Rotenburg, Lower Saxony, where two additional passengers should embark before continuing to Friedrichshafen to take part to the Aero 2013 Airshow. On approach to Rotenburg-Wümme Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a cloud base at 500 feet and a visibility limited to 2 km. On final approach, the aircraft impacted ground and came to rest in an open field, bursting into flames. The burnt wreckage was found 2,3 km short of runway 08 and 570 metres to the left of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed.

Private German

The pilot took off at around 14 h 45 from Maribo aerodrome (Denmark) bound for Cuers. He filed an IFR flight plan that he cancelled(2) at 17 h 15 near the St Tropez VOR (83). He explained that he had overflown the installations at Cuers at 1,500 ft and started an aerodrome circuit via the north for runway 11. He was visual with the ground and noted the presence of snow showers. He reckoned that these conditions made it possible to continue the approach. At about 600 ft, he went into a snow shower. At about 400 ft, he noticed that the horizontal visibility was zero and that he had lost all external visual references. He tried to make a go-around but didn’t feel any increase in engine power. At about 200 ft, he saw that he was to the right of the runway and decided to make an emergency landing. The aeroplane struck the ground on the right side of the runway. It slid for 150 metres and swung around before stopping. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Coolstream Media

Although the pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan through the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS), no evidence of a weather briefing was found. The flight departed in visual meteorological conditions and entered instrument meteorological conditions while climbing through 12,800 feet. The air traffic controller advised the pilot of moderate rime icing from 15,000 feet through 17,000 feet, with light rime ice at 14,000 feet. The controller asked the pilot to advise him if the icing worsened, and the pilot responded that he would let them know and that it was no problem for him. The controller informed the pilot that he was coordinating for a higher altitude. The pilot confirmed that, while at 16,800 feet, "…light icing has been present for a little while and a higher altitude would be great." About 15 seconds later, the pilot stated that he was getting a little rattle and requested a higher altitude as soon as possible. About 25 seconds after that, the flight was cleared to flight level 200, and the pilot acknowledged. About one minute later, the airplane reached a peak altitude of 17,800 feet before turning sharply to the left and entering a descent. While descending through 17,400 feet, the pilot stated, "and N731CA's declaring…" No subsequent transmissions were received from the flight. The airplane impacted the paved surfaces and a wooded median on an interstate highway. A postaccident fire resulted. The outboard section of the right wing and several sections of the empennage, including the horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and rudder, were found about 1/4 mile southwest of the fuselage, in a residential area. Witnesses reported seeing pieces of the airplane separating during flight and the airplane in a rapid descent. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the outboard section of the right wing separated in flight, at a relatively low altitude, and then struck and severed portions of the empennage. There was no evidence of a preexisting mechanical anomaly that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engine. An examination of weather information revealed that numerous pilots reported icing conditions in the general area before and after the accident. At least three flight crews considered the icing "severe." Although severe icing was not forecasted, an Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory included moderate icing at altitudes at which the accident pilot was flying. The pilot operating handbook warned that the airplane was not certificated for flight in severe icing conditions and that, if encountered, the pilot must exit severe icing immediately by changing altitude or routing. Although the pilot was coordinating for a higher altitude with the air traffic controller at the time of the icing encounter, it is likely that he either did not know the severity of the icing or he was reluctant to exercise his command authority in order to immediately exit the icing conditions.

Claude Hochner

The pilot departed Toussus-le-Noble Airport at 0810LT on an IFR flight to Lyon. After contacting ATC, the pilot was vectored for a LOC DME approach to runway 16 at Lyon-Bron Airport. He reported being established on localizer at 0907LT, then was transferred to the tower and was cleared to land. At 0910LT, he reported he was initiating a go-around procedure and was instructed to climb to 3,000 feet maintaining a straight-in path. ATC requested twice the pilot to confirm the approach interruption but he failed to respond. A few moments later, the pilot reported 'Now, I'm not good at all'. The airplane crashed in a retention basin located 1,500 meters short of runway 16 threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Socata

The airplane, registered to SV Leasing Company of Florida, operated by SOCATA North America, Inc., sustained substantial damage during a forced landing on a highway near Hollywood, Florida, following total loss of engine power. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 maintenance test flight from North Perry Airport (HWO), Hollywood, Florida. The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated other crew member sustained minor injuries; there were no ground injuries. The flight originated from HWO about 1216. The purpose of the flight was a maintenance test flight following a 600 hour and annual inspection. According to the right front seat occupant, in anticipation of the flight, he checked the fuel load by applying electrical power and noted the G1000 indicated the left fuel tank had approximately 36 gallons while the right fuel tank had approximately 108 gallons. In an effort to balance the fuel load with the indication of the right fuel tank, he added 72.4 gallons of fuel to the left fuel tank. At the start of the data recorded by the G1000 for the accident flight, the recorded capacity in the left fuel tank was approximately 105 gallons while the amount in the right fuel tank was approximately 108 gallons. The PIC reported that because of the fuel load on-board, he could not see the level of fuel in the tanks; therefore, he did not visually check the fuel tanks. By cockpit indication, the left tank had approximately 105 gallons and the right tank had approximately 108 gallons. The flight departed HWO, but he could not recall the fuel selector position beneath the thrust lever quadrant. He further stated that the fuel selector switch on the overhead panel was in the "auto" position. After takeoff, the flight climbed to flight level (FL) 280, and levelled off at that altitude about 20 minutes after takeoff. While at that altitude they received a "Fuel Low R" amber warning CAS message on the G1000. He checked the right fuel gauge which indicated 98 gallons, and confirmed that the fuel selector automatically switched to the left tank. After about 10 seconds the amber warning CAS message went out. He attributed the annunciation to be associated with a failure or malfunction of the sensor, and told the mechanic to write this issue down so it could be replaced after the flight. The flight continued and they received an amber warning CAS message, "Fuel Unbalance" which the right fuel tank had more fuel so he switched the fuel selector to supply fuel from the right tank to the engine. The G1000 indicates they remained at that altitude for approximately 8 minutes. He then initiated a quick descent to 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and during the descent accelerated to Vmo to test the aural warning horn. They descended to and maintained 10,000 feet msl for about 15 minutes and at an unknown time, they received an amber warning CAS message "Fuel Low R." Once again he checked the right fuel gauge which indicated it had 92 gallons and confirmed that the fuel tank selector automatically switched to the left tank. After about 10 seconds the CAS message went out. Either just before or during descent to 4,000 feet, they received an amber CAS message "Fuel Unbalance." Because the right fuel gauge indicated the fullest tank was the right tank, he switched the fuel selector to supply fuel to the engine from the right tank. The flight proceeded to the Opa-Locka Executive Airport, where he executed an ILS approach which terminated with a low approach. The pilot cancelled the IFR clearance and proceeded VFR towards HWO. While in contact with the HWO air traffic control tower, the flight was cleared to join the left downwind for runway 27L. Upon entering the downwind leg they received another amber CAS message "Fuel Unbalance" and at this time the left fuel gauge indicated 55 gallons while the right fuel gauge indicated 74 gallons. Because he intended on landing within a few minutes, he put the fuel selector to the manual position and switched to the fullest (right) tank. Established on final approach to runway 27L at HWO with the gear down, flaps set to landing, and minimum speed requested by air traffic for separation (85 knots indicated airspeed). When the flight was at 800 feet, the red warning CAS message "Fuel Press" illuminated and the right seat occupant with his permission moved the auxiliary fuel boost pump switch from "Auto" to "On" while he, PIC manually moved the fuel selector to the left tank. In an effort to restore engine power he pushed the power lever and used the manual over-ride but with no change. Assured that the engine had quit, he put the condition lever to cutoff, the starter switch on, and then the condition lever to "Hi-Idle" attempting to perform an airstart. At 1332:42, a flight crew member of the airplane advised the HWO ATCT, "…just lost the engine"; however, the controller did not reply. The PIC stated that he looked to his left and noticed a clear area on part of the turnpike, so he banked left, and in anticipation of the forced landing, placed the power lever to idle, the condition lever to cutoff, the fuel tank selector to off, and put the electrical gang bar down to secure the airplane's electrical system. He elected to retract the landing gear in an effort to shorten the landing distance. The right front seat occupant reported that the airplane was landed in a southerly direction in the northbound lanes of the Florida Turnpike. There were no ground injuries.

Nova Aviation

The pilot of the single-engine turboprop was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight and cancelled his IFR flight plan after being cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. He flew a left traffic pattern for runway 32, a 4,202-foot-long, 75-foot-wide, asphalt runway. The pilot reported that the airplane crossed the runway threshold at 81 knots and touched down normally, with the stall warning horn sounding. The airplane subsequently drifted left and the pilot attempted to correct with right rudder input; however, the airplane continued to drift to the left side of the runway. The pilot then initiated a go-around and cognizant of risk of torque roll at low speeds did not apply full power. The airplane climbed to about 10 feet above the ground. At that time, the airplane was in a 20-degree left bank and the pilot applied full right aileron input to correct. The airplane then descended in a left turn, the pilot retarded the throttle, and braced for impact. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector reported that the airplane traveled about 100 feet off the left side of the runway, nosed down in mud, and came to rest in trees. Examination of the wreckage by the inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The reported wind, about the time of the accident, was from 310 degrees at 10 knots, gusting to 15 knots.

Flying Max

During approach to runway 9, the tower controller instructed the pilot to perform an “S” turn 3 miles from the runway. The pilot initiated the “S” turn to the left, and after turning back to the right towards the runway to complete the other half of the turn, the controller advised the pilot that he did not need to finish the maneuver, and could turn onto final approach. The last recorded ground speed was 89 knots when the pilot banked the airplane sharply to the left at this time, witnesses stated that the airplane seemed to do a wing over onto its back and go straight down. Flight simulation tests revealed that while making a steep turn and not adding power, as the bank angle increased the airspeed would decrease and the airplane would enter an aerodynamic stall. Toxicology testing indicated that the pilot had been using tramadol, a prescription painkiller with potentially impairing effects. The pilot had not reported its use on his most recent application for airman medical certificate approximately 20 months prior to the accident. It is unclear what role, if any, the medication or the condition for which it might have been used played in the accident.

PK Leasing

During the flight, the private pilot/operator was most likely seated in the left seat. He obtained his instrument rating about 7 months prior to the accident, and had accumulated approximately 300 hours of flight experience; of which, about 80 hours were in the accident airplane. The commercial pilot/company pilot was most likely seated in the right seat. He had accumulated approximately 1,000 hours of flight experience; of which, about 125 hours were actual instrument experience, and 80 hours were in the accident airplane. The commercial pilot had filed a flight plan to the wrong airport, received a weather briefing for the wrong airport, and therefore was not aware of the NOTAM in effect for an out of service approach lighting system at the destination airport. When the commercial pilot realized his error, he changed the flight plan, but did not request another weather briefing. According to radar information, the airplane flew the instrument landing system runway 5 approach fast, performed a steep missed approach to 1,000 feet, and then disappeared from radar, consistent with a loss of control during the missed approach. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions were identified with the airplane during the investigation. The reported weather at the accident airport included an overcast ceiling at 200 feet, visibility 1 mile in light rain and mist, and wind from 160 degrees at 4 knots. The investigation could not determine which pilot was flying the airplane at the time of the accident.

Clay Nordman

The airplane stalled on short final approach, and it impacted the ground. The purpose of the flight was for the student to receive dual flight instruction to become more acquainted with the airplane's handling characteristics. The student met with his certified flight instructor and received a briefing regarding the upcoming lesson involving, in part, takeoff and landing practice. The instructor directed his student to perform a simulated engine out approach, and engine power was reduced as the airplane glided toward the airport. The student entered a close in downwind approach and, at the direction of the instructor, then performed a left circling turn onto the base and final approach legs. The landing gear was lowered, and the student questioned the instructor regarding whether they could glide all the way to the runway. The instructor advised his student to maintain 90 knots airspeed. During the descent, as the airplane turned from the close in base leg onto the final approach leg, the instructor told his student "don't bank." The student rolled the wings level. Immediately thereafter, the left bank began a second time and the instructor again said, "Don't bank." The student replied, "I'm not." The instructor applied engine power and right rudder to reduce the left bank. The airplane stopped rolling left, and then rolled into a right bank, whereupon the right wing impacted the ground. At no time did the instructor direct his student to release the airplane's flight controls.

Thys Limburg

Towards the end of a flight from Brussels to Oxford (Kidlington), the pilot was cleared to land from a visual straight-in approach to Runway 01. The surface wind was reported as 030°/15 kt. As the aircraft crossed the airfield boundary, it started to roll to the left. Shortly after, it struck the ground to the west of the runway threshold. Despite an extensive investigation, no technical malfunction was identified which could have caused the apparent uncontrolled roll to the left. Although there was no other conclusive evidence which would explain the manoeuvre, it is possible that control of the aircraft was lost during application of power to adjust the flight path or in an attempted late go-around, or as a result of an unknown distraction. The passengers was the French businessman Paul-Louis Halley, CEO of Carrefour, accompanied by his wife. They were en route to England to take part to a wedding.

Private American

After an uneventful flight from Edinburgh the pilot made a visual approach to Runway 28 (landing distance available 1,400 metres) at Dundee. The pilot reported that the aircraft floated down the runway in the flare and bounced lightly on touchdown. During the bounce the aircraft initially yawed left and then rolled left in a normal pitch attitude with no stall warning. Full right rudder was applied but this was unable to correct the yaw. Power was applied to initiate a go-around, whilst maintaining full right rudder, but the pilot was unable to prevent the left wing from hitting the ground. This caused the aircraft to yaw rapidly to the left bringing one of its wheels into contact with a low wall. The pilot then reduced power and ditched in the River Tay, approximately 10 metres from the shore. The air traffic controllers on duty reported that the aircraft achieved a high nose attitude during the go-around before the left wing dropped and the aircraft veered to the left. The aircraft came to rest with the top of the fuselage out of the water and the pilot and passengers were able to evacuate though the main door and stand on the wing to await rescue by the airport's hovercraft. The hovercraft could only carry two passengers at a time thus the process was delayed resulting in the pilot and passengers suffering from mild hypothermia.

Quest Diagnostics

A review of communications between Mobile Downtown Control Tower, and the pilot revealed that while on approach the pilot reported having a problem. The Ground Controller reported that he had the airplane in sight and cleared the flight to land on runway 18. The pilot stated that he had a "run away engine", and elected to shut down the engine and continued the approach. The Controller then cleared the pilot again to runway 18. The pilot then stated that he did not think that he was going to "make it." The airplane collided with a utility pole and the ground and burst into flames short of the runway. The post-accident examination of the engine found that the fuel control unit arm to the fuel control unit interconnect rod end connection was separated from the rod end swivel ball assembly. The swivel ball assembly was found improperly attached to the inboard side of the arm, with the bolt head facing inboard, instead of outboard, and the washer and nut attached to the arm's outboard side instead of the inboard side. The rod separation would resulted in a loss of power lever control. The published emergency procedures for "Power Lever Control Lose," states; If minimum power obtained is excessive: 1) reduce airspeed by setting airplane in nose-up attitude at IAS < 178 KIAS. 2) "inert Sep" switch--On. 3) if ITT >800 C "Inert Sep"--Off. 4) Landing Gear Control--Down. 5) Flaps--Takeoff. 6) Establish a long final or an ILS approach respecting IAS < 178 KIAS. 7) When runway is assured: Condition Lever to --Cut Off. 8) Propeller Governor Lever to-- Feather. 9) Flaps --Landing as required (at IAS <122 KIAS). 10) Land Normally without reverse. 11) Braking as required. The pilot stated to Mobile Downtown Control Tower, Ground Control that he had a "run away engine" and that he "had to shut down the engine". As a result of the pilot not following the published emergency procedures, the airplane was unable to reach the runway during the emergency.

High Performance Technologies

The private pilot, who sat in the left seat, was executing the LOC RWY 17 instrument approach in actual instrument meteorological conditions, when the airplane decelerated, lost altitude, and began a left turn about 2 miles from the airport. Subsequently, the airplane collided with terrain and came to rest on residential property. The radar data also indicated that the airplane was never stabilized on the approach. A witness, a private pilot, said the airplane "appeared" out of the fog about 300-400 feet above the ground. It was in a left bank, with the nose pointed down, and was traveling fast. The airplane then "simultaneously and suddenly level[ed] out," pitched up, and the engine power increased. The witness thought that the pilot realized he was low and was trying to "get out of there." The airplane descended in a nose-high attitude, about 65 degrees, toward the trees. Radar data indicates that the airplane slowed to 80 knots about 3 miles from the airplane, and then to 68 knots 18 seconds later as the airplane began to turn to the left. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies. Weather reported at the airport 25 minutes before the accident included wind from 140 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 1 statute mile, and ceiling 500 foot overcast. Weather 5 minutes before the accident included wind from 140 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 1 statute miles, and ceiling 300 foot overcast.

European Aeronautics Defense %26 Space Company - EADS

The single engine aircraft was completing an aerial photography flight from Clermont-Ferrand, carrying one passenger and one pilot. On final approach to Moulins-Montbeugny Airport runway 08, at a speed of 85 knots, the pilot estimated that the nose-up attitude of the aircraft was excessive and increased engine power. The aircraft rolled to the left, causing the left wing tip to struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft impacted the ground, lost its undercarriage and slid fo 95 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Both occupants escaped uninjured and fire brigade arrived 15 minutes later. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Technical Leasing

The airplane was fueled to capacity and placed in a heated hangar about one hour before departure. The instrument rated pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and obtained an IFR clearance. Low ceiling, reduced visibility, and ice fog prevented control tower personnel from observing the takeoff. Radar (NTAP) and on-board GPS data indicated the airplane began drifting to the left of runway centerline almost immediately after takeoff. The airplane made a climbing left turn, achieving a maximum altitude of 7,072 feet and completing 217 degrees of turn, before beginning a descending left turn. The airplane impacted terrain on airport property. Autopsy/toxicology protocols were unremarkable. There was no evidence of preimpact failure/malfunction of the airframe, powerplant, propeller, or flight controls. The autopilot and servos, pitot-static system, and flight instruments were tested and all functioned satisfactorily. The pilot's shoulder harness was found attached to the seatbelt, but the male end of the seatbelt buckle was broken.

Eagle Flight Center

Witnesses observed the flight enter downwind for runway 30, after it had completed a published approach to runway 12, with a circle to land on runway 30. The witnesses, one of which was a commercial pilot said that there were jagged ceilings at the time about 400 to 500 feet above the ground. He and two other men with him saw the airplane below the clouds. As the airplane proceeded downwind, it momentarily entered a cloud. As the airplane came out of the cloud, it turned left in about a 30 degree turn. The angle of bank increased to about 70 to 80 degrees, the tail of the airplane came up, and the airplane impacted the ground nose first. Several pilots at the airport heard someone from N69BS make a radio transmission on the UNICOM frequency. What was heard by several people was that N69BS had broken out at 2200 feet. They then heard, 'N69BS turning base,' immediately followed by 'lookout' and 'oh ....' All of the eye witnesses agreed that at no time did they see or hear any problems with the engine. They all said that the sounds coming from the engine never changed. The published approach in use at the time of the accident was the GPS (global positioning system) runway 12. The pilot made his initial approach to runway 12, broke off the approach to the right, entered a right downwind for a landing on runway 30. The published circling minimums for the approach were MDA (minimum descent altitude) 4,800 feet, HAT (height above terrain) 869 feet. Using an approach speed of 90 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 mile. Using an approach speed of 120 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 1/4 miles. The field elevation was 3,931 feet. The profile for the GPS runway 12 approach showed that after the IAF (Jesee way point), the course was 204 degrees, at 7,000 feet, to the Dezzi way point, from Dezzi the course was 114 degrees, descend to 5,600, to Sophi way point, after Sophi descend to 4,800 feet to the missed approach point at the Ruste way point. The distance from Dezzi to Ruste was 10 miles.

Ray M. Dolby

The pilot was cleared for a GPS approach. He stated that he was too high to make a good landing, so he opted for a circling approach to another runway. As he turned for the base leg, he lost visual contact and became disoriented. It was a dark night with no moon. The pilot realized that he was in a 70- to 80-degree left bank and returned the airplane to a level attitude, then noticed the ground directly in front of him. The aircraft ran through a barbed wire fence, collided with trees, and slid rearward to a stop in a high altitude meadow east of the airport. The FAA completed an evaluation of the circling approach procedures and night operations for that airport and did not find any problems.

Nozaki Sangyo

The pilot encountered poor visibility on approach to Kushiro Airport due to foggy conditions. Too low on final, the single engine aircraft collided with elements of the ILS systems and crashed 200 metres short of runway 17, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.

Private Austrian

On final approach to Braunschweig-Wolfsburg Airport, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the single engine aircraft struck power cables and crashed in the Oker River, about 3,5 short of runway 08 threshold. All six occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Durst

The single engine aircraft departed Freiburg im Breisgau Airport at 1216LT on a flight to Vienna-Schwechat Airport, carrying five passengers and one pilot. About 15 minutes later, after he reached the assigned altitude of 8,000 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in Wiedener Eck, near Wieden. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with snow falls and mist. The pilot did not send any distress call.

Socata

The accident flight was the final one of a series of sales demonstration flights. The demonstration pilot occupied the right seat and a potential customer was handling the aircraft from the left seat. The handling pilot was qualified and current on helicopters but had only 100 hours of fixed wing flying experience and had not flown a fixed wing aircraft as-pilot-in-command for some eight years; he controlled the aircraft throughout the flight, under the instruction of the demonstration pilot. After some general handling, including turns and a demonstration of the final approach configuration, F-GLBD returned to the local circuit. The first approach to runway 20 was slightly steep and the landing was firm but satisfactory. During the ground roll the demonstration pilot reconfigured the aircraft and the handling pilot applied power and made a take-off for another circuit. The second approach which was for a final landing was initially stable and on the glideslope. However, on short finals the aircraft went below the glideslope and the nose attitude was too high. There was a crosswind from the right and F-GLBD was on the left of the extended centerline. The demonstration pilot put his left hand on the power lever below that of the handling pilot and, as he did so, told the handling pilot to increase power. When no power was apparent the demonstration pilot repeated his instruction and also applied pressure to the power lever. As the aircraft approached the flare the handling pilot released the power lever and put both hands on the control wheel; the power lever moved quickly to the fully open position under the hand pressure of the demonstration pilot. The aircraft rolled rapidly to approximately 20° to 30° angle of bank to the left and the demonstration pilot took control with both hands on the control wheel. However, the left wing tip and the outboard trailing edge of the left flap struck the ground; the wing tip impact mark was off the runway to the left and the flap impact mark was just on the runway. The left main wheel then made contact with the runway, closely followed by the right main wheel. As the aircraft left the runway at an angle of approximately 230° to the left, the demonstration pilot closed the power lever, the aircraft continued across the grass for a distance of approximately 350 metres. It passed through and destroyed part of the PAPI installation, crossed runway 30 and came to a stop. At the time of the accident, it was dark and the weather was good; the surface wind was 230°/5 knots. All six occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Stage Aviation

According to the aircraft occupants, the aircraft owner, who holds a commercial pilot and cfi certificates, was occupying the right front seat. A friend of the pilot, a 246 hour private pilot with no experience in high performance turbine powered aircraft, was in the left seat and flying the aircraft under the direction of the owner. While on a straight in approach to the airport, the flight was advised three times by the atct of a variable right cross wind from 200 to 220° at speeds from 8 to 14 knots, with higher gust components. The tower also advised the flight of reports of light to moderate turbulence all the way to the ground. Both pilots reported that the aircraft had just touched down on runway 18 when a sudden cross wind gust lifted the right wing. The private pilot did not correct the situation and the aircraft owner could not overpower the other pilots control inputs in time to correct for the wind gust. The left wing tip drug the ground and the aircraft cartwheeled off the left side of the runway and into an airport fence.

Socata

The crew was completing a test flight from Toussus-le-Noble to Epinal. On approach to Epinal-Mirecourt Airport, visibility was below minimums. On final, as the crew was unable to locate the runway, he decided to initiate a go-around procedure and increased engine power. The aircraft rolled to the left, causing the left wing and the engine to struck the runway surface. Power was reduced and the aircraft bounced and eventually came to rest 400 metres further. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.