Learjet 35

Chromed in Hollywood

Aeromedevac Air Ambulance

On December 27, 2021, about 1914 Pacific standard time, a Gates Learjet Corporation 35A, N880Z, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near El Cajon, California. The 2 pilots, and 2 flight nurses were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 repositioning flight. Earlier in the day, the flight crew had flown from Lake Havasu City Airport (HII), Lake Havasu, Arizona, to John Wayne / Orange County Airport (SNA), Santa Ana, California, for a patient transfer. They departed SNA about 1856 to reposition to their home base at Gillespie Field (SEE), El Cajon, California. Review of preliminary communication recordings revealed that at 1908:23, the pilot contacted the SEE Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and reported to the controller they were on the GPS approach to runway 17. The controller issued the current wind and cleared the pilot to land on runway 17. At 1912:03, the pilot reported the airport in sight and requested to squawk VFR. The controller did not acknowledge the request to squawk VFR, however, he reissued the landing clearance for runway 17. At 1912:13, the pilot requested to land on runway 27. The controller asked the pilot if they wanted to cancel their IFR flight plan, to which the pilot replied, “yes sir.” The controller acknowledged that the IFR cancelation was received and instructed the pilot to overfly the field and enter left traffic for runway 27R and cleared them to land runway 27R. At 1912:30, the pilot requested that the runway lights for runway 27R be increased, however, the controller informed them that the lights were already at 100 percent. Preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that after departure from SNA, the flight made a left turn out over the waters of the Pacific Ocean and flew generally south – southeast along the coast and ascended to a cruise barometric altitude of about 11,000 ft sea level (MSL). After the flight passed Carlsbad, California, the airplane turned left and began to descend toward SEE. As shown in figure 1, ADS-B data showed that the airplane overflew SEE at a barometric altitude of about 775 ft MSL (407 ft above ground level) and entered a left downwind for runway 27R. While on the downwind leg, the airplane descended to a barometric altitude of 700 ft MSL, then ascended to a barometric altitude of 950 ft MSL while on the base leg. The last recorded ADS-B target was at 1914:09, at a barometric altitude of 875 ft MSL. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck a set of power lines and subsequently impacted the yard of a residential home about 1.43 nautical miles east of the approach end of runway 27R. The airplane came to rest upright on a heading of about 118°, at an elevation of about 595 ft msl. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a heading of about 310° and was about 186 ft long and 90 ft wide. All major structural components of the airplane were located throughout the wreckage debris path. The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination. At 1855, recorded weather data at SEE showed weather conditions were variable wind at 5 knots, visibility of 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 2,000 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10° C, dew point temperature of 8° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated. At 1955, SEE reported a variable wind of 5 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 1,100 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10°C, dew point temperature of 8°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.96 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated.

Electric Power Construção

The crew departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport for a local test flight. After landing on runway 13, the crew encountered difficulties and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through the perimeter fence (striking concrete poles) and came to rest against trees, broken in two. The copilot aged 76 was killed while both other occupants were injured.

MD Fly

The aircraft departed San Fernando to Esquel on an ambulance flight, carrying a doctor, a nurse and two pilots. While on a night approach to Esquel Airport, the crew encountered low visibility (down to 100 meters) due to foggy conditions. On final, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed, bursting into flames. Both medical staff were killed and both pilots were seriously injured. Two days later, the copilot died from his injuries.

Baires Fly

The aircraft departed Rosario-Islas Malvinas Airport at 1900LT on a charter flight to Buenos Aires, carrying two passengers and two pilots. On approach to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong winds. The aircraft landed 200 metres past the runway 13 threshold and the crew stated the braking procedure. After a course of about 500 metres, the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. It rolled on a grassy area then contacted the concrete taxiway, causing both main landing gear to be torn off. The aircraft came to rest 860 metres from the runway threshold and was damaged beyond repair. All four occupants evacuated safely.

Jet Rescue - Mexico

Following an uneventful flight, the crew configured the aircraft for landing when he realized that the right main landing gear was stuck in its wheel well. The crew continued the approach and landed on runway 15. The airplane fell on its belly, causing the right wing to struck the ground. The airplane slid for few hundred metres then veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a grassy area. All nine occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Trans-Pacific Air Charter

On May 15, 2017, about 1529 eastern daylight time, a Learjet 35A, N452DA, departed controlled flight while on a circling approach to runway 1 at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, and impacted a commercial building and parking lot. The pilot-in-command (PIC) and the second-in-command (SIC) died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to A&C Big Sky Aviation, LLC, and was operated by Trans-Pacific Air Charter, LLC, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, about 1504 and was destined for TEB. The accident occurred on the flight crew’s third and final scheduled flight of the day; the crew had previously flown from TEB to Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts, and then from BED to PHL. The PIC checked the weather before departing TEB about 0732; however, he did not check the weather again before the flight from PHL to TEB despite a company policy requiring that weather information be obtained within 3 hours of departure. Further, the crew filed a flight plan for the accident flight that included altitude (27,000 ft) and time en route (28 minutes) entries that were incompatible with each other, which suggests that the crew devoted little attention to preflight planning. The crew also had limited time in flight to plan and brief the approach, as required by company policy, and did not conduct an approach briefing before attempting to land at TEB. Cockpit voice recorder data indicated that the SIC was the pilot flying (PF) from PHL to TEB, despite a company policy prohibiting the SIC from acting as PF based on his level of experience. Although the accident flight waslikely not the first time that the SIC acted as PF (based on comments made during the flight), the PIC regularly coached the SIC (primarily on checklist initiation and airplane control) from before takeoff to the final seconds of the flight. The extensive coaching likely distracted the PIC from his duties as PIC and pilot monitoring, such as executing checklists and entering approach waypoints into the flight management system. Collectively, procedural deviations and errors resulted in the flight crew’s lack of situational awareness throughout the flight and approach to TEB. Because neither pilot realized that the airplane’s navigation equipment had not been properly set for the instrument approach clearance that the flight crew received, the crew improperly executed the vertical profile of the approach, crossing an intermediate fix and the final approach fix hundreds of feet above the altitudes specified by the approach procedure. The controller had vectored the flight for the instrument landing system runway 6 approach, circle to runway 1. When the crew initiated the circle-to-land maneuver, the airplane was 2.8 nautical miles (nm) beyond the final approach fix (about 1 mile from the runway 6 threshold) and could not be maneuvered to line up with the landing runway, which should have prompted the crew to execute a go-around because the flight did not meet the company’s stabilized approach criteria. However, neither pilot called for a go-around, and the PIC (who had assumed control of the airplane at this point in the flight) continued the approach by initiating a turn to align with the landing runway. Radar data indicated that the airplane’s airspeed was below the approach speed required by company standard operating procedures (SOPs). During the turn, the airplane stalled and crashed about 1/2 nm south of the runway 1 threshold.

Top Air

The aircraft departed Buenos Aires-San Fernando Airport on a positioning flight to Río Gallegos, carrying two pilots. During the takeoff roll, the copilot (pilot-in-command) noticed that the left engine N1 reached a value of 101% instead of 95% like the right engine. At that point the aircraft had already traveled 380 metres. As the aircraft started to veer to the right, the copilot decided to abandon the takeoff procedure without informing the captain. The power levers were brought back to idle and the copilot started to brake. After a course of about 980 metres, the right engine N1 value dropped to 30-40% while the left engine remained at 101%. Then the captain took over control, deployed briefly the thrust reverser system when the aircraft departed the runway to the right. While rolling in a grassy area, it struck a drainage ditch located 80 metres from the runway, lost its undercarriage then slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Private Venezuelan

For unknown reasons, the aircraft completed a belly landing at Panana City-Tocument Airport. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Diplomat Aviation

The aircraft crashed into a garbage and metal recycling plant after striking a towering crane in the Grand Bahama Shipyard, while attempting a second landing approach to runway 06 at Freeport International Airport (MYGF), Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas. The aircraft made an initial ILS instrument approach to Runway 06 at the Freeport International Airport but due to poor visibility and rain at the decision height, the crew executed a go around procedure. The crew requested to hold at the published holding point at 2,000 feet while they waited for the weather to improve. Once cleared for the second ILS approach, the crew proceeded inbound from the holding location to intercept the localizer of the ILS system associated with the instrument approach. During the approach, the crew periodically reported their position to ATC, as the approach was not in a radar environment. The crew was given current weather conditions and advised that the conditions were again deteriorating. The crew continued their approach and descended visually while attempting to find the runway, until the aircraft struck the crane positioned at Dock #2 of the Shipyard at approximately 220 feet above sea level, some 3.2 nautical miles (nm) from the runway threshold. A fireball lasting approximately 3 seconds was observed as a result of the contact between the aircraft and the crane. The right outboard wing, right landing gear and right wingtip fuel tank, separated from the aircraft on impact. This resulted in the aircraft travelling out of control, some 1,578 feet (526 yards) before crashing inverted into a pile of garbage and other debris in the City Services Garbage and Metal Recycling Plant adjacent to the Grand Bahama Shipyard. Both crew and 7 passengers were fatally injured. No person on the ground was injured. The crane in the shipyard that was struck received minimal damages while the generator unit and other equipment in the recycling plant received extensive damages.

FAI rent-a-jet

The airplane was completing an ambulance flight (positioning) from Europe to Bata, Equatorial Guinea, with an intermediate stop in Tamanrasset, carrying a medical team of two doctors and two pilots. During the takeoff roll from Tamanrasset-Aguenar Airport, the crew heard a loud noise and decided to abort. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest. All four occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

GFD - Gesellschaft Für Flugzieldarstellung

On 23 June 2014 at 1522 hrs the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) informed the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) that a collision involving a civil Learjet 35A (Learjet) and a German Air Force Eurofighter had occurred during aerial target demonstrations. According to the Law Relating to the Investigation into Accidents and Incidents Associated with the Operation of Civil Aircraft (FlUUG) accidents and incidents involving civil and military aircraft will be investigated under the responsibility of the BFU. The BFU immediately deployed a team of five investigators to the accident site. The BFU was supported by the Directorate Aviation Safety of the German Armed Forces (AbtFlSichhBw). The Learjet, operated by a civil operator specializing in manned aerial target demonstrations, had taken off at Hohn Airport and had initially been flying with a southern heading in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). At the time of the accident the Learjet had changed to Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and was flying in airspace E with a northern heading. A formation consisting of two Eurofighters had taken off from Nörvenich Air Base with the order to conduct a so-called Renegade mission, i.e. the unknown civil aircraft had to be intercepted, identified, and accompanied to a military airport. After the collision with a Eurofighter, the Learjet crashed to the ground. The pilots of the Learjet suffered fatal injuries and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot of the Eurofighter could land the severely damaged airplane at Nörvenich Air Base.

Evergreen International Airlines

The crew of the twinjet reported that the positioning flight after maintenance was uneventful. However, during the landing roll at their home base, the thrust reversers, steering, and braking systems did not respond. As the airplane approached the end of the runway, the pilot activated the emergency braking system; however, the airplane overran the end of the runway, coming to rest in a ditch. None of the three occupants were injured, but the airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. Two squat switches provided redundancy within the airplane’s electrical system and were configured to prevent inadvertent activation of the thrust reversers and nosewheel steering during flight and to prevent the airplane from landing with the brakes already applied. Because postaccident examination revealed that the squat switch assemblies on the left and right landing gear struts were partially detached from their mounting pads such that both switches were deactivated, all of these systems were inoperative as the airplane landed. The switch assemblies were undamaged, and did not show evidence of being detached for a long period of time. The brakes and steering were working during taxi before departure, but this was most likely because either one or both of the switches were making partial contact at that time. Therefore, it was most likely that the squat switch assemblies were manipulated on purpose during maintenance in an effort to set the airplane’s systems to “air mode.” Examination of the maintenance records did not reveal any recent procedures that required setting the airplane to air mode, and all mechanics involved in the maintenance denied disabling the switches. Mechanics did, however, miss two opportunities to identify the anomaly, both during the return-to-service check and the predelivery aircraft and equipment status check. The anomaly was also missed by the airplane operator’s mechanic and flight crew who performed the preflight inspection. The airplane’s emergency braking system was independent of the squat switches and appeared to operate normally during a postaccident test. Prior to testing, it was noted that the emergency brake gauge indicated a full charge; therefore, although evidence suggests that the emergency brake handle was used, it was not activated with enough force by the pilot. The pilot later conceded this fact and further stated that he should have used the emergency braking system earlier during the landing roll. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which captured the entire accident sequence. Analysis revealed that the airplane took just over 60 seconds to reach the runway end following touchdown, and, during that time, two attempts were made by the pilot to activate the thrust reversers. The pilot stated that as the airplane approached the runway end, the copilot made a third attempt to activate the thrust reversers, which increased the engine thrust, and thereby caused the airplane to accelerate. Audio captured on the CVR corroborated this statement.

Priester Aviation

The flight encountered light rime icing during an instrument approach to the destination airport. The copilot was the pilot flying at the time of the accident. He reported that the airframe anti-icing system was turned off upon intercepting the instrument approach glide slope, which was shortly before the airplane descended below the cloud layer. He recalled observing light frost on the outboard wing and tip tank during the approach. The stick shaker activated on short final, and the airplane impacted left of the runway centerline before it ultimately departed the right side of the runway pavement and crossed a slight rise before coming to rest in the grass. The cockpit voice recorder transcript indicated that the pilots were operating in icing conditions without the wing anti- ice system activated for about 4 1/2 minutes prior to activation of the stick shaker. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure of the flight control system or a loss of anti-ice system functionality. A performance study determined that the airplane’s airspeed during the final 30 seconds of the flight was about 114 knots and that the angle of attack ultimately met the stick shaker threshold. The expected stall speed for the airplane was about 93 knots. The airplane flight manual stated that anti-ice systems should be turned on prior to operation in icing conditions during normal operations. The manual warned that even small accumulations of ice on the wing leading edge can cause an aerodynamic stall prior to activation of the stick shaker and/or stick pusher.

Bluegrass Aviation Partners

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard at Jeffersonville-Clark County Airport. There were no injuries among the people on board and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages to the left wing and the tail section.

Líder Taxi Aéreo

The aircraft was completing an ambulance flight from Palm Beach to Rio de Janeiro with intermediate stops in Aguadilla and Manaus, carrying one patient, a medical team and two pilots. During the takeoff roll from 10 at Manaus-Eduardo Gomes Airport, just before V1 speed, the crew heard a loud noise coming from the right side of the airplane. In the mean time, the aircraft started to deviate to the right. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated a braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest 400 metres past the runway end. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damage beyond repair.

Royal Air Freight - Royal Air Charter

The flight was scheduled to pick up cargo at the destination airport and then deliver it to another location. During the descent and 14 minutes before the accident, the airplane encountered a layer of moderate rime ice. The captain, who was the pilot flying, and the first officer, who was the monitoring pilot, made multiple statements which were consistent with their awareness and presence of airframe icing. After obtaining visual flight rules conditions, the flight crew canceled the instrument flight rules clearance and continued with a right, circling approach to the runway. While turning into the base leg of the traffic pattern, and 45 seconds prior to the accident, the captain called for full flaps and the engine power levers were adjusted several times between 50 and 95 percent. In addition, the captain inquired about the autopilot and fuel balance. In response, the first officer stated that he did not think that the spoilerons were working. Shortly thereafter, the first officer gave the command to add full engine power and the airplane impacted terrain. There was no evidence of flight crew impairment or fatigue in the final 30 minutes of the flight. The cockpit voice recorder showed multiple instances during the flight in which the airplane was below 10,000 feet mean sea level that the crew was engaged in discussions that were not consistent with a sterile cockpit environment, for example a lengthy discussion about Class B airspeeds, which may have led to a relaxed and casual cockpit atmosphere. In addition, the flight crew appears to have conducted checklists in a generally informal manner. As the flight was conducted by a Part 135 operator, it would be expected that both pilots were versed with the importance of sterile cockpit rules and the importance of adhering to procedures, including demonstrating checklist discipline. For approximately the last 24 seconds of flight, both pilots were likely focusing their attention on activities to identify and understand the reason for the airplane's roll handling difficulties, as noted by the captain's comment related to the fuel balance. These events, culminating in the first officer's urgent command to add full power, suggested that neither pilot detected the airplane's decaying energy state before it reached a critical level for the conditions it encountered. Light bulb filament examination revealed that aileron augmentation system and stall warning lights illuminated in the cockpit. No mechanical anomalies were found to substantiate a failure in the aileron augmentation system. No additional mechanical or system anomalies were noted with the airplane. A performance study, limited by available data, could not confirm the airplane's movements relative to an aileron augmentation system or spoileron problem. The level of airframe icing and its possible effect on the airplane at the time of the accident could not be determined.

Todo Para la Aeronáutica

Shortly after takeoff from Guadalajara-Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Airport, the crew encountered high voltage problems. While trying to resolve the issue, the electrical system failed. The crew informed ATC and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. Upon touchdown, the landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its belly and came to rest, bursting into flames. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

FAI rent-a-jet

The crew was completing a cargo flight from Kisangani to Bukavu on behalf of the United Nations. During the takeoff roll, the crew decided to reject takeoff for unknown reasons. The aircraft deviated to the right, causing the main gear to be torn off. The aircraft then slid for few dozen metres and came to rest with its right wing severely damaged. Both pilots escaped uninjured.

Reali Taxi Aéreo

The aircraft was returning to its base in Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont following an ambulance flight to Campo de Marte AFB. Shortly after takeoff from runway 30, while climbing to an altitude of 1,400 feet, the aircraft rolled to the right to an angle of 90° then entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed onto several houses located on Bernardino de Sena Street, bursting into flames. Both pilots as well as six people on the ground were killed. Six others people were seriously injured.

JaGee Ventures

According to the flight crew, they exited the clouds approximately 250 feet above ground level, slightly left of the runway centerline. The pilot not flying took control of the airplane and adjusted the course to the right. The airplane rolled hard to the right and when the pilot corrected to the left, the airplane rolled hard to the left. The airplane impacted the ground in a right wing low attitude, resulting in substantial damage. Further examination and testing revealed anomalies with the yaw damper and spoileron computer. According to the manufacturer, these anomalies would not have prevented control of the airplane. Greater control wheel displacement and force to achieve a desired roll rate when compared with an operative spoileron system would be required. The result would be a slightly higher workload for the pilot, particularly in turbulence or crosswind conditions. An examination of the remaining systems revealed no anomalies.

World Jet II

On August 11, 2007, at 1635 Atlantic standard time, a Gates Learjet 35A, N500ND, registered to World Jet of Delaware Inc, and operated by World Jet II as a 14 CFR 135 on-demand on-scheduled international passenger air taxi flight, went off the end of runway 09 at Melville Hall, Dominica, on landing roll out. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot in command (PIC), first officer (FO), and four passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Saint John's Antigua Island on August 11, 2007, at 1600. The PIC stated the first officer was flying the airplane and the tower cleared them to enter a left downwind. On touchdown the FO requested spoilers, and noticed poor braking. The PIC pumped the brakes with no response. The drag chute was deployed but was not effective. The PIC stated he took over the flight controls and applied maximum braking. The airplane continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, through a fence, and came to a stop on a road.

AirNet Systems

The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight recovery after the captain attempted an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise flight and lost control. The cargo flight was being operated at night under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 at the time of the accident. The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the intentional aileron roll maneuver. The captain stated that the "intentional roll maneuver got out of control" while descending through flight level 200. The captain reported that the airplane "over sped" and experienced "excessive G-loads" during the subsequent recovery. The copilot reported that the roll maneuver initiated by the captain resulted in a "nose-down unusual attitude" and a "high speed dive." Inspection of the airplane showed substantial damage to the left wing and elevator assembly.

Royal Thai Air Force - Kong Thap Akat Thai

Shortly after takeoff from Nakhon Sawan-Takhli AFB, while climbing to a height of about 150 feet, the pilot contacted ATC and declared an emergency following a loss of engine power. He elected to return for an emergency landing when the aircraft went out of control and crashed onto a hangar located near the airport, bursting into flames. All seven occupants were killed, among them two photographers and one mechanic who were taking part to a reconnaissance mission in view to prepare an incoming air race in Thailand.

International Jet Charter

The crew briefed the Instrument Landing System approach, including the missed approach procedures. Weather at the time included a 100-foot broken cloud layer, and at the airport, 2 miles visibility. The approach was flown over water, and at the accident location, there was dense fog. Two smaller airplanes had successfully completed the approach prior to the accident airplane. The captain flew the approach and the first officer made 100-foot callouts during the final descent, until 200 feet above the decision height. At that point, the captain asked the first officer if he saw anything. The first officer reported "ground contact," then noted "decision height." The captain immediately reported "I got the lights" which the first officer confirmed. The captain reduced the power to flight idle. Approximately 4 seconds later, the captain attempted to increase power. However, the engines did not have time to respond before the airplane descended into the water and impacted a series of approach light stanchions, commencing about 2,000 feet from the runway. Neither crew member continued to call out altitudes after seeing the approach lights, and the captain descended the airplane below the decision height before having the requisite descent criteria. The absence of ground references could have been conducive to a featureless terrain illusion in which the captain would have believed that the airplane was at a higher altitude than it actually was. There were no mechanical anomalies which would have precluded normal airplane operation.

Bankair

During the takeoff roll, after the pilot disengaged the nose gear steering, the airplane began to turn to the right. The copilot noticed fluctuations with the engine indications, and called for an abort. Power was reduced to idle, and the pilot corrected to the left using left rudder pedal and braking. The airplane turned to the right again, and the pilot corrected to the left. The airplane continued to turn left, and departed the left side of the runway, tail first, and was substantially damaged. The airplane had accrued 18,040.3 total hours of operation. It was powered by two turbofan engines, each equipped with an electronic fuel computer. Examination of the left engine's wiring harness revealed that the outer shielding on the fuel computer harness assembly was loose, deteriorated, and an approximate 3-inch section was missing. Multiple areas of the outer shielding were also chaffed, the ground wire for the shielding was worn through, and the wiring was exposed. Testing of the wiring to the fuel computer connector, revealed an intermittent connection. After disassembly of the connector, it was discovered that the connector pin's wire was broken off at its crimp location. Examination under a microscope of the interior of the pin, revealed broken wire fragments that displayed evidence of corrosion. Simulation of an intermittent electrical connection resulted in N1 spool fluctuations of 2,000 rpm during engine test cell runs. According to the airplane's wiring maintenance manual, a visual inspection of all electrical wiring in the nacelle to check for security, clamping, routing, clearance, and general condition was to be conducted every 300 hours or 12 calendar months. Additionally, all wire harness shield overbraids and shield terminations were required to be inspected for security and general condition every 300 hours or 12 calendar months, and at every 600 hours or 24 calendar months. According to company maintenance records, the wiring had been inspected 6 days prior to the accident.

Skyward Aviation - USA

The airplane collided with the ground during a low altitude, steep banked, base-to-final left turn toward the landing runway during a circling instrument approach. The airplane impacted terrain 1/3-mile from the approach end of runway 28, and north of its extended centerline. A witness, located in the airport's administration building, made the following statement regarding his observations: "I saw the aircraft in and out of the clouds in a close base for [runway] 28. I then saw the aircraft emerge from a cloud in a base to final turn [and] it appeared to be approximately 300-400 feet above the ground. The left wing was down nearly 90 degrees. The aircraft appeared north of the [runway 28] centerline. The aircraft pitched nose down approximately 30-40 degrees and appeared to do a 1/2 cartwheel on the ground before exploding." ATC controllers had cleared the airplane to perform a GPS-A (circling) approach. The published weather minimums for category C and D airplanes at the 5,900-foot mean sea level airport was 3 miles visibility, and the minimum descent altitude was 8,200 feet mean sea level (msl). Airport weather observers noted that when the accident occurred, the visibility was between 1 1/2 and 5 miles. Scattered clouds existed at 1,200 feet above ground level (7,100 feet msl), a broken ceiling existed at 1,500 feet agl (7,400 feet msl) and an overcast condition existed at 2,400 feet agl (8,300 feet msl). During the approach, the first officer acknowledged to the controller that he had received the airport's weather. The airplane overflew the airport in a southerly direction, turned east, and entered a left downwind pattern toward runway 28. A 20- to 30-knot gusty surface wind existed from 220 degrees, and the pilot inadequately compensated for the wind during his base leg-to-final approach turning maneuver. The airplane was equipped with Digital Electronic Engine Controls (DEEC) that recorded specific data bits relating to, for example, engine speed, power lever position and time. During the last 4 seconds of recorded data (flight), both of the power levers were positioned from a mid range point to apply takeoff power, and the engines responded accordingly. No evidence was found of any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The operator's flight training program emphasized that during approaches consideration of wind drift is essential, and a circling approach should not be attempted in marginal conditions.

Aspen Aviation

A witness saw the airplane approach from the east. She said that the airplane came in "pretty fast" and touched down "approximately half way down the runway." The witness said, "The nose was down. He hit the ground and within 3 seconds he was off the runway and gone. Then all you saw was smoke." The witness said when the airplane hit "the front end shook. It wobbled like a kid on a tricycle. When it shook, it kind of looked like it [the airplane] bounced. Then it was gone." The control tower operator said he heard the captain say something over the radio, which caused him to look in the direction of the airplane. The tower operator saw the airplane off the runway, the main landing gear came off behind the airplane, and the airplane caught fire. The tower operator said he saw four people get out of the airplane. The airplane came to rest in a shallow ravine approximately 331 feet north of the runway. An examination of the airplane showed impact damage to the nose gear and nose gear wheel well. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies.

Million Air Charter

The Learjet 35A received substantial damage on impact with airport property and terrain during a landing overrun on runway 19 (7,002 feet by 150 feet, grooved asphalt) at Charles B. Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC), Kansas City, Missouri. The airplane was operated by a commercial operator as a positioning flight to Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri, with a filed alternate destination of Lincoln Airport (LNK), Lincoln, Nebraska. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. LNK was a certificated airport with a snow removal plan and was served by runway 17R (12,901 feet by 200 feet, grooved asphalt and concrete). The flight was en route to MCI to pick up passengers and continue on as an on-demand charter but diverted to MKC following the closure of MCI. MCI was closed due to a McDonnell Douglas MD83 sliding off a taxiway during an after landing taxi on contaminated runway/taxiway conditions. MKC held a limited airport certificate that did not have a snow removal plan and was served by runway 19. Following a precision approach and landing on runway 19 at MKC, the Learjet 35A slid off the departure end of the runway and impacted airport property and terrain. The Learjet 35A was operated with inoperative thrust reversers as per the airplane's minimum equipment list at the time of the accident. About 1:05 hours before the accident, runway 19 Tapley values were recorded as 21-22-22 with 1/2 inch of wet snow. About 17 minutes before the accident, MKC began snow removal operations. About 7 minutes before the accident, the MKC air traffic control tower (TWR) instructed the snow removal vehicles to clear the runway for inbound traffic. TWR was advised by airport personnel that runway 19 was plowed and surface conditions were 1/4 inch of snow of snow; friction values were not taken or reported. While inbound, the Learjet 35A requested any braking action reports from TWR. The first airplane to land was a Cessna 210 Centurion, and the pilot reported braking action to the TWR as "moderate", which was then transmitted by TWR as "fair" from a Centurion in response to the Learjet 35A's query. The Cessna 210 Centurion pilot did not use brakes during landing and did not indicate this to TWR during his braking action report. The Aeronautical Information Manual states that no correlation has been established between MU values and the descriptive terms "good," fair," and "nil" used in braking action reports. The Airport Winter Safety and Operations advisory circular (AC) states that "pilot braking action reports oftentimes have been found to vary significantly, even when reported on the same frozen contaminant surface conditions." The AC also states, "It is generally accepted that friction surveys will be reliable as long as the depth of snow does not exceed 1 inch (2.5 cm) and/or depth of wet snow/slush does not exceed 1/8 inch (3mm). The Learjet 35A flightcrew calculated a landing distance 5,400 feet. Two of the cockpit voice recording channels, which normally contain the pilot and copilot audio panel information, were blank.

Aviation Jet Charters

The flightcrew stated that approximately 8 miles out on a visual approach for runway 10 they requested winds and altimeter setting from the control tower. They received altimeter setting 29.95 inches Hg., and winds from 090 degrees at 20 knots. About 5 miles out, in full landing configuration, they checked wind conditions again, and were told 090 at 16 knots. They were holding Vref of 125 knots plus 10 knots on final. The approach was normal until they got a downdraft on short final. The airplane sank and they reacted by immediately adding engine power and increasing pitch, but the airplane continued to sink. The airplane's main landing gear came in contact with the top of the barbwire fencing at the approach end of the runway. The airplane landed short of the threshold. The airplane was under control during the roll out and they taxied to the ramp. A special weather observation was taken at the Vance W. Amory International Airport at 1930, 10 minutes after the accident. The special weather observation was winds 090 at 15 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 2,000, temperature 27 degrees centigrade, dewpoint temperature 23 degrees centigrade, altimeter setting 29.95 inches hg.

Air East Management

About 5 miles west of the airport, the flightcrew advised the approach controller that they had visual contact with the airport, canceled their IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules. A witness heard the airplane approach from the east, and observed the airplane at a height consistent with the approach minimums for the VOR approach. The airplane continued over the runway, and entered a "tight" downwind. The witness lost visual contact with the airplane due to it "skimming" into or behind clouds. The airplane reappeared from the clouds at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground on a base leg. As it overshot the extended centerline for the runway, the bank angle increased to about 90-degrees. The airplane then descended out of view. The witness described the weather to the north and northeast of the airport, as poor visibility with "scuddy" clouds. According to CVR and FDR data, about 1.5 miles from the runway with the first officer at the controls, and south of the extended runway centerline, the airplane turned left, and then back toward the right. During that portion of the flight, the first officer stated, "what happens if we break out, pray tell." The captain replied, "uh, I don't see it on the left side it's gonna be a problem." When the airplane was about 1/8- mile south of the runway threshold, the first officer relinquished the controls to the captain. The captain then made an approximate 60-degree heading change to the right back toward the runway. The airplane crossed over the runway at an altitude of 200 feet, and began a left turn towards the center of the airport. During the turn, the first officer set the flaps to 20 degrees. The airplane reentered a left downwind, about 1,100 feet south of the runway, at an altitude of 400 feet. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, the captain called for "flaps twenty," and the first officer replied, "flaps twenty coming in." The CVR recorded the sound of a click, followed by the sound of a trim-in-motion clicker. The trim-in-motion audio clicker system would not sound if the flaps were positioned beyond 3 degrees. About 31 seconds later, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stick pusher stall warning tone. The airplane impacted a rooftop of a residential home about 1/4-mile northeast of the approach end of the runway, struck trees, a second residential home, a second line of trees, a third residential home, and came to rest in a river. Examination of the wreckage revealed the captain's airspeed indicator reference bug was set to 144 knots, and the first officer's was set to 124 knots. The flap selector switch was observed in the "UP" position. A review of the Airplane Flight Manual revealed the stall speeds for flap positions of 0 and 8 degrees, and a bank angle of 60 degrees, were 164 and 148 knots respectfully. There were no charts available to calculate stall speeds for level coordinated turns in excess of 60 degrees. The flightcrew was trained to apply procedures set forth by the airplane's Technical Manual, which stated, "…The PF (Pilot Flying) will call for flap and gear extension and retraction. The PNF (Pilot not flying) will normally actuate the landing gear. The PNF will respond by checking appropriate airspeed, repeating the flap or gear setting called for, and placing the lever in the requested position... The PNF should always verify that the requested setting is reasonable and appropriate for the phase of flighty and speed/weight combination."

E.A.S. Aeroservizi - Executive Aviation Services

During an inspection of the right engine a technician found chips in the oil filter. The damage should have been repaired within the next 20 flight hours. Since the maintenance organization in Switzerland, who usually carry out necessary repairs, did not have the spare parts available on time, the task was assigned to an organization in Nuernberg. On 07.02.2001, the airplane was ferried to Nuernberg and repaired in the presence of the chief technician of the operator. The repairs and the replacement of the parts exclusively on the right engine were certified properly. The return flight to Rome was planned for the 8th of February 2001 at about 1530 o’clock. A charter flight from Rome was to be carried out on the following day. Two pilots and the chief technician of the operator were aboard the aircraft. The flight preparation was carried out by phone from the repair facility. A weather briefing and the NOTAM´s for the flight were obtained properly. The check lists for the take-off were read. During the preparation the unbalanced fuel distribution between the right and left-hand tanks, and the fact that the total amount yet was equal on both sides was discussed. Immediately afterwards the second pilot noticed the failure of his gyro instruments. The airplane was taxied via the taxiways "Juliet" and "Foxtrot" to runway 10. Pilot at the controls was the pilot in command while the second pilot carried out the radio communications with the air traffic control. The pilots received the clearance for a departure via the departure route Noerdlingen (NDG 1 M) to Rome. The take-off was at 1531 o'clock. After 5 nautical miles the airplane turned to the south, following the departure route. At 15:33:49 o'clock the left-hand engine failed without a previous warning. The noise of a down running engine was also heard by several witnesses on the ground. Smoke or a fire was not seen by them. The second pilot reported an emergency with the left-hand engine shortly after the occurrence to the control tower and informed them that they wanted to return for a landing on the runway 10. At that time there were visual meteorological conditions, and the runway was continuously to be seen. Since the departure control Nuernber APP wished to coordinate the flight, the frequency was changed for a short time upon request. After the second pilot had declared the emergency once again they switched back to the tower again and continued the approach to runway 10. Up to the final approach the flight was without particular occurrences. The flaps were first set to 8° and later on to 20°, afterwards the landing gear was extended. At this time the airplane was somewhat north of the extended centerline slightly above the glide path for an instrument approach. Approximately one kilometer in front of the runway, when flying over the main road no. 4 near the small town of Buch, the airplane was observed by different witnesses as it made unusual flight maneuvers. The airplane deviated then from the landing direction to the north, and made some reeling movements. Afterwards it seemed for a short period that the pilot intended to turn right to reach the runway. Immediately afterwards and near the ground the airplane abruptly stalled to the left approximately maintaining its height, then assuming a bank angle of more than 90°, and crashed nearly upside down at 1540 o’clock into a forest north of the runway. The airport fire service, who were in a standby position due to the announced safety landing of the Learjet reached the accident site approximately 4 minutes later and started to extinguish the fire. All three occupants had lost their lives during the impact. The airplane was destroyed.

Air Response North

The captain stated that prior to departure the flight controls were tested, with no abnormalities noted, and the takeoff trim was set to the "middle of the takeoff range," without referring to any available pitch trim charts. During the takeoff roll, the pilot attempted to rotate the airplane twice, and then aborted the takeoff halfway down the 4,840 foot long runway, because the controls "didn't feel right." The airplane traveled off the departure end of the runway and through a fence, and came to rest near a road. The pilot reported no particular malfunction with the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the horizontal stabilizer was positioned at -4.6 degrees, the maximum nose down limit within the takeoff range. The horizontal stabilizer trim and elevator controls were checked, and moved freely through their full ranges of travel. According to the AFM TAKEOFF TRIM C.G. FUNCTION chart, a horizontal stabilizer trim setting of -7.2 was appropriate with the calculated C.G. of 20% MAC. Additionally, Learjet certification testing data stated that the pull force required at a trim setting of -6.0 degrees, the "middle of the takeoff range", was 33 pounds. With the trim set at the full nose down position (-1.7 degrees), 132 pounds of force was required.

Northern Executive Aviation

The aircraft departed Farnborough Airport at 11h22 on a charter flight to Nice with two pilots and three passengers on board, among them the F1 driver David Coulthard. At 12h22, cruising at FL390, the left engine of the aircraft suffered a failure. The crew shut down and began to descend. They declared an emergency and asked to fly to the nearest aerodrome with a runway longer than one thousand six hundred metres. Lyon-Satolas Airport, located about 62 NM away left abeam of the aircraft, was proposed. The descent with one engine shut down towards Lyon-Satolas was undertaken under radar guidance, at a high speed and with a high rate of descent. At 12h35, the pilot stabilised the aircraft at 3,000 feet, intercepted the runway 36L ILS and was cleared to land. The final was started at 233 knots according to radar data and the slow down progressive. At 12h36 min 45 s, the flaps were extended to 8°. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 2,400 feet, 4,4 NM from the runway threshold and at a speed of 184 knots. At 12h36 min 58 s, the landing gear was extended. At 12h37 in 03 s, the flaps were set to 20°. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 2,100 feet, 3,5 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 180 knots. No malfunctions or additional problems were announced to the ATC by the crew during the final approach. At 12h38 min 08 s, the copilot told the captain that the aircraft was a little low. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 1,100 feet, 0,9 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 155 knots. At 12h38 min 17 s, he repeated his warning and announced a speed 10 knots above the approach reference speed. At 12h38 min 22 s, the copilot again stated that the aircraft was a little low on the approach path and immediately afterwards asked the captain to increase the thrust. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 900 feet, 0,1 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 150 knots. At 12h38 min 24 s, the captain indicated that he was losing control of the aircraft. The aircraft, over the runway threshold, banked sharply to the left, touched the ground with its wing, crashed and caught fire. Both pilots were killed while all three passengers evacuated with minor injuries.

Bankair

The pilot canceled the IFR flight plan as the aircraft crossed the VOR and reported the airport in site. The last radio contact with Air Traffic Control was at 0935:16. The crew did not report any problems before or during the accident flight. The distance from the VOR to the airport was 4 nautical miles. Witnesses saw the airplane enter right traffic at a low altitude, for a landing on runway 36, then turn right from base leg to final, less than a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane pitch up nose high, and the right wing dropped. The airplane than struck trees west of the runway, struck wires, caught fire, and impacted on a hard surface road. This was a training flight for the left seat pilot to retake a Learjet type rating check ride he had failed on March 24, 2000. He failed the check ride, because while performing an ILS approach in which he was given a simulated engine failure, and he was transitioning from instruments to VFR, he allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point below Vref [landing approach speed]. According to the company's training manual, "...if a crewmember fails to meet any of the qualification requirements because of a lack in flight proficiency, the crewmember must be returned to training status. After additional or retraining, an instructor recommendation is required for reaccomplishing the unsatisfactory qualification requirements." The accident flight was dispatched by the company as a training flight. On the accident flight a company check airman was in the right seat, and the check ride was set up for 0800, April 5,2000. The flight arrived an hour and a half late. The left seat pilot's, and the company's flight records did not indicate any training flights, or any other type of flights, for the pilot from March 24, 2000, the date of the failed check flight, and the accident flight on April 5, 2000. The accident flight was the first flight that the left seat pilot was to receive retraining, and was the only opportunity for him to demonstrate the phase of flight that he was unsuccessful at during the check flight on March 24th. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any discrepancies.

Sunjet Aviation

On October 25, 1999, about 1213 central daylight time (CDT), a Learjet Model 35, N47BA, operated by Sunjet Aviation, Inc., of Sanford, Florida, crashed near Aberdeen, South Dakota. The airplane departed Orlando, Florida, for Dallas, Texas, about 0920 eastern daylight time (EDT). Radio contact with the flight was lost north of Gainesville, Florida, after air traffic control (ATC) cleared the airplane to flight level (FL) 390. The airplane was intercepted by several U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Air National Guard (ANG) aircraft as it proceeded northwestbound. The military pilots in a position to observe the accident airplane at close range stated (in interviews or via radio transmissions) that the forward windshields of the Learjet seemed to be frosted or covered with condensation. The military pilots could not see into the cabin. They did not observe any structural anomaly or other unusual condition. The military pilots observed the airplane depart controlled flight and spiral to the ground, impacting an open field. All occupants on board the airplane (the captain, first officer, and four passengers) were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Crew: Michael Kling, Stephanie Bellegarrigue. Passengers: Payne Stewart, Van Ardan, Bruce Borland, Robert Fraley.

Avioriprese Jet Executive

The aircraft was completing a charter flight from Milan to Genoa with two pilots and one passenger on board, the Director of an Italian Company working for Coca Cola. On approach to Genoa-Cristoforo Colombo Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with low clouds and rain falls. Due to insufficient visibility, the crew initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, while completing a second attempt to land, the aircraft descended too low and crashed in the sea some 8 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.

Corporate Jets

The aircraft departed Naples, Italy, on a ferry flight to Lanseria, with intermediate stops in Luxor and Nairobi. The aircraft was ferried in South Africa to be refurbished as it was recently purchased by a new owner. Because of the border-crossing prohibition a second flight plan was filed via Djibouti City. While cruising at an altitude of 41,000 feet, the aircraft deviated from the initial route and crossed the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. At 1630LT, the aircraft was shot down by ground fire, entered a dive and crashed near the city of Adwa. Three days of negotiation with the Ethiopian government were necessary to clear a rescue team to visit the crash site. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both pilots, a British and a Swedish citizen, were killed.

Orion Aircraft Leasing

Witnesses near the airport saw the flight approach on a left base to runway 4, touchdown on the runway, and takeoff again. One witness, a pilot, said the airplane turned onto final to the 'south' (right) of the runway centerline.' The airplane made a 'sharp' turn to the left to realign with the runway center, slightly overshot the runway to the left, turned to the right 'sharply,' and touched down on the runway. The witness further stated, '...by the time the pilot was on the runway he had wasted approximately 1,200 to 1,500 feet of runway 4, they hit reverse thrusters [sic] and were on full bore till they crossed runway 27 and 9.' The witness saw heat come out of both engine thrust reversers, the nose gear touched down and then came up again. He then saw the airplane come off the ground about 30 to 40 feet, wobble left and right at a 'slow airspeed,' crossover a highway at a low altitude, right wing low, strike some wires, go into a field, and catch fire. The pilot said, when he touched down on the runway, the airplane seemed to 'lurch' to the side. He said at this point his airspeed was 126 knots. He elected to abort the landing, and applied full power. He said the engines would not develop thrust and he elected to land in a field less than 1/4 mile in front of him. Examination of the left thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully open. Both the left and right pneumatic latches were found in the unlocked position. Examination of the right thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully closed. The left pneumatic latch was found in the locked position. The right pneumatic latch was found in the unlocked position. The inboard sequence latches were found about 2 inches forward of full aft travel. The thrust reverser switch was found in the 'NORMAL' position. According to Gates Lear Jet Airworthiness Directive (AD) 79-08-01, '...to preclude inadvertent thrust reverser deployment and possible loss of aircraft control....,' the following limitations apply to all gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A, aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust reversers. According to the AD, Section I-LIMITATION; '....Thrust Reversers must not be operated prior to takeoff...Thrust Reversers must not be used for touch and go landings...After Thrust Reversers have been deployed, a visual check of proper door stowing must be made prior to takeoff...Operational Procedures in this Thrust Reverser Supplement are mandatory.' According to Lear Jet and FlightSafety International, the procedures that are taught to Lear Jet pilots in the use of thrust reverse and spoilers during landings are; '...pilots [are] to use thrust reverse only on full stop Lear Jet landings. Pilot are trained not to deploy spoilers or thrust reverse during touch and go's or during balked landings.' The pilot-in-command of N19LH at the time of the accident, told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that he was 'aware' of the limitations on the Aeronca Thrust Reverser and he knew that once the Thrust Reverser was deployed that he was 'committed' to land. The pilot told the IIC that he knew of the limitations and that he was committed to land.

First Air Jet Charter

The captain reported: 'Shortly after V1...there was a loss of power to the left engine....' (FAR Part 1 defines V1 as takeoff decision speed.) However, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, stated the captain retarded power on the left engine as a training exercise. The first officer stated there was no preflight discussion of emergency procedure practice. The airplane became airborne about 3,500 feet down the runway; the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft, and it crashed to the left of the runway, and a fire erupted. The crew escaped with minor injuries. A teardown of the left engine was performed under FAA supervision at the engine manufacturer's facilities; the engine manufacturer reported that damage found during the teardown 'was indicative of engine rotation and operation at the time of impact....' Both airspeed indicator bugs were found set 9 to 11 knots below the V1 speed on the takeoff and landing data (TOLD) card. No evidence of an aircraft or engine malfunction, to include inflight fire, was found at the accident site.

Colvin Aviation

The pilot-in-command stated he was cleared for an ILS approach. He had to use spoilers to intercept the glideslope. The landing was extended at the outer marker as the airspeed was slowed through 200 knots. As the airspeed decreased the spoilers were retracted and the flaps were extended to 20-degrees. The airplane was drifting to the right and flaps were lowered to 40-degrees as the drift was corrected. The airplane floated and touched down long. The spoilers, and brakes were applied as well as full reverse. There was no braking due to hydroplaning. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane went off the end of the runway, skidded through 200 feet of sod, vaulted off a 25 foot embankment, skidded across a road, and collided with a ditch.

Aircraft Charter Group

The first officer was in the left seat, flying the airplane, and the captain was in the right seat, for the positioning flight. Approaching the destination, the crew briefed, then attempted an ILS RWY 18 approach. The captain reported not receiving the localizer, when, in fact, the airplane was actually about 5 nautical miles to the left of it. Winds at the airport, about that time, were from 190 degrees true, at 5 knots; however, area winds at 6,000 feet were from 220 degrees, in excess of 40 knots. The crew executed a missed approach, but did not follow the missed approach procedures. The captain later requested, and received clearance for, the VOR RWY 25 approach. The captain partially briefed the approach to the first officer as the airplane neared the VOR, then subsequently "talked through" remaining phases of the approach as they occurred. The outbound course for the VOR RWY 25 approach was 066 degrees, and the minimum altitude outbound was 4,300 feet. After passing the VOR, the captain directed the first officer to maintain 4,700 feet. The airplane's last radar contact occurred as the airplane was proceeding outbound, 7 nautical miles northeast of the VOR, at 4,800 feet. As the airplane approached the course reversal portion of the procedure turn, the captain initially directed the first officer to turn the airplane in the wrong direction. When the proper heading was finally given, the airplane had been outbound for about 2 minutes. During the outbound portion of the course reversal, the captain told the first officer to descend the airplane to 2,900 feet, although the procedure called for the airplane to maintain a minimum of 4,300 feet until joining the inbound course to the VOR. During the inbound portion of the course reversal, the captain amended the altitude to 3,000 feet. As the airplane neared the inbound course to the VOR, the captain called out the outer marker. The first officer agreed, and the captain stated that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The first officer then noted that the VOR indications were fluctuating. The captain pointed out the VOR's continued reception, and the first officer noted, "but it's all over the place." Shortly thereafter, the first officer stated that he was descending the airplane to 2,300 feet. Three seconds later, the airplane impacted trees, then terrain. The wreckage was located at the 2,300-foot level, on rising mountainous terrain, 061 degrees magnetic, 12.5 nautical miles from the VOR. It was also 10.3 nautical miles prior to where a descent to 2,300 feet was authorized. There was no evidence that the crew used available DME information. There was also no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunction.

Aero Reservaciones Ejecutivas - ARE

The aircraft departed Ciudad Obregón Airport at 2001LT on a charter flight to Toluca, carrying four passengers and two pilots. For unknown reasons, the crew cancelled the flight plan and returned to Ciudad Obregón. A second takeoff was recorded at 2118LT and en route, the crew cancelled again the flight plan as he wanted to divert to Tepic, then Guadalajara and later Puerto Vallarta. After ATC informed the crew that Guadalajara Airport was closed to traffic, the crew finally decided to fly to Tepic. But this airport was also closed to traffic. On final approach to Tepic Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 8,3 km short of runway 02. At the time of the accident, the airport was closed and the approach light system was off. One of the passenger was the drug lord Héctor Luis Palma Salazar who was later arrested.

Servicios Turisticos

En route from Veracruz to Nogales, while 112 km from the destination, the crew declared an emergency following a fire in the left engine and was cleared to divert to Magdalena de Kino Airport. The aircraft landed too far down the runway which is 1,386 metres long. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest few dozen metres further, bursting into flames. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Canada Jet Charters

On 11 January 1995, at 0035 Pacific standard time (PST), the twin-engine Learjet 35 departed Vancouver International Airport, British Columbia, on a night, instrument flight rules (IFR), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) flight to the Masset aerodrome, on the northern end of the Queen Charlotte Islands. On board the Learjet were a flight crew of two pilots, and a medical team consisting of two attendants and a doctor. Their mission was to evacuate a patient from Masset and deliver her to Prince Rupert for treatment; the aircraft was then to return to Vancouver. The flight-planned route was at flight level (FL) 390, direct to Sandspit then direct to Masset. Following routine communications with Air Traffic Services (ATS), at about 0144, the aircraft reported "outbound" from the Masset non-directional beacon (NDB) on the published NDB "A" instrument approach procedure to runway 12. Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar, situated near Sandspit, tracked the aircraft as it flew the approach. Radar data shows that the aircraft began a descent about 10 seconds after it had completed the procedure turn and was established on the final inbound approach track. Forty-three seconds later, at a point 8.8 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold of runway 12 and on the final, inbound track, the aircraft disappeared from radar. Department of National Defence (DND) Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft began searching the area shortly after the aircraft was declared missing, and were later assisted by other private and military aircraft and vessels. On the second day of the search, flotsam from the aircraft was found in the area. Extensive underwater searching using sonar and underwater cameras found the aircraft wreckage on 31 January 1995, in 260 feet of water, near the last known position. The aircraft had been destroyed. The bodies of two occupants were found several days after the accident, but the other three occupants have not been found and are presumed to have been fatally injured. The accident occurred at latitude 54/08NN and longitude 131/58NW, at about 0149 PST, during the hours of darkness in unknown weather conditions.

Air Charter - Germany

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a charter flight from Munich to Magnitogorsk and back, with an intermediate stop in Moscow to pick up a Russian navigator. Shortly after takeoff, at a height of about 15 metres, the aircraft banked left and impacted the ground some 30 metres to the left of the runway. Out of control, it rolled for about 325 metres before coming to rest. A pilot was killed while six other occupants were seriously injured.