Boeing 747-200

Saudi Arabian Airlines - SAUDIA

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Kalitta Air

Shortly after take off from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, while climbing by night, the crew informed ATC about engine problems and was cleared for an immediate return. After the crew realized he could not make it, he attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft collided with a farm and crashed in an open field. While all 8 crew members were injured (five seriously), two people in the farm were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.

Kalitta Air

The flight crew arrived at Brussels the day before the accident, with a flight from Bahrain. The crew rested until the Sunday morning. The aircraft arrived at Brussels on Sunday with another crew; the two crews exchanged some information regarding the airplane. There were no mechanical problems reported. Runway 20 was in service for take-offs, while Runway 25L was mostly used for landings. The pilot performed the pre-flight inspection; he found only minor discrepancies (left inner tire check and E&E door latch down). The pre-flight briefing covered the standard departure call-outs, the runway incursion information, a discussion on the Runway 20 length, etc.. The crew also briefed about the engine failure procedures for an engine failure prior to V1, and they also briefed about an abort takeoff after V1 if there was a dangerous situation that would not allow the airplane to fly. After completing the flight documents, the crew requested an early departure, which they received. For the computation of the take-off parameters, the crew used the Kalitta Air On-board Performance System (OPS computer). The crew determined they needed the full length of the runway for take-off. The airplane taxied towards the B1 intersection for the Runway 20. After a few minutes, waiting for another airplane to land on Runway 25, they lined up on Runway 20, making a tight turn, in order to gain a few meters with respect to the usual departure position. The airplane was cleared for take-off at 11:29. The pilot pushed the throttles forward and checked the engines were stable. The Flight Engineers then set the engine power for take-off (setting “normal”, also known as “reduced thrust”). The aircraft started to accelerate. The standard call-out were made when the speed reached the determined value. - “airspeed” - 80 knots - V1 A few seconds after reaching V1, the engine N°3 ingested a bird. Approximately 5 seconds after V1, the engine N°3 stalled and caused a loud “bang”, and a vibration felt in the cockpit. The pilot stated he had the feeling that the aircraft was no longer accelerating, and decided to abort the take-off. Two seconds after having heard the detonation, the thrust levers were brought back to idle, and braking action was initiated. The thrust reversers were not deployed. The FO called the tower, and notified the aircraft was going to the overrun. The pilot turned the aircraft a few degrees to the right, in order to avoid the approach lights at the end of the runway. The aircraft left the runway at a speed of approximately 72 Knots. The aircraft reached a first embankment, dropping from a height of 4 m, and broke in three parts. The aircraft came to a stop just above the top of the railroad embankment. The crew exited the airplane through the service door since the L1 door normally used was blocked due to deformation of the structure.

Atlas Air

Shortly after take off from Lomé international Airport, while on a cargo flight to Amsterdam, the crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. The approach and landing were considered as normal and the aircraft returned safely to the apron. While all three crew members were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to bulkhead destruction.

Tradewinds Airlines

The takeoff from Medellín-José María Córdova Airport runway 36 was initiated in rain falls. During the takeoff roll, the Engine Gas Temperature warning light came on, informing the crew about EGT problems on engines n°1 and 4. In the same time, the engine n°1 encountered technical problems. The captain decided to abort the takeoff procedure and started an emergency braking manoeuvre despite the aircraft' speed was 12 knots above the V1 speed. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest about 150 metres further. All five crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Northwest Airlines

During the initial approach, the red GEAR annunciator light above the gear lever illuminated, and the landing gear warning horn sounded after the gear handle was selected down and the flaps were selected to 25 degrees. During the go-around, the captain asked the second officer (SO), "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." When all gear are down and locked on the Boeing 747-200, the landing gear indication module located on the SO’s instrument panel has five green lights: one nose gear light above four main landing gear lights. The crew then read through the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure from the cockpit operations manual to troubleshoot the problem. Although the checklist twice presented in boldface type that five lights must be present for the gear to be considered down and locked, the crew did not verbalize the phrase either time. The captain did not directly request a count, and the SO did not verbally confirm, the number of gear down annunciator lights that were illuminated; instead, the flight crew made only general comments regarding the gear, such as "all gear," "all green," or "got 'em all." Because the crew believed that all of the gear annunciator lights were illuminated, they considered all gear down and locked and decided not to recycle the landing gear or attempt to extend any of the gear via the alternate systems before attempting a second approach. During all communications with air traffic control, the flight crew did not specify the nature of the problem that they were troubleshooting. Although the checklist did not authorize a low flyby, if the flight crewmembers had verbalized that they had a gear warning, the controller most likely would have been able to notify the crew of the nose gear position before the point at which a go-around was no longer safe. Multiple gear cycles were conducted after the accident, and the nose gear extended each time with all nose gear door and downlock indications correctly displayed on the landing gear indication module. Post accident examination of the nose gear door actuator found that one of the two lock keys was installed 180 degrees backward. Although this improper configuration could prevent proper extension of the nose gear, the actuator had been installed on the accident airplane since 2001 after the actuator was overhauled by the operator. No anomalies were found with the landing gear indication module, the nose gear-operated door sequence valve, and the nose/body landing gear selector valve.

Atlas Air

The aircraft departed Dubai on a cargo flight to Düsseldorf with three crew members on board. Following an uneventful flight, the crew established radio contact with Düsseldorf Radar at 0543LT. The crew were told that runway 23L was in use. Two minutes later the radar controller contacted flight 8995: "I just talked to the tower and ah for the time being braking action on all parts of the runway is supposed to be good. They are measuring again right now because it started to snow again and I'll keep you advised." The flight was then cleared to descend to FL80. The flight crew decided to set the autobrakes for landing on Medium, to account for the snow. At 05:50 the radar controller again contacted the flight about the current weather circumstances: "...latest update on the weather situation ahm the friction tester has reported braking action to be good for the moment however as its continuing to snow they are ah afraid that it might worsen, so they are going to do another friction test right before you land." In the following minutes the flight was given descent instructions and vectors for an approach to runway 23L. At 05:54 the controller radioed: "weather update we now have a surface wind of three four zero degrees eleven knots, that's slight tail wind component by two knots. Visibility is down to one thousand five hundred meters, still in snow showers and ah cloud base is now five hundred feet only." The flight was subsequently cleared for the approach. At 05:57 the radar controller instructed the crew to contact Düsseldorf Tower. The Tower controller stated: "Good morning,... we are just waiting for the braking action values from the friction tester stand by a second. The surface wind is actually three three zero degrees one two knots." Two minutes later the controller radioed: "... the braking action was measured to be medium at all parts. And ah the visibility dropped right now due to the heavy snow showers at the field ah. The RVR value at the touchdown zone is presently nine hundred meters, at the mid-point one thousand one hundred meters and ah stop end one thousand one hundred meters." At that moment the flight was 3,5 nautical miles out. The flight was subsequently cleared to land. The airplane touched down about 1700 ft (518 m) past the runway threshold. Ground spoilers and thrust reversers deployed and the autobrakes activated. Still the airplane did not decelerate as expected and the pilot applied manual braking. The airplane failed to stop and overran the runway end. It collided with ILS equipments, which caused a fire in engines n°2 and 3. All three crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Air Atlanta Iceland

The aircraft and crew were assigned to operate a cargo flight, DLH8457, from Sharjah, U.A.E. to Frankfurt, Germany. The crew did not notice anything unusual with the aircraft apart from a few known defects verbally reported by the crew that operated the previous sector from Bangkok. The aircraft was then prepared for the flight to Frankfurt and the crew completed pre-departure checks including an external inspection of the aircraft. After push back and engines start-up, at 1623:24 hr the crew was cleared by ATC to taxi the aircraft to runway 30. From the performance and speed reference cards the crew ascertained the decision speeds for a reduced engine thrust 10º flap takeoff as follows; V1 – 162 KIAS, Vr – 174 KIAS and V2 – 180 KIAS. The crew line-up the aircraft for a full length take-off and was cleared for take-off at 1631:42 hr. A surface wind check of 340º/08 kt was passed by the tower controller. The take-off roll commenced at 1633:32 hr. During the roll, the FO made the 80 KIAS call at 1633:57 hr followed by the V1 call 26 seconds later. At the same time of the V1 call, the tower controller transmitted to the crew “and Lufthansa there was a bang and you’ve got smoke coming on the right hand side”. The commander then aborted the take-off at 1634:26 hrs whilst maintaining the aircraft on the runway centreline. The speed of the aircraft when aborting actions were first initiated by the crew was 165 KIAS. The crew indicated that the power levers were brought to idle, full reverse thrust selected, speed brakes deployed and manual application of brakes were made. The aircraft acceleration however, continued to 171 KIAS before decelerating normally but was not able to come to a halt within the accelerate stop distance available. Just prior to reaching the end of the runway, the commander turned the aircraft to the left to avoid the elevated approach lights at the end of the runway and it came to a stop in an open sand area approximately 30 metres from the prepared surface of the runway in a nose low attitude. The commander then ordered an evacuation and the crew exited through the right upper deck door using ladders provided by personnel from the airport RFF services.

MK Airlines

MKA1602 landed on Runway 24 at Halifax International Airport at 0512 and taxied to the ramp. After shutdown, loading of the aircraft was started. During the loading, two MK Airlines Limited crew members were observed sleeping in the upper deck passenger seats. After the fuelling was complete, the ground engineer checked the aircraft fuelling panel and signed the fuel ticket. The aircraft had been uploaded with 72 062 kg of fuel, for a total fuel load of 89 400 kg. The ground engineer then went to the main cargo deck to assist with the loading. Once the loading was complete, the ramp supervisor for the ground handling agent went to the upper deck to retrieve the MKA1602 cargo and flight documentation. While the loadmaster was completing the documentation, the ramp supervisor visited the cockpit and noted that the first officer was not in his seat. Approximately 10 minutes later, the ramp supervisor, with the documentation, left the aircraft. At 0647, the crew began taxiing the aircraft to position on Runway 24, and at 0653, the aircraft began its take-off roll. See Section 1.11.4 of this report for a detailed sequence of events for the take-off. During rotation, the aircraftís lower aft fuselage briefly contacted the runway. A few seconds later, the aircraftís lower aft fuselage contacted the runway again but with more force. The aircraft remained in contact with the runway and the ground to a point 825 feet beyond the end of the runway, where it became airborne and flew a distance of 325 feet. The lower aft fuselage then struck an earthen berm supporting an instrument landing system (ILS) localizer antenna. The aircraft's tail separated on impact, and the rest of the aircraft continued in the air for another 1200 feet before it struck terrain and burst into flames. The final impact was at latitude 44°52'51" N and longitude 063°30'31" W, approximately 2500 feet past the departure end of Runway 24, at an elevation of 403 feet above sea level (asl). The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. All persons on board (seven crew members) were fatally injured.

Hydro Air Cargo

The crew departed Brussels on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Lagos. On approach by night, the crew was cleared to land on runway 19R that was closed to traffic due to resurfacing process. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with several equipments then veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. ATC cleared the crew to land on runway 19R while the runway 19L was the one in service at the time of the accident.

China Airlines

On May 25, 2002, China Airlines (CAL) CI611, a Boeing 747-200, Republic of China (ROC) registration B-18255, was a regularly scheduled flight from Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (CKS), Taoyuan, Taiwan, ROC to Chek Lap Kok International Airport, Hong Kong. Flight CI611 was operating in accordance with ROC Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) regulations. The captain (Crew Member-1, CM-1) reported for duty at 1305 , at the CAL CKS Airport Dispatch Office and was briefed by the duty dispatcher for about 20 minutes, including Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) regarding the TPE Flight Information Region (FIR). The first officer (Crew Member-2, CM-2) and flight engineer (Crew Member-3, CM-3) reported for duty at CAL Reporting Center, Taipei, and arrived at CKS Airport about 1330. The aircraft was prepared for departure with two pilots, one flight engineer, 16 cabin crew members, and 206 passengers aboard. The crew of CI611 requested taxi clearance at 1457:06. At 1507:10, the flight was cleared for takeoff on Runway 06 at CKS. The takeoff and initial climb were normal. The flight contacted Taipei Approach at 1508:53, and at 1510:34, Taipei Approach instructed CI611 to fly direct to CHALI. At 1512:12, CM-3 contacted China Airlines Operations with the time off-blocks, time airborne, and estimated time of arrival at Chek Lap Kok airport. At 1516:24, the Taipei Area Control Center controller instructed CI611 to continue its climb to flight level 350, and to maintain that altitude while flying from CHALI direct to KADLO4. The acknowledgment of this transmission, at 1516:31, was the last radio transmission received from the aircraft. Radar contact with CI611 was lost by Taipei Area Control at 1528:03. An immediate search and rescue operation was initiated. At 1800, floating wreckage was sighted on the sea in the area 23 nautical miles northeast of Makung, Penghu Islands. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 225 occupants were killed.

MK Airlines

The aircraft departed Luxembourg-Findel Airport on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Port Harcourt, carrying nine passengers, four crew members and a load consisting of almost 60 tons of electronics. On a night approach to Port Harcourt Airport, the copilot who was the pilot-in-command failed to comply with the company published procedures and carried a non-standard autopilot approach, tracking a localizer radial inbound and descending using the vertical speed mode as reference. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the ground 700 metres short of runway. The undercarriage was torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest with its front section that broke away, bursting into flames. A crew member was killed, seven occupants were injured and five escaped uninjured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

Cameroon Airlines

Following an uneventful flight from Douala, the crew started the descent to Paris-Roissy-CDG Airport by night and poor weather conditions. After touchdown on the wet runway 09R, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft went out of control, veered to the right off runway, crossed a grassy area, lost its nose gear and came to rest between both taxiways Z6 and Z7. All 203 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft christened 'Mount Cameroon' was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages in the electronic bay because the nose landing gear penetrated the fuselage.

Korean Air Cargo

Boeing 747 HL-7451 arrived at Stansted at 15:05 after a flight from Tashkent. Prior to leaving the aircraft, the flight engineer made an entry in the Technical Log stating "Captain's ADI [Attitude Director Indicator] unreliable in roll' he also verbally passed the details to the operator's ground engineer who met the aircraft on arrival. During turnover repair works on the ADI were carried out. Some cargo was offloaded and other cargo loaded for the flight to Milan-Malpensa (takeoff weight was 548,352 lb including 68,300 lb of fuel) and a new crew boarded the aircraft. After a delay of an hour, because ATC had not received the flight plan, Flight 8509 was cleared to depart Stand Alpha 6 and taxi to runway 23 holding point at 18:25. Subsequently, at 18:36 KAL 8509 was cleared to takeoff with a reported surface wind of 190deg/18 kt. The Dover 6R Standard Instrument Departure called for a climb ahead to 1.5 miles DME, then a left turn onto the 158 inbound radial to the Detling VOR. Climbing through 900 feet, the ADI 'Comparator' buzzer sounded three times. Shortly afterwards, the warning sounded a further two times, coincident with the captain expressing concerns over his DME indication. Climbing through 1400 feet, ATC instructed the crew to contact 'London Control'. And as the captain initiated the procedure turn to the left, the 'Comparator' warning sounded again some 9 times. The maximum altitude reached was 2,532 feet amsl. The aircraft then banked left progressively and entered a descent until it struck the ground in a approx. 40deg nose down pitch and 90deg bank to the left; the speed was high in the region of 250 to 300 kt.

El Al Cargo

The aircraft was on a flight from John F . Kennedy International Airport, New York, to Ben Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv, with an intermediate stop at Schiphol Airport for a crew change and cargo processing. The aircraft arrived in Amsterdam at 13:40 and was scheduled for departure at 16:30 but received an air traffic control slot time of 17:20 for departure. The maintenance transit check was carried out. The aircraft was refuelled with 74,200 litres of Jet A1 fuel, making the total amount of fuel on board of 72 metric tons. The four people on board the aircraft at take off were the captain, copilot, flight engineer, and one non-revenue passenger. There was a total of 114.7 metric tons of cargo on board of which 6.5 metric tons were considered low grade dangerous goods. The flightcrew involved in the accident had arrived at Schiphol Airport on a previous El Al flight and had 20 hours crew rest prior to the beginning of their crew duty. The air traffic situation at Schiphol Airport prior to the departure of EI Al 1862 was not extraordinary, according to ATC witnesses. Two runways were in use, 01L for take off and 06 for landing. There was moderate inbound traffic for runway 06, a moderate number of departures from 01L and several VFR flights over the northern part of the city of Amsterdam. From the beginning of El Al 1862's emergency declaration, air traffic services for the flight were provided by Amsterdam Radar on 124.87, Schiphol Approach on 121.2, Schiphol Arrival on 118.4 and indirectly by Schiphol Tower. The captain requested clearance for push back at 17:04. The aircraft taxied out at 17:14. The copilot was to be the pilot flying (PF), and the captain was to be the pilot not flying (PNF). The takeoff roll on runway 01L started at 17:21, with a takeoff gross weight of 338.3 metric tons, and the aircraft followed the Pampus departure as cleared by ATC. The performance limited maximum takeoff gross weight for the prevailing conditions of the flight was 359.3 metric tons. No anomalies were evident during the initial climb until 17:27.30, as the aircraft was passing through an altitude of about 6,500 feet. The flight data recorder revealed that the n°3 and 4 engines and their pylons departed the right wing at this time. The copilot then transmitted the emergency call, "El Al 1862, mayday, mayday, we have an emergency". The aircraft turned to the right, and according to witnesses on the ground, started dumping fuel immediately. The Amsterdam Radar controller confirmed the emergency call and immediately cleared the area of other traffic. At 17:28.06 the controller, not knowing the reason for the emergency call, asked the crew if they wanted to return to Schiphol Airport. After the acknowledgement by the crew of their intention to return to the airport they were instructed to turn to heading 260 and were informed about their position relative to Schiphol Airport. At 17:28.17 the crew reported a fire on engine n°3 and subsequently they indicated loss of thrust on engines n°3 and 4. Witnesses heard one or more banging sounds and saw a dark plume of smoke trailing the aircraft. Some witnesses saw objects fall. Other witnesses also saw fire on the right wing which eventually disappeared. When the aircraft turned right two vapour trails were seen to emerge from the wingtips. At 17:28.57, El Al 1862 was informed that runway 06 was in use and the wind was 040° at 21 knots. The flight crew however requested runway 27 for landing. ATC then asked the crew if they could switch radio frequency to Schiphol Approach Control on 121.2 megahertz. The crew immediately switched frequency to Approach Control. Subsequently the flightcrew was instructed to switch to Schiphol Arrival on 118.4 megahertz. Because the aircraft was only 7 miles from the airport and still flying at an altitude of 5,000 feet, a straight in approach was not feasible and the crew was instructed to turn right to heading 360 and descend to 2,000 feet. The crew was again informed about the wind (by then 050° at 22 knots). About one minute later at 17:31.17 the controller asked what distance they required to touchdown. Shortly thereafter, the controller asked for the number of track miles the flight crew required for an approach. The crew stated that they needed "12 miles final for landing". Together with this reply to ATC, the call "Flaps 1" could be heard as background conversation in the cockpit. ATC instructed El Al 1862 to turn right to heading 100. During the turn the controller asked for the status of the aircraft and was informed : "n°3 and 4 are out and we have problems with the flaps". The airplane had turned through heading 100 and was maintaining heading 120. No corrective action was taken by the controller. The aircraft maintained an airspeed of 260 knots and was in a gradual descent. El Al 1862 was cleared for the approach and directed to turn right to heading 270 to intercept the final approach course. The airplane was then at an altitude of about 4,000 feet, with a ground speed of approximately 260 knots and on heading 120. The position was 3 nautical miles north of the centreline of runway 27 at a distance of about 11 miles projected on the extended centreline of runway 27. According to the radar plot, it took about thirty seconds before the aircraft actually changed heading. When it became apparent that the airplane was going to overshoot the localizer, the controller informed the crew accordingly and directed the aircraft to turn further to heading 290 in an attempt to intercept the final approach again but now from the south. Twenty seconds later a new heading instruction to 310 was given, along with descent clearance to 1,500 feet. The flightcrew acknowledged this instruction at 17:35.03 and added, "and we have a controlling problem". Approximately 25 seconds later the copilot called, "Going down 1862, going down ". In the first part of this transmission commands from the captain to raise all the flaps and to lower the landing gear could be heard. During the middle part of this transmission a sound was heard, and in the final part of the transmission another sound was audible. These sounds were later analyzed and determined to be the stick shaker and the ground proximity warning system respectively. The airplane crashed at 17:35.42 into an eleven-floor apartment building in the Bijlmermeer, a suburb of Amsterdam, approximately 13 km east of Schiphol Airport. The impact was centred at the apex of two connected and angled blocks of apartments and fragments of the aircraft and the buildings were scattered over an area approximately 400 meters wide and 600 meters long. Firefighting and rescue operations started shortly after the crash. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and the resulting fire. The accident occurred during dusk. All four occupants as well as 43 people on the ground were killed. 26 other people on the ground were injured, 11 of them seriously.

China Airlines

Four minutes after takeoff from Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 5,000 feet, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency after the engine n°3 separated from the right wing. The crew was instructed first to maintain FL050 and to initiate a left turn but the captain replied this was not possible so he was eventually cleared to turn to the right. Two minutes later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on the slope of Mt Wuzu located near Wanli, about 20 km northeast of Taipei. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five crew members were killed. The accident occurred six minutes after takeoff.

Air India

After touchdown at New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport following an uneventful flight from London-Heathrow Airport, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the thrust reversers when the pylon of the engine n°1 failed. The engine partially detached, causing a fuel line to rupture and the fuel to ignite. The aircraft was stopped after a course of almost 3 km and all 215 occupants were evacuated safely. The fire was extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flying Tigers

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Singapore-Changi Airport, carrying a load of textiles, computer softwares and mail as well as four crew members. Following a direct route to Kayell for an NDB approach to runway 33, the crew was cleared to 'descend two four zero zero' (2,400 feet), which was interpreted by the crew as 'to 400'. The crew continued the descent, passed below the minimum descent altitude of 2,400 feet when the aircraft struck trees and crashed on the slope of a wooded terrain located near the village of Puchong, about 14 km from the airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all four crew members were killed.

South African Airways -SAA - Suid Afrikaanse Lugdiens - SAL

On November 27th 1987 flight SA295 was scheduled to depart from Taipei's Chiang Kai Shek Airport at 13:00 UTC for Mauritius' Plaisance Airport and Johannesburg, South Africa on a scheduled international air transport service. Due to adverse weather and the late arrival of a connecting flight the departure time was delayed and the airplane took off at 14:23 UTC with 149000 kg of fuel, 43225 kg of baggage and cargo, 140 passengers and a crew comprising 5 flight crew members and 14 cabin crew members. The calculated flight time was 10 hours 14 minutes. The take-off was normal. At 14:56 UTC the crew communicated with Hong Kong Radar and thereafter routine position reports were given to the flight information centres (FICs) at Hong Kong, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Colombo, Cocos Islands and Mauritius. At 15:55 a routine report was made to the Operator's base at Johannesburg. The information given was that the airplane had taken off from Taipei at 14:23, was flying at FL310 and that the arrival time at Mauritius was estimated as 00:35 UTC. At about 22:30 the pilot called Mauritius FIC, using HF radio, and advised that the aircraft had been at position 070° East at 22:29 at FL350 and that the time at position 065° East was estimated as 23:12. At 23:13 the position report of 065° East at FL350 was given to Mauritius FIC. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) over position 060° East was given as 23:58. About 23:45 the master fire warning alarm sounded on the flight deck. Somebody, probably the pilot, inquired where the warning had come from and received the reply that it had come from the main deck cargo. The pilot then asked that the check list be read. Some 30 seconds later somebody on the flight deck uttered an oath. The pilot called Mauritius Approach Control at 23:49 and said that they had a smoke problem and were doing an emergency descent to FL140. The approach controller gave clearance for the descent and the pilot asked that the fire services be alerted. The controller asked if full emergency services were required to which the pilot replied in the affirmative. At 23:51 the approach controller asked the pilot for his actual position. The pilot replied: "Now we have lost a lot of electrics, we haven't got anything on the aircraft now". At 23:52 the approach controller asked for an ETA at Plaisance and was given the time of 00:30. At 23:52:50 the pilot made an inadvertent transmission when he said to the senior flight engineer: "Hey Joe, shut down the oxygen left". From this time until 00:01:34 there was a period of silence lasting 8 minutes and 44 seconds. From 00:01:34 until 00:02:14 the pilot inadvertently transmitted instructions, apparently to the senior flight engineer, in an excited tone of voice. Most of the phrases are unintelligible. At 00:02:43 the pilot gave a distance report as 65 nautical miles. This was understood by the approach controller to be the distance to the airport. In fact it was the distance to the next waypoint, Xagal. The distance to the airport at that point was approximately 145 nautical miles. At 00:02:50 the approach controller recleared the flight to FL50 and at 00:03:00 gave information on the actual weather conditions at Plaisance Airport, which the pilot acknowledged. When the approach controller asked the pilot at 00:03: 43 which runway he intended to use he replied one three but was corrected when the controller asked him to confirm one four. At 00:03:56 the controller cleared the flight for a direct approach to the Flic-en-Flac (FF) non-directional beacon and requested the pilot to report on approaching FL50. At 00:04:02 the pilot said: "Kay". From 00:08:00 to 00:30:00 the approach controller called the aircraft repeatedly but there was no reply. The aircraft crashed into the Indian Ocean at a position determined to be about 134 nautical miles North-East of Plaisance Airport. The accident occurred at night, in darkness, at about 00:07 UTC. The local time was 04:07. Within a few days drifting pieces of wreckage were found, but it took until January 28th, 1988 for the main wreckage field to be found on the Ocean floor, at a depth of 4400 meters. The cockpit voice recorder was recovered on 6 January 1989.

Air France

Air France flight 091 was involved in runway excursion accident at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, Brazil. The aircraft, a Boeing 747-200, took off from Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport, France at 21:30 UTC on a flight to Santiago, Chile with en route stops at Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, Argentina. The flight to Rio de Janeiro took about eleven hours and was uneventful. At 08:34 UTC the aircraft touched down on runway 14, 400 meters from the threshold. After reversers were set, the aircraft deviated from the runway heading and at 2,000 meters from the threshold it veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft ran over the grass for 765 meters, until passing over a drainage ditch and the load apron concrete step, where the landing gears folded aft with the left wing gear completely separating. On the load apron concrete the aircraft spun around for 275 meters until stopping, after the left outboard wing section struck an illumination stand. For a few seconds engines 2, 3 and 4 kept running at maximum reverse thrust, while engine number one run operated at full forward thrust. After the engines were shut down, the passengers evacuated using three of the aircraft's left hand side escape slides. The fire that started on the area near engines number 2 and 3 was extinguished by the airport fire fighters. It appeared that the n°1 engine throttle cable had broken, making it impossible for the flight crew to control engine power. The engine had accelerated to an unusually high level of (forward) thrust (above takeoff power).

Japan Airlines

JA8119 was a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747SR, a short range variant of the Boeing 747 Series 100. The was aircraft specifically configured for domestic flights with a high density seating arrangement. On June 2, 1978 the aircraft operated on a flight to Osaka (ITM). It floated after touchdown and on the second touchdown the tail struck the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to the rear underside of the fuselage. The rear pressure bulkhead was cracked as well. The aircraft was repaired by Boeing. Engineers replaced the lower part of the rear fuselage and a portion of the lower half of the bulkhead. Seven years later, on August 12, 1985, JA8119 had completed four domestic flights when it landed at Tokyo-Haneda (HND) at 17:17. The next flight was to be flight 123 to Osaka (ITM). The aircraft took off from Tokyo-Haneda at 18:12. Twelve minutes later, while climbing through 23900 feet at a speed of 300 knots, an unusual vibration occurred. An impact force raised the nose of the aircraft and control problems were experienced. A decompression had occurred and the crew got indications of problems with the R5 door. In fact, the rear pressure bulkhead had ruptured, causing serious damage to the rear of the plane. A portion of its vertical fin, measuring 5 m together with the section of the tail cone containing the auxiliary power unit (APU) were ripped off the plane. Due to the damage, the hydraulic pressure dropped and ailerons, elevators and yaw damper became inoperative. Controlling the plane was very difficult as the airplane experienced dutch rolls and phugoid oscillations (unusual movement in which altitude and speed change significantly in a 20-100 seconds cycle without change of angle of attack). The aircraft started to descend to 6600 feet while the crew tried to control the aircraft by using engine thrust. Upon reaching 6600 feet the airspeed had dropped to 108 knots. The aircraft then climbed with a 39 degree pitch-up to a maximum of approx. 13400 feet and started to descend again. At 18:56 JAL123 finally brushed against a tree covered ridge, continued and struck the Osutaka Ridge, bursting into flames. A stewardess, one female passenger and two little girl survived while 520 other occupants were killed.

Air India

On the morning of 23rd June, 1985 Air India's Boeing 747 aircraft VT-EFO (Kanishka) was on a scheduled passenger flight (AI182) from Montreal and was proceeding to London enroute to Delhi and Bombay. It was being monitored at Shannon on the radar scope. At about 0714 GMT it suddenly disappeared from the radar scope and the aircraft, which had been flying at an altitude of approximately 31,000 feet, plunged into the Atlantic Ocean off the southwest coast of Ireland at position latitude 51° 3.6' N and longitude 12° 49' W. This was one of the worst air disasters wherein all the 307 passengers plus 22 crew members perished. The fact that emergency had arisen was first by Shannon Upper Area Control (UAC) after the aircraft had disappeared from the radar scope. The control gave a number of calls to the aircraft but there was obviously no response. Thereafter various messages were transmitted and that is how the rest of the world came to know of the accident. Shannon Control at 0730 hours advised the Marine Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) about the situation which appeared to have arisen. MRCC, in turn, explained the situation to Valencia Coast Station and requested for a Pan Broadcast. Thereafter ships started converging on the scene of the accident and they commenced search and rescue operations.

Avianca

Following an uneventful flight from Paris-Roissy-CDG Airport, the crew was cleared to descent to Madrid-Barajas Airport runway 33. Once the altitude of 9,000 feet reached on descent, the crew was cleared to continue. At 0103LT, he was cleared to land on runway 33 and should complete a turn to the right. Following several errors on approach, the crew initiated a right turn prior to pass over the VOR, causing the aircraft to descent below the MDA. At an altitude of 2,247 feet and at a speed of 142 knots, the right main gear struck the top of a hill. Upon impact, the right main gear and the engine n°4 were torn off. Three seconds later, while in a 4,9° nose-up attitude, at a speed of 135 knots, the aircraft struck the top of a second hill. Then, six seconds later, the right wing struck the ground. The aircraft overturned and crashed upside down, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found 12 km from the runway threshold in an olive plantation. Eleven passengers (among them four members of the same family, father, mother and both children) were injured while 181 other occupants were killed, among them the Peruvian writer Manuel Scorza.

Korean Air

On 31 August 1983, a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747, designated KE 007, departed John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, United States, on a one-stop scheduled flight for Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The en-route stop occurred at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska, United States. At Anchorage, the aircraft was refuelled and serviced for the remainder of the flight to Seoul and, in accordance with company practice, the flight and cabin crews were changed. The flight departed at the planned time of departure which, in keeping with Korean Air Lines' procedure, was calculated for each KE 007 flight. The departure from Anchorage was flexible to ensure arrival in Seoul at the scheduled arrival time of 21:00 hours* (06:00 hours local time). The actual departure time of 13:00 hours on 31 August would have resulted in an on-time arrival of KE 007 in Seoul, had the flight been completed in accordance with its flight plan. On departing Anchorage, the flight had 269 persons on board consisting of 240 passengers, 3 flight crew members, 20 cabin attendants, and 6 crew members of KAL being repositioned to Seoul. Soon after departure from Anchorage, KE 007 deviated to the right (north) of its direct track to Bethel. This deviation resulted in a progressively greater lateral displacement to the right of its planned route which, ultimately, resulted in its penetration of adjacent high seas airspace in flight information regions (FIR_s) operated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as of sovereign USSR airspace overlying Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island and their surrounding territorial waters. No evidence was found during the investigation to indicate that the flight crew of KE 007 was, at any time, aware of the flight's deviation from its planned route in spite of the fact that it continued for over five hours. According to representatives of the United States, military radar installations in Alaska were not aware in real time that the aircraft was proceeding west with an increasing northerly deviation from the recognized airways system. The military radar installations of the Japanese Defence Agency were aware that an aircraft was tracking in USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island. According to representatives of Japan, they were not a\vare that it was a civil aircraft off its intended track. Approximately between 16:40 and 17:08 hours military aircraft operated by the USSR attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula. The interception attempts were unsuccessful. From about 18:00 hours when KE 007 was approaching Sakhalin Island, USSR, the flight was intercepted by USSR military aircraft. At 18:26:02 hours the aircraft was hit by at least one of t\\'o air-to-air missiles fired by the pilot of one of the USSR interceptor aircraft who had been directed, by his ground command and control units, to shoot down an aircraft which they assumed to be a United States RC-135. As a result of the attack, KE 007 collided with the sea and sank off the southwest coast of Sakhalin Island. There were no survivors. The flight recorders, fragmentary pieces of the aircraft and a small number of items of personal property were salvaged by divers from the USSR during a two month period following the accident. In addition, some flotsam from the aircraft was dispersed by tidal currents and recovered later. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) tapes were recovered by the USSR in 1983 and were handed over to ICAO in January 1993 by the representatives of the Russian Federation. They also made available recordings and transcripts of the communications between the pilots of the intercepting fighter aircraft and their ground controllers as well as the communications between the command centres. The representatives of the United States made available certified copies and transcripts of the Anchorage ATC tapes, and the representatives of Japan made available the Tokyo ATC tape. In the course of the investigation, all practical steps were taken to confirm the authenticity of the communications tapes. A comprehensive assessment of the physical characteristics of the CVR and the DFDR tapes and the information recorded thereon was made to ensure that they contained authentic records. The material on the communications tapes and the CVR and DFDR tapes showed no evidence of contradiction with known information and correlated well with other sources of data. There was no evidence to suggest that the crew of flight KE 007 was aware that their aircraft was flying to the north of its planned route or that they knew of the presence of the intercepting fighter aircraft. The DFDR record established that flight KE 007 maintained a constant magnetic heading from soon after departure from Anchorage until the attack by the fighter aircraft. The maintenance of the constant magnetic heading was so accurate it could only have resulted from the autopilot controlling the aircraft. The CVR and the DFDR records also established that the aircraft did not sustain an extensive avionics or navigation systems failure or malfunction prior to the attack by the USSR fighter aircraft. The evidence obtained supported the first hypothesis of those listed in the 1983 ICAO report, Le. that the crew inadvertently flew virtually the entire flight on a constant magnetic heading. The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading and the resulting track deviation was due to the KE 007 crew's failure to note that the autopilot had either been left in heading mode or had been switched to INS when the aircraft was beyond the range (7.5 NM) for the INS to capture the desired track. Concerning the interception and associated identification, signalling and communications the investigation found the following: 1) Interceptions of KE 007 were attempted by USSR military aircraft over Kamchatka Peninsula and made in the vicinity of Sakhalin Island. 2) The USSR command centre personnel assumed that KE 007 was a United States RC-135 aircraft. KE 007's climb from FL 330 to FL350 during the time of the interception over Sakhalin Island was interpreted as being an evasive action, thus further contributing to the USSR presumption that it was an RC-135 aircraft. 3) No attempt was made by the USSR to contact the crew of KE 007 by radio on the distress frequency 121.5 MHz or on any other VHF or HF frequency. However, the interceptor pilot was instructed by his ground control to attempt to attract the attention of the crew of the intruding aircraft by firing his aircraft's cannon and flashing its navigation lights. It was not possible to assess the distance of the interceptor aircraft from the intruder nor their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired. 4) The USSR command centre personnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with the position of the intruder aircraft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity. The time factor became paramount as the intruder aircraft was .about to coast out from Sakhalin Island. Therefore, exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its identity. .5) It was not possible to determine the position of KE 007 at the time of the missile attack in relation to USSR sovereign airspace.

Korean Air

Following an uneventful flight from Los Angeles via Anchorage, the crew started the approach to Seoul-Gimpo Airport in the early morning, just after sunset. On final to runway 14, with a limited visibility of 1,000 meters due to patches of fog, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane landed 90 meters short of runway threshold. Then the aircraft struck a concrete wall, causing all main gears to be torn off or to pushed back in their respective wheel well, except the nose gear which remained intact. The airplane slid on its belly for about 1,200 metres before coming to rest in flames on the left side of the runway. 14 occupants escaped uninjured while 198 others were injured. Unfortunately, eight passengers and six crew members, among them both pilots, were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by a fire that probably ignited in a cargo compartment.

Air India

After takeoff from Bombay-Santa Cruz Airport runway 27, while climbing by night at an altitude of 2,400 feet, the captain contacted ATC and wished a Happy New Year. He was cleared to climb to 8,000 feet and initiated a turn to the right according to departure procedures. Once the turn was finished and the aircraft was leveling, the captain realized his Attitude Director Indicator (ADI) was still showing a right-bank indication. The copilot confirmed his ADI was correct and the flight engineer noticed the difference between the captain's ADI and the third ADI system. Despite these two confirmation, the captain started a turn to the left as he thought the aircraft was still in a right-bank attitude. The airplane entered a left turn to an angle of 40° then until an excessive angle of 108° when control was lost. From an altitude of 2,000 feet, the airplane entered a dive and crashed into the Arabian Sea. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 213 occupants were killed. Most of the debris were found in shallow water about 3 km offshore. Control was lost as the pilot-in-command was flying over the sea by night without any visual references with the ground.

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines - Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij

The KLM Boeing 747, registration PH-BUF, took off from Schipol Airport (Amsterdam) at 0900 hours on 27 March 1977, en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This flight was part of the Charter Series KL4805/4806 Amsterdam-Las Palmas (Canary Islands) - Amsterdam operated by KLM on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group (H.I.N.T.), Rijswijk-Z.H. The Boeing 747 registration N736PA, flight number 1736, left Los Angeles International Airport, California, United States, on 26 March 1977, local date, at 0129Z hours, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 0617Z hours. After the aeroplane was refuelled and a crew change effected, it took off for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) at 0742Z. While the aeroplanes were en route to Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. On account of this incident and of a warning regarding a possible second bomb, the airport was closed. Therefore, KLM 4805 was diverted to Los Rodeos (Tenerife) Airport, arriving at 1338Z on 27 March 1977. For the same reason, PAA1736 proceeded to the same airport, which was its alternate, landing at 1415. At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aeroplane, but after about twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit on Flight KL 4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 expect the H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PAA 1736 crew prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination. When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had been parked with four other aeroplanes on account of the congestion caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PAA 1736 and the entrance to the active runway. The first officer and the flight engineer left the aeroplane and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PAA 1736 to pass by, obliging them to writ until the former had started to taxi. The passengers of PAA 1736 did not leave the aeroplane during the whole time that it remained in the airport. KLM 4805 called the tower at 1656 requesting permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so and at 1658 requested to backtrack on runway 12 for take-off on runway 30. The tower controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to the holding position for runway 30 by taxiing down the main runway and leaving it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805 acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down tile main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805 immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should continue on to the end of the runway and there backtrack. Finally, at 1659, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 1702, the PAA aeroplane called the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the third taxiway to their left. At 1703:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that at that moment they were passing by taxiway C4. The tower controller told KLM 4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC clearance ." In response to a query from KLM 4805, the tower controller advised both aeroplanes - KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 - that the runway centre line lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated to PAA 1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report leaving the runway. At the times indicated, the following conversations took place between the tower and the KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 aeroplanes. Times taken from KLM CVR. 1705:44.6 KLM 4805: The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take-off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance. (1705:50.77). 1705:53.41 Tower: KLM eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take-off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706 :08.09). 1706:09.61 KLM 4805: Ah - Roger, sir, we are cleared to the Papa Beacon, flight level nine zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now (at take-off). (1706:17.79). 1706:18.19 Tower : O.K..... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (1706: 21.79). Note: A squeal starts at: 1706:19.39 The squeal ends at: 1706:22.06 1706:21.92 PAA 1736: Clipper one seven three six. (1706 : 23.39). 1706:25.47 Tower: Ah - Papa Alpha one seven three six report the runway clear. (1706: 28.89). 1706:29.59 PAA 1736: O.K., will report when we're clear. (1706:30.69). 1706:31.69 Tower: Thank you. Subsequently, KLM 4805, which had released its brakes to start take-off run 20 seconds before this communication took place, collided with the PAA aeroplane. The control tower received no further communications from PAA 1736, nor from KLM 4805. There were no eyewitnesses to the collision. All 248 occupants on board the KLM 747 were killed. Among the 396 people on board the Pan Am 747, 335 were killed (among them nine crew members) and 61 others were injured.