Cessna 550 Citation II

GB Aviation Leasing LLC

On December 18, 2025, at 1015 eastern standard time, a Cessna Citation 550, N257BW, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Statesville, North Carolina. The pilot and 6 passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was positioned on the south parking ramp at Statesville Regional Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina, for passenger loading and preflight. Ground personnel reported the airplane was fully fueled prior to the flight. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) audio began recording the accident flight at 0944:21. The CVR recording confirmed the airline transport rated pilot was seated in the left seat, the pilot’s adult son, who held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land and an instrument rating, was a passenger in the right seat. A rear seat passenger with a private pilot certificate and ratings for multi-engine land, instrument airplane, and rotorcraft-helicopter was positioned near the cockpit in the cabin area. Engine start was initiated using onboard battery power and, following an initial unsuccessful start of the left (no. 1) engine, both engines were started about 0953. The airplane taxied from the south parking area at 0959, crossed runway 10/28 at midfield, and taxied to the approach end of runway 10. During taxi, the pilot and the two pilot-rated passengers discussed that a thrust reverser indicator light(s) for an unspecified engine was inoperative, but that the thrust reverser for the affected engine was working properly. The airplane departed from runway 10 at SVH, under visual flight rules (VFR) about 1006. The pilot intended to activate an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, with a planned destination of Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida, once airborne. The pilot performed the takeoff and departure while the right seat passenger performed various checklists and communicated on the radio. During takeoff roll, the rear passenger commented that the left engine was producing more power than the right and indicated there may have been a faulty gauge. The pilot continued the takeoff. Preliminary GPS data showed the airplane made a climbing left turn following takeoff. At 1007:19 the pilot commented that he would remain VFR until they received their IFR clearance. At 1008, the airplane had turned about 180° and attained an altitude of about 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane continued to turn left and began to descend. The right-seat passenger attempted to contact ZTL ATC and activate the flight’s IFR flight plan three times between 1008 and 1010 but was unsuccessful due to the controller’s workload and associated radio communications. About 1009 there was discussion between the pilot and rear passenger about climbing to a higher altitude, even though they were technically required to remain VFR. The airplane had descended to about 1,580 ft msl and was established on a heading of about 250° and 164 knots (kts) indicated airspeed (IAS) at that time. The pilot initiated a climb, and shortly after, the rear passenger noted a difference between the left and right engine interstage turbine temperature (ITT) indications. There were no further discussions regarding the engine instruments throughout the remainder of the CVR recording. The autopilot was either disengaged intentionally, or it disengaged independently at 1010:02. Beginning at 1010:14 no intelligible CVR audio was captured from the left seat hot microphone and audio panel for the next 3 minutes and 55 seconds. Starting at 1010:18, the cockpit area microphone captured the pilot making remarks indicating his altitude indicator was not working properly and that additional left side flight instruments may not have been working properly. The Garmin GTN-750 stopped recording airspeed data at 1009:37 and heading data at 1010:58. About 1011, airplane control was transferred to the right seat passenger, at an altitude of about 4,500 ft msl. No comments were recorded during the remainder of the CVR recording to indicate there were any malfunctions with the right side cockpit flight instruments. At 1011:04 severe degradation in CVR audio quality began in all channels, which continued for 3 minutes and 5 seconds. About 1013, at an altitude of about 1,870 ft msl, the pilot and both pilot-rated passengers stated they could see the ground. Although a positive transfer of airplane control was not recorded, subsequent communication between the pilot and right seat passenger was consistent with the pilot having resumed control of the airplane at that time. The pilot requested the flaps be extended at 1013:03, made a right turn to a westerly heading, and requested the landing gear be extended at 1013:22. Subsequent discussions were consistent with the landing gear being configured; however, the gear indicator lights were not illuminated. At 1013:48, the right seat passenger transmitted on the SVH common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) in part “…we’re having some issues here.” At 1014:05 the rear passenger made a query to the pilot regarding power to the “alternator” (NOTE: the CE-550 airplane is not equipped with an alternator). About 4 seconds later audio quality returned to previous levels on all recorded CVR audio channels. After the audio quality returned, the pilot made a comment indicating that was the “problem”, however, did not specify what the “problem” was or what actions were taken to correct it. There were no additional discussions regarding the pilot’s flight instrumentation for the remainder of the CVR recording. The airplane started a left turn (consistent with the base leg) towards runway 28 about 1014:10, at an altitude of about 1,325 ft and 142 kts groundspeed. The Garmin GTN-750 recordings of airspeed data returned at 1014:12. The GPS data showed the airplane rolled out of the turn onto runway heading about 1014:50, at an altitude of about 1,240 ft msl and 114 kts IAS. Recorded CVR audio indicated the right seat passenger visually acquired the runway and provided directions to the pilot as to where the runway was. About 1015:00, the pilot made comments which indicated he had acquired the runway visually. Recorded data from the GTN-750 showed that the airplane’s airspeed and altitude continued to decrease from the time the airplane was aligned on final approach to the runway until 1015:18, when the airplane was at 984 ft msl and 99 kts IAS. The airplane continued to descend to 942 ft msl until the CVR audio and GPS data ended at 1015:23. The IAS increased to 107 kts and then decreased to about 93 kts during the final five seconds of data. Accident Site and Wreckage Examination of the accident site revealed that the first identified point of impact (FIPI) was the first (easternmost) light station of the runway 28 Medium Intensity Approach Light System with Runway Alignment Indicator Lights (MALSR), located about 1,380 ft from the runway threshold. Two lightbulbs, the left and fourth from the left position (when viewed looking towards the runway), approximately 6 ft apart, were separated from the otherwise intact 29 ft tall light station and located on the ground near the station. The upper portion of the second MALSR light station located about 180 ft from the FIPI was separated, of which about 15 ft of the frangible pole was still standing. A group of damaged trees located about 235 ft from the FIPI, were sheared about 12 ft above ground level (agl). The first indication of fire was blackened branches and grass near the west side of the trees. A ground impression was observed about 350 ft from the FIPI, near the airport perimeter fence, and extended through the MALSR decision light station. The debris path continued along a westerly heading through the runway overrun to where the main wreckage came to rest on the runway blast area about 400 ft short of the runway 28 threshold, oriented on an easterly heading. Heavy charring of the ground began near the decision light station and continued along the remaining length of the debris field to the wreckage. A post impact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage and heat damaged both wings, empennage, and both engines. All flight control surfaces were identified in the debris path and main wreckage. No evidence of pre-impact separation of any airplane component or structure was observed. Both engines remained attached to the pylon structures and both thrust reversers were found in the stowed position. There was no evidence of uncontained engine failure with either engine. Examination of the cockpit throttle quadrant found both thrust levers to be in the full forward position and both reverse throttle levers in the down position, consistent with being stowed. The No. 1 engine stage 2 low pressure turbine (LPT) blades, viewed through the exhaust duct, were all full length and appeared undamaged. The No. 1 engine fan blades, viewed through the engine inlet, exhibited various degrees of damage and had missing material at the blade tips. The engine inlet surfaces exhibited circumferential scoring between the fan blades forward to the inlet. The No. 2 engine stage 2 LPT blades, viewed through the exhaust duct, were all full length and appeared undamaged. Most of the engine inlet was not attached to the engine. The No. 2 engine fan blades exhibited various degrees of damage and had missing material at the blade tips. Pilot Experience The pilot had type ratings for the A-320, A-330, A-350, B-737, B-757, B-767, CE-500, and DC-10. As part of the pilot’s CE-500 type rating, he had the limitation “CE-500 Second in Command Required.” The pilot reported civil flight experience that included 17,000 total and 400 hours in the last six months as of his last first-class medical application dated April 29, 2025. Review of the right-seat passenger’s logbook indicated that he had 175.3 total flight hours in single engine land airplanes as of November 29, 2025. The right seat passenger’s most recent first-class medical certificate was issued on August 12, 2024. The right seat passenger was not qualified to perform second in command duties per Title 14 CFR part 61.55. The rear passenger reported civil flight experience that included 3,500 total and 65 hours in last six months as of his last medical application dated February 21, 2025. He was issued a second-class medical certificate without limitation. Weather The SVH Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), recorded on the CVR audio, reported the weather at 0945 as wind calm, visibility 10, ceiling 3,900 ft broken, 4,800 ft overcast, temperature 7° C, dewpoint -0° C, altimeter 30.19. The SVH AWOS, recorded on the CVR audio, reported the weather at 0954 as wind from 050° at 3 knots, visibility 10, 3,900 ft scattered, ceiling 5,000 ft overcast, temperature 7° Celsius, dewpoint 0° C, altimeter 30.19. The Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR), at 1015, reported weather at SVH as: wind calm, visibility of 5 statute miles, heavy drizzle, ceiling broken at 1,200 ft agl, ceiling broken at 2,200 ft agl, overcast clouds at 5,000 ft agl, temperature of 7°C, dew point temperature of 1°C, altimeter setting of 30.19 inHg; Remarks: station with a precipitation discriminator, temperature of 7.2°C and dew point temperature of 1.0°C. Recorders The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild GA-100 tape-based cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The CVR was recovered at the accident site by NTSB personnel. Audio recording of the accident flight was successfully downloaded from the CVR. The recorder contained about 31 minutes of analog audio on a continuous loop tape in a four-channel format: one channel for each flight crew and one channel for the cockpit area microphone (CAM) with one spare channel. Audio quality of the recording was poor with low signal-to-noise ratio and extraordinary means were required to make portions of the recording intelligible. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be. A Garmin GTN-750 was recovered at the accident site by NTSB personnel. The GTN-750 is a combination GPS/Navigation receiver/Radio/Multi-Function display that has the capability of recording some data in non-volatile memory. In its configuration on the accident aircraft the unit recorded about 20 parameters for the full accident flight. Weather: METAR KSVH 181515Z AUTO 00000KT 5SM +DZ BKN012 BKN022 OVC050 07/01 A3019 RMK AO2 T00720010 METAR KSVH 181535Z AUTO 00000KT 1 3/4SM +RA SCT004 OVC010 06/04 A3019 RMK AO2 P0001 T00550035

Daviator

N689VP

Prestige Worldwide Flights

South African Civil Aviation Authority

A Cessna S550 Citation S/II of the South African Civil Aviation Authority crashed into the Outeniqua mountains, near the town of Friemersheim. The three occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The Citation departed Port Elizabeth Airport (FAPE) on a positioning flight to George Airport (FAGG). On approach to FAGG, the flying crew requested to carry out a calibration flight for the very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) beacon at FAGG. Due to inclement weather conditions at the time, they were not cleared to conduct VOR calibration. As a result, they decided to land and refuel the aircraft before commencing with the calibration of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) on runway 11 at FAGG. The flying crew requested take-off from runway 11 and an early right turn to intercept radial 250°, 17 nautical miles (nm) DME arc to radial 330° at 3000 feet (ft) climbing to 4,000 feet. The air traffic control (ATC) granted their request. Radar data indicated that at 10:42, the aircraft took off from runway 11 and, once airborne, made a right-hand turn to intercept radial 250° using the George VOR (GRV VOR). The aircraft climbed to 3000ft. Once the aircraft reached 17 nm on the DME from the GRV VOR (DME is co-located with the VOR), it commenced with a right-hand turn to intercept radial 330° while maintaining 17nm DME arc. At 10:46, the ATC at FAGG advised the flying crew that they were now exiting controlled airspace and were advised to broadcast on the special rules frequency. The crew acknowledged the advisory to change frequency and there was no further communication. The aircraft was still being monitored by ATC using secondary surveillance radar. At 10:50, radar data showed the aircraft crossing radial 310° and entered a climb from 3000ft, reaching 3,900 feet. As the aircraft levelled off at 3,900 feet, a rapid descent occurred, and the aircraft lost 1500ft in approximately 9 seconds. Three seconds prior to impact, the aircraft nose pitched up before impacting a ridge at 2,192 feet.

José João Abdalla Filho

The aircraft took off from the Comandante Rolim Adolfo Amaro Aerodrome (SBJD), Jundiaí - SP, to the Barra Grande Aerodrome (SIRI), Maraú - BA, at about 1458 (UTC), in order to carry out a private flight, with two pilots and eight passengers on board. Upon arriving at the destination Aerodrome, at 1717 (UTC), the aircraft made an undershoot landing on runway 11, causing the main and auxiliary landing gear to burst. The airplane moved along the runway, dragging the lower fuselage and the lower wing, leaving the runway by its left side, and stopping with the heading lagged, approximately, 210º in relation to the landing trajectory. Afterwards, there was a fire that consumed most of the aircraft. The aircraft was destroyed. One crewmember and four passengers suffered fatal injuries and the other crewmember and four passengers suffered serious injuries.

Avia Jet

On July 19, 2019, about 1844 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 550 airplane, N320JT, sustained substantial damage while landing at Mesquite Airport (67L), Mesquite, Nevada. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, had minor injuries. The airplane was registered to Avia Jet LLC, and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a ferry flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the cross-country flight. The flight departed Tri-Cities Airport (PSC), Pasco, Washington about 1625 and was destined for Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Las Vegas, Nevada. A surveillance video at 67L captured the airplane as it was sliding across the runway shortly after landing. The main landing gear had collapsed prior to entering the video frame and a large fire and dark smoke followed the airplane as it continued down the runway. The airplane disappeared from view as it exited the runway near the departure end of the runway. Shortly after the accident, the pilot was placed under arrest for operating an aircraft while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.

Private American

The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in a turbofan-powered airplane. Shortly after departure, the airplane entered a witness-estimated 90° left bank with the nose parallel to the horizon; as the airplane began to roll out of the turn, the nose remained at or below the horizon before it dropped and the airplane impacted the ground. Flight track data revealed that, shortly after departure, the airplane's ground speed immediately began decreasing from its maximum of 141 knots during takeoff and continued decreasing until the last recorded data point, which showed that the airplane had a ground speed of 100 knots. The surface wind reported about 10 minutes before the accident was from 170° at 9 knots, gusting to 14 knots, which resulted in a 1- to 2-knot tailwind component. Given this information and the airplane's configuration at the time of the accident, the airplane's indicated airspeed (IAS) would have been between about 86 and 93 knots. The airplane's stall speed was calculated to be 100 knots IAS (KIAS) with a bank angle of 45° and 118 KIAS with a bank angle of 60°. Thus, the pilot failed to maintain airspeed or accelerate after departure, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall A pilot who had flown with the accident pilot twice before the accident reported that, during these flights, the pilot had flown at reduced power settings and slower-than-normal airspeeds. During the flight 1 year before the accident, he reached over and pushed the power levers forward himself. He also stated that every time he had flown with the pilot, he was "very behind the airplane." Postaccident examination of the engines revealed no signs of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation, and both engines exhibited circumferential rub marks on all rotating stages, blade tip bending opposite the direction of rotation, and debris ingestion through the gas path, indicating that the engine had power at impact. Further, the right engine full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) nonvolatile memory recorded no faults. (The left engine FADEC could not be downloaded due to damage.) The Airplane Flight Manual stated that the pilot must, in part, advance the throttle lever to the maximum takeoff detent for the FADEC's nonvolatile memory to record a logic trend snapshot 2 seconds after takeoff. The lack of a FADEC logic trend snapshot is consistent with the pilot not fully advancing the throttles during the takeoff and initial climb and is likely why he did not attain or maintain sufficient airspeed. The flight track data, pilot witness account, and airplane damage are consistent with the pilot failing to fully advance the power levers while maneuvering shortly after takeoff, which led to his failure to maintain sufficient airspeed and resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall.

Dirt Dynamics

The commercial pilot was conducting a cross-country, business flight with 10 passengers onboard the 8-passenger airplane. He reported that air traffic control cleared the flight for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to the runway. While descending, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at 3,100 ft mean sea level (msl), and ice started to accumulate on the wing's leading edges, empennage, and windshield. The pilot activated the pneumatic deice boots multiple times during the approach and slowed the airplane to 120 knots. The airplane then exited the clouds about 400 ft above ground level (agl), and the pilot maintained 120 knots as the airplane flew over the airport fence; all indications for landing were normal. About 100 ft agl, the airplane started to pull right. He applied left correction inputs, but the airplane continued to pull right. He applied engine power to conduct a goaround, but the airplane landed in grass right of the runway, sustaining damage to the wings and landing gear. Witnesses and passengers reported that the airplane stalled. During examination of the airplane immediately after the accident, about 1/2 to 1 inch of mixed ice was found on the right wing's leading edge, the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and the angle of attack probe. Ice was also observed on the windshield. The flaps were found in the "up" position. Flight control continuity was established. Although the airplane was originally certificated for two-pilot operation, the pilot was flying the airplane under a single-pilot exemption. The pilot received a logbook endorsement indicating that he had received single-pilot training and was properly qualified under the single-pilot exemption. However, he had not met the turbine flight time qualifications (1,000 hours) to be properly authorized to conduct the flight under the single-pilot exemption because he only had 500 hours. A review of cockpit voice recorder information indicated that, although the pilot verbalized that the landing gear was "all green," followed by stating "check, check, check," he did not verbalize all the approach or landing checklist items nor did he make any audible comments about activating the pneumatic deice boots or windshield anti-ice. A review of radar data for the flight indicated that, during the last 2 minutes of flight, while the airplane was on final approach to the runway, the indicated airspeed got as low as 99 knots. The last recorded radar return indicated that the airplane had an airspeed of 104 knots at 900 ft msl. The pilot's lack of minimum flight experience required to fly the airplane without a copilot likely led to task saturation as he flew the airplane entered IMC and icing conditions while on an ILS approach. He subsequently failed to lower the flaps during the approach, which resulted in a no-flap approach instead of a full-flap landing. The ice on the leading edges of the wings, the no-flap approach, and the low airspeed likely led to the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.