Northwest Airlines

Boeing 747-200

During the initial approach, the red GEAR annunciator light above the gear lever illuminated, and the landing gear warning horn sounded after the gear handle was selected down and the flaps were selected to 25 degrees. During the go-around, the captain asked the second officer (SO), "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." When all gear are down and locked on the Boeing 747-200, the landing gear indication module located on the SO’s instrument panel has five green lights: one nose gear light above four main landing gear lights. The crew then read through the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure from the cockpit operations manual to troubleshoot the problem. Although the checklist twice presented in boldface type that five lights must be present for the gear to be considered down and locked, the crew did not verbalize the phrase either time. The captain did not directly request a count, and the SO did not verbally confirm, the number of gear down annunciator lights that were illuminated; instead, the flight crew made only general comments regarding the gear, such as "all gear," "all green," or "got 'em all." Because the crew believed that all of the gear annunciator lights were illuminated, they considered all gear down and locked and decided not to recycle the landing gear or attempt to extend any of the gear via the alternate systems before attempting a second approach. During all communications with air traffic control, the flight crew did not specify the nature of the problem that they were troubleshooting. Although the checklist did not authorize a low flyby, if the flight crewmembers had verbalized that they had a gear warning, the controller most likely would have been able to notify the crew of the nose gear position before the point at which a go-around was no longer safe. Multiple gear cycles were conducted after the accident, and the nose gear extended each time with all nose gear door and downlock indications correctly displayed on the landing gear indication module. Post accident examination of the nose gear door actuator found that one of the two lock keys was installed 180 degrees backward. Although this improper configuration could prevent proper extension of the nose gear, the actuator had been installed on the accident airplane since 2001 after the actuator was overhauled by the operator. No anomalies were found with the landing gear indication module, the nose gear-operated door sequence valve, and the nose/body landing gear selector valve.

Douglas DC-9

The DC-9 was taxiing to the gate area when it collided with a company A319 that was being pushed back from the gate. Prior to arriving at the destination airport, the DC-9 experienced a loss of hydraulic fluid from a fractured rudder shutoff valve located in the DC-9's right side hydraulic system. The left side hydraulic system had normal hydraulic pressure and quantity throughout the flight. The flightcrew elected to continue to the scheduled destination and declared an emergency while on approach to the destination airport. After landing, the emergency was negated by the flight crew and the airplane taxied to the gate. Flight data recorder information indicates the left engine, which provides power for the left hydraulic system, was shut down during taxi. The captain stated he did not remember shutting the left engine down, and that if he had, it would have been after clearing all runways. The first officer stated that he was unaware that the left engine was shut down. Upon arrival at the gate with the left engine shut down and no hydraulic pressure from the left system and a failure of the right hydraulic system, the airplane experienced a loss of steering and a loss of brakes. The flightcrew requested company maintenance to chock the airplane since they were unable to use brakes to stop the airplane. The crew said they were going to keep the "...engines running in case we have to use reversers..." The airplane began to roll forward and the captain applied reverse thrust but the reversers did not deploy. The airplane impacted the A319 with a speed of approximately 15.65 miles per hour to 16.34 miles per hour. Evacuation of the DC-9 was completed approximately 5:22 minutes after the collision and evacuation of the A319 occurred approximately 13:08 minutes after the collision. Examination of the left hydraulic system revealed no anomalies and examination of the right hydraulic system revealed a fractured rudder shutoff valve that displayed features consistent with fatigue. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer issued a service letter pertaining to the replacement of the rudder shutoff valve based upon reliability information that was reported to them. The number of reports was greater than that of the Federal Aviation Administration's Service Difficulty Reports database, and less than the operators records.

Airbus A319

Two maintenance technicians where on board Northwest Airlines' Airbus A319 N313NB which was taxied from a maintenance area to Gate 10. When they arrived in the vicinity of gate 10, the mechanic who was steering the plane, activated the parking brake and waited for ground personnel and a jetway operator to arrive. After the ground personnel arrived he released the parking brake. The airplane did not move and he advanced the throttles out of their idle detents "a couple of inches, about halfway." The airplane began to move at a "fairly decent speed," and he realized the throttles were still out of the idle detent position. He pulled the throttle back and applied brakes; however, the airplane did not slow and continued until it struck the concrete support column of the jetway, and the left wing contacted the right side of a Boeing 757-251 (N550NW, parked at gate 9). The nose gear sheared off the Airbus, and the right side of the Boeing sustained a 6-foot long, 2-foot wide gash, just aft of the R1 door. The mechanic estimated that the airplane was about halfway down the parking line when he pulled back the throttles. Initial review of the flight data recorder for the time period surrounding the accident revealed that about 10 seconds after the parking brake was released, the thrust lever angles for both engines were increased to about 17 degrees for about 8 seconds, before they were returned to the idle position. During that time, the engines N1 and N2 speeds increased to about 71, and 85 percent, respectively.

Douglas DC-9

On December 3, 1990, at 1345 est, Northwest flight 1482, a DC-9 (N3313L), and Northwest flight 299, a Boeing 727 (N278US), collided near the intersection of runway 09/27 and 03C/21C in dense fog at Detriot-Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport, MI. At the time of the collision, the B-727 was on its takeoff roll, and the DC-9 had just taxied onto the active runway. The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed. Seven of the 40 passengers and 1 crew member aboard the DC-9 received fatal injuries. None of the 146 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard the B-727 were injured.

McDonnell Douglas MD-82

A McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 operating Northwest Airlines flight 255 was destroyed when it crashed onto a road during takeoff from Detroit-Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Michigan, USA. Just one of the 155 occupants survived the accident. Additionally, Two persons on the ground were killed. Flight NW255 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight between Saginaw, Michigan and Santa Ana, California, with en route stops at Detroit and Phoenix, Arizona. About 18:53, flight 255 departed Saginaw and about 19:42 arrived at its gate at Detroit. About 20:32, flight 255 departed the gate with 149 passengers and 6 crewmembers on board. During the pushback, the flightcrew accomplished the BEFORE (engine) START portion of the airplane checklist, and, at 20:33, they began starting the engines. The flight was then cleared to "taxi via the ramp, hold short of (taxiway) delta and expect runway three center [3C] (for takeoff)..." The ground controller amended the clearance, stating that the flight had to exit the ramp at taxiway Charlie. The crew was requested to change radio frequencies. The first officer repeated the taxi clearance, but he did not repeat the new radio frequency nor did he tune the radio to the new frequency. At 20:37, the captain asked the first officer if they could use runway 3C for takeoff as they had initially expected 21L or 21R. After consulting the Runway Takeoff Weight Chart Manual, the first officer told the captain runway 3C could be used for takeoff. During the taxi out, the captain missed the turnoff at taxiway C. When the first officer contacted ground control, the ground controller redirected them to taxi to runway 3C and again requested that they change radio frequencies. The first officer repeated the new frequency, changed over, and contacted the east ground controller. The east ground controller gave the flight a new taxi route to runway 3C, told them that windshear alerts were in effect, and that the altimeter setting was 29.85 inHg. The flightcrew acknowledged receipt of the information. At 20:42, the local controller cleared flight 255 to taxi into position on runway 3C and to hold. He told the flight there would be a 3-minute delay in order to get the required "in-trail separation behind traffic just departing." At 20:44:04, flight 255 was cleared for takeoff. Engine power began increasing at 20:44:21. The flightcrew could not engage the autothrottle system at first, but, at 20:44:38, they did engage the system, and the first officer called 100 knots at 20:44:45. At 20:44:57, the first officer called "Rotate." Eight seconds later, the stall warning stick shaker activated, accompanied by voice warnings of the supplemental stall recognition system (SSRS). The takeoff warning system indicating that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff, did not sound at any time prior or during takeoff. After flight 255 became airborne it began rolling to the left and right before the left wing hit a light pole in a rental car lot. After impacting the light pole, flight 255 continued to roll to the left, continued across the car lot, struck a light pole in a second rental car lot, and struck the side wall of the roof of the auto rental facility in the second rental car lot. The airplane continued rolling to the left when it impacted the ground on a road outside the airport boundary. The airplane continued to slide along the road, struck a railroad embankment, and disintegrated as it slid along the ground. Fires erupted in airplane components scattered along the wreckage path. Three occupied vehicles on the road and numerous vacant vehicles in the auto rental parking lot along the airplane's path were destroyed by impact forces and or fire. One passenger, a 4-year-old child was injured seriously.

Boeing 727-200

Flight NW6231 departed New York-JFK at 19:14 for a ferry flight to Buffalo and was cleared by departure control to climb to FL140. At 19:21 the flight was cleared to climb to FL310. The aircraft began to climb 2,500 fpm at an airspeed of 305 knots. As the aircraft climbed through FL160, both the airspeed and the rate of climb began to increase. Reaching FL230, the airspeed had reached 405 knots and the rate of climb had exceeded 6,500 fpm. The overspeed warning horn sounded a little later, followed 10 seconds later by a stick shaker stall warning. The aircraft then leveled at 24800 feet with a speed of 420 knots until it turned rapidly to the right, 13 seconds later. The airplane started to descend out of control, reaching a vertical acceleration of +5g until it struck the ground in a slightly nose down and right wing-down attitude. The aircraft had descended from 24000 feet to 1090 feet in 83 seconds.

Douglas DC-7

A Northwest Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-7C, N290 MATS charter Flight 293, crashed in the north Pacific Ocean approximately 116 nautical miles west-southwest of Annette Island, Alaska, at approximately 1816 G.m.t., June 3, 1963. The flight departed McChord AFB, Washington, for Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, carrying 95 passengers and a crew of 6. The passenger list included military personnel, dependents, Department of Defense employees and a Red Cross employee. All occupants of the aircraft were lost at sea and the aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft had been airborne approximately 2 hours and 35 minutes when radio contact was lost. No difficulties were reported by the crew prior to this time. The wreckage was sighted by a Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft at 0322 C.m.t., June 4, 1963, at 54 degrees 21' N - 134 degrees 39' W but no survivors were observed. Approximately 1,500 pounds of floating aircraft wreckage was recovered.

Boeing 720

The aircraft arrived in Miami at 1240, following a routine flight from Chicago, Illinois The captain of the inbound flight reported that the only mechanical discrepancy was, "the outflow valves being a little sticky merely made it a little difficult to maintain the pressurization in a smooth manner. "These valves were cleaned, and a leaking rivet at the No. 4 reserve fuel tank was plugged when it was noticed by the mechanic. This was the only maintenance performed during the "turnaround". Flight 705 is regularly scheduled from Miami. to Portland, Oregon, with intermediate stops at Chicago, Illinois and Spokane and Seattle, Washington. The computed takeoff gross weight of 175,784 pounds, and center of gravity (e.g.) of 25 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) were both well within the allowable limits. Prior to departing the ramp at 1325, the crew asked the ground controller about the departure routes being utilized, and he replied that most flights were departing ". . either through a southwest climb or a southeast climb and then back over the top of it. . . "The flight departed Miami with an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance at 1335 In accordance with the pilot's request for a". . . southeast vector "a left turn was rude after takeoff from runway 27L and circuitous routing was utilized in conjunction with radar vectors from Miami Departure Control, to avoid *** of anticipated turbulence associated with thunderstorm activity (See Attachment A). A similar departure pattern had been previously flown by another flight Subsequently, while maintaining 5,000 feet and a heading of 300 degrees, Flight 705 requested clearance to climb to a higher altitude. Following a discussion between the flight and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) radar departure controller about the storm activity, and while clearance to climb was being coordinated with the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), the flight advised "Ah-h we're in the clear now. We can see it out ahead . . . looks pretty bad." At 1343, Flight 705 was cleared to climb to flight level 2/ 250 (FL250). They responded, "OK ahhh, we'll make a left turn about thirty degrees here and climb. . "The controller asked of 270 degree was their selected climbout heading, and they replied that this would take them". . . out in the open again". . Accordingly, clearance was granted. Following some discussion about the severity of the turbulence, which was described as moderate to heavy, the flight advised, "OK, you better run the rest of them off the other way then." At 1345 radar service was terminated and control of Flight 705 was transferred to Miami ARTCC. When the flight did not establish radio communication with ARTCC on the initial frequency, Departure Control provided a secondary frequency, and instructed the flight to turn to a heading of 360 degrees which was acknowledged. When Miami ARTCC requested position and altitude, the flight replied, "We're just out of seventeen five (17,500 feet) and standby on the DME one." This transmission ended at 1348, and was the last known communication with Flight 705 The voice transmissions emanating from the flight were made by the first officer. Witnesses in the area reported that a loud explosion had occurred in the air, and several felt a subsequent ground tremor. They also reported that heavy rain had been failing in the area. One witness, in company with five other persons, was seven miles south of the main wreckage site She heard the sound of an explosion which had no echo. When she looked in that direction she saw an orange ball of flame in the edge of a cloud. As she directed the attention of her companions toward this flame, it dropped straight down, becoming a streak, and disappeared behind trees. Shortly after the disappearance a second sound was heard. Statements were received from the crews of four other flights operating in the Miami area at the approximate time of the accident. The first, in a large jet which approached Miami from the west at 7,000 feet, reported the weather as ". . . in and out of broken clouds and light rain showers with light turbulence. Darker heavy shower activity was observed to the (south) of course. We observed no small cells on our radar scope. . only a broad rain area. . . "Another crew, in a four-engine aircraft, departed Miami at 1318, via a departure pattern similar to that which Flight 705 later followed. They described the worst turbulence as". medium to moderate . . . "from west of the airport to north of the Miami VORTAC .3/ They were maintaining 5,000 feet at the time. A third crew in a 720B was folding southeast of Miami at 13,000 feet. They observed numerous rain cells on radar in the Miami area and encountered light ice at this altitude. The fourth crew, also flying a large jet, taxied out shortly after Flight 705 but delayed takeoff for nearly an hour because of the weather. The weather in the Miami area at the time of the accident was characterized by a pre-frontal squall line approximately 250 miles in length, oriented on a northeast-southwest line immediately northwest of Miami (See Attachment A). The U. S. Weather Bureau (USWB) radar observation at Miami at 1344 indicated a broken area of thunderstorms associated with this line, with cells two to twenty miles in diameter, and tops of detectable moisture at 30,000 feet. The line was moving southeast at eight knots, and moderate rain showers were occurring at the station. The 0600 and 1800 Miami radiosonde ascents showed the freezing level to have been at 11,100 and 12,400 feet m.s.1., respectively. SIGMET 4/ No. 3 prepared by the USWB at Miami, valid from 0900-1300, forecast moderate to severe turbulence 5/ in thunderstorms, with a chance of extreme turbulence in heavier thunderstorms. This advisory was called to the attention of the crew of Flight 705 by the operations agent at Miami, and was attached to their dispatch papers. SIGMET No. 4, valid from 1300-1700, was not received until approximately 1315, after the crew of Flight 705 had left the operations office. It forecast moderate to severe turbulence, but deleted the reference to extreme turbulence indicated in SIGMET No 3. Since the dispatcher for this flight is stationed in Minneapolis, the physical Limitations involved made it difficult to apprise the crew of this latest advisory prior to their taxi time of 1325. The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and all 43 occupants have been killed.

Douglas DC-7

A Northwest Airlines DC-7CF, N285, was ditched near Biorka Island, Sitka Sound, Alaska, on October 22, 1962, about 2052 G.m.t. All 95 passengers and 7 crew members successfully evacuated and were quickly rescued. No serious injuries were reported. The flight was operating as Military Air Transport Charter Flight No. 293 en route from McChord Air Force Base, Tacoma, Washington, to Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska. While cruising at an altitude of 20,000 feet No. 2 engine lost power. Remedial measures failed, the propeller oversped and the engine seized. Attempts at feathering failed and the flight radioed a declaration of emergency and started descent toward Sitka Sound, Alaska. Other futile attempts were made to feather as the No. 2 engine became dangerously hot and shed parts. The captain elected to ditch. Passengers were moved aft and away from the plane of rotation of No. 2 propeller, crew members issued ditching instructions, and occupants and flotation gear were readied. The aircraft was put down skillfully under favorable conditions of weather and sea during daylight, and all occupants were quickly in liferafts. Previously alerted marine craft were nearby and took all hands aboard. Amphibious rescue aircraft were also close by. The aircraft sank in water 250 feet deep in about 24 minutes.

Lockheed L-188 Electra

At approximately 0855 1, the flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 14R. At this time the aircraft was taxing on a westerly heading in the runup area adjacent to runway 14R. Flight 706 acknowledged the clearance, while continuing toward the runway, and made a running takeoff No witnesses were found who observed the actual lift-off. N137US was observed after lift-off, 3,000 to 4,000 feet down the runway at an estimated altitude of 50 to 75 feet and in a normal climb attitude. At the 8,000-foot marker the altitude of the aircraft was estimated to have been approximately 100 feet, which is a slightly lower altitude than Electra aircraft normally attain at this point during takeoff. Five witnesses noted a change in engine sound during this portion of the flight. Between the 8,000 and the 9,000 foot runway marker the aircraft was observed to commence an apparently coordinated right turn with a slowly increasing rate of bank. When the bank angle was 30 to 45 degrees, the crew made a short, garbled transmission. Immediately thereafter, at a bank angle of 50 to 60 degrees, the aircraft began to lose altitude. The minimum altitude attained in the entire turn was 200 to 300 feet. The right wing near the No. 4 engine struck powerlines adjacent to the Chicago Northwestern Railroad tracks, severing the lines at an angle of about 70 degrees from the horizontal, and causing a bright bluish flash. The aircraft then continued in a direction of about 271 degrees magnetic and, when in a bank of about 85 degrees and a nose-down attitude of about 10 degrees, the right wing of the aircraft struck the railroad embankment. Continuing to roll about its longitudinal axis, the aircraft cartwheeled, the nose crashing into the ground 380 feet beyond the point of first Impact, and landed right side up It then slid tall first another 820 feet. The aircraft disintegrated throughout its path, and wreckage was strewn over an area 200 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. Evidence of ground fire was found at various points along this path. Impact occurred on airport property about 3,800 feet abeam and to the right of the end of runway 14R, about 500 feet north of Irving Park Road. After passing beyond the railroad embankment the aircraft was lost to view by most of the eye witnesses because of trees and other obstructions; immediately thereafter a large mushroom of orange-red flame accompanied by heavy black smoke was seen. Time of impact was established as 0857. The aircraft was demolished by impact and fire. All occupants were fatally injured.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

On October 28, 1960, at 1139 m. s. t., a Douglas C-54A-DC, N 48762, operated by Northwest Airlines, Inc., as Flight 104, crashed and burned approximately 13 nautical miles northwest of the Missoula, Montana Airport. The captain, first officer, two hostesses and all eight passengers died in the crash. The flight took off from Spokane, Washington, on an instrument flight plan. En route radio reports were routine and indicated the flight was on schedule, and in no difficulty. The aircraft was observed from the ground flying on course toward Missoula in and along the Clark Fork Valley within six nautical miles west of the scene of the crash. The engines were running and the aircraft was descending as if on an approach to a landing. As the aircraft descended deeper into the valley, flight visibility became restricted by light snow showers, and the tops of the mountains surrounding the valley were obscured by the overcast. The aircraft entered a steep left banking turn and the nose was raised in an apparent attempt to turn and climb out through an intersecting valley; however, the aircraft continued to sink toward the ground, rolled to the left and crashed inverted. The Board believes the accident was caused by the failure of the pilot to continue in accordance with his IFR flight plan by attempting a VFR approach during instrument weather conditions.

Douglas DC-7

While the flight was en route between Okinawa and the Philippine Islands, the No. 2 engine experienced an appreciable power loss followed by overspeeding of the propeller. The crew instituted emergency procedures but was unable to control or feather the propeller. The propeller separated from the engine with a resulting nose section fire. Attempts to extinguish the fire failed, and the crew elected to ditch the aircraft. The ditching was accomplished at night during a rainstorm and while under Instrument conditions. All 58 occupants, including the 7 crew members, successfully evacuated the aircraft. Of these, 44 suffered minor injuries and one woman passenger died.

Lockheed L-188 Electra

The four engine aircraft departed Chicago-Midway at 1438LT bound for Miami, carrying 57 passengers and a crew of six. While cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet over the south of Indiana State, the aircraft entered a dive and crashed in a huge explosion in a snow covered field located east of Tell City. Some debris were also found in a wooded area. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 63 occupants were killed. The crew was unable to send any distress call prior to the accident.

Douglas DC-6

At approximately 0329LT, the airplane crashed on takeoff from Wold-Chamberlain Field, Minneapolis, Minnesota. A number of the 62 persons (including 2 infants) aboard suffered serious injuries but there were no fatalities. Fire, which broke out a short time after all occupants were evacuated, consumed the aircraft. The aircraft took off normally and climbed to a height of about 100 feet. It then gradually nosed over and entered a descent which continued until it struck the ground. Sky conditions were clear; however, the prevailing visibility was about three miles in fog, and in localized areas around the airport it was reduced to lens than a mile by patches of denser fog. Takeoff was made on runway 22 and the climbout was a from a lighted, built-up section toward an open, unlighted area. The Board believes that the pilot while trying to remain contact in reduced visibility allowed the nose of the aircraft to drop when flaps were retracted because of inattention to flight instruments. The darkness and reduced visibility during climbout contributed to a sensory illusion which completely obscured the fact of descent from the pilot.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

Flight 2 was scheduled daily between Seattle, Washington. and New York, New York, with intermediate stops at Portland, Oregon, and Chicago., Illinois. It departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0806 on an IFR flight plan to Portland, Oregon, via Victor Airway 23 to cruise at 6,000 feet. There were 32 passengers arid a crew of six consisting of Captain Robert Reeve Heard, First Officer Gene Paul Johnson, Flight Engineer Carl Vernon Thomsen, Flight Service Attendant David V. Razey, Senior Stewardess Elinor A. Whitacre. and Junior Stewardess Dorothy L. Oetting. Takeoff was made on runway 20 and the flight climbed to an altitude of 1,000 to 1,200 feet. At this time power reduced and the wing flaps which had been set at the normal 25-degree takeoff position, were retracted at an airspeed of 145 knots. Immediately the crew became aware of severe buffeting and a strong tendency of the aircraft to roll to the left. Because the buffeting began almost immediately after the flaps ware retracted, the captain believed that it was due to a split-flap condition, i. e., the wing flaps on one side of the aircraft being retracted while the flaps on the other side remained partially or fully down. Power was reduced momentarily in an attempt to alleviate the buffeting but this was not effective and maximum continuous power was again restored. After being cleared by the Seattle tower for return the captain decided not to turn the aircraft because of control difficulty and advised that he would proceed to McChord Air Force Base at Tacoma. Thereafter, the captain testified the trouble became worse and the aircraft continued to lose altitude. The captain elected to ditch and did so at approximately 0810. Touchdown was on smooth water at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots and there was no abrupt deceleration. Passengers and crew members, except the captain and first officer, left the aircraft through the main cabin door and emergency exits. The captain and first officer, after a passenger count, left the aircraft through cockpit windows and swam to the left and right wings, respectively. The aircraft sank in approximately 15 minutes and by that time all persons on the wings had been supplied with buoyant cushions from the cabin seats. Those who survived were rescued by surface craft from the 42-degree F. water within 30 to 35 minutes from the time of ditching.

Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation

Northwest Airlines' Flight 8 departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0148, September 6, 1953, for a nonstop flight to Chicago, Illinois. Gross weight on takeoff was 105,839 pounds; maximum allowable for takeoff was 116,740; maximum allowable for landing was 98.500 pounds. The location of the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. Weather at Seattle-Tacoma Airport during takeoff was: ceiling 200 feet and one-fourth mile visibility. Just after the aircraft became airborne No. 3 propeller oversped. Attempts by the flight engineer to correct this condition were unsuccessful and feathering was started one and one-half minutes later. However, the propeller continued to rotate at about 400 r.p.m. The flight's takeoff alternate was Yakima, Washington (a distance of 122 miles), but due to high terrain en route the captain elected to request clearance to proceed to Portland, Oregon (a distance of 132 miles), at 5,000 feet. This clearance was granted immediately. Using METO 2 power the aircraft reached 5,000 feet, well above the overcast, about 14 minutes after takeoff. Near the end of this climb the oil temperature of No. 4 engine was exceeding limits and the oil supply was being rapidly reduced. The flight engineer attempted to lower the temperature by fully opening the oil cooler flap. Temperature, however, remained high and the oil quantity continued to dwindle fast. Accordingly, the No. 4 propeller was feathered at about 0205 at the order of the captain who then declared an emergency and elected to land at McChord Air Force Base. Radio communication was established with McChord and arrangements made for a GCA approach after a short delay in establishing a frequency. No. 3 propeller had not feathered fully and was still windmilling at approximately 400 r.p.m. Meanwhile the captain had requested "takeoff" flaps, but the flaps would not extend hydraulically, and the copilot went to the cabin to crank them down. He stated that he turned the crank about 15-20 turns, at which point he found that it would no longer turn freely, whereupon he backed it to its original position. He was then called back to the cockpit to assist the captain in controlling the aircraft. Control difficulty had been continuously experienced with the aircraft yawing sharply and dropping a wing. The captain had placed the trim controls approximately in neutral, believing that he had a better feel and control of the aircraft without them at the recommended minimum speed of 130 knots. The aircraft, which had re-entered the overcast at about 2,000 feet, was then several miles from McChord Field under GCA direction on its first approach when its position and heading became such that the GCA operator directed a box pattern be flown to establish a proper approach. The second approach was executed in accordance with the directed pattern and the final approach was in line with Runway 34. The landing gear control was not actuated for gear extension until the aircraft broke out of the overcast at an altitude estimated at between 500 and 800 feet on a GCA controlled straight-in approach to Runway 34. At this time the captain ordered that No. 3 be unfeathered but it would not unfeather and continued to windmill. Only the right main gear extended fully and locked, as Indicated by its green light, but the landing was then committed. Shortly after touchdown retraction of the unlocked nose and left main gears allowed the aircraft to veer off the runway to the left. It then skidded sideways to its right, folding the right main gear inward, and the No. 2 engine was torn free. The aircraft came to rest on a heading of 212 degrees some 3,000 feet from the point of touch and about 7,000 feet short of the far end of the 10,000-foot runway. At about that time a gasoline fire started and spread rapidly over the ground below the airplane. Previously alerted fire apparatus, already standing by, kept the fire from spreading while all passengers and four of the crew left quickly by the main cabin door, the door sill being five or six feet above the ground. The flight engineer and the captain left by the cockpit crew door after ascertaining the cabin to be empty. All 32 occupants ware clear within an estimated two minutes. There were no fatalities although several persons were treated for burns at the McChord Air Force Base Hospital.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

Flight 324 departed Elmendorf Air Force Base at 2111, January 18, with the same 40 passengers who had enplaned at Haneda Air Force Base, Tokyo. The aircraft had 2,600 gallons of fuel and 100 gallons of oil aboard. Gross weight at takeoff was 68,275 pounds (permissible 71,800), and the load was properly distributed with relation to the center of gravity. The flight climbed to the 10,000-foot assigned altitude and at 2213, shortly after passing Middleton Island, requested permission to descend to 8,000 feet. ARTC cleared the flight to descend and the new cruising altitude was reached at 2222. The trip was uneventful until opposite Sitka, Alaska, when the pilot reported, at 0003 (January 19), that No. 1 propeller had been feathered. In another radio transmission (0029), the pilot ascribed the trouble to a "broken" oil cooler, and advised that the flight was proceeding to Sandspit. In other transmissions, he requested weather forecasts for Annette, Sandspit, and Port Hardy. Following receipt of this information, which revealed that Annette weather was below minimums, he again advised that a precautionary landing would be made at Sandspit, and gave 0128 as the estimated time of arrival. The flight was cleared to that point and proceeded without further incident on three engines. The aircraft touched down at a point about one-third down the runway. After a short roll, power was applied at about the mid-point of the strip and the aircraft took off, barely clearing a low fence and driftwood which was approximately two feet high at the end of the runway. After it failed to reappear at the approach end of the landing strip, the Sandspit radio operator discovered from the shouting of survivors that the flight had crashed in Hecate Strait. The radio operator immediately sent notification messages to place Search and Rescue facilities in operation. The wreckage could not be seen because of limited visibility, In company with a Canadian customs official, he launched his small boat and effected the rescue of the seven survivors standing on and clinging to the right wing tip of the partially submerged aircraft. Following the alerting of Search and Rescue facilities, messages were relayed by Annette Flight Control to two other aircraft in the area. They attempted to light the area with flares and locate the wreckage, but were unsuccessful in their efforts.

Martin 202

At Spokane the aircraft was checked visually, and departed Geiger Field at 1204 with the same crew, seven passengers, and 800 gallons of fuel. The flight plan was under Instrument Flight Rules to cruise at 6,000 feet Mean Sea Level between Spokane and Wenatchee, Washington. At takeoff the aircraft’s total weight was 33,822 pounds, as compared with a maximum allowable of 37,780 pounds. The disposable load was distributed in such a manner that the aircraft’s center of gravity was within prescribed limits. Four minutes after takeoff, at 1208, the flight reported having reached the cruising level of 6,000 feet MSL at 1207. At 1212 it was given the Wenatchee weather which was below minima. The flight immediately asked clearance to the next scheduled stop, Yakima, where the weather was above minima. While the Spokane radio operator was obtaining the requested clearance, the flight broadcasted an emergency message. This was at about 1213, only some 15 seconds after asking for the new clearance. No difficulty of any sort had been reported previously. This emergency message was copied by company operators at Spokane, Yakima and Seattle. At the latter place it was also recorded on a magnetic tape by Aeronautical Radio, Inc., an independent radio organization serving several air carriers. The message was in three short sentences. All operators agree that the first was, “We are in trouble,” and that the last was, “Going down fast.” The middle sentence was interpreted by one operator as, “Plane gone nuts” and by the second as, “Right engine haywire.” The third operator put down a series of Q’s, meaning not understood. The actual context of the message will be discussed later in this reports. There was no further radio contact with the flight. At or about 1214 the aircraft crashed on the Pundy farm about three miles west of Reardan, Washington, and approximately 20 miles from Geiger Field. All aboard were killed. A flash fire followed impact and burning continued for some time at the end location throughout the wreckage area. Weather conditions during the short flight from Geiger Field to the impact site included restricted visibility due to light snow. At the flight level there was no icing or turbulence either forecast or reported. Instrument conditions prevailed at the flight’s altitude. At the place and time of the crash the ceiling was about 200 feet and the surface visibility about one-third mile.

Martin 202

The flight left Helena at 0753LT, using Runway 29. The flight plan, amended before takeoff, specified an altitude of 10,500 feet MSL under instrument flight rules via Amber Airway number 2 to the Whitehall (Montana) Range Station and from there to the Butte Airport via Red Airway number 2. Also, before taking off, the pilot asked the Helena Tower if the Homestake Fan normally and was informed that Butte Radio advised that it was. Following takeoff from Runway 29, the aircraft was flown in a climbing right turn so that it passed approximately over the Station as it headed south toward the Whitehall Range Station. At 0801 the flight reported to Helena that it had reached its cruising altitude. This message was acknowledged. The next message from the flight was to Butte at 0814 stating that it was over Whitehall (Range Station) at 0811 and starting descent. Butte acknowledged this message, gave that flight the station altimeter setting of 29.97, advised that the wind was south, calm, and that the Weather Bureau advised what the ceiling was lower to the east and north and better to the south and southwest. Flight 115 replied that it had vertical visibility at 10,500 feet. This was the last radio contact with the flight. A search was instituted after several futile attempts to contact the aircraft. On the following morning, the wreckage was sighted from a local search aircraft at about 0900. Ground parties immediately started for the crash site. All debris were found in a snow covered wooded area and all 21 occupants were killed.

Martin 202

Northwest Airlines' NC93037 departed from the Minneapolis- St Paul International Airport at 0946LT on a local flight. The purpose of the flight was a six-month instrument competency check of Captain John R. Galt under the supervision of Captain Ray Render, a company cheek pilot. Also on board and listed as official observers were William H Solomon, CAA air carrier agent, who was sitting on the jump seat between and immediately behind the pilots' seats, and CAA personnel from the Minneapolis Control Tower, E. Bergstrom, R. Olsen and B. Erickson, who were sitting in the main cabin. At the time of takeoff there were 800 gallons of fuel on board which resulted in a total aircraft weight of 32,943 pounds. This weight was within the allowable limit of 38,000 pounds and the aircraft was properly loaded. The weather was clear and visibility was unlimited. Following takeoff, two simulated US (Instrument landing system) approaches were made to the airport and at 1025LT the crew radioed the control tower that this phase of the check flight was completed. This was the last known contact with the flight. After departing the Minneapolis area, the aircraft was first seen near Center City, Minnesota, 43 miles northwest of Minneapolis. At this time it was making a steep left turn at an altitude estimated to he between 4,000 and 5,000 feet, and landing gear was down. At the completion of this turn a shallow climb was started. Throughout these maneuvers the engines sounded as if they were operating in a normal manner. The attention of the ground witness was then diverted for a few moments, and when he again saw the aircraft it was in a partially inverted position and starting a steep dive. After losing approximately 2,500 feet in the dive, an apparently normal recovery was made to a level flight attitude and the aircraft proceeded in a northeasterly direction. Shortly thereafter it was seen to make two or three pitching oscillations about its lateral axis. These maneuvers may he described as a series of steps made by the aircraft as it was being lowered abruptly, followed by a recovery to level flight. During each oscillation approximately 400 feet in altitude was lost and a noise was heard such as is usually associated with a surge of engine power. The aircraft continued on a northeast heading. Two miles south of Almelund, Minnesota, which is 14 miles northeast of Center City, the aircraft was seen to make a shallow right turn of approximately 270 degrees and once more to return to a level attitude heading in a northwesterly direction. Throughout the above-mentioned maneuvers, the aircraft was gradually losing altitude, and the right propeller was observed to be turning slowly during the latter part of the flight. Nearing Almelund and at an altitude of approximately 500 or 600 feet above the ground, a steep right turn was begun. Altitude was lost rapidly and after turning approximately 90 degrees, the aircraft's right wing struck the ground. All but one of the six occupants were killed at impact, the injured person died several days later without regaining consciousness. The aircraft was demolished.

Douglas DC-4

The flight 2501, was scheduled to operate between the terminal points of New York, N. Y., and Seattle, Wash, via intermediate points of Minneapolis, Minn., and Spokane, Wash. At approximately 1931 the flight departed from LaGuardia Airport for Minneapolis with a crew consisting of Robert C. Lind, captain, Verne F. Wolfe, first officer, and Bonnie A. Feldman, stewardess. On board were 55 passengers, 2, 500 gallons of fuel, 80 gallons of oil, and 490 pounds of express, which resulted in an aircraft weight of 71, 342 pounds for takeoff. This was 58 pounds below the maximum permissible takeoff weight, and the load was distributed so that the center of gravity was within approved limits. The flight plan filed with ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) specified a cruising altitude of 6 000 feet to Minneapolis. An altitude of 4,000 feet had been originally requested because of forecast en route thunderstorms, but denied by ARTC because other traffic was assigned at that level. At 2149, when over Cleveland, Ohio, a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet was again requested by the flight and this time approved by ARTC. Forty minutes later the flight was requested by ARTC to descend to 3, 500 feet because there was an eastbound flight at 5,000 feet over Lake Michigan which was experiencing severe turbulence and difficulty in maintaining its assigned altitude. ARTC estimated that the two flights would pass each other in the vicinity of Battle Creek, Mich., and that the standard separation of 1,000 feet would not be sufficient because of the turbulence. At 2251, Flight 2501 reported that it was over Battle Creek at 3,500 feet, and that it would be over Milwaukee at 2337. When in the vicinity of Benton Harbor, at 2313, the flight requested a cruising altitude of 2,500 feet, however, no reason was given for the request. ARTC was unable to approve this altitude because of other traffic. Acknowledgement that ARTC could not approve descent to 2,500 feet was received at 2315, and this was the last communication received from the flight. At 2337, Northwest Radio at Milwaukee advised the company at LaGuardia and Minneapolis, and ARTC at Chicago, that the flight was ten minutes overdue since they had incorrectly copied the 2251 flight report as 2327. At 2345 Northwest Radio at Milwaukee transmitted to the flight instructions to circle the range station at Madison, Wis., if its radio transmitter was inoperative. During the same period, all CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) radio stations in the Chicago-Minneapolis area tried to contact the flight on all frequencies. At 2358, Chicago ARTC, at the request of Northwest Airlines, alerted air-sea rescue facilities in the area, which included the Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and the state police of Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana. The missing aircraft was assumed to have been involved in an accident at 0530 since the fuel supply at that time would have been exhausted. An intensive search of the Lake Michigan area was commenced at daylight June 24. On the following day, at 1830, the United States Coast Guard cutter Woodbine found an oil slick, aircraft debris, and the aircraft log book in Lake Michigan approximately 18 miles north-northwest of Benton Harbor. At 0530, June 25, underwater search operations were conducted with divers and sonar equipment. Divers descended at the points where strong sonar contacts were made. At those locations, the lake bottom was 150 feet below the surface of the water and was covered by a layer of silt and mud estimated to be 30 to 40 feet deep. Visibility was less than eight inches. The possibility of locating anything was slight, and movement was severely restricted. In addition to diving operations, the entire area was dragged with grapnel but without results. After two days of operation, the Navy suspended their search because of the difficult conditions, and because nothing had been found which would indicate that the aircraft could be recovered. Since then, the Coast Guard and aircraft flying in that area have maintained a sea and air surveillance. The only parts of the aircraft that were recovered were those with sufficient buoyancy to float a fuel tank float, foam rubber cushions, arm rests, clothing, blankets, pillows, pieces of luggage, cabin lining, plywood flooring and other wooden parts. The cushions and arm rests, shredded from impact forces and cutting edges of the fuselage, indicated that the aircraft struck the water at high speed. A plywood oxygen bottle support bracket, which had been installed in the forward left side of the fuselage, showed that the inertia forces acted in a forward, downward, and to the left direction. There was no sign of fire found on any parts recovered. All 58 occupants have been killed.

Martin 202

The aircraft departed Washington DC at 1230LT destined for Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, with intermediate stops in Detroit, Rochester, Madison and Minneapolis. With the exception of an hour and 23 minute delay at Detroit, required for the replacement of a ring seal in the hydraulic system, the flight proceeded in air routine manner to Madison, Wisconsin After arrival at Madison the aircraft was serviced with 1,010 gallons of fuel and 38 gallons of oil. Also on board were 10 passengers and 1,799 pounds of cargo which resulted in an aircraft weight of 36,842 pounds. This weight was well within the allowable limit of 39,100 pounds, and so far as is known, the aircraft was properly loaded. Weather information available to the flight prior to its departure from Madison showed that Rochester, 75 miles south southeast of Minneapolis, was reporting a ceiling of 700 feet with visibility of five miles, and that Minneapolis was reporting a ceiling of 900 feet with visibility of 1/2 mile 3. In addition, there was fog and blowing snow at these stations. Turbulence was expected in the clouds, and icing above the freezing level of 8,000 feet. The trip was planned to Minneapolis at an altitude of 4 000 feet, the schedule stop at Rochester being made contingent upon weather conditions at the time of the flight’s arrival. Madison, Wis., and Jamestown, N. Dak where weather conditions were well above landing minimums, were designated as alternate airports. Flight 307 arrived over Rochester at 2023, and because there was light freezing rain, did not land. Twelve minutes later the flight made a routine report to company radio that it was over Stanton which is a radio beacon 30 miles south of the Twin Cities Airport at Minneapolis, and at 2041 contacted Minneapolis Approach Control for landing clearance. The tower advised Flight 307 of existing, weather conditions. There was a precipitation ceiling of 900 feet, visibility was variable 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile, and the wind was from the north 27 miles per hour with gusts up to 40 miles per hour. The tower informed the flight that there had been two electric power failures at the field, and that if no further communication were received from the tower, it would be in all probability the result of another power failure The flight was also told that the ILS was serviceable, but that it had not been flight checked. As Flight 307 approached, another NWA flight, a Boeing 377, was standing at the approach end of the instrument runway, Runway 35, checking engines prior to flight Takeoff clearance was given to the Boeing 377. When it had proceeded half-way down the runway, Flight 307 reported that it was over the outer marker, which was 4.7 miles south of the approach end of the runway. The high intensity runway lights were increased in intensity, their coning device was set to 1/2 mile, the prevailing visibility at the time, and Flight 307 was cleared to land. Flight 307 was not seen from the tower during its approach, but it was heard to pass overhead at which time the controllers received the call, “I have got to get in Clearance was again given to land, following which the flight advised that it would climb to 2,400 feet on the northwest course of the Minneapolis radio range. After a pause, the flight transmitted. “We are going in-we are going in.” After the aircraft had flown over the field, it was observed flying straight and level 3.8 miles northwest of the airport. A wing was seen to fall. Then, the aircraft was observed to dive almost vertically from an altitude of about 300 feet, and crash into a residence in the city of Minneapolis Fire which started immediately after the crash consumed the house and much of the aircraft wreckage. All of the 13 occupants of the aircraft and two of the occupants of the house were killed.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

First Officer Upham made the takeoff, and shortly after the airplane became airborne Captain Christian cut the left outboard engine and feathered the propeller, creating a simulated engine failure on takeoff. The purpose was to instruct the first officer in emergency procedures. The airplane climbed very slowly and, veering slightly to the left, passed over the center of Edmonton at an altitude of 400 to 500 feet. Then the flight turned to the right approximately 180 degrees to get on course toward Anchorage. This brought it back over town and Captain Christian unfeathered the propeller. Power was restored to left outboard engine and the airplane continued to climb. During this interval the tower asked the crew if they had taken off on three engines and received a negative reply. At 1645 Trans-Canada Airlines Communications received the following message from Flight 6427, "We were off at 32, cruising 7000 at 44, estimating Whitecourt at 02, out (from the ramp) at 22." No indication of trouble was given and no further messages were received from the flight. Although this message indicates the flight had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 7000 feet MSL, all evidence points to the fact that it was never above 3000 feet MSL, (700 feet above the terrain). Surviving crew members stated that after reaching an altitude of approximately 700 feet above the terrain, Captain Christian feathered the propellers of both left engines and continued to instruct First Officer Upham in emergency procedures. Shortly after this, the crew began to realize that the airplane was getting dangerously low over a wooded area and rising terrain and that the situation was rapidly developing into an actual emergency. The captain took over the controls and attempted to restart the left engines. However, before sufficient power could be restored the airplane began striking the tree tops. It crashed and burned several hundred feet beyond the point of initial contact with the trees. Two crew members were killed while three others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

Martin 202

Northwest Airlines' Flight 421 departed from Chicago for Minneapolis at 1550, August 29, 1948. On board were 33 passengers, four crew members, 800 gallons of fuel, and 1,038 pounds of baggage. Total aircraft weight was 38,015 pounds which was within the certificated limit and it was properly loaded in reference to the center of gravity. Weather information available to the flight prior to departure indicated that relatively good flying conditions existed en route with the exception of scattered rain showers and thunderstorms which were in the vicinity of La Crosse, Wisconsin and Rochester, Minnesota. Routine position reports were received from the flight as it progressed on course at Its flight plan altitude of 8,000 feet. At 1655, one hour and five minutes after takeoff from Chicago, the flight reported over La Crosse, 125 miles southeast of Minneapolis, and was at that time cleared to start an en route descent. Four minutes later, at 1659, the flight reported passing through the 7,000-foot altitude level. No indication of any trouble was contained in this transmission. This was the last word beard from the flight. Between 1645 and 1700 several persons in the vicinity of Winona, Minnesota, approximately 95 miles southeast of Minneapolis were watching a thunderstorm which was approaching from the northwest, AS the storm moved over Winona, the wind increased in intensity and considerable lightning and thunder were observed. At this time, about 1705, Flight 421 was seen flying below the overcast. As it passed over Winona, the aircraft appeared to enter the roll cloud or the leading edge of the thunderstorm at which time it was lost from view. Seconds later parts of the airplane were observed falling. It was later found that the flight had crashed approximately 4 miles northwest of Winona on a bluff on the east side of the Mississippi River. All 37 occupants were killed.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

Take-off from Anchorage was accomplished at 2012, March 12, 1948, and the flight proceeded en route. 2 At 2028 the flight reported over the Wasilla Intersection, which is the intersection of the north course of the Anchorage radio range and the east course of the Skwentna radio range. This intersection is located 35 miles north 3 of Anchorage. Three minutes later, at 2031, the flight reported that it was at its cruising altitude of 11,000 feet. At 2042 the flight reported over Sheep Mountain, a non-directional radio beacon located 85 miles airways distance, 31 degrees, from Anchorage. At 2103 the flight reported being over the Gulkana radio range station, 159 miles, 34 degrees, from Anchorage, and at this time it estimated that it would be over Northway, Alaska, 283 miles from Anchorage, at 2136. Gulkana did not establish communication with the flight. However, the flight repeated its clearance into the Fairbanks area back to Northway, indicating that the flight could receive on 400 kcs, the frequencies for both the Northway radio range and communication. Shortly before the position report of 2103, the flight was observed flying an easterly heading approximately 4 miles south of the Gulkana radio range station. Approximately 42 miles, 51 degrees, from the Gulkana radio range station is Mt. Sanford, the elevation of which is 16,208 feet. In order to provide a safe lateral distance from Mt. Sanford for aircraft flying the route, the airway from Gulkana east is deflected to the north, its course being 23 degrees. Fifteen minutes after the flight was observed flying easterly from Gulkana a fire was observed on the western slope of Mt. Sanford. Except for a repeat transmission of the flight's Gulkana position report, overheard by Northway Radio 124 miles northeast of Gulkana and approximately one minute before the fire was observed on Mt. Sanford, no communication was received from the flight after 2103. Northwest Airlines, at 2150, requested from Anchorage Radio the reported time of the flight over Northway, at which time Anchorage Radio advised that neither the Northway nor the Gulkana stations had been able to contact the flight, and that a fire had been reported on Mt. Sanford. Radio facilities over the route were immediately alerted. Since all attempts to contact the flight were unsuccessful, it was concluded that the flight had struck Mt. Sanford and burned.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

On final approach to Chicago-Midway Airport, the four engine aircraft was too low and hit a concrete marker. After impact, the aircraft nosed down and crashed in flames few hundred yards short of runway. All 41 occupants were quickly evacuated while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Douglas DC-3

After touchdown, the crew was unable to stop the aircraft within the landing distance available. The aircraft overrun, rolled for several yards and collided with construction equipment before coming to rest in flames. Both pilots and a passenger were killed while all other occupants were injured. Delivered to Northwest Airlines in June 1939, the aircraft was destroyed.

Douglas DC-3

On approach to Fargo, the aircraft became unstable, pitched up and down. The captain decided to increase the engine power but the aircraft stalled and crashed in flames in a prairie located in Moorhead. The aircraft was destroyed by a post impact fire and a pilot survived while all 14 other occupants were killed.

Lockheed 14 Super Electra

The aircraft started the take-off to the northwest at 2114LT, leaving the ground at a point approximating the intersection of the two field run rays, and crossed the field boundary in a normal climb. After reaching an estimated altitude of 500 feet, the aircraft began a slow turn to the left, thick is the usual procedure in contacting the west leg of the Miles City radio range for the purpose of continuing flight to Billings, Montana. Shortly after starting the turn, the aircraft was seen to lose altitude rapidly and descend almost to the ground before the descent was checked, and the aircraft pulled up in a sharp climb to an altitude approximating that previously attained. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft turned sharply to the loft and descended rapidly, striking the ground in a ravine and headed in a southeasterly direction with its left tang and nose slightly down. The aircraft traveled for a distance of approximately 280 feet from the point of first contact with the ground, scattering fragments along its path, and came to rest on rising terrain, where it was entirely destroyed by fire at a point 2650 feet distant from the west boundary of the Miles City airport, and 1200 feet south of a projection of north boundary of the airport. The crash resulted in the death of all person aboard the aircraft. Crew: C. B. Chamberlain, pilot, R. B. Norby, copilot.

Lockheed 14 Super Electra

Shortly after takeoff from Billings Airport by night, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed past the runway end. A passenger was killed while all nine other occupants were injured. Crew: Walter R. Bullock, pilot, Lester H. Doan, copilot.

Lockheed 14 Super Electra

24 minutes after its departure from Hollywood-Burbank Airport, while cruising northeast of Santa Clarita, the crew encountered foggy conditions. While cruising at a height of some 3,300 feet, the twin engine aircraft hist the Stroh Peak located in the Mint Canyon. Rescuers arrived on scene 36 hours later. The aircraft was totally wrecked and all 9 occupants were killed. Brand new, the aircraft was on its way to Las Vegas to be shown to the President of the company. All occupants were employees of Northwest Airlines or Lockheed Company. Crew: Sidney Willey, Lockheed test pilot in charge of the flight, Fred Whittemore, Northwest Airlines Vice-President and copilot. Passengers: Henry Salisbury, Northwest Airlines official, accompanied with his wife and two children, Richard and Judith, Mrs Carl B. Squier, wife of Lockheed's Sales Manager, Liola Totty, Lockheed stenographer, Evelyn Dingle, Northwest Airlines employee.

Lockheed 14 Super Electra

While cruising at an altitude of 9,000 feet in good weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and dove into the ground before crashing on a wooded hill located some 22 km northeast of Bozeman. All ten occupants were killed. Crew: Nick B. Mamer, pilot, Frederick W. West, Jr., copilot. Passengers: T. Anderson, I. E. Stevenson, G. A. Anderson, L. Levin, Walter Ton, A. Croonquist, Douglas McKay, W. E. Borgenheimer.

Lockheed 10 Electra

While overflying west Idaho in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft hit a mountain and was destroyed. Both crew members were killed. Crew: Joe Livermore, pilot, Arthur A. Haid, copilot.

Lockheed 10 Electra

Shortly after liftoff, while climbing to a height of some 20 feet, the left engine failed. The aircraft stalled and impacted the runway surface. Simultaneously, the left engine restarted and the aircraft climbed to a height of 75 feet. At this moment, the right engine failed and the aircraft stalled and crashed past the runway end. Quickly on the scene, rescuers were able to evacuate all eight occupants injured while the aircraft was destroyed. Brand new, it was delivered to Northwest Airlines few weeks ago.