Boeing 747-200

Saudi Arabian Airlines - SAUDIA

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Kalitta Air

Shortly after take off from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, while climbing by night, the crew informed ATC about engine problems and was cleared for an immediate return. After the crew realized he could not make it, he attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft collided with a farm and crashed in an open field. While all 8 crew members were injured (five seriously), two people in the farm were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.

Kalitta Air

The flight crew arrived at Brussels the day before the accident, with a flight from Bahrain. The crew rested until the Sunday morning. The aircraft arrived at Brussels on Sunday with another crew; the two crews exchanged some information regarding the airplane. There were no mechanical problems reported. Runway 20 was in service for take-offs, while Runway 25L was mostly used for landings. The pilot performed the pre-flight inspection; he found only minor discrepancies (left inner tire check and E&E door latch down). The pre-flight briefing covered the standard departure call-outs, the runway incursion information, a discussion on the Runway 20 length, etc.. The crew also briefed about the engine failure procedures for an engine failure prior to V1, and they also briefed about an abort takeoff after V1 if there was a dangerous situation that would not allow the airplane to fly. After completing the flight documents, the crew requested an early departure, which they received. For the computation of the take-off parameters, the crew used the Kalitta Air On-board Performance System (OPS computer). The crew determined they needed the full length of the runway for take-off. The airplane taxied towards the B1 intersection for the Runway 20. After a few minutes, waiting for another airplane to land on Runway 25, they lined up on Runway 20, making a tight turn, in order to gain a few meters with respect to the usual departure position. The airplane was cleared for take-off at 11:29. The pilot pushed the throttles forward and checked the engines were stable. The Flight Engineers then set the engine power for take-off (setting “normal”, also known as “reduced thrust”). The aircraft started to accelerate. The standard call-out were made when the speed reached the determined value. - “airspeed” - 80 knots - V1 A few seconds after reaching V1, the engine N°3 ingested a bird. Approximately 5 seconds after V1, the engine N°3 stalled and caused a loud “bang”, and a vibration felt in the cockpit. The pilot stated he had the feeling that the aircraft was no longer accelerating, and decided to abort the take-off. Two seconds after having heard the detonation, the thrust levers were brought back to idle, and braking action was initiated. The thrust reversers were not deployed. The FO called the tower, and notified the aircraft was going to the overrun. The pilot turned the aircraft a few degrees to the right, in order to avoid the approach lights at the end of the runway. The aircraft left the runway at a speed of approximately 72 Knots. The aircraft reached a first embankment, dropping from a height of 4 m, and broke in three parts. The aircraft came to a stop just above the top of the railroad embankment. The crew exited the airplane through the service door since the L1 door normally used was blocked due to deformation of the structure.

Atlas Air

Shortly after take off from Lomé international Airport, while on a cargo flight to Amsterdam, the crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. The approach and landing were considered as normal and the aircraft returned safely to the apron. While all three crew members were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to bulkhead destruction.

Tradewinds Airlines

The takeoff from Medellín-José María Córdova Airport runway 36 was initiated in rain falls. During the takeoff roll, the Engine Gas Temperature warning light came on, informing the crew about EGT problems on engines n°1 and 4. In the same time, the engine n°1 encountered technical problems. The captain decided to abort the takeoff procedure and started an emergency braking manoeuvre despite the aircraft' speed was 12 knots above the V1 speed. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest about 150 metres further. All five crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Northwest Airlines

During the initial approach, the red GEAR annunciator light above the gear lever illuminated, and the landing gear warning horn sounded after the gear handle was selected down and the flaps were selected to 25 degrees. During the go-around, the captain asked the second officer (SO), "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." When all gear are down and locked on the Boeing 747-200, the landing gear indication module located on the SO’s instrument panel has five green lights: one nose gear light above four main landing gear lights. The crew then read through the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure from the cockpit operations manual to troubleshoot the problem. Although the checklist twice presented in boldface type that five lights must be present for the gear to be considered down and locked, the crew did not verbalize the phrase either time. The captain did not directly request a count, and the SO did not verbally confirm, the number of gear down annunciator lights that were illuminated; instead, the flight crew made only general comments regarding the gear, such as "all gear," "all green," or "got 'em all." Because the crew believed that all of the gear annunciator lights were illuminated, they considered all gear down and locked and decided not to recycle the landing gear or attempt to extend any of the gear via the alternate systems before attempting a second approach. During all communications with air traffic control, the flight crew did not specify the nature of the problem that they were troubleshooting. Although the checklist did not authorize a low flyby, if the flight crewmembers had verbalized that they had a gear warning, the controller most likely would have been able to notify the crew of the nose gear position before the point at which a go-around was no longer safe. Multiple gear cycles were conducted after the accident, and the nose gear extended each time with all nose gear door and downlock indications correctly displayed on the landing gear indication module. Post accident examination of the nose gear door actuator found that one of the two lock keys was installed 180 degrees backward. Although this improper configuration could prevent proper extension of the nose gear, the actuator had been installed on the accident airplane since 2001 after the actuator was overhauled by the operator. No anomalies were found with the landing gear indication module, the nose gear-operated door sequence valve, and the nose/body landing gear selector valve.

Atlas Air

The aircraft departed Dubai on a cargo flight to Düsseldorf with three crew members on board. Following an uneventful flight, the crew established radio contact with Düsseldorf Radar at 0543LT. The crew were told that runway 23L was in use. Two minutes later the radar controller contacted flight 8995: "I just talked to the tower and ah for the time being braking action on all parts of the runway is supposed to be good. They are measuring again right now because it started to snow again and I'll keep you advised." The flight was then cleared to descend to FL80. The flight crew decided to set the autobrakes for landing on Medium, to account for the snow. At 05:50 the radar controller again contacted the flight about the current weather circumstances: "...latest update on the weather situation ahm the friction tester has reported braking action to be good for the moment however as its continuing to snow they are ah afraid that it might worsen, so they are going to do another friction test right before you land." In the following minutes the flight was given descent instructions and vectors for an approach to runway 23L. At 05:54 the controller radioed: "weather update we now have a surface wind of three four zero degrees eleven knots, that's slight tail wind component by two knots. Visibility is down to one thousand five hundred meters, still in snow showers and ah cloud base is now five hundred feet only." The flight was subsequently cleared for the approach. At 05:57 the radar controller instructed the crew to contact Düsseldorf Tower. The Tower controller stated: "Good morning,... we are just waiting for the braking action values from the friction tester stand by a second. The surface wind is actually three three zero degrees one two knots." Two minutes later the controller radioed: "... the braking action was measured to be medium at all parts. And ah the visibility dropped right now due to the heavy snow showers at the field ah. The RVR value at the touchdown zone is presently nine hundred meters, at the mid-point one thousand one hundred meters and ah stop end one thousand one hundred meters." At that moment the flight was 3,5 nautical miles out. The flight was subsequently cleared to land. The airplane touched down about 1700 ft (518 m) past the runway threshold. Ground spoilers and thrust reversers deployed and the autobrakes activated. Still the airplane did not decelerate as expected and the pilot applied manual braking. The airplane failed to stop and overran the runway end. It collided with ILS equipments, which caused a fire in engines n°2 and 3. All three crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Air Atlanta Iceland

The aircraft and crew were assigned to operate a cargo flight, DLH8457, from Sharjah, U.A.E. to Frankfurt, Germany. The crew did not notice anything unusual with the aircraft apart from a few known defects verbally reported by the crew that operated the previous sector from Bangkok. The aircraft was then prepared for the flight to Frankfurt and the crew completed pre-departure checks including an external inspection of the aircraft. After push back and engines start-up, at 1623:24 hr the crew was cleared by ATC to taxi the aircraft to runway 30. From the performance and speed reference cards the crew ascertained the decision speeds for a reduced engine thrust 10º flap takeoff as follows; V1 – 162 KIAS, Vr – 174 KIAS and V2 – 180 KIAS. The crew line-up the aircraft for a full length take-off and was cleared for take-off at 1631:42 hr. A surface wind check of 340º/08 kt was passed by the tower controller. The take-off roll commenced at 1633:32 hr. During the roll, the FO made the 80 KIAS call at 1633:57 hr followed by the V1 call 26 seconds later. At the same time of the V1 call, the tower controller transmitted to the crew “and Lufthansa there was a bang and you’ve got smoke coming on the right hand side”. The commander then aborted the take-off at 1634:26 hrs whilst maintaining the aircraft on the runway centreline. The speed of the aircraft when aborting actions were first initiated by the crew was 165 KIAS. The crew indicated that the power levers were brought to idle, full reverse thrust selected, speed brakes deployed and manual application of brakes were made. The aircraft acceleration however, continued to 171 KIAS before decelerating normally but was not able to come to a halt within the accelerate stop distance available. Just prior to reaching the end of the runway, the commander turned the aircraft to the left to avoid the elevated approach lights at the end of the runway and it came to a stop in an open sand area approximately 30 metres from the prepared surface of the runway in a nose low attitude. The commander then ordered an evacuation and the crew exited through the right upper deck door using ladders provided by personnel from the airport RFF services.

MK Airlines

MKA1602 landed on Runway 24 at Halifax International Airport at 0512 and taxied to the ramp. After shutdown, loading of the aircraft was started. During the loading, two MK Airlines Limited crew members were observed sleeping in the upper deck passenger seats. After the fuelling was complete, the ground engineer checked the aircraft fuelling panel and signed the fuel ticket. The aircraft had been uploaded with 72 062 kg of fuel, for a total fuel load of 89 400 kg. The ground engineer then went to the main cargo deck to assist with the loading. Once the loading was complete, the ramp supervisor for the ground handling agent went to the upper deck to retrieve the MKA1602 cargo and flight documentation. While the loadmaster was completing the documentation, the ramp supervisor visited the cockpit and noted that the first officer was not in his seat. Approximately 10 minutes later, the ramp supervisor, with the documentation, left the aircraft. At 0647, the crew began taxiing the aircraft to position on Runway 24, and at 0653, the aircraft began its take-off roll. See Section 1.11.4 of this report for a detailed sequence of events for the take-off. During rotation, the aircraftís lower aft fuselage briefly contacted the runway. A few seconds later, the aircraftís lower aft fuselage contacted the runway again but with more force. The aircraft remained in contact with the runway and the ground to a point 825 feet beyond the end of the runway, where it became airborne and flew a distance of 325 feet. The lower aft fuselage then struck an earthen berm supporting an instrument landing system (ILS) localizer antenna. The aircraft's tail separated on impact, and the rest of the aircraft continued in the air for another 1200 feet before it struck terrain and burst into flames. The final impact was at latitude 44°52'51" N and longitude 063°30'31" W, approximately 2500 feet past the departure end of Runway 24, at an elevation of 403 feet above sea level (asl). The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. All persons on board (seven crew members) were fatally injured.

Hydro Air Cargo

The crew departed Brussels on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Lagos. On approach by night, the crew was cleared to land on runway 19R that was closed to traffic due to resurfacing process. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with several equipments then veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. ATC cleared the crew to land on runway 19R while the runway 19L was the one in service at the time of the accident.