Cessna 414 Chancellor

MJ Aviation

Aircraft Charter and Leasing

Sierra AE

On October 8, 2020, about 1115 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 414, N8132Q, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at North Palm Beach County General Aviation Airport (F45), West Palm Beach, Florida. The private pilot and six passengers sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to the pilot’s son, a multiengine airplane rated passenger who was seated in the front right seat, his father was flying family members to Claxton-Evans County Airport, Claxton, Georgia, where they planned a fuel stop before proceeding to their home-base of Columbus Municipal Airport, Columbus, Indiana. After the preflight inspection, engine start and taxi, he noted no irregularities when his father performed the engine run-up. His father then taxied onto the runway, checked the trim for takeoff, applied brakes, and advanced the throttles to full power. Once at full rpm, his father released the brakes and the airplane began its takeoff roll. Shortly into the takeoff roll, he felt a momentary “slight shudder” which appeared to come from the controls. As the airplane continued down the runway, he looked out of the window and thought that they should have rotated. He observed that the airspeed indicator showed about 10 to 15 knots past “blueline;” however, the airplane remained on the runway and continued to gain speed. The airplane was running out of runway, and the pilot’s son attempted to pull back on the control yoke; however, the controls would not move, so he pulled the throttles back to idle and applied maximum braking; he estimated that the airplane’s indicated airspeed was between 120 and 130 knots when the aborted takeoff was initiated. The airplane departed the paved portion of the runway, travelled through the grass and impacted a dirt mound before coming to rest in a marsh. A witness who observed the takeoff stated, “They were going fast enough to fly, but they weren’t coming up off the ground.” He further stated said the engines never lost power until the pilot shut them off in an attempt to stop. Initial examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that it came to rest upright and submerged in about 5 ft of water about 450 ft beyond the departure end of runway 14. The fuselage and cabin area remained relatively intact. The right wing and engine were separated. The right elevator was bent upwards nearly vertical with the vertical stabilizer; the left elevator separated. The left wing and engine remained attached in their respective locations, with the outboard portion of the left wing sheared at the wing tip fuel tank.

Warbird Associates

On October 29, 2019, at 1058 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 414A airplane, N959MJ, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident in Colonia, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot’s spouse reported that he planned to depart Leesburg Executive Airport (JYO), Leesburg, Virginia, about 0900 local; however, he delayed his departure due to the weather at his destination, Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey. She reported that the pilot was scheduled to give a lecture in Queens, New York, in the afternoon. Review of radar and flight plan data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the airplane departed JYO at 0950 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and proceeded on course to LDJ. At 1053:20, the airplane’s radar altitude was 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and its position was over the DAPVY GPS waypoint, which was the first waypoint associated with the GPS-A circling instrument approach procedure to LDJ. The airplane then turned to a northeast heading, which was consistent with the final approach course for the GPS-A approach. For the next 2 1/2 minutes, the airplane descended along the final approach course and crossed the final approach fix (GEZSY) about 1,200 ft msl (radar altitude). During the descent from DAPVY to GEZSY, the airplane’s groundspeed varied from about 110 knots, to 140 knots, and then to 100 knots. The airplane continued to descend after GEZSY and crossed the subsequent waypoint of 3 nautical miles (nm) from BAUTZ about 700 ft msl. From GEZSY t0 3nm to BAUTZ the groundspeed varied from about 100 knots, to 115 knots, and to 85 knots. The airplane subsequently descended to 600 ft msl, maintained course, and remained at 600 ft for about 1 minute. During this time, groundspeed varied and increased from about 80 knots to 90 knots before decreasing to 65 knots. At 1058:02, the airplane’s flight track turned left off course and the airplane rapidly descended. The final radar return, at 1058:07, was less than 1/10 mile from the accident site and showed the airplane at 200 ft msl headed northwest. About 1050, the controller provided the pilot with a recently received pilot report (PIREP) for cloud bases at 500 ft overcast at nearby Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR). The pilot acknowledged and subsequently informed the controller that LDJ was reporting bases at 700 ft. The controller then informed the pilot that the automated report at EWR was reporting an 800 ft broken ceiling. At 1051:50 the pilot was cleared for the GPS-A nonprecision circling instrument approach procedure to LDJ. At 1056:56, the controller stated to the pilot, “say flight conditions.” The pilot immediately responded, “say again oh we're still IFR.” At 1058:06 the controller again asked the pilot to say the flight conditions; however, there was no response. At 1058:12, the controller stated to the pilot, “check altitude immediately;” however, there was no response from the pilot. This was the only altitude warning the controller provided to the pilot. The controller attempted to reach the pilot again multiple times, but there was no response.

KL Management

The commercial pilot departed for a cross-country, personal flight with no flight plan filed. No evidence was found that the pilot received a preflight weather briefing; therefore, it could not be determined if he checked or received any weather information before or during the accident flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed at the departure airport; however, during the departure climb, the weather transitioned to instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with precipitation, microburst, and rain showers over the accident area. During the takeoff clearance, the air traffic controller cautioned the pilot about deteriorating weather conditions about 4 miles east of the airport. Radar data showed that, about 5 1/2 minutes after takeoff, the airplane had climbed to about 7,800 ft above ground level before it started a rapid descending right turn and subsequently impacted the ground about 9.6 miles east of the departure airport. Recorded data from the airplane’s Appareo Stratus 2S (portable ADS-B receiver and attitude heading and reference system) revealed that, during the last 15 seconds of the flight, the airplane’s attitude changed erratically with the pitch angle fluctuating between 45° nose-down and 75°nose-up, and the bank angle fluctuating between 170° left and 150° right while descending from 5,500 to 500 ft above ground level, indicative of a loss of airplane control shortly after the airplane entered the clouds. Several witnesses located near the accident site reported seeing the airplane exit the clouds at a high descent rate, followed by airplane parts breaking off. One witness reported that he saw the airplane exit the overcast cloud layer with a nose down pitch of about 60°and remain in that attitude for about 4 to 5 seconds “before initiating a high-speed dive recovery,” at the bottom of which, the airplane began to roll right as the left horizontal stabilizer separated from the airplane, immediately followed by the remaining empennage. He added that the left wing then appeared to shear off near the left engine, followed by the wing igniting. An outdoor home security camera, located about 0.5 mile north-northwest of the accident location, captured the airplane exiting the clouds trailing black smoke and then igniting. Examination of the debris field, airplane component damage patterns, and the fracture surfaces of separated parts revealed that both wings and the one-piece horizontal stabilizer and elevators were separated from the empennage in flight due to overstress, which resulted from excessive air loads. Although the airplane was equipped with an autopilot, the erratic variations in heading and altitude during the last 15 seconds of the flight indicated that the pilot was likely hand-flying the airplane; therefore, he likely induced the excessive air loads while attempting to regain airplane control. Conditions conducive to the development of spatial orientation existed around the time of the in-flight breakup, including restricted visibility and the flight entering IMC. The flight track data was consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation and a resultant loss of airplane control. Therefore, the pilot likely lost airplane control after inadvertently entering IMC due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s design stress limits and subsequent in-flight breakup. Contributing to accident was the pilot’s improper decision to conduct the flight under visual flight rules despite encountering IMC and continuing the flight when the conditions deteriorated. Toxicology testing on specimens from the pilot detected the presence of delta-9-tetrahydrocanninol (THC) in heart blood, which indicated that the pilot had used marijuana at some point before the flight. Although there is no direct relationship between postmortem blood levels and antemortem effects from THC, it does undergo postmortem redistribution. Therefore, the antemortem THC level was likely lower than detected postmortem level due to postmortem redistribution from use of marijuana days previously, and it is unlikely that the pilot’s use of marijuana contributed to his poor decision-making the day of the accident. The toxicology testing also detected 67 ng/mL of the sedating antihistamine diphenhydramine. Generally, diphenhydramine is expected to cause sedating effects between 25 to 1,120 ng/mL. However, diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and the postmortem heart blood level may increase by about three times. Therefore, the antemortem level of diphenhydramine was likely at or below the lowest level expected to cause significant effects, and thus it is unlikely that the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine contributed to the accident.

Category III Aviation

The pilot and four passengers were nearing the completion of a cross-county business flight. While maneuvering in the traffic pattern at the destination airport, the controller asked the pilot if he could accept a shorter runway. The pilot said he could not, so he was instructed to enter a holding pattern for sequencing; less than a minute later, the pilot said he could accept the shorter runway. He was instructed to conduct a left 270° turn to enter the traffic pattern. The pilot initiated a left bank turn and then several seconds later the bank increased, and the airplane subsequently entered a steep nose-down descent. The airplane impacted a shopping center parking lot about 1.6 miles from the destination airport. A review of the airplane's flight data revealed that, shortly after entering the left turn, and as the airplane’s bank increased, its airspeed decreased to about 59 knots, which was well below the manufacturer’s published stall speed in any configuration. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot failed to maintain airspeed during the turn, which resulted in an exceedance of the aircraft's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.

Southern Aircraft Consultancy

The aircraft departed Dunkeswell Airfield on the morning of the accident for a flight to Retford (Gamston) Airfield with three passengers on board, two of whom held flying licences. The passengers all reported that the flight was uneventful and after spending an hour on the ground the aircraft departed with two passengers for Enstone Airfield. This flight was also flown without incident.The pilot reported that before departing Enstone he visually checked the level in the aircraft fuel tanks and there was 390 ltr (103 US gal) on board, approximately half of which was in the wingtip fuel tanks. After spending approximately one hour on the ground the pilot was heard to carry out his power checks before taxiing to the threshold of Runway 08 for a flight back to Dunkeswell with one passenger onboard). During the takeoff run the left engine was heard to stop and the aircraft veered to the left as it came to a halt. The pilot later recalled that he had seen birds in the climbout area and this was a factor in the abandoned takeoff. The aircraft was then seen to taxi to an area outside the Oxfordshire Sport Flying Club, where the pilot attempted to start the left engine, during which time the right engine also stopped. The right engine was restarted, and several attempts appeared to have been made to start the left engine, which spluttered into life before stopping again. Eventually the left engine started, blowing out clouds of white and black smoke. After the left engine was running smoothly the pilot was seen to taxi to the threshold for Runway 08. The takeoff run sounded normal and the landing gear was seen to retract at a height of approximately 200 ft agl. The climbout was captured on a video recording taken by an individual standing next to the disused runway, approximately 400 m to the south of Runway 08. The aircraft was initially captured while it was making a climbing turn to the right and after 10 seconds the wings levelled, the aircraft descended and disappeared behind a tree line. After a further 5 seconds the aircraft came into view flying west over buildings to the east of the disused runway at a low height, in a slightly nose-high attitude. The right propeller appeared to be rotating slowly, there was some left rudder applied and the aircraft was yawed to the right. The left engine could be heard running at a high rpm and the landing gear was in the extended position. The aircraft appeared to be in a gentle right turn and was last observed flying in a north-west direction. The video then cut away from the aircraft for a further 25 seconds and when it returned there was a plume of smoke coming from buildings to the north of the runway. The pilot reported that the engine had lost power during a right climbing turn during the departure. He recovered the aircraft to level flight and selected the ‘right fuel booster’ pump (auxiliary pump) and the engine recovered power. He decided to return to Enstone and when he was abeam the threshold for Runway 08 the right engine stopped. He feathered the propeller on the right engine and noted that the single-engine performance was insufficient to climb or manoeuvre and, therefore, he selected a ploughed field to the north of Enstone for a forced landing. During the approach the pilot noticed that the left engine would only produce “approximately 57%” of maximum power, with the result that he could not make the field and crashed into some farm buildings. There was an immediate fire following the accident and the pilot and passenger both escaped from the wreckage through the rear cabin door. The pilot sustained minor burns. The passenger, who was taken to the John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford, sustained burns to his body, a fractured vertebra, impact injuries to his chest and lacerations to his head.

Make it Happen Aviation

The twin-engine airplane, flown by an airline transport pilot, was approaching the destination airport after a cross-country flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. The destination airport weather conditions about 1 minute before the accident included an overcast ceiling at 200 ft and 1/2-mile visibility with light rain and fog. According to air traffic control (ATC) data, the flight received radar vectors to the final approach course for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 20. As shown by a post accident simulation study based on radar data and data recovered from the airplane's electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI), the airplane's flight path did not properly intercept and track either the localizer or the glideslope during the instrument approach. The airplane crossed the final approach fix about 360 ft below the glideslope and then maintained a descent profile below the glideslope until it leveled briefly near the minimum descent altitude, likely for a localizer-only instrument approach. However, the lateral flight path from the final approach fix inbound was one or more dots to the right of the localizer centerline until the airplane was about 1 nautical mile from the runway 20 threshold when it turned 90° left to an east course. The turn was initiated before the airplane had reached the missed approach point; additionally, the left turn was not in accordance with the published missed approach instructions, which specified a climb on runway heading before making a right turn to a 270° magnetic heading. The airplane made a series of pitch excursions as it flew away from the localizer. The simulation study determined that dual engine power was required to match the recorded flight trajectory and ground speeds, which indicated that both engines were operating throughout the approach. The simulation results also indicated that, based on calculated angle of attack and lift coefficient data, the airplane likely encountered an aerodynamic stall during its course deviation to the east. The airplane impacted the ground about 2.2 miles east-northeast of the runway 20 threshold and about 1.75 miles east of the localizer centerline. According to FAA documentation, at the time of the accident, all components of the airport's ILS were functional, with no recorded errors, and the localizer was radiating a front-course to the correct runway. Additionally, a post accident flight check found no anomalies with the instrument approach.An onsite examination established that the airplane impacted the ground upright and in a nose-low attitude, and the lack of an appreciable debris path was consistent with an aerodynamic stall/spin. Wreckage examinations did not reveal any anomalies with the airplane's flight control systems, engines, or propellers. The glideslope antenna was found disconnected from its associated cable circuit. Laboratory examination and testing determined that the glideslope antenna cable was likely inadequately connected/secured during the flight, which resulted in an unusable glideslope signal to the cockpit avionics. There was no history of recent maintenance on the glideslope antenna, and the reason for the inadequate connection could not be determined. Data downloaded from the airplane's EHSI established that the device was in the ILS mode during the instrument approach phase and that it had achieved a valid localizer state on both navigation channels; however, the device never achieved a valid glideslope state on either channel during the flight. Further, a replay of the recorded EHSI data confirmed that, during the approach, the device displayed a large "X" through the glideslope scale and did not display a deviation pointer, both of which were indications of an invalid glideslope state. There was no evidence of cumulative sleep loss, acute sleep loss, or medical conditions that indicated poor sleep quality for the pilot. However, the accident occurred more than 2 hours after the pilot routinely went to sleep, which suggests that the pilot's circadian system would not have been promoting alertness during the flight. Further, at the time of the accident, the pilot likely had been awake for 18 hours. Thus, the time at which the accident occurred and the extended hours of continuous wakefulness likely led to the development of fatigue. The presence of low cloud ceilings and the lack of glideslope guidance would have been stresses to the pilot during a critical phase of flight. This would have increased the pilot's workload and situational stress as he flew the localizer approach, a procedure that he likely did not anticipate or plan to conduct. In addition, weight and balance calculations indicated that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was aft of the allowable limit, and the series of pitch excursions that began shortly after the airplane turned left and flew away from the localizer suggests that the pilot had difficulty controlling airplane pitch. This difficulty was likely due to the adverse handling characteristics associated with the aft CG. These adverse handling characteristics would have further increased the pilot's workload and provided another distraction from maintaining control of the airplane. Therefore, it is likely that the higher workload caused by the pilot's attempt to fly an unanticipated localizer approach at night in low ceilings and his difficulty maintaining pitch control of the airplane with an aft CG contributed to his degraded task performance in the minutes preceding the accident.

Lawrence R. Liptack

The twin engine aircraft, owned by Lawrence R. Liptack, crashed in flames in an open field located northeast of Bowie, Texas. The pilot and owner, aged 51, was killed with his son aged 10. The multi-engine airplane was about 500 ft above ground level (agl) and on a left base landing approach when a witness saw the airplane suddenly point straight down, begin spinning, and make three complete rotations before impacting terrain in a partially nose-down attitude. The airplane came to rest upright, and was mostly consumed by an immediate post impact fire. A post accident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A pilot operating another pipeline patrol airplane in the vicinity reported frequent severe-to-extreme turbulence about 1,000-2,000 ft above ground level. Data from an on-board GPS unit indicated that, while on the base leg of the airport traffic pattern for landing, the accident airplane's airspeed decayed 10 knots below the manufacturer's recommended approach speed for turbulent conditions. An autopsy performed on the pilot found significant existing atherosclerotic disease (60 to 80 percent) and described evidence of an acute, premortem, nonocclusive thrombosis of the left anterior descending coronary artery. The medical examiner's conclusion stated it "appears the decedent likely suffered an acute cardiac event while piloting his aircraft" and "died primarily due to hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and that his multiple blunt force injuries likely contributed to his death." It is likely that the pilot was incapacitated due to the acute cardiac event and lost control of the airplane during the approach to land.

Tango Two Aviation

The pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff, the twin-engine airplane's left front baggage door opened. He attempted to return to the airport, but the left engine lost engine power while the airplane was on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The airplane subsequently impacted power lines and terrain. An explosion occurred during the impact sequence, and a fire ensued that almost completely consumed the airframe. Tear down examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies. A test run of the left engine revealed no anomalies; however, due to impact and fire damage, it was not possible to fully test or examine the left engine's fuel system. The reason for the left engine’s loss of power could not be determined.

Luis A. Terry

Aircraft was substantially damaged when it veered off the runway while landing at Hammonton Municipal Airport (N81), Hammonton, New Jersey. The private pilot was not injured and the commercial pilot-rated passenger received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight. The flight originated from Montgomery County Airpark (GAI), Gaithersburg, Maryland about 1105 and was destined for N81. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The airplane was being repositioned to N81 in order for the owner's insurance adjuster and a local mechanic to physically inspect previous claim work for damage done during ground handling following Hurricane Sandy. The pilot reported lowering the landing gear during the approach to runway 03, and confirmed that they were extended by observing the landing gear position indicator lights. Immediately after touchdown, the airplane veered to the left. The pilot applied full right rudder, but the airplane continued to veer to the left. After departing the left side of the runway, the airplane struck several trees and was subsequently engulfed in a post-crash fire. According to FAA records, the pilot held a private certificate, with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land. His most recent FAA third class medical certificate was issued on January 2, 2013. As of April 5, 2013, the pilot reported a total of 587 total hours of flight experience, of which 120 hours were in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The seven-seat, twin-engine, low-wing, retractable tricycle-gear airplane was manufactured in 1977 and was equipped with two Continental Motors TSIO-520, 520-hp engines. Review of the airplane's maintenance logbooks revealed that its most recent annual inspection was completed on October 26, 2012. At the time of inspection, the airplane had accumulated 9,335 total hours in service. The number one and two engines accumulated approximately 735 and 157 total hours of operation since overhaul, respectively. The airplane had flown about three hours since the most recent annual inspection. The 1154 recorded weather observation at Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey, located about 15 miles southeast of the accident site, included wind from 330 degrees at 13 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 1,600 feet, temperature 11 degrees C, dew point 4 degrees C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 29.83 inches of mercury. N81 was a non-tower-controlled airport equipped with one asphalt runway, oriented in a 03/21 configuration. The runway was 3,601 feet in length and 75 feet wide. The field elevation for the airport was 65 feet mean sea level.

Evram

The twin engine aircraft departed Innsbruck-Kranebitten Airport at 0654LT on a private flight to Valencia, Spain, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. VFR conditions prevailed at the time of departure. After takeoff from runway 26, the pilot turn to the south when he encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. In IMC conditions, the aircraft contacted trees, lost height and crashed in a wooded area located near the village of Ellbögen, about 15 km southeast of Innsbruck Airport, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 1,612 metres. Two passengers were seriously injure while six other occupants were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post impact fire.

Scott A. Humpal

The pilot performed an instrument approach to the runway with an approaching winter storm. A review of on-board global positioning system (GPS) data indicated that the airplane flew through the approach course several times during the approach and was consistently below the glideslope path. The airplane continued below the published decision height altitude and drifted to the right of the runway’s extended centerline. The GPS recorded the pilot’s attempt to perform a missed approach, a rapid decrease in ground speed, and then the airplane descend to the ground, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Further, the airplane owner, who was also a passenger on the flight, stated that, after the pilot made the two “left turning circles” and had begun a third circle, he perceived that the airplane “just stalled.” An examination of the airframe and engine did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s anti-ice and propeller anti-ice switches were found in the “off” position. A review of weather information revealed that the airplane was operating in an area with the potential for moderate icing and snow. Based on the GPS data and weather information, it is likely that the airframe collected ice during the descent and approach, which affected the airplane’s performance and led to an aerodynamic stall during the climb.

Forent Energy

The privately owned Cessna 414A departed Toronto/Buttonville Municipal Airport, Ontario, en route to Sydney, Nova Scotia. The flight was operating under an instrument flight rules flight plan with the pilot-in-command and the aircraft owner on board. Nearing Sydney, the aircraft was cleared to conduct an instrument approach. At the final approach waypoint the pilot was advised to discontinue the approach due to conflicting traffic. While manoeuvring for a second approach, the aircraft departed from controlled flight, entered a rapid descent and impacted the water at 2335 Atlantic Daylight Time. The aircraft wreckage was located using a side-scan sonar 11 days later, in 170 feet of water. The aircraft had been destroyed and both occupants were fatally injured. No signal was detected from the emergency locator transmitter.

Juan García Martínez

The twin engine aircraft departed San Salvador-Ilopango Airport on a private flight to Barranquilla with an intermediate stop in San Andrés Island, carrying one passenger and one pilot. On final approach to San Andrés-Gustavo Rojas Pinilla Airport runway 06, the left engine failed. The pilot increased power on the right engine but the aircraft continued to lose height. The pilot ditched the aircraft near the coast. Both occupants evacuated safely and were quickly rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Bajaj Holdings

According to witnesses, the airplane departed runway 35 and was observed flying in and out of the clouds. Several of the witnesses observed the airplane initiate a turn to the west. One witnesses commented that it was dark but he could still see the silhouette of the airplane. He observed the airplane descend below the trees. All of the witnesses reported flames and "fireballs." On scene evidence was consistent with the airplane impacting trees in a left turn. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of the airplane, flight controls, engines, and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. Weather observations and radar data depicted low clouds, and restricted visibility due to rain and mist, in the vicinity of the airport. Toxicological examination revealed cetirizine, an antihistamine, consistent with use within the previous 12 hours. Most studies have not found any significant impairment from the medication, though it is reported to cause substantial sedation in some individuals.

Drilling Structures International

The 2,212-hour instrument rated commercial pilot collided with terrain while circling to land after completing an instrument approach to an uncontrolled non-towered airport. The airport had two instrument approaches to Runway 14; a VOR and a RNAV(GPS). The published minimums for a circling approach to Runway 32 are a 500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility (VOR14) and a 700 foot ceiling and one mile visibility for RNAV(GPS) to Runway 14. The weather at the airport at the time of the accident was reported as 300 overcast, visibility of 3/4 of a mile in mist, with winds from 020 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 14 knots. Two witnesses reported that the airplane circled over the airport and then descended straight to the ground. Radar data revealed that after the airplane made the instrument approach to Runway 14, at approximately 2,800 feet mean sea level (msl), the airplane initiated a circling turn to the left and a slight descent. The last radar hit showed the airplane at 2,600 feet at a groundspeed of 186 knots. A post impact fire consumed some of the airframe. The pilot's logbooks were not located during the course of the investigation and his instrument experience and currency could not be determined. The pilot was reported to be very familiar with the airport and the 2 instrument approaches. A detailed examination of the wreckage of the airplane failed to reveal any anomalies with the airframe, structure, or systems. Flight control continuity was established at the accident site. The engines were examined, and no mechanical anomalies were found. The propellers were shipped to the manufacturer's facility for examination and teardown. Both propellers were rotating at the time of ground impact. Neither of the two propellers was found in the feathered position. Blade damage was consistent with both propellers operating under power at the time of impact. No mechanical defects were noted with either propeller.

Flight Source

The airplane encountered in-flight icing, and the pilot diverted to an airport to attempt to knock the ice off at a lower altitude. During the instrument approach, the pilot advised the tower controller of the ice, and that it depended on whether or not the ice came off the airplane if she would land. As the airplane broke out of the clouds, it appeared to tower personnel to be executing a missed approach; however, it suddenly "dove" for the runway. The tower supervisor noticed that the landing gear were not down, and at 75 to 100 feet above the runway, advised the pilot to go around. The airplane continued to descend, and by the time it impacted the runway, the landing gear were only partially extended, and the propellers and airframe impacted the pavement. The pilot then attempted to abort the landing. The damaged airplane became airborne, climbed to the right, stalled, and nosed straight down into the ground.

ATA of Broward

According to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) personnel, the pilot was given the current weather information before attempting his first instrument approach into Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), Lawrenceville, Georgia, which included: winds calm, visibility 1/2-mile in fog, and ceiling 100 feet. The pilot acknowledged the current weather information and elected to continue for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway-25 approach. During the first landing attempt, the pilot reported that he was going to execute a missed approach, but that he saw the airport below and wanted to attempt another approach. The ARTCC controller provided the pilot with radar vectors back to the ILS runway-25 approach and again updated the pilot with current weather conditions. During the second approach the tower controller advised the pilot that he was left of the runway-25 centerline. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged that he was left of the centerline, the tower controller saw a bright "orange glow" off of the left side of the approach end of runway 25. Although the weather conditions were below approach minimums for the runway 25-approach, the pilot elected to attempt the landing. A flight inspection of the ILS was completed on December 26, 2006, and the results of the inspection revealed that the ILS runway-25 approach system was satisfactory. Examination of the airframe, flight control system components, engines and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

Hawaii Air Ambulance

The twin-engine medical transport airplane was on a positioning flight when the pilot reported a loss of power affecting one engine before impacting terrain 0.6 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The airplane was at 2,600 feet and in a shallow descent approximately 8 miles northwest of the airport when the pilot checked in with the tower and requested landing. Three and a half minutes later, the pilot reported that he had lost an engine and was in a righthand turn. Radar data indicated that the airplane was 2 miles southwest of the airport at 1,200 feet msl. The radar track continued to depict the airplane in a descent and in a right-hand turn, approximately 1.9 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The altitude fluctuated between 400 and 600 feet, the track turned right again, and stabilized on an approximate 100- degree magnetic heading, which put the airplane on a left base for the runway. The track entered a third right-hand turn at 500 feet. The pilot's last transmission indicated that one engine was not producing power. The last radar return was 6 seconds later at 200 feet, in the direct vicinity of where the wreckage was located. Using the radar track data, the average ground speed calculations showed a steady decrease from 134 knots at the time of the pilot's initial report of a problem, to 76 knots immediately before the airplane impacted terrain. The documented minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) for this airplane is 68 knots. The zero bank angle stall speed varied from 78 knots at a cruise configuration to 70 knots with the gear and flaps down. A sound spectrum study using recorded air traffic control communications concluded that one engine was operating at 2,630 rpm, and one engine was operating at 1,320 rpm. Propeller damage was consistent with the right engine operating at much higher power than the left engine at the time of impact, and both propellers were at or near the low pitch stops (not feathered). Examination and teardown of both engines did not reveal any evidence of mechanical malfunction. Investigators found that the landing gear was down and the flaps were fully deployed at impact. In this configuration, performance calculations showed that level flight was not possible with one engine inoperative, and that once the airspeed had decreased below minimum controllable airspeed (VMC), the airplane could stall, roll in the direction of the inoperative engine, and enter an uncontrolled descent. The pilot had been trained and had demonstrated a satisfactory ability to operate the airplane in slow flight and single engine landings. However, flight at minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative was not practiced during training. The operator's training manual stated that during single engine training an objective was to ensure the pilot reduced drag; however, there was no procedure to accomplish this objective, and the ground training syllabus did not specifically address engine out airplane configuration performance as a dedicated topic of instruction. The operator's emergency procedures checklist and manufacturer's information manual clearly addressed the performance penalties of configuring the airplane with an inoperative engine, propeller unfeathered, the landing gear down, and/or the flaps deployed. The engine failure during flight procedure checklist and the engine inoperative go-around checklist, if followed, configure the airplane for level single engine flight by feathering the propeller, raising the flaps, and retracting the landing gear.

Devonshire Aviation

The purpose of the flight was to "check out" the airplane before delivering it to its new owner, and to provide the copilot with an indoctrination ride in the Cessna 414. During the approach, the pilot provided guidance and corrections to the copilot. The copilot flew the airplane to within 200 feet of the ground when the nose of the airplane yawed abruptly to the right. The pilot took control of the airplane, and pushed the engine and propeller controls to the full forward position. He placed the fuel pump switches to the "high" position, retracted the flaps, and attempted to retract the landing gear. With full left rudder and full left aileron applied, he could neither maintain directional control nor stop a roll to the right. The airplane struck the ground and continued into the parking area where it struck an airplane and a waste-oil tank. Examination of the airplane following the accident revealed that the landing gear was down and locked, and the propeller on the right engine was not feathered. The emergency procedure for an engine inoperative go-around required landing gear retraction and a feathered propeller on the inoperative engine. The pilot's handbook further stated, "Climb or continued level flight is improbable with the landing gear extended and the propeller windmilling." After the accident, both pilots stated that they didn't notice a power loss on the right engine until the copilot surrendered the flight controls. The right engine was removed and placed in a test cell. The engine started immediately on the first attempt and ran continuously without interruption.

Charter Air

The twin engine aircraft departed Linz-Hörsching Airport on a taxi flight to Stuttgart with five passengers and two pilots on board. During the takeoff roll on runway 27, at a speed of 105 knots, the crew started the rotation. Immediately after liftoff, the aircraft adopted a high nose attitude with an excessive angle of attack. It rolled to the left, causing the left gear door and the left propeller to struck the runway surface, followed shortly later by the right propeller. After the speed dropped, the aircraft stalled and crash landed on the runway. It slid for few dozen metres and came to rest 2,752 metres past the runway threshold. All seven occupants were evacuated, one passenger suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Hawaii Air Ambulance

The airplane collided with trees and mountainous terrain at the 3,600-foot-level of Mauna Kea Volcano during an en route cruise descent toward the destination airport that was 21 miles east of the accident site. The flight departed Honolulu VFR at 0032 to pickup a patient in Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii. The inter island cruising altitude was 9,500 feet and the flight was obtaining VFR flight advisories. At 0113, just before the flight crossed the northwestern coast of Hawaii, the controller provided the pilot with the current Hilo weather, which was reporting a visibility of 1 3/4 miles in heavy rain and mist with ceiling 1,700 feet broken, 2,300 overcast. Recorded radar data showed that the flight crossed the coast of Hawaii at 0122, descending through 7,400 feet tracking southeast bound toward the northern slopes of Mauna Kea and Hilo beyond. The last recorded position of the aircraft was about 26 miles northwest of the accident site at a mode C reported altitude of 6,400 feet. At 0130, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact was lost and also said that at the airplane's altitude, radar coverage would not be available inbound to Hilo. The controller terminated radar services. A witness who lived in the immediate area of the accident site reported that around 0130 he heard a low flying airplane coming from the north. He alked outside his residence and observed an airplane fly over about 500 feet above ground level (agl) traveling in the direction of the accident site about 3 miles east. The witness said that light rain was falling and he could see a half moon, which he thought provided fair illumination. The area forecast in effect at the time of the flight's departure called for broken to overcast layers from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, with merging layers to 30,000 feet and isolated cumulonimbus clouds with tops to 40,000 feet. It also indicated that the visibility could temporarily go below 3 statute miles. The debris path extended about 500 feet along a magnetic bearing of 100 degrees with debris scattered both on the ground and in tree branches. Investigators found no anomalies with the airplane or engines that would have precluded normal operation. Pilots for the operator typically departed under VFR, even in night conditions or with expectations of encountering adverse weather, to preclude ground holding delays. The pilots would then pick up their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance en route. The forecast and actual weather conditions at Hilo were below the minimums specified in the company Operations Manual for VFR operations.

Young Forever

The pilot was on a circling approach for landing in instrument icing conditions. The landing gear were extended and the flaps were lowered to 15°. The alternate air induction system was not activated. The surviving passenger stated when the airplane came out of the clouds and the airplane started to buffet and shake. The pilot was heard to state on the UNICOM frequency by the fixed base operator and a lineman, "Emergency engine ice." The airplane was observed to make a 60-degree angle of bank and collided with trees and terrain. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the airplane will stall at 129 miles per hour with the landing gear and flaps down at 15-degrees. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the crash site was 6,568.52 pounds. Witnesses who knew the pilot stated the pilot had flown one other known flight in icing conditions before the accident flight.

Alta Flights Charters

The Alta Flights Cessna 414A (registration C-GVZE, serial number 414A0219) departed Cranbrook, British Columbia, at approximately 1910 mountain daylight time (MDT) on a visual flight rules cargo flight to Calgary, Alberta. The aircraft disappeared from the Calgary area radar at 1936 MDT, at an indicated altitude of 9000 feet above sea level (asl) in the Highwood Range mountains, approximately 49 nautical miles southwest of Calgary. The aircraft wreckage was found on a mountain ridge at 8900 feet asl some 40 hours later. The flight was in controlled descent to Calgary when the impact occurred. There was a total break-up of the aircraft, and the pilot, the lone occupant, was fatally injured. There was a brief fireball at the time of impact.

Osprey Air Services

The pilot reported visually checking the main fuel tanks during his preflight inspection of the airplane and later reported there was enough fuel for the intended flight which would be less than 1 hour, plus a 45-minute reserve amount of fuel. He estimated the fuel level in the main fuel tanks was 2-3 inches from the top. He also reported that before the accident flight he had never flown the accident make and model airplane, and that he had not had any flight training in the airplane. The passengers were boarded, the flight departed and climbed to between 4,500 and 6,500 feet msl. He leaned the mixture during cruise, and the flight continued. He began descending when the flight was 12 miles from the destination airport, and he performed the pre landing checks when the flight was 3 miles from the destination airport. The flight entered left downwind where he lowered the landing gear and turned on the fuel pumps. When abeam the landing point he reduced power, lowered the flaps 10 degrees, and turned onto base leg. During the base leg while rolling out of the turn and flying at 600 feet, "the right engine suddenly came to a stop...." He banked to the left to maintain zero sideslip, pushed the mixture, propeller, and throttle controls full forward, and identified the right engine had failed. He reportedly pulled the right propeller control to the feather position but during the postaccident investigation, the right propeller blades were not in the feather position and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the propeller. The pilot further reported that while pulling the right propeller control to the feather position, the airplane, "began to yaw right and simultaneously bank right...." He moved the left throttle control to idle, and they were on the ground in a span of 6 seconds from the time the right engine quit. No fuel leakage was noted at the scene, and no fuel contamination was noted in a nearby pond. Additionally, only residual fuel was noted in the fuel lines in each engine compartment. A total of 4.0 and 1.5 gallons of fuel were drained from the left and right auxiliary fuel tanks, respectively. No evidence of preimpact flight control failure or malfunction was noted. Neither propeller was at or near the feather range at the time of impact. Both engines were removed from the airplane, placed on a test stand with a "club" propeller, and both engines were noted to operate normally during the engine run. Examination of the right seat in the third row of the airplane revealed the seat frame was bent down on the left side, and all seat feet were in position but distorted; no fracture of the seat feet were noted. Examination of the seat of the passenger who sustained minor injuries (left seat in the third row) revealed the seatpan was compressed down, and the lapbelt was unbuckled. The inboard arm rest was bent inward, and the outboard arm rest was bent outward. The seat frame indicated displacement to the left. The seat back was twisted counter clockwise, and the left forward seat foot was in place. The seat and attach structure was certificated for a maximum forward g loading of 9 g's, and a maximum sideward g loading of 1.5 g's. This does not include a 1.33 margin of safety factor. The seat and attach structure was tested to ultimate loads in a combined forward, sideward, and upward directions in accordance with CAR 3.390-2. The same loads were also applied in a downward direction by itself. The empennage was separated just aft of the aft pressure bulkhead but remained secured by flight control cables. According to personnel from the airplane manufacturer, the tested load (150 percent limit) for the empennage in negative shear translates to 14.0 g loading. Based on Cessna Engineering rough calculations, they believe the empennage is capable of sustaining an additional 30 percent beyond what it was tested to, or an estimated 18.2 g's in negative shear loading.

Rits Aviation

The commercial pilot/owner was on a cross-country flight from Orlando, Florida, to Salisbury, Maryland, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot stated that all five fuel tanks were topped off and verified as full before departure. The fueler, in a written statement, reported that he added 100 gallons of fuel and that the fuel tank levels were topped off. In addition to the main tanks, the airplane was equipped with two large-capacity auxiliary tanks (31.5 gallons of useable fuel each) and a locker tank, and the airplane's total useable fuel capacity was 183 gallons. As the airplane approached Maryland, the pilot requested weather for White Plains, New York (HPN) and then changed his destination to HPN. As he approached the New York area at 21,000 feet, air traffic control (ATC) instructed the pilot to fly a published arrival procedure and to maintain an altitude of 16,000 feet. The pilot stated that, due to poor weather and air traffic congestion, he became concerned about possible delays and informed ATC that he had "minimal fuel." He did not declare an emergency. ATC then issued the pilot a descent clearance, and he reduced both throttles to idle. In preparation to level off at the new altitude, the pilot increased power on both throttles, and the right engine stopped producing power. The pilot was unable to maintain the assigned altitude and told the controller that he had "lost an engine, and needed vectors to the nearest runway." The left engine stopped producing power about 2 minutes later. The pilot ditched the airplane and exited the airplane before it sank. The airplane was not recovered. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane before the flight.

Trace Aviation

The VFR repositioning flight departed Rome, Georgia en route to Canton, Georgia but never arrived. Late on the evening of April 10, 2003, the pilot's spouse contacted the local authorities when her husband did not arrive at home or call. The spouse stated that her husband flew out of Rome early Thursday morning headed to Augusta, Georgia to pick up an unknown number of passengers and fly them back to Rome, Georgia. The authorities confirmed that the passengers had arrived at their destination. The Civil Air patrol began a search and located the airplane on the side of "Bear Mountain" in Canton, Georgia, on April 11, 2003. The wreckage site was located 11.3 nautical miles west of Cherokee County Airport, Canton, Georgia, and 26 nautical miles east of Rome, Georgia on the west side of Bear Mountain. The mountains ridgeline runs northeast and southwest, near the town of Waleska, Georgia. The field elevation at the crash site was 1,750 feet above mean sea level (msl) and the peak of Bear Mountain was 2,268 feet msl. The upslope of the terrain at the site was estimated at 30-40 degrees. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assembly and accessories revealed no anomalies.

FMU - Flieg mit Uns Luftfahrtunternehmen

While descending to Hahn Airport, the pilot encountered marginal weather conditions with limited visibility due to clouds down to 500 feet. On approach, the twin engine aircraft collided with trees and crashed about 11 km from the runway 03 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Potter %26 Son

The airplane was destroyed after an attempted landing following a reported partial power loss of the left engine while en route. The flight did not divert to the closest airport located about 27 nautical miles to the southwest while at an altitude of about 15,900 feet. This airport was a controlled field equipped with airport rescue and fire fighting (ARFF), and its longest runway was 9,005 feet. The flight diverted to the departure airport located about 93 nautical miles to the north. This airport was an uncontrolled field not equipped with ARFF, and its longest runway was 5,000 feet. No emergency was declared. The airplane was reported by a witness to be too high and too fast to land on runway 34 at the airport. The winds were from 140 degrees at 6 knots. The wreckage distribution was consistent with an impact resulting from a Vmc (minimum control speed with the critical engine inoperative) roll to the left. The pilot received a checkout from the right seat in the accident airplane by the airplane owner. The checkout was about 20 minutes in duration and did not include any single-engine flight maneuvers or emergency procedures. The owner did not hold a certified flight instructor certificate. The pilot had stopped flying for 12 years and just began giving flight instruction and flying in single-engine airplanes about a year prior to the accident. The pilot's recent multiengine flight experience was limited to a couple of non-revenue flights within the past year while seated in the right seat of a King Air. The King Air was used for commercial charter work which would involve one or two landings per flight. One landing was made on the day prior to the accident. The accident pilot asked the King Air pilot to accompany him along on the accident flight; the King Air pilot declined. A multiengine commercial rated pilot-rated passenger, who the accident pilot knew, was seated in the right front seat. Examination of the airplane's supplemental type certificate (STC) revealed that the airplane had undergone numerous inspections by different maintenance personnel. The left engine's variable absolute pressure controller had safety wire around its control arm, which precluded its normal operation and a pressure relief valve that was not called for in the STC drawings. At the time of issuance, Federal Regulation's did not require STC instructions for continued airworthiness. Reliance on the airplane and engine maintenance manuals would not have provided enough information for continued airworthiness in accordance with the STC and could have yielded a setting exceeding those for which the STC parts were originally certificated to and thus increasing Vmc speed. Examination of the left engine revealed a cylinder head separation on the number six cylinder assembly, which had accumulated an estimated time since installation of 240 hours. Visual inspection of the assembly revealed the presence of some undecipherable characters in its parts numbering. A cylinder head separation from another airplane was also examined. This cylinder assembly accumulated about 270 hours since installation. Both cylinder assembly examinations revealed the presence of additional material on the cylinder barrel threads and fatigue fracture on the cylinder head.

Lynch Flying Service

During climbout, the airplane encountered an area of freezing rain resulting in rapid airframe ice accretion and loss of climb capability. The pilot informed ATC that he was unable to maintain altitude and requested and received clearance back to Great Falls, the departure airport. ATC radar showed that the airplane then began a right turn over mountainous terrain extending up to 8,309 feet prior to loss of radar contact (lower and relatively flat terrain, down to less than 5,000 feet, was located to the left of the aircraft's track.) During the last minute of radar contact, the aircraft was in a right turn at a descent rate of about 400 feet per minute; the aircraft passed less than 1/2 mile from the 8,309-foot mountain summit just prior to loss of radar contact, at an altitude of 8,400 to 8,500 feet. The aircraft crashed on the southwest flank of the 8,309-foot mountain about 1/2 mile south of the last recorded radar position. Wreckage and impact signatures at the crash site were indicative of an inverted, steep-angle, relatively low-speed, downhill impact with the terrain. The investigation revealed no evidence of any aircraft mechanical problems.

Private South African

En route from Gaborone to Maun, an oil leak occurred on the left engine. The pilot shut down the left engine and feathered its propeller. Unable to maintain a safe altitude, he elected to make an emergency landing but eventually crash landed in a wooded area located about 128 km southwest of Pandamatenga. All five occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed. It was reported that the left engine oil pressure dropped while its temperature increased.

Malibu Boats West

The pilot reported that light snow was falling, with approximately 2 inches already on the ground, and the runway had been plowed approximately one hour prior to his departure. About 20 minutes had elapsed since the airplane had been towed from the '68 degree F' hangar. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated 'normally' and became airborne after traveling about 2,160 feet down the 3,240-foot runway. After liftoff, the airplane did not climb above 25 or 30 feet agl. The airplane impacted an embankment at the end of the runway, continued across railroad tracks, and through a fence coming to rest in a brick storage yard about 800-1,000 feet from the departure end of the runway. The pilot stated that someone told him that the airport did not have any deicing equipment, therefore, he did not deice the airplane. The weather facility, located 5 miles from the accident site, reported the wind from 100 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 1/2 mile with snow and freezing fog, temperature 27 degrees F.

Private Mexican

Following an uneventful flight from San Antonio, the pilot started a night approach to Monterrey-Del Norte. On final in good weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances few km from the airfield. Both occupants were killed.

Mack Ponder

The pilot had the main and auxiliary fuel tanks filled and performed an abbreviated preflight prior to departing the Alpine Airport. The pilot did not perform an engine run-up prior to takeoff. The pilot stated that while the airplane was climbing through 100 feet agl, the left engine 'started to surge.' The pilot reported that he knew the airplane would not be able to climb at field elevation with one engine inoperative. The pilot switched the left engine's boost pump from low to high; however, the left engine continued to surge while the airplane lost altitude. The pilot initiated a forced landing with the landing gear and flaps retracted and the left propeller unfeathered. The airplane impacted the ground left wing tip first and a fire erupted, which damaged the left wing and left side of the fuselage. The left engine's spark plugs were found covered with thick black soot. The left engine's magnetos were rotated using an electric hand-held drill, and the left magneto did not produce any spark and the right magneto produced a spark in three of its six distributor cap posts. The left magneto's primary winding resistance and capacitor leakage were found to be beyond the manufacturer's specified limits. The internal components of both magnetos were covered in a dark oil and debris. The maximum takeoff weight for the accident airplane was 6,350 pounds; however, the takeoff weight at the time of the accident was calculated to be 6,509 pounds. The aircraft's single engine performance charts indicated that the airplane would obtain a 29 fpm climb at maximum gross weight with the inoperative engine feathered. The pilot operating handbook's supplement section indicated that the auxiliary fuel pump should only be used when the engine-driven fuel pump failed. A caution statement states in bold print, 'If the auxiliary fuel pump switches are placed in the HIGH position with the engine-driven fuel pump(s) operating normally, total loss of engine power may occur.'

Gibalco Air Services

The twin engine aircraft departed Harper on a charter flight to Monrovia, carrying five police officers and one pilot. On a night approach to Monrovia-Roberts Airport, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances 4 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.

Robert J. Scott

The pilot refueled the auxiliary tanks of the airplane at a different airport 1 month prior to the accident, and had not flown on the auxiliary tanks since that time. He was repositioning the airplane back to home base after a series of revenue flights when the accident occurred. About 20 minutes after takeoff he positioned the left and right engines to their respective auxiliary fuel tanks, and then returned to the mains 30 minutes later. The right engine began to surge and subsequently stopped running. Turning on the fuel boost pump restarted the engine. Five minutes later the engine quit and he secured it after unsuccessful restart attempts. Then the left engine began to surge and was developing only partial power. He diverted to an alternate airport with decaying altitude and power in the remaining engine. Crossing the airport, he saw he was too high to land with a tailwind so he circled to land into the wind. On the base leg he made the decision to land straight ahead in a field due to power lines in his path, rapidly decaying altitude, and power. During the landing roll, the airplane collided with a ditch. The left and right main fuel filters contained a foreign substance, which upon laboratory examination, was found to be a polyacrylamide. This is a manmade synthetic polymer that is used as an agricultural soil amendment that aids in reducing soil erosion. Distribution of the polymer is typically not done by aircraft. Inspection of the fueling facility revealed that the employees who do refueling did not have any formal or on-the-job training. There was no record that the delivery system filters had been examined or changed. The maintenance to the truck, delivery system, and storage facility are done by the employees on an as needed, time permitted basis. The fuel truck was found to be improperly labeled, and the fuel nozzle was lying in a compartment amid dirt, gravel, and other contaminates with no caps or covers for protection.

Gemco

The airplane was level at 2,000 feet, in instrument meteorological conditions, when the pilot reported 'we've just lost our ahh artificial horizon.' About 5 minutes later, air traffic control lost radar contact, and communications with the airplane. A witness about 1 mile north of the accident site stated he heard the sound of engine noise coming from the water and he described the sound as loud and constant. The sound lasted for about 30 seconds and was followed by an 'explosive collision/impact sound.' He further stated he walked to the shore and attempted to locate the source of the sound, but 'because of the fog, I couldn't see anything at all.' The airplane was located in about 25 feet of water, and was scattered over a 150 to 200 foot area. The recovered wreckage consisted of both engines, parts of the airplane's left wing, empennage, fuselage, seats, and interior. The airplane's attitude indicator was not recovered. A faint needle impression was found on the face of the airplane's vertical speed indicator between minus 2,500 and 3,000 feet per minute. Examination of the left and right vacuum pumps did not reveal any malfunctions or failures.

Sequel Group

The airplane impacted terrain during takeoff initial climb in dark night conditions with a 100 ft ceiling and 1/4 mile visibility in fog. The instrument rated private pilot sustained serious injuries and does not recall the flight. No discrepancies were found with the aircraft, flight instruments, or engines that would have contributed to the accident. A weather briefing was obtained and an IFR flight plan was filed. The pilot had 312.8 hrs total time (54.2 hrs in this aircraft), 61 hrs night flight time (36.9 hrs in this aircraft) and 26.8 hrs actual instrument time (19.6 hrs in this aircraft). Toxicological findings were positive for benzoylecgonine (metabolite of cocaine), ethanol, and cocaethylene (substance formed when cocaine and alcohol are simultaneously ingested) in a urine sample subpoenaed by the NTSB from the hospital that treated the pilot. Benzoylecgonine can be found in urine for 3 to 5 days after cocaine use. Since blood was not available for analysis, it could not be determined how much of each substance was ingested and when they were ingested. The pilot stated that he was not under the influence of cocaine or alcohol on the day of the crash.

Silverhawk Security Specialists

The airplane had just taken off and was at approximately 300 agl when the right engine 'had a sudden and catastrophic failure.' The right propeller stopped spinning with the blades in the low-pitch position. The pilot initiated a right turn back toward the airport, but the airplane would not maintain altitude. The pilot rolled out of the turn, but the descent continued until the airplane struck the trees. Examination of the airplane's right engine revealed that the crankshaft was broken at the number 3 short cheek, just forward of the number two cylinder piston rod. The number two crankshaft bearing was broken and melted. The oil feed line to the number two bearing was blocked by a piece of the broken bearing. The Single Engine Climb Data table in the Cessna 414 Pilot's Operating Handbook indicates that an airplane weighing 5,680 pounds, with gear and flaps retracted and the inoperative propeller in feather, operating at a density altitude of 5,055 feet, will have a best climb indicated airspeed of 115 knots. The rate of climb will be 308 feet per minute.

Rentair

The twin engine aircraft departed Tenerife-Sur-Reina Sofia Airport on a taxi flight to Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While descending to Los Rodeos Airport runway 12, weather conditions worsened and the pilot was instructed by ATC to make an approach to runway 30 via a special VFR clearance. Few minutes later, while approaching at an insufficient altitude, the aircraft collided with a house under construction and crashed in a garden. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed. The accident occurred in IMC conditions.

Valley Forge Manufacturing Corporation

About 26 minutes after takeoff while at 21500 feet, the pilot requested a non existent route. Seven minutes later, the passenger stated the pilot was light headed and fading then he had passed out. The passenger had once held a student pilot certificate and about 5 years earlier she had accrued 73 hours of flight time in Cessna 150/152 aircraft. The air traffic controller, and other pilots on the radio frequency tried to assist the passenger. The passenger was advised to provide oxygen for herself and the pilot, but she was unable. The airplane climbed to 34,200 feet where the airplane departed controlled flight, recovered, then departed controlled flight several more times before beginning a nose low descent. Witnesses reported hearing the airplane orbiting several times while flying above a cloud layer then observed the airplane orbiting beneath the clouds. While in a descending right wing low attitude, the airplane impacted the ground and came to rest submerged in a pond. Examination of the flight controls, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A discrepancy with the regulating valve was noted. Two small holes were noted in the cabin door seal. The left wing pressurization duct had been replaced about 8 years earlier but the right wing pressurization duct, had not been replaced. The ducts are on-condition components. There was no preimpact failure or malfunction noted with the barometric pressure switch, the cabin altitude annunciator bulbs, the safety valve, solenoid valve, or differential pressure/cabin altitude gauge. Testing for carbon monoxide for both was negative.

Air Turicum

The crew was completing a flight from Colmar to Zurich with an intermediate stop in Basel. While on a night approach to runway 28 at Zurich-Kloten Airport, both engines lost power simultaneously. The aircraft lost height, struck a three-floor building and crashed on a second one located few dozen metres further. The captain was seriously injured while the copilot was killed.

Mirko M. Nussbaum

Witnesses observed the airplane overfly their homes at low altitude in a tight circular pattern. A witness about 1/2 mile from the airport '. . . watched the plane try to make a turn to the left trying to go back west to the Highland County Airport. The plane made a sharp turn, seemed to be having difficulty stabilizing the airplane . . . .' Also, a witness reported that she heard a loud noise, and then she observed an airplane just barely above the trees. The landing gear was down, and the airplane 'kept dipping up and down.' Another witness reported the airplane was 'wobbling left to right,' and then it descended into trees, struck vehicles, came to rest against a tree, and was destroyed by a post crash fire. A person, who flew with the pilot as a safety pilot on several occasions, reported that the pilot had a habit of making steep close-in turns, from downwind to base, to final; and he noticed 'lack in airspeed management during approach.' Examination of the wreckage did not disclose any preimpact failure of the airplane or engine.

Frank J. Mazzei Jr.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot contacted Charleston Approach Control to pick up his IFR clearance to the destination. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain VFR and he then attempted to coordinate with Washington Center for the clearance. The controller subsequently was unable to establish radar contact with the flight and he also lost radio contact with the pilot. The aircraft collided with the upslope of high terrain in weather conditions comprised of fog, sleet, and snow. The accident site was about 14 miles from the departure point. Toxicological testing of the pilot revealed benzoylecgonine.

Daniel E. Smith

Recorded radar data showed the aircraft was flying in an area of mountainous terrain. Mountain tops in the area were reported to be obscured. Radar data showed that the aircraft first descended to a low altitude as it flew up a valley, then it climbed until impacting rising terrain about 7,200 feet msl. Wreckage was scattered over 300 feet up the mountain slope. About 32 miles southwest at Bakersfield (elevation 507 feet), the 1000 pdt weather was in part: 4500 feet scattered, 6000 feet overcase, visibility 20 miles, wind from 260 degrees at 10 knots. Nearby residents reported that the mountain was obscured in clouds at the time of the accident. During postmortem toxicology tests, a low level of ethanol (23 mg/dl) was detected in muscle fluid specimen, probably from post-mortem production. No ethanol was detected in brain fluid.

Casey Industrial

The pilot took off from an uncontrolled airport. He attempted to obtain an IFR clearance and reported that he was VFR at 3,500 feet. While air traffic control personnel were locating the flight plan and coordinating the IFR clearance, they lost radio contact with the pilot. The pilot continued to fly towards his destination, transiting rising mountainous terrain which was partially obscured by clouds. Wreckage was located about 28 nautical miles from the departure airport, at the 4,050-foot level. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction. According to FAR Part 91.3, the pilot had the ultimate authority for the operation of the airplane, and in the case of an in-flight emergency, had the authority to deviate from flight rules "to the extent required to meet that emergency." According to the AIM, an emergency could be either "a distress or an urgency condition." An urgency condition would exist "the moment the pilot becomes doubtful about position... weather, or any other condition that could adversely affect flight safety." Under FAR Part 91.3, the pilot would have been authorized to climb the airplane under IFR conditions, even if he were to enter controlled airspace.

Tiger Aviation

The pilot was cleared for the VOR runway 17 approach. Field elevation and the minimum descent altitude were 590 and 980 feet respectively. The missed approach point was 10.4 miles outbound from the Waco VOR, which coincided with the runway threshold. The pilot stated that the passenger seated in the right front seat established visual contact with the airport. After confirming that the airport was in sight and the runway environment identified, the pilot continued his descent towards the runway to land on runway 17. The pilot further stated that 'I realized that there would not be adequate runway to safely land, and initiated a right turn to execute a missed approach.' The right wing of the airplane impacted the top of the trees. The FAA inspector at the scene reported that after impacting the trees, the airplane continued through the trees for approximately 400 feet on a track of 344 degrees prior to coming to rest on a heading of 230 degrees.