Douglas DC-9

Aeronaves TSM

The aircraft departed Managua on a cargo flight to Saltillo with an intermediate stop in Tapachula, carrying two passengers and two pilots on behalf of DHL. During a night approach to Saltillo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 17. One minute later, he initiated a go-around and decided to divert to Monterrey Airport which was the alternate. Due to a poor flight preparation, the crew was unaware that Monterrey Airport was closed to traffic that night. So few minutes later, the crew returned to Saltillo and was again cleared to land on runway 17. At that time, weather conditions were marginal with a limited visibility due to fog. Following an ILS CAT I approach, the pilot-in-command descended below the MDA and continued the approach despite he did not establish any visual contact with the runway and its equipment. The aircraft landed hard to the right of the runway and on the last third of the runway. After landing, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres, lost its nose gear and came to rest against an embankment. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Linea Aeropostal Venezolana - LAV

The aircraft departed Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport on a schedule service to Puerto Ordaz, carrying 125 passengers and a crew of 5. On this flight, the copilot was the PIC with the captain acting as instructor and a second copilot who was seating in the jump seat and acting as an observer. During the takeoff roll from Caracas Airport, the liftoff was completed quickly, causing the base of the empennage to struck the runway surface (tail strike). Nevertheless, the captain decided to proceed to Puerto Ordaz. On final to Puerto Ordaz, the approach speed was too low (123,8 knots). The aircraft sank and landed hard, causing the fuselage to be bent at the aft cabin, just prior to the tail, and both engine pylons to fail and to break from the fuselage. The aircraft was brought to a stop on the main runway and all 130 occupants evacuated safely.

USA Jet Airlines

The aircraft departed Hamilton, Ontario, on a cargo flight to Saltillo, Coahuila, with an intermediate stop in Shreveport, LA, carrying two pilots and a load consisting of 4 tons of auto parts. The aircraft arrived in Shreveport at 2319LT and departed at 2348LT. On approach to Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport, the crew encountered low visibility due to poor weather conditions and dark night. On final approach to runway 17, as the captain was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, he decided to abandon the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. Nine seconds later, the aircraft stuck the ground and crashed 550 metres to the east of the runway 17 threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed, the captain was killed and the copilot was seriously injured.

Hewa Bora Airways

During the takeoff roll from runway 18 at Goma Airport, the crew started the rotation but the aircraft failed to respond. The aircraft continued, overran and crashed in the Birere District, about 100 metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. Three passengers were killed as well as 37 people on the ground. All other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

Aserca Airlines

The aircraft was on a post maintenance delivery mission. A crew of two engineers was positioning the aircraft from a technical hangar at Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport to the main terminal. While taxiing on the ramp, the crew lost control of the aircraft that rolled to a grassy area and eventually collided with a drainage ditch. The left main gear collapse and the left wing was severely damaged. Both crew were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sosoliso Airlines

The aircraft with call sign OSL 1 145 which departed Abuja at 1225 hrs UTC (1.25 pm local time) with endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes was on a scheduled passenger flight enroute Port Harcourt with 110 Persons on Board (103 Passengers and 7 Crew) and the flight continued normally. At 1241 hours UTC, the aircraft cruising at FL240 (24,000ft) Above Sea Level (ASL) got in contact with Port Harcourt Approach Control. The Approach control gave the OSL 1145 in - bound clearance to expect no delay on ILS Approach to runway 21, QNH of 1008 and temperature of 33° C. At about 1242 hours UTC (1.42pm local), the Approach controller passed the 1230 hours UTC weather report to the aircraft as follows: Wind - 260° /02kts Visibility - 12km Weather - Nil Cloud - BKN 420m, few CB (N-SE) at 690m QNH - 1008HPA Temperature - 33° C. About 1250 hours UTC (1.50 pm local), the aircraft, which was 90 nautical miles to the station, contacted Approach Control for initial descent clearance and was cleared down to FL 160. The aircraft continued its descent until about 1300 hours UTC (2.00 pm local) when the crew asked Approach Control whether it was raining over the station to which the controller reported negative rain but scattered CB and the crew acknowledged. At 1304 hours UTC, the crew reported established on the glide and the localizer at 8 nautical miles to touch down. Then the Approach controller informed the aircraft of precipitation approaching the station from the direction of runway 21 and passed the aircraft to Tower for landing instructions. At 1305 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Tower and reported established on glide and localizer at 6 nautical miles to touch down. The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 21 but to exercise caution as the runway surface was slightly wet and the pilot acknowledged. At about 1308 hours UTC, the aircraft made impact with the grass strip between runway 21 and taxiway i.e. 70m to the left of the runway edge, and 540m from the runway 21 threshold. At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft tail section impacted heavily with a concrete drainage culvert. The airplane then disintegrated and caught fire along its path spanning over 790m. The cockpit section and the forward fuselage were found at about 330m from the rest of the wreckage further down on the taxiway creating a total wreckage trail of 1 120m. Fire and rescue operations were carried out after which 7 survivors and 103 bodies were recovered. Five of the survivors died later in the hospital. The accident occurred in `Instrument Meteorological Conditions' (IMC) during the day.

Northwest Airlines

The DC-9 was taxiing to the gate area when it collided with a company A319 that was being pushed back from the gate. Prior to arriving at the destination airport, the DC-9 experienced a loss of hydraulic fluid from a fractured rudder shutoff valve located in the DC-9's right side hydraulic system. The left side hydraulic system had normal hydraulic pressure and quantity throughout the flight. The flightcrew elected to continue to the scheduled destination and declared an emergency while on approach to the destination airport. After landing, the emergency was negated by the flight crew and the airplane taxied to the gate. Flight data recorder information indicates the left engine, which provides power for the left hydraulic system, was shut down during taxi. The captain stated he did not remember shutting the left engine down, and that if he had, it would have been after clearing all runways. The first officer stated that he was unaware that the left engine was shut down. Upon arrival at the gate with the left engine shut down and no hydraulic pressure from the left system and a failure of the right hydraulic system, the airplane experienced a loss of steering and a loss of brakes. The flightcrew requested company maintenance to chock the airplane since they were unable to use brakes to stop the airplane. The crew said they were going to keep the "...engines running in case we have to use reversers..." The airplane began to roll forward and the captain applied reverse thrust but the reversers did not deploy. The airplane impacted the A319 with a speed of approximately 15.65 miles per hour to 16.34 miles per hour. Evacuation of the DC-9 was completed approximately 5:22 minutes after the collision and evacuation of the A319 occurred approximately 13:08 minutes after the collision. Examination of the left hydraulic system revealed no anomalies and examination of the right hydraulic system revealed a fractured rudder shutoff valve that displayed features consistent with fatigue. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer issued a service letter pertaining to the replacement of the rudder shutoff valve based upon reliability information that was reported to them. The number of reports was greater than that of the Federal Aviation Administration's Service Difficulty Reports database, and less than the operators records.

Aero California

Shortly after takeoff from runway 05L at Mexico City-Benito Juarez Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft encountered windshear. It lost height and crash landed on the runway. Upon impact, the landing gear were torn off. Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway, lost its right wing and came to rest. All 56 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed.

Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas

While cruising at an altitude of 25,000 feet on a cargo flight from Yopal to Mitú, the crew was cleared to descend to 7,000 feet for an approach to runway 01 at Mitú-Fabio Alberto León Bentley Airport. Few minutes later, while descending at an altitude of 23,300 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a mountainous and isolated area located about 135 km northwest of Mitú Airport. The wreckage was found 10 days later, on December 28, at coordinates N 002° 19' 15'' W 070° 47' 13''. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

AeroMéxico

The approach and landing at Monterrey-General Mariano Escobido Airport were completed by night and poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to heavy rain falls and mist. At the time of the accident, runway 29 threshold was displaced by 900 metres, reducing the landing distance available from 3,000 metres to 2,100 metres due to construction works. Following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft landed too far down a wet runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 60 metres further with the right partially torn off. 11 passengers were injured while 79 other occupants were unhurt.

Intercontinental Colombia - Intercontinental de Aviación

Following an uneventful flight from Florencia, the crew was cleared to descend to Neiva-Benito Salas Airport. On approach, the aircraft was unstable and after the GPWS alarm sounded, the captain increased power and gained altitude, causing the aircraft to climb over the glide. The approach was continued and the airplane passed over the threshold at a height of 140 feet and eventually landed 1,700 feet past the runway threshold at intersection Bravo (the runway is 5,249 feet long). After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but two tyres burst and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a grassy area. All 71 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Airtran Airways

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.

Ghana Airways

While descending to Conakry-Gbessia Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage that could not be lowered. Several attempts were made to lower the gear manually but this was unsuccessful. The crew decided to complete a belly landing. After touchdown, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres and came to rest on the runway. All 50 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

AeroMéxico

Following an uneventful flight from Mexico City, the crew started the descent to Reynosa-General Lucio Blanco Airport and encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls issued from the tropical storm 'Keith'. Following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft was too high on the glide and approaching at an excessive speed. It landed too far down the wet runway 31 and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage, struck several houses, went down an embankment and came to rest in a canal. All 90 occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was slightly injured. On the ground, four people were killed.

Airtran Airways

Examination of the area of the fire origin revealed that relay R2-53, the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, was severely heat damaged, as were R2-54 and the other relays in this area. However, the R2-53 relay also exhibited loose terminal studs and several holes that had burned through the relay housing that the other relays did not exhibit. The wire bundles that run immediately below the left and right heat exchanger cooling fans and the ground service tie relays exhibited heat damage to the wire insulation, with the greatest damage located just below the R2-53 relay. The unique damage observed on the R2-53 relay and the wire damage directly below it indicates that fire initiation was caused by an internal failure of the R2-53 relay. Disassembly of the relay revealed that the R2-53 relay had been repaired but not to the manufacturer's standards. According to the manufacturer, the damage to the relay housing was consistent with a phase-to-phase arc between terminals A2 and B2 of the relay. During the on-scene portion of the investigation, three of the four circuit breakers in the left heat exchanger cooling fan were found in the tripped position. To determine why only three of the four circuit breakers tripped, all four were submitted to the Materials Integrity Branch at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for further examination. The circuit breakers were visually examined and were subjected to an insulation resistance measurement, a contact resistance test, a voltage drop test, and a calibration test (which measured minimum and maximum ultimate trip times). Testing and examination determined that the circuit breaker that did not trip exhibited no anomalies that would prevent normal operation, met all specifications required for the selected tests, and operated properly during the calibration test. Although this circuit breaker appeared to have functioned properly during testing, the lab report noted that, as a thermal device, the circuit breaker is designed to trip when a sustained current overload exists and that it is possible during the event that intermittent arcing or a resistive short occurred or that the circuit opened before the breaker reached a temperature sufficient to trip the device.

Transportes Aéreos Ejecutivos - TAESA

The aircraft was completing a service from Tijuana to Mexico City with intermediate stops in Guadalajara and Uruapan, carrying 13 passengers and a crew of five. It departed Uruapan-General Ignacio López Rayón Airport runway 20 at 1859LT on the last leg to Mexico City. After liftoff, the crew was cleared to climb to 5,000 feet and while at an altitude of about 1,000 metres, the aircraft adopted a high angle of attack then stalled, entered a dive and crashed in an avocado plantation located 5,3 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 18 occupants were killed.

Trans World Airlines - TWA

The first officer failed to maintain the proper rate of descent (sink rate) resulting in a hard landing on touch down, and separation of the left main landing gear during landing rollout. The pilot-in-command stated he knew the first officer was not going to make a good landing. He did not take any corrective action other than informing the first officer initially to increase power. Examination of the left main landing gear assembly revealed a preexisting crack in the outer cylinder housing.

Italian Air Force - Aeronautica Militare Italiana

While parked at Vnukovo Airport, the aircraft was hit by a Rossiya Ilyushin II-96 that was taxiing to its position. The II-96 just landed at Vnukovo Airport following an official flight from Amman, carrying a delegation of the Russian Government who took part to the funerals of the King Hussein of Jordan. While taxiing by night on a snow covered taxiway, the II-96 hit with its right wing the tail of the DC-9 that was parked 28 metres to the right of the taxiway. While the II-96 was slightly damaged, the DC-9 was damaged beyond repair. There were no injuries. The DC-9 was scheduled to leave Moscow in few hours on an official flight to Rome, carrying the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema who made an official visit in Moscow.

Cebu Pacific Air

The aircraft departed Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport at 0916LT on a regular schedule flight to Cagayán de Oro. The crew made an unscheduled stop at Tacloban Airport to deliver spare tires for another Cebu aircraft. It took off from Tacloban Airport at 1002LT and continued to Cagayán de Oro at FL115. While descending in marginal weather conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Sumagaya (2,234 metres high) located about 54 km northeast of Cagayán de Oro Airport. First rescuers arrived on site about 24 hours later and the wreckage was found in an isolated area about 150 metres below the summit. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 104 occupants were killed, among them five foreigners including one Swiss citizen. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with clouds and strong winds.

Austral Lineas Aéreas

The aircraft departed Posadas-Libertador General José de San Martín Airport at 2118LT on a regular scheduled flight to Buenos Aires, carrying 69 passengers and five crew members. While cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet, weather conditions deteriorated with cumulonimbus reported till 49,000 feet, stormy weather, icing conditions and severe turbulences with winds up to 80 km/h and an OAT of -59° C. The crew modified his route and entered the Montevideo FIR without contacting Montevideo ATC. At 2204LT, the aircraft entered an area with severe icing conditions and three minutes later, the copilot (pilot-in-command) initiated a descent without prior permission. Meanwhile, the captain contacted Ezeiza Control, requesting permission to descend. Ezeiza Control radioed that the flight was over Uruguay territory and that they needed to contact Montevideo Control for permission. At 2209:17, Montevideo ATC cleared the crew to descend to FL257, an altitude reached at 2210:25. During the descent the first officer complained that his airspeed indicator did not seem to be working correctly. Descending through FL300, the first officer extended the slats. The pilots were trained to extend slats when recovering from approach to stall situations at 10,000 - 12,000 feet. However, the actual airspeed at the time of extension was higher than permitted. This exceeded the design limit, causing an asymmetry. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a near vertical attitude in an open field located about 21 km east of Nuevo Berlin. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 74 occupants were killed. At the point of impact, a cratere of 10 metres deep by 30 metres wide was found. The accident was not survivable. It was reported that that the airspeed suddenly increased from 200 knots to 450 knots in four seconds, probably after the Pitot tubes got iced.

Ghana Airways

Following an uneventful flight from Accra-Kotoka Airport, the crew started the descent to Abidjan-Félix Houphouët-Boigny Airport in poor weather conditions. Due to heavy rain falls, the horizontal visibility did not exceed 2 km and on final, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, the crew started a second approach to runway 21, established on the ILS but continued the approach above the glide. This caused the aircraft to land 900 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft skidded and veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and came to rest 1,800 metres past the runway threshold. All 104 occupants were evacuated, among them three passengers were slightly injured. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with heavy rain falls and wind from 110 gusting at 25 knots.

Líneas Aéreas Allegro

En route from Orlando to Cancún, the crew got lost and was unable to follow the prescribed route, causing the aircraft to deviate from the flight plan to the west. Eventually, the crew was vectored to the Tampico-General Francisco Javier Mina Airport located about 1,144 km northwest of the destination airport. On final approach, both engines failed simultaneously due to fuel exhaustion. The aircraft lost speed, stalled and collided with ILS equipment located about 300 metres short of runway 31. Upon impact, the undercarriage were sheared off and the aircraft crash landed on the runway and came to rest 220 metres further. All 47 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

ValuJet

ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). The inbound flight had been delayed and arrived at Miami at 13:10. Flight 592 had been scheduled to depart at 13:00. The cruising altitude was to be flight level 350 with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 32 minutes. The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)). The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as "Oxy Cannisters -‘Empty.’" This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment. Flight 592 was pushed back from the gate shortly before 13:40. The DC-9 then taxied to runway 09L. At 14:03:24, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff and the flightcrew acknowledged the clearance. At 14:04:24, the flightcrew was instructed by ATC to contact the north departure controller. At 1404:32, the first officer made initial radio contact with the departure controller, advising that the airplane was climbing to 5,000 feet. Four seconds later, the departure controller advised flight 592 to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:07:22, the departure controller instructed flight 592 to "turn left heading three zero zero join the WINCO transition climb and maintain one six thousand," which was acknowledged. At 14:10:03, the flight crew heard a sound, after which the captain remarked, "What was that?" At that moment, the airplane was at 10,634 feet msl, 260 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and both engine pressure ratios (EPRs) were 1.84. At 14:10:15, the captain stated, "We got some electrical problem," followed 5 seconds later with, "We’re losing everything." At 14:10:21, the departure controller advised flight 592 to contact Miami on frequency 132.45 mHz. At 14:10:22, the captain stated, "We need, we need to go back to Miami," followed 3 seconds later by shouts in the background of "fire, fire, fire, fire." At 14:10:27, the CVR recorded a male voice saying, "We’re on fire, we’re on fire." At 14:10:28, the controller again instructed flight 592 to contact Miami Center. At 14:10:31, the first officer radioed that the flight needed an immediate return to Miami. The controller replied, "Critter five ninety two uh roger turn left heading two seven zero descend and maintain seven thousand." The first officer acknowledged the heading and altitude. The peak altitude reached was 10,879 feet msl at 14:10:31, and about 10 seconds a wings-level descent started. Shouting in the cabin subsided. The controller then queried flight 592 about the nature of the problem. The captain stated "fire" and the first officer replied, "uh smoke in the cockp... smoke in the cabin." The controller responded, "roger" and instructed flight 592, when able, to turn left to a heading of two five zero and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. At 14:11:12, a flight attendant was heard shouting, "completely on fire." The DC-9 began to change heading to a southerly direction and at 14:11:26, the north departure controller advised the controller at Miami Center that flight 592 was returning to Miami with an emergency. At 14:11:37, the first officer transmitted that they needed the closest available airport. At 1411:41, the controller replied, "Critter five ninety two they’re gonna be standing (unintelligible) standing by for you, you can plan runway one two when able direct to Dolphin [a navaid] now." At 14:11:46, the first officer responded that the flight needed radar vectors. At 14:11:49, the controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading one four zero. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:12:45, the controller transmitted, "Critter five ninety two keep the turn around heading uh one two zero." There was no response from the flightcrew. The last recorded FDR data showed the airplane at 7,200 feet msl, at a speed of 260 KIAS, and on a heading of 218 degrees. At 14:12:48, the FDR stopped recording data. The airplane’s radar transponder continued to function; thus, airplane position and altitude data were recorded by ATC after the FDR stopped. At 14:13:18, the departure controller instructed, "Critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at Miami." Again there was no response. At 14:13:27, the controller instructed flight 592 to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. At 1413:37, an unintelligible transmission was intermingled with a transmission from another airplane. No further radio transmissions were received from flight 592. At 14:13:43, the departure controller advised flight 592, "Opa Locka airport’s about 12 o’clock at 15 miles." The accident occurred at 14:13:42. Ground scars and wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane crashed into the Everglades in a right wing down, nose down attitude.

Continental Airlines

The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'Hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15°. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental Airlines' (COA) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of COA. COA was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.

ADC Airlines - Aviation Development Company

The approach to Monrovia-James Spriggs Payne Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with a visibility limited due to heavy rain falls. On final, the aircraft struck the ground short of runway threshold, causing the undercarriage to be torn off. The aircraft slid on its belly for about 500 metres before coming to rest on the runway. All 91 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

ValuJet

As ValuJet Flight 597 began its takeoff roll, a 'loud Bang' was heard by the occupants, the right engine fire warning light illuminated, the crew of a following airplane reported to the ValuJet crew that the right engine was on fire, and the takeoff was rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and the right engine main fuel line, and a cabin fire erupted. The airplane was stopped on the runway, and the captain ordered evacuation of the airplane. A flight attendant (F/A) received serious puncture wounds from shrapnel and thermal injuries; another F/A and 5 passengers received minor injuries. Investigation revealed that an uncontained failure of the right engine had occurred due to fatigue failure of its 7th stage high compressor disc. The fatigue originated at a stress redistribution hole in the disc. Analysis of fatigue striation measurements indicated that the fatigue crack had originated before the disc was last overhauled at a repair station (Turk Hava Yollari) in 1991, but was not detected. Also, investigation of the repair station revealed evidence concerning a lack of adequate recordkeeping and a failure to use 'process sheets' to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures.

Intercontinental Colombia - Intercontinental de Aviación

The aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado Airport at 1843LT with a delay of six hours because of technical problems with the electrical systems. At 1934LT, after being cleared to start the descent to Cartagena-Rafael Núñez Airport, the crew descended from FL190 to FL080 when radar contact was lost. Four minutes later, the pilot of a Cessna 208 operated by Aerocorales informed ARTCC about a plane descending vertically and crashing in a marshy field located near María La Baja. The wreckage was found about 40 km southeast of Cartagena Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and among the debris, a nine year old girl was found alive, all 51 other occupants have been killed.

ADC Airlines - Aviation Development Company

The aircraft departed Banjul, Gambia, on an international scheduled service to Lagos with intermediate stops in Freetown, Monrovia and Accra. The approach to Monrovia-James Spriggs Payne Airport runway 23 was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. On final, at a distance of 4 km from the runway threshold, the captain confirmed that visual contact with the runway was established and continued the approach. At an excessive speed, the airplane passed over the runway threshold at a height of 150 feet and landed too far down the runway, about 3,000 feet past its threshold. On a wet runway surface, despite full brakes and reverse thrusts were deployed, the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance. It overran at a speed of 80 knots and came to rest 120 metres further, bursting into flames. All 85 occupants were rescued, among them few were slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

USAir - US Airways

USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.

Aviaco - Aviacion y Comercio

On final approach to Vigo Airport runway 20, the crew encountered foggy conditions with a visibility limited to 1,500 metres. The aircraft descended below the glide and the left main gear struck an element of the approach light system located 100 metres short of runway threshold. The aircraft then landed 50 metres short of runway, causing both main landing gear to collapse. The aircraft slid on its belly for about 580 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 116 occupants were rescued, among them 21 were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Servivensa - Servicios Avensa - Servicios Aerovias Venezolanas

The approach to Ciudad Bolívar Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to heavy rain falls. On short final, about 4,800 metres short of runway 06 threshold, the aircraft was too high on the glide and the captain decided to make a correction. After touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran the wet runway (1,737 metres long) and came to rest 150 metres further. All 65 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Garuda Indonesian Airways

On approach to Denpasar-I Gusti Ngurah Rai Airport, Bali, the aircraft was too high on the glide. The captain made an overcorrection, causing the aircraft to approach the runway with a high rate of descent. In a nose-up attitude, the aircraft struck the runway surface with a positive acceleration of 5 g. After landing, the crew completed the deceleration and braking procedure, vacated the runway and rolled to the gate where all occupants disembarked safely. A complete inspection of the aircraft by technicians revealed that it suffered major fuselage damages and was later declared as damaged beyond repair.

Japan Air System

The approach to Hanamaki Airport was completed by the copilot. On short final, eight seconds prior to landing on runway 02, the aircraft was caught by downdrafts and windshear. Three seconds prior to touchdown, the captain regained control but this was too late. The aircraft landed hard, right main gear first. It rolled for about 1,860 metres before coming to rest on the runway, bursting into flames. All 76 occupants were rescued, among them 20 were injured. A fire erupted under the right wing following a tank rupture.

Linea Aeropostal Venezolana - LAV

The aircraft departed Caracas-Maiquetía-Simon Bolivar on a post maintenance test flight, carrying eight engineers and technicians and three crew members. Twenty-eight minutes into the flight, the crew started the test program when nine minutes later, the pilot was able to send a brief mayday message but its content remains unclear. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea 16 km off Margarita Island. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and few debris were found floating on water while the majority of the aircraft sank to a significant depth and was not recovered.

Aviaco - Aviacion y Comercio

The crew completed the approach to runway 09 with a tailwind component of 11 knots. The aircraft landed hard 50 metres past the runway threshold, bounced and landed hard a second time 360 metres further. All tires burst and the fuselage broke in two between sections 756 and 760. The aircraft came to rest and all 99 occupants were evacuated, among them 26 were injured, four seriously. A positive acceleration of 4,49 g was recorded on the first impact and 4,79 g on the second impact.

Intercontinental Colombia - Intercontinental de Aviación

On approach to Tumaco-La Florida Airport, at a height of about 100 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and struck the runway surface. The crew was able to complete the braking procedure, vacated the runway and stopped the aircraft on the apron. All 92 occupants evacuated when the right wing partially failed. Few passengers were injured and the aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

USAir - US Airways

At the time of the accident, gusty winds were forecast for the surface to higher altitudes. The copilot was flying and configured the airplane about four miles out for landing on runway 24. The flightcrew received progressive wind information during the approach; the last report was wind at 310° and 25 knots. The approach speed was v ref + 10. According to the flightcrew, during the landing flare a wind gust occurred, and the airplane lifted in a nose down attitude. The gust stopped and then the airplane descended to the runway and landed hard. The examination of the airplane revealed the fuselage cracked near where the wings were attached and the aft fuselage was bent down about 7°. Two passengers were seriously injured.

Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane

While descending to Warsaw-Okecie Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity. On final approach, the copilot suggested the captain to abandon the landing procedure and to initiate a go-around maneuver. The captain dismissed the copilot's suggestion, disengaged the autopilot system and continued the approach when visual contact with the ground was established at an altitude of 400 feet. In a nose-down attitude and at an excessive speed of 155 knots (about 25-30 knots above the recommended speed), the aircraft struck the runway 33 surface nose gear first. The aircraft bounced then veered off runway to the left, rolled on soft ground for about 860 metres and lost its nose gear before coming to rest. All 96 occupants were evacuated, among them three passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Linea Aeropostal Venezolana - LAV

After departure from Maracaibo-La Chinita Airport, the crew followed a wrong heading to Santa Bárbara de Zulia (153° instead of 193°), which caused the aircraft to fly to the southeast over the lake of Maracaibo. While cruising at an altitude of 16,500 feet, the crew was cleared by ATC to descend to 5,500 feet. The crew reported to ATC that the VOR seemed to be inoperative but this was denied by the air traffic controller. At an altitude of 9,900 feet, the captain realized something was wrong about the heading selection, stopped the descent and initiated a right turn to gain height when the GPWS alarm sounded. Shortly later, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt La Aguada (3,320 meters high) located about 27 km northeast of Valera, some 170 km northeast of Santa Bárbara de Zulia. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 45 occupants were killed.

Ryan International Airlines

The flight had flown through weather conducive to airframe ice about 40 minutes prior to the accident during descent into Cleveland. During the 35-minute turnaround at Cleveland the crew did not exit the airplane to conduct an exterior preflight inspection to verify that the wings were free of ice contamination. It was snowing while they were on the ground. The airplane stalled and rolled into the ground immediately after takeoff. There was no operator requirement for the preflight. The flight had not been given training regarding the effects of wing contamination on the airplane. The FAA and the manufacturer have been aware for several years of the propensity of the DC-9 series 10 to the loss of control caused by wing contamination, but neither of them took positive action to include related information in the approved airplane flight manual. Both pilots were killed.

Northwest Airlines

On December 3, 1990, at 1345 est, Northwest flight 1482, a DC-9 (N3313L), and Northwest flight 299, a Boeing 727 (N278US), collided near the intersection of runway 09/27 and 03C/21C in dense fog at Detriot-Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport, MI. At the time of the collision, the B-727 was on its takeoff roll, and the DC-9 had just taxied onto the active runway. The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed. Seven of the 40 passengers and 1 crew member aboard the DC-9 received fatal injuries. None of the 146 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard the B-727 were injured.

Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane

On the 14th November 1990 ALITALIA flight 404, aircraft type DC-9-32 registration I-ATJA, took off from runway 36R at LIN bound for ZRH. The flight was a scheduled commercial flight. The clearance was to the destination airport Zürich, via a CANNE IC departure to Flight Level 120, the transponder code 0302. The PIC assumed the duties of assisting pilot and dealt with the radio-telephony. The First Officer was the handling pilot. The take-off was at 1836 hrs. The standard climb via CANNE towards Airway A9 to the cruising flight level of 200 was trouble free. About 2 minutes after reaching Flight Level 200 the crew listened to Zürich VOLMET. From this they gathered that the surface wind at Zürich was 240/08 kt. This led the PIC forsee a landing on runway 28. Having heard from the ATIS that the landing runway was 14, the crew still discussed a right hand circling approach for a landing on runway 28. The discussion continued considering a left hand circling to runway 28. At 1852.53 hrs, from a QNH of 1019 hPa the crew worked out a QFE of 970 hPa. During the descent, the crew discussed the approach procédure for runway 14, where the Copilot mentioned the Outer Marker height for runway 16. After the discussion about the setting of the navigation aids, they also discussed the procédure to be followed in the event of a communications failure. The crew were instructed that following radar vectors they should fly an ILS approach to runway 14. At 1900.01 hrs the Copilot said "We perform a CAT JJ (approach)". The PIC was in agreement because the navigation equipment had to be checked. Whilst verifying the décision height, it transpired that the Copilot was still Consulting the approach chart for runway 16. Further lengthy discussions about the setting of the required navigation aids followed. As the aircraft passed abeam Zürich descending to Flight Level 90, the PIC noted: "We are by KLOTEN, FL 90. He is bringing us in high". Clearance to descend to Flight Level 60 followed at 1902.28 hrs. At 1902.50 hrs ALITALIA 404 was instructed to fly heading 325. VHF NAV 1 was tuned to Trasadingen VOR (TRA), VHF NAV 2 to Kloten VOR (KLO). To define the fix at EKRON, the course 068 was also set. At 1904.32 hrs the PIC repeated "The outer marker is at 1200 ft (QFE), it can be verified by 3.8 [NM] from Kloten. Rhein (RHI NDB) 5.6 [NM]...". At 1905.15 hrs a new heading was required which the PIC confirmed. The identification of the ILS - 14 was registered on the CVR at 1905.32 hrs. At 1906.20 hrs, together with the approach clearance to runway 14, a new heading of 110, descent to 4000 ft and the QNH of 1019 hPa was given. The PIC confirmed this clearance, however the heading was read back as 120. The incorrect readback of the clearance by the PIC caused the Copilot some uncertainty of the required heading to be flown. The PIC confirmed the approach clearance and the cleared altitude 4000 ft to the COPI, whereby the COPI ordered "RADIO APPROACH...". At this point an altitude of about 5000 ft (QNH) was passed. One of the pilots asked the other whether he had a Glide Path indication. The aircraft position was just before interception of the Localiser passing an altitude of about 4700 ft (QNH) (according to radar and DFDR). It was already about 1300 ft below the Glide Path. Answering the question about the Glide Path, the other pilot replied (hardly understandable) "On 1...I don't have...." Consequently the PIC said: "Good, so let's do it on 1". The COPI then ordered "RADIO 1". The flaps were probably set to 15°. In the meantime, the aircraft had passed through the localiser and was now slightly east of it. About the same time as the PIC said "Capture LOC capture glide path capture - so we are on the localiser, a little off track but..." (translated from Italian) the aircraft descended through 4000 ft (QNH) (about 11.5 NM from the threshold runway 14). It was thus about 1200 ft below the glide path. The QFE 970 hPa was also set by the COPI. About 5 seconds later the Altitude Exit Alert was heard (Descent through 3700 ft [QNH]). The PIC cancelled the warning by setting 5000 ft (Go Around Altitude) on the Altitude Preselect. The PIC said to the COPI: "There is another one (Finnair 863) in front quite close. You can reduce even further to 150 (kt) otherwise we'll end up with a "go around". A discussion followed about possible icing. After this the flaps were set to 25 during which no Landing Gear horn was heard. At this point the aircraft was established on the localiser. The altitude was about 3000 ft QNH - ca. 1200 feet below the glide path. The PIC: "Outer Marker check is at 1250 ft [QFE]". The height was now about 1600 ft QFE. 10 seconds after Flaps 25, the flaps were set to 50. The Outer Marker height of 1250 ft QFE was now passed. The PIC said "Bravo" followed by sounds of switching. At 8 NM final the PIC mentioned "3.8 almost 4 miles". At about 7 NM final, (15 seconds after the PIC's words "Almost 4 miles") the COPI asked "... haven't we passed it?". After a further 12 seconds the COPI asked once again "Didn't we pass the outer marker?" The height was now 670 ft QFE. The PIC's answer was "No no it hasn't changed yet. At 6.6 NM final the PIC said "Oh it shows 7 The crew was now ordered by Zürich ARR to change frequency to Zürich TWR. At 6.25 NM final the pilots conversed as follows: "... That doesn't make sense to me "Nor to me ...". 2 seconds after this conversation the PIC called out "Pull, pull, pull, pull! ". Simultaneously autopilot disconnection could be heard. The position was now about 500 ft AGL overhead Weiach - about 350 ft QFE. 2 seconds later the COPI called out "GO AROUND" the PIC responded with "No no no no ... catch the glide". At this point the DFDR shows a pitch change from -2° [AND] to +5.4° [ANU]. At the same time the thrust was increased from 1.3 to 1.7 EPR. The sink rate decreased from 1100 ft/min. to 190 ft/min. After 11 seconds (the pitch oscillated at +1° [ANU]) the PIC asked "Can you hold it?" to which the COPI replied "Yes". One second after the COPI's answer the Radio Altimeter warning (pip pip pip) indicating 200 ft/AGL could be heard. During this, the PIC said "Hold on let's try to At 1911.18 hrs the aircraft Struck the north em slope of the Stadlerberg at a altitude of 1660 ft QNH. All 46 occupants were killed.

Aviaco - Aviacion y Comercio

The approach to Mahón Airport was completed by night and poor weather conditions. On final, the crew lost visual contact with the runway and the captain instructed the pilot to initiate a go-around. In a certain confusion, the aircraft continued its approach until it struck the runway surface with a positive acceleration of 3,56 G. The captain took over control, initiated a go-around and decided to return to Palma de Mallorca where a safe landing wa completed. All 89 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages.

Evergreen International Airlines

The DC-9 arrived at Carswell AFB at 01:12 CST after a flight from Kelly AFB. The aircraft was off-loaded and re-loaded with cargo by USAF personnel. The engines were then started at 02:04. The crew received taxi instructions for runway 17 and took off from this runway at 02:09. At (or immediately after) rotation, the main cargo door opened. An emergency was declared and the crew climbed to 2500 feet msl before entering a right turn. When about 5nm north of the airport the captain began a shallow turn to the right (for base leg). The aircraft crossed the extended centreline and the captain tightened the turn to establish their position relative to the runway threshold. In doing so, the air load on the door probably caused it to rapidly move to its full open over the top position. A sudden opening of the door would also have produced an unexpected change in the yawing and rolling moments. The captain, possibly partially disoriented, may not have sensed the increasing roll and nose tuck and thus failed to correct a changing attitude until a critical bank angle and loss of altitude had occurred. The DC-9 struck the ground in an inverted, nose down, left wing low attitude and disintegrated. It appeared that the first officer, when closing the main cargo door, didn't hold the door control valve 'T' handle in the closed position long enough for the latching hooks to move into place over the door sill spools. External latched and locked indicators were applied incorrectly, so the first officer thought the door was latched properly when the handle was pointed more toward the 'locked' than the 'unlocked' chevron. It also appeared that one of the two open door warning light switches was malfunctioning. Because of their wiring, this malfunction made the entire door warning system ineffective.

Eastern Airlines

Eastern flight 573 contacted approach control at 2323 cst, was advised to expect an ILS runway 16 approach and was vectored around weather. At 2330, the controller advised the ILS glide slope (g/s) had gone into 'alarm' but the loc appeared normal. At 2333, the wind shifted to 310° at 7 knots. Since the bc approach to runway 34 was notamed as inop, the crew continued to runway 16, using 50° of flaps. At 2334, they told the controller, 'if you don't get the g/s up, we'll do a... loc approach.' They reported receiving the g/s, but were advised the g/s was still in alarm. The aircraft broke out of clouds in rain at 900 feet; light turbulence was encountered on final approach. At about 1 mile out, the f/o noted the aircraft was high and advised the captain. The captain pushed the nose over and reduced power, increasing speed and rate of descent. Requested altitude callouts were not made. F/O advised captain to flare, but flare was inadequate. The aircraft touched down hard and the fuselage failed between stations 813 and 756. Aircraft was stopped with the tail resting on the runway. Four passengers received minor injuries during evacuation. Weather study showed a moderate to strong (vip level 2 to 3) weather echo over the approach end of runway 16.

Continental Airlines

Weather conditions were moderate snow and freezing temperatures. Following a 27 minute delay between deicing and departure, on takeoff the aircraft was over-rotated by the first officer. Aircraft control was lost, the aircraft stalled and impacted off the right side of the runway. Company procedures called for repeat deicing when in icing conditions if a delay exceeds 20 minutes. Confusion between the tower and the flight crew due to procedural errors resulted in the delayed takeoff clearance. Both pilots were inexperienced in their respective crew positions. The captain had 33 hours experience as a DC-9 captain. The first officer had 36 hours jet experience, all in the DC-9. First officer demonstrated weak scan in training and had pilot performance problems with previous employers. First officer was on reserve, and had not flown for 24 days. The trip was assigned to the first officer for proficiency. Flight was first officer's 2nd trip as DC-9 first officer. Wing vortices from a landing aircraft on a parallel runway were not a factor in the accident.

Garuda Indonesian Airways

On final approach to Medan-Polonia Airport, pilots encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, turbulences and heavy rain falls. On final, the aircraft became unstable and lost height. The pilot increased engine power when the aircraft struck a television antenna, stalled and crashed in a field, bursting into flames. 23 occupants were killed while 22 others were injured.

Scandinavian Airlines System - SAS

DC-9 "Gissur Viking" was approaching Trondheim runway 27 with the co-pilot at the controls. Descending through 2500 feet the ATC controller asked the crew to contact SAS Station in Trondheim over company frequency. The captain was working through the checklist but contacted SAS, contrary to company regulations (it's not allowed use company frequency while on final approach). The captain then forgot to arm the spoilers because he had not completed the checklist. He co-pilot noticed that the spoilers had not been armed and, while descending through 100 feet, called "Spoilers". The pilot instinctively extended the spoilers and, realizing his mistake, immediately retracted them. The aircraft entered a high sink rate and touched down heavily. A go-around was executed and after landing severe structural damage was found to the undercarriage, engines (30° respectively 15° tilted down), and tail cone (the APU was pushed halfway up the tail). All 107 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

AeroMéxico

AeroMéxico flight AM498 was a scheduled passenger flight from Mexico City to Los Angeles with intermediate stops at Guadalajara, Loreto and Tijuana. The DC-9, named 'Hermosillo', departed Tijuana Airport at 11:20 and proceeded toward Los Angeles at FL100. At 11:44 Coast Approach Control cleared the flight to 7,000 feet. Just three minutes earlier Piper PA-28-181 Cherokee N4891F departed Torrance Airport, CA for a VFR flight to Big Bear, CA. On board were a pilot and two passengers. The Piper pilot turned to an easterly heading toward the Paradise VORTAC and entered the Terminal Control Area (TCA) without receiving clearance from ATC as required by FAR Part 91.90. At 11:47 the AeroMéxico pilot contacted LA Approach Control and reported level at 7,000 feet. The approach controller cleared flight 498 to depart Seal Beach on a heading of 320 degrees for the ILS runway "two five left final approach course...". At 11:51:04, the approach controller asked the flight to reduce its airspeed to 190 KIAS and cleared it to descend to 6,000 feet. At about 11:52:09, flight 498 and the Piper collided over Cerritos at an altitude of about 6,560 feet. The Piper struck the left hand side of the DC-9's horizontal and vertical stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizer sliced through the Piper's cabin following which it separated from the tailplane. Both planes tumbled down out of control. The wreckage and post impact fires destroyed five houses and damaged seven others. Fifteen persons on the ground were killed. The sky was clear, the reported visibility was 14 miles.

USAir - US Airways

During arrival, the crew of USAir flight 499 landed on runway 24, which was covered with snow. Reportedly, while landing, the aircraft touched down approximately 1,800 to 2,000 feet beyond the displaced threshold. Altho armed, the spoilers did not autodeploy, so the captain operated them manually. He lowered the aircraft's nose, actuated reverse thrust and applied brakes. The brakes were not effective. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the end of the runway, ran over a runway end id light, struck a fence and came to rest straddling a road. The crew had planned on making an ILS approach to runway 06, but the RVR was only 2,800 feet and a minimum RVR of 4 000 feet was requested for that runway. The crew elected to land on runway 24, since 1/2 mile visibility was sufficient for that runway. However, the approach was made with a qtrg tailwind and approximately 10 knots above Vref. Tailwind landings were not authorized on runway 24 in wet/slippery conditions. The runway braking action was reported as fair-to-poor. The pilot's handbook cautioned the crew to monitor the spoilers when landing on slippery runways, since the spoilers auto-deploy only with wheel spin-up or when the nose wheel is on the ground. A passenger was slightly injured while 22 other occupants were uninjured.