Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain

Pablo Air Charters

Private Brazilian

Crashed in unknown circumstances in bushes near Cobán, Guatemala, while engaged in an illegal flight. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and no one was found on the scene. The registration seems to be false.

Donald H. Sefton

On December 05, 2021, at 1652, a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain airplane, N64BR, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident in Medford, Oregon. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot and passenger made a flight on November 24, from the airplane’s home airport in Fallon, Nevada to Medford. After landing, the pilot noticed the airplane was leaking a large amount of fuel from the right wing-root. The pilot arranged to make the necessary repairs with a fixed based operator (FBO) at the airport and drove a rental car back home to Nevada. On December 4, a mechanic at the FBO notified the pilot that the maintenance to the airplane was completed. The pilot responded that he would plan to get the airport about 1430 the following day (on the day of the accident). The pilot and passenger drove to Medford arriving about 1600. The radio communication times could not be confirmed for accuracy for the purposes of the preliminary report. The pilot received an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance and was issued the BRUTE7 departure procedure with the LANKS transition. During the exchange of the clearance instructions, the pilot requested the controller read back the departure procedure and transition phonetically. The pilot’s family and a business associate stated this was very normal for the pilot and he would often have people clarify names and instructions. The published BRUTE SEVEN Standard Instrument Departure (SID) with a takeoff from runway 14 consisted of a “climbing right turn direct MEF [Medford] NDB [nondirectional beacon],” and continue to the BRUTE intersection on a bearing of 066°. After receiving the clearance, the controller informed the pilot the overcast layer base was at 200 ft above ground level (agl) the tops of the layer was at 2,500 ft. After the airplane departed the pilot made a radio communication to the controller asking “will you be calling my turn for the BRUTE7?” The controller replied that he would not be calling his turn and that the pilot should fly the departure as published making a climbing right turn to overfly the approach end of runway 14 before proceeding to the BRUTE intersection (see Figure 1 below). The pilot acknowledged the communication, which was his last transmission. Several seconds later, the controller stated that he was receiving a low-altitude alert that the airplane’s altitude was showing 1,700 ft. He made several attempts to reach the pilot with no response. The radar and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) information disclosed that the airplane arrived in the run-up area for runway 14 about 1643 and then continued onto the runway about 6 minutes thereafter. The airplane departed about 1649:30 and after crossing over the south end of the runway, it climbed to about 1,550 ft mean sea level, equivalent to 200 ft agl (see Figure 2 below). The airplane then began a gradual right turn and climbed to 1,950 ft maintaining an airspeed between 120- 130 kts. As the airplane turn continued to the north the altitude momentarily decreased to 1,650 ft (about 350 ft agl) with the airspeed increasing to 160 kts. Thereafter, the airplane then increased the bank angle and made a 360-degree turn initially climbing to 2,050 ft. At the completion of the turn, the airplane descended to 1,350 ft, consistent with it maneuvering below the cloud layer. The airspeed increased to about 160 kts and several seconds later, the airplane climbed to 2,250 ft with the derived airspeed showing below 15 kts. Six seconds later was the last radar return, located about 990 ft north-northwest of the accident site. Video footage was obtained from several fixed security cameras on buildings around the accident site. A review of the footage revealed that the airplane descended below the cloud layer and then climbed back up. About 16 seconds thereafter, the airplane is seen descending in a near vertical attitude. The airplane’s position and strobe light appeared to be illuminated throughout the video. The preliminary review of the recorded audio from the camera footage revealed that there were sound components at frequencies that correspond to the normal operating speed range of the airplane engines. The accident site was adjacent to the garage bays of an automobile dealership located about 2,800 ft west-southwest from the departure end of runway 14. A majority of the wreckage had been consumed by fire and sustained major crush deformation. Various items in the cockpit were not burned, including numerous paper sectionals and IFR charts of which there were several current departure procedure plates for the Medford Airport. The Piper PA-31-350 Navajo (Panther conversion), airplane was manufactured in 1977 and was powered by two Lycoming TIO-540-J2B series engines driving two, four-bladed Q-Tip propellers. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin GNS 530W and an autopilot. The pilot had previously owned a PA-31-350 and purchased the accident airplane in 2013. According to his electronic logbooks he had amassed about 1,500 hours in a PA-31-350 of which 280 hours was in actual instrument meteorological conditions. The logbooks indicated that the pilot had departed from Medford in August 2018 and 2019 by way of the JACKSON1 and EAGLE6 departure procedures, respectively. Investigators compiled a comparison of ADS-B data from two airplanes that departed before the accident airplane (at 1507 and 1556) and two that departed after (1734 and 1813). A comparison of flight tracks from the three airplanes that departed runway 14 revealed that all began the right turn after the accident flight.

Goyo Air

Shortly after takeoff from runway 10 at South Bimini-Intl Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea. The wreckage was found in shallow water. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was killed.

Private Ecuadorian

The twin engine airplane (a PA-31 Panther II variant) departed Nueva Loja-Lago Agrio Airport at 1023LT on an ambulance flight to Guayaquil, carrying one patient, one nurse, two doctors and two pilots. The descent to Guayaquil-José Joaquín de Olmedo Airport was started when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in the Río Salitre, near Salitre, about 35 km north of Guayaquil Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.

Marc Inc

The pilot was approaching Chetumal Airport when he reported engine problems. He elected to make an amergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field located in Sergio Butrón Casas, about 25 km west of Chetumal Airport. Both occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Security Aviation

On November 29, 2019, about 1911 Alaska standard time, a Piper PA-31-350 airplane, N4087G, was destroyed by impact and postcrash fire when it collided with mountainous terrain about 15 miles west of Cooper Landing, Alaska. The three occupants; the airline transport pilot, a flight nurse, and the flight paramedic were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Fly 4 You Inc., doing business as Security Aviation, as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 visual flight rules air ambulance flight. Dark night visual meteorological conditions existed at the departure and destination locations and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight departed Ted Stevens International Airport (PANC), Anchorage, Alaska, about 1848, destined for Seward Airport (PAWD), Seward, Alaska. Dispatch records indicated that, on November 29, Providence Seward Medical Center emergency clinic personnel contacted multiple air ambulance companies with a "weather check" for possible air ambulance transportation of a patient from Seward to Anchorage. The first company contacted was Guardian Flight, who declined the flight at 1624 due to limited daylight hours. The second company, LifeMed Alaska, declined the flight at 1637 due to weather. The third and final company contacted for the flight was Medevac Alaska. Their dispatch officer was not notified of the previous declined flight requests and forwarded the request to Security Aviation, who is their sole air charter provider. At 1731 Security Aviation accepted the flight, and Medevac Alaska flight SVX36 was staffed with a nurse and paramedic. A preliminary review of archived Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) data revealed that the accident airplane departed PANC and flew south about 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) toward the Sterling Highway. The airplane was then observed descending to 2,200 ft msl while flying a right racetrack pattern before flying into the valley toward Cooper Landing. The last data point indicated that at 1911:14 the airplane was over the west end of Jean Lake at 2,100 ft msl, on a 127° course, and 122 kts groundspeed. Ground witnesses who were in vehicles on the Sterling Highway near milepost 63, reported that they saw the lights of the airplane flying over the highway that night. One witness stated that he saw the airplane west of the mountains turn in a circle as it descended and then entered the valley. He observed the wings rocking back and forth and while he was looking elsewhere, he heard an explosion and observed a large fire on the mountainside. Another witness reported seeing the airplane flying low and explode when it impacted the mountain. Witnesses to the fire called 911 and observed the wreckage high on the mountainside burning for a long time after impact. The airplane was reported overdue by the chief pilot for Security Aviation and the FAA issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 2031. The Alaska Rescue Coordination Center dispatched an MH-60 helicopter to the last known position and located the burning wreckage that was inaccessible due to high winds in the area. On December 1, 2019, the Alaska State Troopers coordinated a mountain recovery mission with Alaska Mountain Rescue Group. The wreckage was observed on the mountain at an elevation of about 1,425 ft msl in an area of steep, heavily tree-covered terrain near the southeast end of Jean Lake in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge. The airplane was highly fragmented and burned, however all major airplane components were accounted for. Multiple large trees around the wreckage were fractured and indicated an easterly heading prior to the initial impact.

TransPacificos

The twin engine airplane departed Popayán-Guillermo León Valencia Airport runway 26 at 14:06:06. The aircraft encountered difficulties to gain sufficient height. About 20 seconds after liftoff, at a speed of 82 knots, the aircraft rolled to the right then entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed onto two houses located 530 metres past the runway end. Two passengers were seriously injured and seven other occupants were killed.

Private American

In the morning, the Guatemala Army Forces were informed by ATC that a PA-31 entered the Guatemala Airspace without prior permission. The twin engine airplane crashed in a wooded area located near the farm of Sepens located in the region of Sayaxché, Petén. The aircraft was partially destroyed by impact forces and both occupants were killed. A sticker was set on the fuselage with the registration N2613 which is wrong.

Private Venezuelan

The twin engine airplane departed Venezuela in the evening on a probable drug smuggling flight with an unknown destination. At 2226LT, after it entered the Dominican Airspace, a crew of the Dominican Air Force was dispatched with an Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano but the PA-31 disappeared from radar screens at 2228LT after crashing in a sugar cane field located in the region of San Rafael de Yuma, between La Romana and Punta Cana. Due to limited visibility caused by night and poor weather conditions, SAR operations were suspended shortly after midnight. The wreckage was found in the next early morning. Nobody was found on site and the aircraft is probably written off. The registration YV312 may be a wrong one.

Marc Inc

The commercial pilot was conducting an aerial observation (surveying) flight in a piston engineequipped multiengine airplane. Several hours into the flight, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that the airplane had a fuel problem and that he needed to return to the departure airport. When the airplane was 8 miles from the airport, and after passing several other airports, the pilot informed ATC that he was unsure if the airplane could reach the airport. The final minutes of radar data depicted the airplane in a descent and tracking toward a golf fairway as the airplane's groundspeed decreased to a speed near the single engine minimum control airspeed. According to witnesses, they heard an engine sputter before making two loud "back-fire" sounds. One witness reported that, after the engine sputtered, the airplane "was on its left side flying crooked." Additional witnesses reported that the airplane turned to the left before it "nose-dived" into a neighborhood, impacting a tree and private residence before coming to rest in the backyard of the residence. A witness approached the wreckage immediately after the accident and observed a small flame rising from the area of the left engine. Video recorded on the witness' mobile phone several minutes later showed the airplane engulfed in flames. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of either engine. The fuel systems feeding both engines were damaged by impact forces but the examined components generally displayed that only trace amounts of fuel remained; with the exception of the left engine nacelle fuel tank. Given the extent of the fire damage to this area of the wreckage, and the witness report that the post impact fire originated in this area, it is likely that this tank contained fuel. By design, this fuel in this tank was not able to supply fuel directly to either engine, but instead relied on an electric pump to transfer fuel into the left main fuel tank. Fire damage precluded a detailed postaccident examination or functional testing of the left nacelle fuel transfer pump. Other pilots who flew similar airplanes for the operator, along with a review of maintenance records for those airplanes, revealed at least three instances of these pumps failing in the months surrounding the accident. The other pilots also reported varying methods of utilizing fuel and monitoring fuel transfers of fuel from the nacelle fuel tanks, since there was no direct indication of the quantity of fuel available in the tank. These methods were not standardized between pilots within the company and relied on their monitoring the quantity of fuel in the main fuel tanks in order to ensure that the fuel transfer was occurring. Had the pilot not activated this pump, or had this pump failed during the flight, it would have rendered the fuel in the tank inaccessible. Given this information it is likely that the fuel supply available to the airplane's left engine was exhausted, and that the engine subsequently lost power due to fuel starvation. The accident pilot, along with another company pilot, identified fuel leaking from the airplane's left wing, about a week before the accident. Maintenance records showed no actions had been completed to the address the fuel leak. Due to damage sustained during the accident, the origin of the fuel leak could not be determined, nor could it be determined whether the fuel leak contributed to the fuel starvation and eventual inflight loss of power to the left engine. Because the left engine stopped producing power, the pilot would have needed to configure the airplane for single-engine flight; however, examination of the left engine's propeller found that it was not feathered. With the propeller in this state, the pilot's ability to maintain control the airplane would have been reduced, and it is likely that the pilot allowed the airplane's airspeed to decrease below the singleengine minimum controllable airspeed, which resulted in a loss of control and led to the airplane's roll to the left and rapid descent toward the terrain. Toxicology results revealed that the pilot had taken doxylamine, an over-the-counter antihistamine that can decrease alertness and impair performance of potentially hazardous tasks. Although the toxicology results indicated that the amount of doxylamine in the pilot's cavity blood was within the lower therapeutic range, review of ATC records revealed that the pilot was alert and that he was making necessary decisions and following instructions. Thus, the pilot's use of doxylamine was not likely a factor in the accident.

Bernard J. Krupinski

The commercial pilot of the multiengine airplane was the first of a flight of two airplanes to depart on the cross-country flight, most of which was over the Atlantic Ocean. The pilot of the second airplane stated that he and the accident pilot reviewed the weather for the route and the destination before departing; however, there was no record of the accident pilot receiving an official weather briefing and the information the pilots accessed before the flight could not be determined. The second pilot departed and contacted air traffic control, which advised him of thunderstorms near the destination; he subsequently altered his route of flight and landed uneventfully at the destination. The second pilot stated that he did not hear the accident pilot on the en route air traffic control frequency. Two inflight weather advisories were issued for the route and the area of the destination about 42 and 15 minutes before the accident flight departed, respectively, and warned of heavy to extreme precipitation associated with thunderstorms. It could not be determined whether the accident pilot received these advisories. Review of air traffic control communications and radar data revealed that, about 5 miles from the destination airport, the pilot of the accident airplane reported to the tower controller that he was flying at 700 ft and "coming in below" the thunderstorm. There were no further communications from the pilot. The airplane's last radar target indicated 532 ft about 2 miles south of the shoreline. The airplane was found in about 50 ft of water and was fragmented in several pieces. Postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engines that would have precluded normal operation. A local resident about 1/2 mile from the accident site took several photos of the approaching thunderstorm, which documented a shelf cloud and cumulus mammatus clouds along the leading edge of the storm, indicative of potential severe turbulence. Review of weather imagery and the airplane's flight path showed that the airplane entered the leading edge of "extreme" intensity echoes with tops near 48,000 ft. Imagery also depicted heavy to extreme intensity radar echoes over the accident site extending to the destination airport. It is likely that the pilot encountered gusting winds, turbulence, restricted visibility in heavy rain, and low cloud ceilings in the vicinity of the accident site and experienced an in-flight loss of control at low altitude. Such conditions are conducive to the development of spatial disorientation; however, the reason for the pilot's loss of control could not be determined based on the available information.

Private Mexican

En route from Toluca to Acapulco, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions. In limited visibility, the twin engine airplane struck hilly and wooded terrain in the Sierra de Chilpancingo, near San Vicente. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.

Private American

The twin engine airplane was involved in a smuggling flight within Mexico and was carrying three people. In unclear circumstances, the pilot attempted a belly landing in a swampy area located in El Sacrificio, State of Campeche. The wreckage was found by local authorities few hours later and no trace of the occupant was found or the load was found. The registration N633D is attributed to a Piper PA-31 with MSN 31-7852098 which was not involved in this accident. Thus, it was confirmed by Mexican and US Authorities that the registration was false.

Thai Regional Airlines

While descending to Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a swamp and came to rest against a wood bridge. The wreckage was found about 15 km from the airport, along the borders of Nong Chok and Min Buri districts. The captain was killed while three other occupants were injured.

Tiuna Tours

The crew was performing a cargo flight from La Paragua to Canaima. While descending to Canaima in the early morning, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crashed some 34 km northeast of the intended destination, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were killed. Crew: Johnny Ramirez, pilot, José Angel Soto Zapata, copilot.

Spohrer %26 Dodd Aviation

The airline transport pilot of the multiengine airplane had fueled the main (inboard) fuel tanks to capacity before the cross-county flight. As the flight approached the destination airport, an air traffic controller instructed the pilot to turn right for a visual approach, and the pilot acknowledged. Subsequently, the pilot reported that he might have to land on a highway. The airplane impacted a marsh area about 15 miles from the destination airport. Review of data downloaded from an onboard engine monitor revealed that the right engine momentarily lost and regained power before experiencing a total loss of power. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the left propeller was feathered and that the right propeller was in the normal operating range. Sufficient fuel to complete the flight was drained from the left wing fuel tanks. Although the right wing fuel tanks were compromised during the impact, sufficient fuel was likely present in the right main fuel tanks to complete the flight before impact because both the left and right main fuel tanks were fueled to capacity concurrently before the flight, but it likely was in a low fuel state due to fuel used during the flight. The right wing main fuel tank was not equipped with a flapper valve, which should have been located on the baffle nearest the wing root where the fuel pickup was located. The flapper valve is used to trap fuel near the fuel pickup and prevent it from flowing outboard away from the pickup. The maintenance records did not indicate that the right main fuel tank bladder had been replaced; however, the manufacture year printed on the bladder was about 20 years before the accident and 16 years after the manufacture of the airplane, indicating that the bladder had been replaced at some point. When the right main fuel tank bladder was replaced, the flapper valve would have been removed. Based on the evidence, it is likely that maintenance personnel failed to reinstall the flapper valve after installing the new fuel bladder. This missing valve would not affect operation of the fuel system unless the right main fuel tank was in a low fuel state, when fuel could flow outboard away from the fuel pickup (such as in a right turn, which the pilot was making when the engine lost power), and result in fuel starvation to the engine.Toxicology testing of the pilot revealed that his blood alcohol level during the flight was likely between 0.077 gm/dl and 0.177 gm/dl, which is above the level generally considered impairing. Therefore, it is likely that, during the right turn, the fuel in the right main fuel tank moved outboard, which resulted in fuel starvation to the right engine. When the right engine lost power, the pilot should have secured the right engine by feathering the propeller to reduce drag and increase single-engine performance; however, given the position of the propellers at the accident site, the pilot likely incorrectly feathered the operating (left) engine, which rendered the airplane incapable of maintaining altitude. It is very likely that the pilot's impairment due to his ingestion of alcohol led to his errors and contributed to the accident.

Keystone Air Service

At 1817 Central Daylight Time, the Keystone Air Service Ltd. Piper PA-31-350 (registration C-FXLO, serial number 31-8052022) departed Runway 06 at Thompson Airport, Manitoba, on an instrument flight rules flight to Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International Airport, Manitoba, with 2 pilots and 6 passengers on board. Shortly after rotation, both engines began to lose power. The crew attempted to return to the airport, but the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude. The landing gear was extended in preparation for a forced landing on a highway southwest of the airport. Due to oncoming traffic, the forced landing was conducted in a forested area adjacent to the highway, approximately 700 metres south of the threshold of Runway 06. The occupants sustained varying serious injuries but were able to assist each other and exit the aircraft. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and there was no fire. Emergency services were activated by a 911 call and by the Thompson flight service station. Initial assistance was provided by sheriffs of the Manitoba Department of Justice after a crew member flagged down their vehicle on the highway.

Nacional de Aviacion

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport on a charter flight to Bahía Solano, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. En route, while in cruising altitude, the crew contacted ATC and reported engine trouble. He was then cleared to divert to Mariquita-José Celestino Mutis Airport for an emergency landing. On final approach to runway 19, the aircraft stalled and crashed on hilly and wooded terrain, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 10 occupants were killed.

Ferg's Air Charter

On Tuesday December 2nd, 2014 at approximately 8:45 am (1345Z) a Ferg’s Air Limited, Piper PA-31-350 Navajo aircraft, registration C6-REV, operated as Southern Air Limited Flight 302, ditched in waters approximately 6nm from shore in the southwestern district of New Providence. The flight originated at Governor’s Harbour, Eleuthera (MYEM) with 10+1 persons on board at approximately 8:15 am in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). At around 8:30am, the aircraft 15 nautical miles east of Lynden Pindling International Airport at 4,500 feet contacted Nassau Air Traffic Control Tower. The aircraft was instructed that runway 09 was in use and they can expect a landing on that runway. Upon final approach to runway 09, with the landing gears selected to the “EXTEND” position, only the nose and right main landing gear lights indicated the “down and locked” position. The left main landing gear light did not illuminate to indicate the “down and locked” position, so the landing was aborted and the pilot requested to go around so he could recycle and troubleshoot the landing gear issue. The pilot made a left turn, flew over the north western shoreline and recycled the landing gears a few times and also tried the emergency hand pump in an attempt to extend the gear. Despite all efforts, the left main landing gear light still did not illuminate to indicated the gear was in the safe “down and locked” position. At this time the aircraft was allowed to fly by the tower so that the controller may make a visual check of the landing gears to see if they were in the extended position. The controller advised the pilot that all gears “appeared to be extended”. Once again the pilot proceeded outbound to make another attempt for landing. For this approach the pilot made a right turn over the southwestern shoreline and proceeded downwind to runway 09. While on the downwind to runway 09 the pilot stated he began to experience problems with the right engine. The engine eventually stopped and all attempts to restart were unsuccessful. As a result of single engine operation, level flight could not be maintained even after retracting the gears and cleaning up the airplane. The decision was made by the pilot to ditch in the water vs. attempting to make the airport where numerous trees and obstacles would make the landing more difficult if the runway could not be made. After touching down on the water the most of the occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft through the normal and emergency exits before the aircraft sank into the ocean. One passenger died during the process. Witness stated that “the plane skipped across the water three times before rotating and hitting with a severe impact. The port (left) tail section received the bulk of the impact as did the port side of the plane.” Eye witness further stated that the passenger that died and “luggage from the baggage compartment were ejected from the rear of the plane on the port side.” “Multiple passengers could not swim or were extremely limited in their ability to swim.” Despite the plane having the full complement of survival equipment (life vests), only two were taken out of the aircraft. Passengers were holding on to bags and other debris that floated out of the aircraft as it submerged. Passengers helped each other until rescuers arrived to assist. Estimates from eye witness were that “the entire plane disappeared under water from 30 to 60 seconds after impact.” The depth where the aircraft came to rest on the water was reported as in excess of 6,500 feet. Once the aircraft settled, it submerged and was not able to be recovered. Safety concerns raised by eye witness could not be confirmed as the plane was never recovered.

Laser Aéreo

The twin engine aircraft departed Araracuara Airport runway 09 at 1503LT on a charter flight to Florencia, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. During initial climb, the right engine failed. The crew lost control of the airplane that stalled and crashed in a wooded area. The wreckage was found 8,2 km from the airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 10 occupants were killed, among them a Swiss citizen.

Aeroflight Executive Services

The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Seattle in the USA to Thailand via Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Scotland and across Europe. However the flight crew abandoned the aircraft in Greenland late in December 2013 after experiencing low oil pressure indications on both engines. This may have been due to the use of an incorrect grade of oil for cold weather operations. The aircraft remained in Greenland until 28 February 2014, when a replacement ferry pilot was engaged. Although the engine oil was not changed prior to departing Greenland, the flight continued uneventfully to Wick, in Scotland. Following some maintenance activity on the right engine, the aircraft departed for Le Touquet in France. However, approximately 25 minutes after takeoff, the engines successively lost power and the pilot carried out a forced landing in a ploughed field. Examination of the engines revealed that one piston in each engine had suffered severe heat damage, consistent with combustion gases being forced past the piston and into the crankcase.

Maui Island Air

The airplane departed during dark (moonless) night conditions over remote terrain with few ground-based light sources to provide visual cues. Weather reports indicated strong gusting wind from the northeast. According to a surviving passenger, shortly after takeoff, the pilot started a right turn; the bank angle continued to increase, and the airplane impacted terrain in a steep right bank. The accident site was about 1 mile from the airport at a location consistent with the airplane departing to the northeast and turning right about 180 degrees before ground impact. The operator's chief pilot reported that the pilot likely turned right after takeoff to fly direct to the navigational aid located southwest of the airport in order to escape the terrain induced turbulence (downdrafts) near the mountain range northeast of the airport. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed damage and ground scars consistent with a high-energy, low-angle impact during a right turn. No evidence was found of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented during the right turn. Although visual meteorological conditions prevailed, no natural horizon and few external visual references were available during the departure. This increased the importance for the pilot to monitor the airplane's flight instruments to maintain awareness of its attitude and altitude. During the turn, the pilot was likely performing the additional task of engaging the autopilot, which was located on the center console below the throttle quadrant. The combination of conducting a turn with few visual references in gusting wind conditions while engaging the autopilot left the pilot vulnerable to visual and vestibular illusions and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude, and trajectory. Based on toxicology findings, the pilot most likely had symptoms of an upper respiratory infection but the investigation was unable to determine what effects these symptoms may have had on his performance. A therapeutic level of doxylamine, a sedating antihistamine, was detected, and impairment by doxylamine most likely contributed to the development of spatial disorientation.

Intan Angkasa Air Service

On 19 January 2014, a PA-31-350 Piper Chieftain, registered PK-IWT, was being operated by PT. Intan Angkasa Air Service, on positioning flight from Sentani Airport, Jayapura with intended destination of Juanda Airport, Surabaya for aircraft maintenance. The positioning flight was planned to transit at Dumatubun Airport Langgur of Tual, Maluku and Haluoleo Airport, Kendari at South East Sulawesi for refuelling. On the first sector, the aircraft departed Sentani Airport at 2351 UTC (0851 WIT) and estimated arrival at Langgur was 0320 UTC. On board on this flight was one pilot, two company engineers and one ground staff. At 0240 UTC the pilot contacted to the Langgur FISO, reported that the aircraft position was 85 Nm to Langgur Airport at altitude 10,000 feet and requested weather information. Langgur FISO acknowledged and informed that the weather was rain and thunderstorm and the runway in used was 09. When the aircraft passing 5,000 feet, the pilot contacted the Langgur FISO and reported that the aircraft position was 50 Nm from langgur and informed the estimated time of arrival was 0320 UTC. The Langgur FISO acknowledged and advised the pilot to contact when the aircraft was at long final runway 09. At 0318 UTC, the pilot contacted Langgur FISO, reported the position was 25 Nm to Langgur at altitude of 2,500 feet and requested to use runway 27. The Langgur FISO advised the pilot to contact on final runway 27. At 0325 UTC, Langgur FISO contacted the pilot with no reply. At 0340 UTC, Langgur FISO received information from local people that the aircraft had crashed. The aircraft was found at approximately 1.6 Nm north east of Langgur Airport at coordinate 5° 38’ 30.40” S; 132° 45’ 21.57” E. All occupants fatally injured and the aircraft destroyed by impact force and post impact fire. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire, several parts of the remaining wreckage such as cockpit could not be examined due to the level of damage. The aircraft was not equipped with flight recorders and the communication between ATC and the pilot was not recorded. No eye witness saw the aircraft prior to impact. Information available for the investigation was limited. The analysis utilizes available information mainly on the wreckage information including the information of the wings, engines and propellers.

Private Dominican

The aircraft departed the Dominican Republic for an international flight and no flight plan was filed. While cruising in the region of Jérémie, the twin engine aircraft hit a mountain some 30 km from Jérémie. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire and both occupants were killed. According to Dominican Authorities, the owner of the plane, a businessman, leased it to a couple from Honduras who were certainly performing an illegal flight.

John Thomas Fetcko

The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were flying from their home, which was located at a residential airpark where no fuel services were available, to an airport located about 37 miles away. According to the passenger, shortly after departure, she queried the pilot about the airplane's apparent low fuel state. The pilot responded that one of the fuel gauges always indicated more available fuel than the other, and that if necessary they could use fuel from that tank. However, about 15 minutes after departure, the pilot advised air traffic control that the airplane was critically low on fuel. About 5 minutes later, both engines lost total power, and the airplane descended into trees and terrain. Examination of the airframe and engines after the accident confirmed that all of the airplane's fuel tanks were essentially empty, and that the trace amounts of fuel recovered were absent of contamination. Based on the autopsy and toxicology results, the pilot had emphysema, hypertension, dilated cardiomyopathy, and severe coronary artery disease; however, given that the passenger did not report any signs of acute incapacitation, and that the pilot did not communicate any medical issues to air traffic control, it does not appear that these conditions affected his performance on the day of the accident. The pilot did not report any chronically painful conditions to the FAA in his most recent medical certificate applications; however, postaccident toxicology tests indicated that the pilot was taking several pain medications (diclofenac, gabapentin, and oxycodone) and one illegal substance (marijuana). Based on the medications' Food and Drug Administration warnings, gabapentin and oxycodone may be individually impairing and sedating; their combined effect may be additive. The effects of the underlying conditions that necessitated the medication could not be determined. It is impossible to determine from the available information what direct effect the marijuana alone may have had on the pilot's judgment and psychomotor functioning; however, the combination of marijuana, oxycodone, and gabapentin likely significantly impaired the pilot's judgment and contributed to his failure to ensure the airplane had sufficient fuel to complete the planned flight.

Ameriflight

The pilot began flying the twin piston-engine airplane model for the cargo airline about 11 months before the accident. Although he had since upgraded to one of the airline’s twin turboprop airplane models, due to the airline’s logistical needs, the pilot was transferred back to the piston-engine model about 1 week before the accident. The flight originated at one of the airline’s outlying destination airports and was planned to stop at an interim destination to the southwest before continuing to the airline’s base as the final destination. The late afternoon departure meant that the flight would arrive at the interim destination about 10 minutes after sunset. That interim destination was situated in a sparsely populated geographic bowl just south of terrain that was significantly higher, and the ceilings there included multiple broken and overcast cloud layers near, or lower than, the surrounding terrain. Although not required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, the airline employed dedicated personnel who performed partial dispatch-like activities, such as providing relevant flight information, including weather, to the pilots. Before takeoff on the accident flight, the pilot conferred briefly with the dispatch personnel by telephone, and, with little discussion, they agreed that the flight would proceed under visual flight rules to the interim destination. Information available at the time indicated that the cloud cover almost certainly precluded access to the airport without an instrument approach; however, the airplane was not equipped to conduct the only available instrument approach procedure for that airport. Additionally, the pilot did not have in-flight access to any GPS or terrain mapping/database information to readily assist him in either locating the airport or remaining safely clear of the local terrain. Although the airplane was not being actively tracked or assisted by air traffic control (ATC) early in the flight, review of ground tracking radar data showed that the flight initially headed directly toward the interim destination but then began a series of turns, descents, and climbs. The airplane then disappeared from radar as the result of radar coverage floor limitations due to high terrain and radar antenna siting. The airplane reappeared on radar about 24 minutes after it disappeared and about 9 minutes after the FAA-defined beginning of night. Based on the flight track, it is likely that the pilot made a dedicated effort to access the airport, while concurrently remaining clear of the clouds and terrain, strictly by visual means. This task was made considerably more difficult and hazardous by attempting it in dusk conditions, and then darkness, instead of during daylight hours. About 15 minutes after the airplane reappeared on radar, when it was at an altitude of about 13,500 ft, the pilot contacted ATC and requested and was granted an instrument flight rules clearance to his final destination. About 3 minutes later, the controller cleared the flight to descend to 10,000 ft, and the airplane leveled off at that altitude about 6 minutes later. However, upon reaching 10,000 ft, the pilot requested a lower altitude to escape “heavy” upand down-drafts, but the controller was unable to comply because the ATC minimum vectoring altitude was 9,700 ft in that region. About 1 minute later, radar contact was lost. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted terrain in a steep nose-down attitude in a near-vertical trajectory. Although examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical deficiencies that would have prevented normal operation and continued flight, the extent of the damage precluded, except on a macro scale, any determination of the preimpact integrity or functionality of any systems, subsystems, or components, including the ice protection systems, autopilot, and nose baggage door. Analysis of the radar data indicated that the airplane was above 10,000 ft for at least 41 minutes (possibly in two discontinuous periods) and above 12,000 ft (in two discontinuous periods) for at least 18 minutes. Although the airplane was reportedly equipped with supplemental oxygen, the investigation was unable to verify either its presence or its use by the pilot. Lack of supplemental oxygen at those altitudes for those periods could have contributed to a decrease in the pilot’s mental acuity and his ability to safely conduct the light. Analysis of air mass data revealed that mountain-wave activity and up- and downdrafts with vertical velocities of about 1,000 ft per minute (fpm) were present near the accident site and that the largest and most rapid transitions from up- to down-drafts occurred near the accident site, which was also supported by the airplane’s altitude data trace. The analysis also indicated that the last radar target from the airplane was located in a downdraft with a velocity of between 600 and 1,000 fpm. Other meteorological analysis indicated that the airplane encountered icing conditions, likely in the form of supercooled large droplets (SLD), several minutes before the accident. Aside from pilot reports from aircraft actually encountering SLD, no tools currently exist to detect airborne SLD. Further, the tools and processes to reliably forecast SLD do not exist. SLD is often associated with rapid ice accumulation, especially on portions of the airplane that are not served by ice protection systems. Airframe icing, whether due to accumulation rates or locations that exceed the airplane’s deicing system capabilities, mechanical failure, or the pilot’s failure to properly use the system, can impose significant adverse effects on airplane controllability and its ability to remain airborne. Because of the pilot’s recent transition from the Beechcraft BE-99, in which the pitot heat was always operating during flight, he may have forgotten that the accident airplane’s pitot heat procedures were different and that the pitot heat had to be manually activated when the airplane encountered the icing conditions. If the pitot heat is not operating in icing conditions, the airspeed information becomes unreliable and likely erroneous. Erroneous airspeed indications, particularly in night instrument meteorological conditions when the pilot has no outside references, could result in a loss of control. The investigation was unable to determine whether the pitot heat was operating during the final portion of the flight. The investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot used the autopilot during the last portion of the flight. If he was using the autopilot, it is possible that, at some point, he was forced to revert to flying the airplane manually due to the unit’s inability and to a corresponding Pilot’s Operating Handbook prohibition against using it to maintain altitude in the strong up- and downdrafts, which would increase the pilot’s workload. Another possibility is that the autopilot was unable to maintain altitude, and, instead of disconnecting it, the pilot overpowered it via the control wheel. If that occurred and the pilot overrode the autopilot for more than 3 seconds, the pitch autotrim system would have activated in the direction opposite the pilot’s input, and, when the pilot released the control wheel, the airplane could have been significantly out of trim, which could result in uncommanded pitch, altitude, and speed excursions and possible loss of control. Whether the pilot was hand-flying the airplane or was using the autopilot, the encounter with the strong up- and downdrafts and consequent altitude loss likely prompted the pilot to input corrective actions to regain the lost altitude, specifically increasing pitch and possibly power. Such corrections typically result in airspeed losses; those losses can sometimes be significant as a function of downdraft strength and the airplane’s climb capability. If that capability is compromised by the added weight, drag, and other adverse aerodynamic effects of ice, aerodynamic stall and a loss of control could result. Radar tracking data and ATC communications revealed that another, similar-model airplane flew a very similar track about 6 minutes behind the accident airplane, except that that other airplane was at 12,000 ft not 10,000 ft. The 10,000-ft ATC-mandated altitude placed the accident airplane closer to the underlying high terrain and into the clouds with the icing conditions and the strong vertical air movements. In contrast, the pilot of the second airplane reported that he was in and out of the cloud tops and did not report any weather-induced difficulties. The accident pilot did not have any efficient in-flight means for accurately determining the airborne meteorological conditions ahead, and the ATC controller did not advise him of any adverse conditions. Therefore, the pilot did not have any objective or immediate reason to refuse the ATC-assigned altitude of 10,000 ft. Ideally, based on both the AIRMET and the ambient temperatures, the pilot should have been aware of the likelihood of icing once he descended into clouds. That, particularly combined with his previously expressed lack of confidence in the airplane’s capability in icing conditions, could have prompted him to request either an interim stepdown altitude of 12,000 ft or an outright delay in a direct descent to 10,000 ft, but, for undetermined reasons, the pilot did not make any such request of ATC. Based on the available evidence, if the ATC controller had not descended the airplane to 10,000 ft when he did, either by delaying or by assigning an interim altitude of 12,000 ft, it is likely that the airplane would not have encountered the icing conditions and the strong up- and downdrafts. In addition, if the presence of SLD and/or strong up- and downdrafts had been known or explicitly forecast and then communicated to the pilot either via his weather briefing, his onboard equipment, or by ATC, it is likely that the pilot would have opted to avoid those phenomena to the maximum extent possible. The flight’s encounter with airframe icing and strong up-and downdrafts placed the pilot and airplane in an environment that either exacerbated or directly caused a situation that resulted in the loss of airplane control.

Devenco Trading

On the morning of 25 November 2012 at 0902Z the pilot, sole occupant on board the aircraft, took off from FAGC to FATZ. He filed an IFR flight plan to cruise at F110 in controlled airspace. The take-off roll and initial climb from RWY 17 was uneventful and passing FL075 FAGC Tower Controller transferred the aircraft to Johannesburg Approach Control (Approach) on 124.5 MHz. On contact with Approach the pilot was cleared to climb to FL110. On the climb approaching FL090 the aircraft lost power on the left engine, oil pressure dropped and the cylinder head temperature increased. He then advised Approach of the problem and requested to level out at FL090 to attempt to identify the problem. He requested radar vectors from Approach to route direct to FAGC and proceeded to shut down the left engine. The pilot continued routing FAGC using the right engine but was unable to maintain height. He noticed the oil pressure and manifold pressure on the right engine dropping. The pilot also reported seeing fire through the cooling vents of the right engine cowling. The pilot requested distance to FAGC from Approach and was told it is 2.5nm (nautical miles) and the aircraft continued loosing height. An update from Approach seconds later indicated that the aircraft was 1nm from FAGC. The pilot decided to do a wheels up forced landing on an open field when he realized that the aircraft was too low. He landed wheels up in a wings level attitude. The aircraft impacted and skidded across an uneven field and came to a stop 5m from Donovan Street. The pilot disembarked the aircraft and attempted to put out the fire which had started inflight on the right engine but without success. Eventually the right wing and the fuselage were engulfed by fire. Minutes later the FAGC fire department using two vehicles extinguished the fire. The pilot escaped with no injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by the ensuing fire.

Premier Aviation

Shortly after takeoff from Constanza-14 de Junio Airport, bound to Las Américas Airport in Santo Domingo, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The burnt wreckage was found near the village of Tireo, about 3 km northeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. The exact circumstances of the accident are unclear. It is believed that the flight was illegal and that a load of 11 of cocaine was found at the crash site.

Intan Angkasa Air Service

On 24 August 2012, a Piper Chieftain PA-31-350 aircraft, registered PK-IWH, was being operated by PT. Intan Angkasa Airservice to conduct an aerial survey (aero magnetic) flight at a survey area located north of Bontang, East Kalimantan. There were 4 persons on board; one pilot, one security officer and two surveyors. Based on the flight plan submitted by the Pilot in Command (PIC) to the Briefing Office, the flight was planned with an altitude of 3,000 feet AMSL en-route and 500 feet AGL while surveying the area. The fuel endurance was for 6 hours flight time and the aircraft equipped with an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT). The aircraft departed from Temindung Airport (WALS), Samarinda at 0751 local time (LT - 2351 UTC). At 0004 UTC, the pilot informed to the Temindung Control Tower controller (Temindung Tower) that the aircraft was abeam Tanjung Santan descending from 3,000 feet and established contact with Bontang Info officer (Bontang Info). At 0005 UTC, the pilot informed the Bontang Info that the aircraft altitude was 300 feet and estimated over Bontang at 0011 UTC. Bontang info acknowledged this transmission and advised the pilot to report when the flight left the Bontang Area. At 0010 UTC, the SureTrack (flight following system) stopped receiving data from the aircraft. The last recorded information was an aircraft speed of 138 knots, heading 352°, latitude 0°8’33” N and longitude 117°12’54” E. At 0600 UTC, the engineer of the PK-IWH aircraft asked the Temindung Tower about the flight as the fuel endurance had been exceeded. The Temindung Tower contacted Bontang Info to get information about the aircraft. After receiving the request, Bontang Info tried to contact the pilot twice and there was no reply. Bontang Info also contacted the Tanjung Bara Airstrip to request information about the aircraft but there was no information. The Temindung Tower reported that: • at 0610 UTC declared INCERFA (Uncertainty phase); • at 0630 UTC declared ALERFA (Alert phase); • at 0700 UTC declared DETRESFA (Distress phase). At 0730 UTC, the search and rescue team was assembled; the team consisted of the Temindung Airport Authority, National Search and Rescue, Indonesian Police, Army and Airforce. The search operation was conducted via ground and air using three helicopters. On 26 August 2012 at 0850 UTC, the aircraft wreckage was located by a ground search team on a ridge of Mayang Hill, Bontang at approximately 1,200 feet AMSL at coordinates 00°12’34.3”N, 117°16’57.3”E, 12 NM from Bontang Aerodrome on bearing of 294°. The accident site was within the planned aircraft survey area. All occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact force and post impact fire.

Keystone Air Service

The Piper PA31-350 Navajo Chieftain (registration C-GOSU, serial number 31-7752148), operating as Keystone Air Service Limited Flight 213, departed Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International Airport, Manitoba, enroute to North Spirit Lake, Ontario, with 1 pilot and 4 passengers on board. At 0957 Central Standard Time, on approach to Runway 13 at North Spirit Lake, the aircraft struck the frozen lake surface 1.1 nautical miles from the threshold of Runway 13. The pilot and 3 passengers sustained fatal injuries. One passenger sustained serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire. After a short period of operation, the emergency locator transmitter stopped transmitting when the antenna wire was consumed by the fire.

Trans North Aviation

The airplane was dispatched on an emergency medical services flight. While being vectored for an instrument approach, the pilot declared an emergency and reported that the airplane was out of fuel. He said the airplane lost engine power and that he was heading toward the destination airport. The airplane descended through clouds and impacted trees and terrain short of its destination. No preimpact anomalies were found during a postaccident examination. The postaccident examination revealed about 1.5 ounces of a liquid consistent with avgas within the airplane fuel system. Based on the three previous flight legs and refueling receipts, postaccident calculations indicated that the airplane was consuming fuel at a higher rate than referenced in the airplane flight manual. Based on this consumption rate, the airplane did not have enough fuel to reach the destination airport; however, a 20-knot tailwind was predicted, so it is likely that the pilot was relying on this to help the airplane reach the airport. Regardless, he would have been flying with less than the 45-minute fuel reserve that is required for an instrument flight rules flight. The pilot failed to recognize and compensate for the airplane’s high fuel consumption rate during the accident flight. It is likely that had the pilot monitored the gauges and the consumption rate for the flight he would have determined that he did not have adequate fuel to complete the flight. Toxicology tests showed the pilot had tetrahydrocannabinol and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (marijuana) in his system; however, the level of impairment could not be determined based on the information available. However, marijuana use can impair the ability to concentrate and maintain vigilance and can distort the perception of time and distance. As a professional pilot, the use of marijuana prior to the flight raises questions about the pilot’s decision-making. The investigation also identified several issues that were not causal to the accident but nevertheless raised concerns about the company’s operational control of the flight. The operator had instituted a fuel log, but it was not regularly monitored. The recovered load manifest showed the pilot had been on duty for more than 15 hours, which exceeded the maximum of 14 hours for a regularly assigned duty period per 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The operator stated that it was aware of the pilot’s two driving while under the influence of alcohol convictions, but the operator did not request a background report on the pilot before he was hired. Further, the operator did not list the pilot-rated passenger as a member of the flight crew, yet he had flown previous positioning legs on the dispatched EMS mission as the pilot-in-command.

Transbanca

The twin engine aircraft departed Maracay on a cargo flight to Puerto Ordaz, carrying one pilot, one passenger and some bank documents. While in cruising altitude, the pilot informed ATC about smoke in the cockpit and elected to divert to the nearest airport. Eventually, he attempted an emergency landing in an open field located some 20 km east from Zaraza. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. While both occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

AirNet Systems

The twin-engine airplane was scheduled for a routine night cargo flight. Witnesses and radar data described the airplane accelerating down the runway to a maximum ground speed of 97 knots, then entering an aggressive climb before leveling and pitching down. The airplane subsequently impacted a parallel taxiway with its landing gear retracted. Slash marks observed on the taxiway pavement, as well as rotation signatures observed on the remaining propeller blades, indicated that both engines were operating at impact. Additionally, postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airframe or either engine. The as-found position of the cargo placed the airplane within the normal weight and balance envelope, with no evidence of a cargo-shift having occurred, and the as-found position of the elevator trim jackscrew was consistent with a neutral pitch trim setting. According to the airframe manufacturer's prescribed takeoff procedure, the pilot was to accelerate the airplane to an airspeed of 85 knots, increase the pitch to a climb angle that would allow the airplane to accelerate past 96 knots, and retract the landing gear before accelerating past 128 knots. Given the loading and environmental conditions that existed on the night of the accident, the airplane's calculated climb performance should have been 1,800 feet per minute. Applying the prevailing wind conditions about time of the accident to the airplane's radar-observed ground speed during the takeoff revealed a maximum estimated airspeed of 111 knots, and the airplane's maximum calculated climb rate briefly exceeded 3,000 feet per minute. The airplane then leveled for a brief time, decelerated, and began descending, a profile that suggested that the airplane likely entered an aerodynamic stall during the initial climb.

Private American

The pilot stated he experienced a high temperature in the right engine and a partial loss of engine rpm while at 9,000 feet mean sea level in cruise flight. He requested and received clearance from air traffic control to descend and divert to another airport. He leveled the airplane at 2,500 feet and both engines were operating; however, the right engine experienced a loss of rpm which made it difficult to maintain altitude. The pilot reduced power in both engines, turned the fuel boost pump on, opened the cowl flaps and the engine continued to run with a low rpm. The pilot elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean, instead of landing as soon as practical at the nearest suitable airport, as instructed in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). Additionally, he shut down the right engine before performing the troubleshooting items listed in the POH. He attributed his decision to ditch the airplane to poor single-engine performance and windy conditions. The wind at the destination airport was from 060 degrees at 6 knots and runway 8 was in use at the time of the accident. The airplane was not recovered.

Pioneer Air Service

On September 19, 2010, at 1440 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA31-350, N84859, registered to Spirit Air Inc, and operated by Pioneer Air Service was on initial climb out when the lower half of the main cabin door came open. The pilot reversed his course and returned to the departure airport, landing on runway 27. The right main landing gear tire blew out on the landing roll. The airplane went off the right side of the runway, struck a tree, caught fire and came to a complete stop. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight plan was filed. The commercial pilot and five passengers were not injured and the airplane received substantial damage. The flight originated from Bimini Airport, South Bimini Island, Bahamas, at 1435, and was operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

New Life Research %26 Development

The twin engine departed Guatemala City-La Aurora Airport at 0930LT on a flight to Rio Dulce with two pilots on board. En roue, the crew contacted ATC, modified his flight plan and was cleared to continue direct to Puerto Barrios. Following few touch-and-go manoeuvres at Puerto Barrios Airport, the crew completed a new approach and landing on runway 12. The pilot-in-command increased engine power and took off when he lost control of the airplane that crashed on a road, coming to rest upside down. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

North Wind Aviation

Aircraft departed on a round trip flight from Goose Bay to Cartwright and Black Tickle before returning to Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador. The pilot was to deliver freight to Cartwright as well as a passenger and some freight to Black Tickle. At approximately 0905, the pilot made a radio broadcast advising that the aircraft was 60 nautical miles west of Cartwright. No further radio broadcasts were received. The aircraft did not arrive at destination and, at 1010, was reported as missing. The search for the aircraft was hampered by poor weather. On 28 May 2010, at about 2200, the aircraft wreckage was located on a plateau in the Mealy Mountains. Both occupants of the aircraft were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. There was no emergency locator transmitter on board and, as such, no signal was received.

Canadian Air Charters

The Canadian Air Charters Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain (registration C-GNAF, serial number 31-8052130) was operating under visual flight rules as APEX 511 on the final leg of a multi-leg cargo flight from Vancouver to Nanaimo and Victoria, British Columbia, with a return to Vancouver. The weather was visual meteorological conditions and the last 9 minutes of the flight took place during official darkness. The flight was third for landing and turned onto the final approach course 1.5 nautical miles behind and 700 feet below the flight path of a heavier Airbus A321, approaching Runway 26 Right at the Vancouver International Airport. At 2208, Pacific Daylight Time, the target for APEX 511 disappeared from tower radar. The aircraft impacted the ground in an industrial area of Richmond, British Columbia, 3 nautical miles short of the runway. There was a post-impact explosion and fire. The 2 crew members on board were fatally injured. There was property damage, but no injuries on the ground. The onboard emergency locator transmitter was destroyed in the accident and no signal was detected.

Frontier Flying Service

The scheduled commuter flight was about 10 miles north of the destination airport, operating under a special visual-flight-rules clearance, and descending for landing in instrument meteorological conditions. According to the pilot he started a gradual descent over an area of featureless, snow-covered, down-sloping terrain in whiteout and flat light conditions. During the descent a localized snow shower momentarily reduced the pilot’s forward visibility and he was unable to discern any terrain features. The airplane collided with terrain in an all-white snow/ice field and sustained substantial damage. At the time of the accident the destination airport was reporting visibility of 1.5 statute miles in light snow and mist, broken layers at 900 and 1,600 feet, and 3,200 feet overcast, with a temperature and dew point of 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The pilot reported that there were no pre accident mechanical problems with the airplane and that the accident could have been avoided if the flight had been operated under an instrument-flight-rules flight plan.

CSG Services

Shortly after takeoff from Darwin Airport, while in initial climb, one of the engine failed. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to return but eventually attempted to ditch the aircraft that came to rest in shallow water about 200 metres offshore. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Timothy O’Brien

On 7 November 2008, a Piper Aircraft Corp. PA-31-350 Chieftain, registered VH-OPC, was being operated on a private flight under the instrument flight rules (IFR) from Moorabbin Airport, Vic. to Port Macquarie via Bathurst, NSW. On board the aircraft were the owner-pilot and three passengers. The aircraft departed Moorabbin Airport at about 1725 Eastern Daylight-saving Time and arrived at Bathurst Airport at about 1930. The pilot added 355 L of aviation gasoline (Avgas) to the aircraft from a self-service bowser and spent some time with the passengers in the airport terminal. Recorded information at Bathurst Airport indicated that, at about 2012 (12 minutes after civil twilight), the engines were started and at 2016 the aircraft was taxied for the holding point of runway 35. The aircraft was at the holding point for about 3 minutes, reportedly at high engine power. At 2020, the pilot broadcast that he was entering and backtracking runway 35 and at 2022:08 the pilot broadcast on the common traffic advisory frequency that he was departing (airborne) runway 35. At 2023:30, the pilot transmitted to air traffic control that he was airborne at Bathurst and to standby for departure details. There was no record or reports of any further radio transmissions from the pilot. At about 2024, a number of residents of Forest Grove, a settlement to the north of Bathurst Airport, heard a sudden loud noise from an aircraft at a relatively low height overhead, followed shortly after by the sound of an explosion and the glow of a fire. A witness located about 550 m to the south-west of the accident site, reported seeing two bright lights that were shining in a constant direction and ‘wobbling’. There was engine noise that was described by one witness as getting very loud and ‘rattling’ or ‘grinding’ abnormally before the aircraft crashed. At 2024:51, the first 000 telephone call was received from witnesses and shortly after, emergency services were notified. The aircraft was seriously damaged by impact forces and fire, and the four occupants were fatally injured.

Aeronet Supply

During climb a few minutes after takeoff, a fire erupted in the airplane's right engine compartment. About 7 miles from the departure airport, the pilot reversed course and notified the air traffic controller that he was declaring an emergency. As the pilot was proceeding back toward the departure airport witnesses observed fire beneath, and smoke trailing from, the right engine and heard boom sounds or explosions as the airplane descended. Although the pilot feathered the right engine's propeller, the airplane's descent continued. The 12-minute flight ended about 1.25 miles from the runway when the airplane impacted trees and power lines before coming to rest upside down adjacent to a private residence. A fuel-fed fire consumed the airframe and damaged nearby private residences. The airplane was owned and operated by an airplane broker that intended to have it ferried to Korea. In preparation for the overseas ferry flight, the airplane's engines were overhauled. Maintenance was also performed on various components including the engine-driven fuel pumps, turbochargers, and propellers. Nacelle fuel tanks were installed and the airplane received an annual inspection. Thereafter, the broker had a ferry pilot fly the airplane from the maintenance facility in Ohio to the pilot's Nevada-based facility, where the ferry pilot had additional maintenance performed related to the air conditioner, gear door, vacuum pump, and idle adjustment. Upon completion of this maintenance, the right engine was test run for at least 20 minutes and the airplane was returned to the ferry pilot. During the following month, the ferry pilot modified the airplane's fuel system by installing four custom-made ferry fuel tanks in the fuselage, and associated plumbing in the wings, to supplement the existing six certificated fuel tanks. The ferry pilot held an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate with inspection authorization. He reinspected the airplane, purportedly in accordance with the Piper Aircraft Company's annual inspection protocol, signed the maintenance logbook, and requested Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval for his ferry flight. The FAA reported that it did not process the first ferry pilot's ferry permit application because of issues related to the applicant's forms and the FAA inspector's workload. The airplane broker discharged the pilot and contracted with a new ferry pilot (the accident pilot) to immediately pick up the airplane in Nevada and fly it to California, the second ferry pilot's base. The contract specified that the airplane be airworthy. In California, the accident pilot planned to complete any necessary modifications, acquire FAA approval, and then ferry the airplane overseas. The discharged ferry pilot stated to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator that none of his airplane modifications had involved maintenance in the right engine compartment. He also stated that when he presented the airplane to the replacement ferry pilot (at most 3 hours before takeoff) he told him that fuel lines and fittings in the wings related to the ferry tanks needed to be disconnected prior to flight. During the Safety Board's examination of the airplane, physical evidence was found indicating that the custom-made ferry tank plumbing in the wings had not been disconnected. The airplane wreckage was examined by the NTSB investigation team while on scene and following its recovery. Regarding both engines, no evidence was found of any internal engine component malfunction. Notably, the localized area surrounding and including the right engine-driven fuel pump and its outlet port had sustained significantly greater fire damage than was observed elsewhere. According to the Lycoming engine participant, the damage was consistent with a fuel-fed fire originating in this vicinity, which may have resulted from the engine's fuel supply line "B" nut being loose, a failed fuel line, or an engine-driven fuel pumprelated leak. The fuel supply line and its connecting components were not located. The engine-driven fuel pump was subsequently examined by staff from the NTSB's Materials Laboratory. Noted evidence consisted of globules of resolidified metal and areas of missing material consistent with the pump having been engulfed in fire. The staff also examined the airplane. Evidence was found indicating that the fire's area of origin was not within the wings or fuselage, but rather emanated from a localized area within the right engine compartment, where the engine-driven fuel pump and its fuel supply line and fittings were located. However, due to the extensive pre- and post-impact fires, the point of origin and the initiating event that precipitated the fuel leak could not be ascertained. The airplane's "Pilot Operator's Handbook" (POH), provides the procedures for responding to an in-flight fire and securing an engine. It also provides single-engine climb performance data. The POH indicates that the pilot should move the firewall fuel shutoff valve of the affected engine to the "off" position, feather the propeller, close the engine's cowl flaps to reduce drag, turn off the magneto switches, turn off the emergency fuel pump switch and the fuel selector, and pull out the fuel boost pump circuit breaker. It further notes that unless the boost pump's circuit breaker is pulled, the pump will continuously operate. During the wreckage examination, the Safety Board investigators found evidence indicating that the right engine's propeller was feathered. However, contrary to the POH's guidance, the right engine's firewall fuel shutoff valve was not in the "off" position, the cowl flaps were open, the magneto switches were on, the emergency fuel pump switches and the fuel selector were on, and the landing gear was down. Due to fire damage, the position of the fuel boost pump circuit breaker could not be ascertained. Calculations based upon POH data indicate that an undamaged and appropriately configured airplane flying on one engine should have had the capability to climb between 100 and 200 feet per minute and, at a minimum, maintain altitude. Recorded Mode C altitude data indicates that during the last 5 minutes of flight, the airplane descended while slowing about 16 knots below the speed required to maintain altitude.

Torquip Transmission Services

After landing in Winterveld, the aircraft (a Panther III version) hit a rock on the ground. On impact, the right main gear was torn off. The aircraft veered to the right and came to rest with its right wing severely damaged. Nobody was injured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Servant Air

The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Post accident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall.

Baer Air

The airplane had undergone routine maintenance, and was returned to service on the day prior to the incident flight. The mechanics who performed the maintenance did not secure the right engine cowling using the procedure outlined in the airplane's maintenance manual. The mechanic who had been working on the outboard side of the right engine could not remember if he had fastened the three primary outboard cowl fasteners before returning the airplane to service. During the first flight following the maintenance, the right engine's top cowling departed the airplane. The pilot secured the right engine, but the airplane was unable to maintain altitude, so he then identified a forced landing site. The airplane did not have a sufficient glidepath to clear a tree line and buildings, so he landed the airplane in a clear area about 1,500 yards short of the intended landing area. The airplane came to rest in a field of scrub brush, and about 5 minutes after the pilot deplaned, the grass under the left engine ignited. The subsequent brush fire consumed the airplane. Examination of the right engine cowling revealed that the outboard latching fasteners were set to the "open" position. When asked about the security of the cowling during the preflight inspection, the pilot stated that he "just missed it."