Boeing 737-800

China Eastern Airlines

The airplane departed Kunming-Wujiaba Airport at 1315LT on a schedule service (flight MU5735) to Guangzhou, carrying 123 passengers and a crew of nine. At 1420LT, while cruising at an altitude of 29,100 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent until 7,400 feet then climbed to 8,600 feet. It finally entered a steep descent and crashed almost two minutes later in a vertical attitude on hilly and wooded terrain located southwest of Wuzhou. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 132 occupants were killed. Two days after the accident, the CVR was found while the DFDR was found on March 27.

Air India Express

Air-India Express Limited B737-800 aircraft VT-AXH was operating a quick return flight on sector Kozhikode-Dubai-Kozhikode under ‘Vande Bharat Mission’ to repatriate passengers who were stranded overseas due to closure of airspace and flight operations owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. The aircraft departed from Kozhikode for Dubai at 10:19 IST (04:49 UTC) on 07 August 2020 and landed at Dubai at 08:11 UTC. The flight was uneventful. There was no change of crew and no defect was reported on the first sector. The aircraft departed from Dubai for Kozhikode at 10:00 UTC as flight AXB 1344 carrying 184 passengers and six crew members. AXB 1344 made two approaches for landing at Kozhikode. The aircraft carried out a missed approach on the first attempt while coming into land on runway 28. The second approach was on runway 10 and the aircraft landed at 14:10:25 UTC. The aircraft touched down approximately at 4,438 ft on 8,858 ft long runway, in light rain with tailwind component of 15 knots and a ground speed of 165 knots. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway and this ended in runway overrun. The aircraft exited the runway 10 end at a ground speed of 84 knots and then overshot the RESA, breaking the ILS antennae and a fence before plummeting down the tabletop runway. The aircraft fell to a depth of approximately 110 ft below the runway elevation and impacted the perimeter road that runs just below the tabletop runway, at a ground speed of 41 knots and then came to an abrupt halt on the airport perimeter road just short of the perimeter wall. There was fuel leak from both the wing tanks; however, there was no postcrash fire. The aircraft was destroyed and its fuselage broke into three sections. Both engines were completely separated from the wings. The rescue operations were carried out by the ARFF crew on duty with help of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel stationed at the airport and several civilians who rushed to the crash site when the accident occurred. Upon receipt of the information about the aircraft crash the district administration immediately despatched fire tenders and ambulances to the crash site. Nineteen passengers were fatally injured and Seventy Five passengers suffered serious injuries in the accident while Ninety passengers suffered minor or no injuries. Both Pilots suffered fatal injuries while one cabin crew was seriously injured and three cabin crew received minor injuries. The rescue operation was completed at 16:45 UTC (22:15 IST).

Pegasus Airlines

Following an uneventful flight from Izmir-Adnan Menderes Airport, the crew initiated the approach to Istanbul-Sabiha Gökçen Airport runway 06. Weather conditions were poor with thunderstorm activity, rain, CB's and a wind from 290 gusting to 37 knots. After touchdown on a wet runway, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, turned slightly to the left then went down an embankment (25 meters high) and came to rest, broken in three. Three passengers were killed while all 180 other occupants were evacuated to local hospitals. It is understood that the airplane apparently landed 1,500 meters past the runway threshold (runway 06 is 3,000 meters long) with a non negligible tailwind component that must be confirmed.

Ukraine International Airlines

On Wednesday, January 08, 2020, at 00:53, the inbound flight No. 751 of Ukraine International, Boeing 737-800, UR-PSR, en route to Tehran Imam Khomeini INTL. Airport from Kyiv Boryspyl INTL. Airport was cleared for landing, and after four minutes landed on the IKA runway. After disembarking 58 passengers and refueling, the flight crew went on to check into the hotel located at IKA. From 01:16 to 01:38, the aircraft was refueled with 9510 kg (11800 liters) of fuel. Once the total weight of the cargo received from passengers (310 packages weighing 6794 kg) was determined, in order to comply with the maximum takeoff weight allowed for aircraft, 82 packages in 2094 kg in weight, were separated by Airport Service Company, that is, they were not loaded. Initially, 78 packages of the passenger's luggage were not loaded first, then due to the large volume of passengers' hand luggage, the flight attendants passed some of them on to the Airport Service Company personnel to be placed in the aircraft cargo. After that, 4 packages belonging to the passengers were removed from the aft cargo door, where the hand luggage was placed. At 04:35, the flight crew embarked on the aircraft. After checking the aircraft and cabin, boarding was announced at 04:45, and passengers started to board the plane. Based on the available documents, 167 passengers proceeded to the Airport Services Co. counter at the airport terminal, all of whom went on board. Only one of the passengers who received the boarding pass online the night before the flight, due to the delay in arriving in Tehran from another city did not go to the airport in person, and therefore had been removed from the list of passengers provided by the UIA. At 05:13, the pilot made his first radio contact with the IKA's control tower ground unit and requested the initial clearance for flying, which was issued by the controller subsequently. At 05:48, all the aircraft documents required to start the flight operations were filled out, and all the doors were then closed at 05:49. The flight was initially scheduled for 05:15, and based on the flight coordinator's report form, the reason given for its delay was the aircraft being overweight and the decision not to load the passengers' lugga for reducing the aircraft weight. At 05:51 the pilot notified his position at the airport parking, declared his readiness to exit the parking and start up the aircraft. The IKA tower asked him to wait for receiving the clearance since they wanted to make the coordination required with other relevant units. At 05:52, the IKA tower made the necessary coordination with the Mehrabad approach unit, who contacted Tehran ACC asking for clearance. Accordingly, the controller in ACC made coordination on Ukrainian flight clearance with the CMOCC. The clearance was issued by the CMOCC. At 05:54, the Mehrabad approach unit, received the FL260 clearance for the flight AUI752 from ACC, and forwarded it to IKA via the telecommunication system. Flight no. 752 was detached from the A1 Jet Bridge and at about 05:55 started to leave its parking position, NO 116 on the right, by a pushback truck. Following that, at 05:55 the ground controller cleared the AUI752 flight for startup and exiting the parking, which was read back by the pilot. At 06:12, the aircraft took off from the Runway 29 Right of IKA and was delivered to the Mehrabad approach unit. The pilot contacted the approach unit, and announced the IKA 1A radar procedure as SID procedure. Next, the Mehrabad approach identified and cleared the flight to climb to FL260. The controller instructed the pilot to turn to the right after 6,000 feet, and continue straight to PAROT. After it was read back by the pilot, the controller again instructed the pilot to continue to PAROT point once passing the 6000-foot altitude, which was read back by the pilot. From 06:17 onwards, upon the disappearance of the PS752 information from the radarscope, the controller called the captain repeatedly, but received no response. According to the data extracted from the surveillance systems and FDR, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 8,100 feet; thereafter, the label including the call sign and altitude of aircraft disappeared from the radarscope, yet no radio contact indicating unusual conditions was received from the pilot. FDR recording terminated at 06:14:56. This time corresponds to the termination of Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) and ADS-B information. After the mentioned time, the aircraft was still being detected by the Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), according to which the aircraft veered right and after approximately three minutes of flying, it disappeared from the PSR at 06:18 too. The aircraft was conducting the flight under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and the accident occurred around half an hour before the sunset.

Turkish Airlines - THY Türk Hava Yollari

On November 21, 2019, a regular THY2UT flight en-route Istanbul – Odesa at B737-800 aircraft, nationality and registration mark TC-JGZ of the Turkish Airlines, was performed by the aircraft crew consisting of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), co-pilot and four flight attendants of the aircraft. In fact, the departure from Istanbul Airport was performed at 17:33. The actual aircraft landing took place at 18:55. According to the flight plan, the alternate aerodromes were Istanbul and Chi<U+0219>inau. There were 136 passengers and 2793 kg of luggage on board the aircraft. The PIC was a Pilot Flying, and the co-pilot was a Pilot Monitoring of the aircraft. The pre-flight briefing of the crew, according to its explanations, was carried out before departure from the Istanbul Airport, after which the PIC took the decision to perform the flight. The climb and level flight were performed in the normal mode. The landing approach was performed to the Runway16 with ILS system at a significant crosswind component of variable directions. At the final stage of approaching with ILS to Runway 16, the ATC controller of the aerodrome control tower (ATC Tower) gave the aircraft crew a clearance for landing. The aircraft crew confirmed the controller’s clearance and continued the landing approach. Subsequently, from a height of about 50 meters, the aircraft performed a go-around due to the aircraft non-stabilization before landing. Following the go-around, the aircraft headed to the holding area to wait for favorable values of wind force and direction. At 18:45, the PIC took the decision to carry out a repeated landing approach, reported of that to the ATC controller, who provided ATS in the Odesa Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA.) At 18:51, the crew re-contacted the Tower controller and received the clearance to land. At 18:55, after touchdown, during the runway run, the aircraft began to deviate to the left and veered off of the runway to the left onto the cleared and graded area. After 550 m run on the soil, the aircraft returned to the runway with its right main landing gear and nose part (while moving on the soil, the nose landing gear collapsed) and came to rest at the distance of 1612 m from the runway entrance threshold. The crew performed an emergency evacuation of passengers from the aircraft. As a result of the accident, the aircraft suffered a significant damage to the nose part of the fuselage and left engine. None of the passengers or crew members was injured.

SpiceJet

On 01.07.2019, B737-800 aircraft was involved in an accident (runway excursion) at Mumbai airport while landing in moderate to heavy rain. The aircraft was under the command of an ATPL holder (PF) with a CPL holder as First Officer (PM). There were 160 passengers and 7 crew members on board. There was no injury to any of the passengers or crew members. The aircraft suffered substantial damage. The subject flight was fifth of the day for the aircraft and second for the flight crew. The flight crew had earlier operated Mumbai-Jaipur sector and the incident flight was from Jaipur to Mumbai. There were no technical issues reported by the flight crew either during Mumbai Jaipur sector or on the return leg (Jaipur- Mumbai) till descent into Mumbai. The pilots had carried out briefing amongst themselves for the approach including the weather and Go Around actions, if required. The aircraft commenced descent into Mumbai in the late evening hours. As per the reported weather at the time of approach visibility was 2100 metres in rain making it dark. Reported winds were 090/12 Knots. Runway was wet and the trend provided was ³temporary reduction in visibility to 1500 metres with thunder/ showers of rain´. During descend at approximately 7000' Pressure Altitude, the crew observed an indication for IAS disagree, indicating a discrepancy of airspeed between the instrument sources for the flight crew. Although this indication was momentary, the 'Non-Normal Checklist' was carried out. The indication discrepancy did not recur for the remainder of the flight. The aircraft was radar vectored for an ILS approach for Runway 27 at Mumbai. The approach was stabilized by 3800' Pressure Altitude with landing gear down, flaps 30 and auto brake selected at 3. The autopilot was engaged throughout the descent phase and during approach, the second autopilot was also coupled for the ILS approach. At 100', the autopilot and the auto-throttle were disengaged by the PF. The flare manoeuvre consumed approximately 5807' of the runway length prior to the aircraft touchdown with 3881' of runway remaining. After touchdown, the speed brakes deployed automatically and maximum reverse thrust and wheel brakes were applied. The aircraft exited the paved surface at 65 Knots and came to rest at a distance of 615' beyond the end of the runway. Once the aircraft came to rest, the flight crew advised cabin crew to be at their stations. The pilots were unable to contact ATC through VHF communication. The PF contacted his airline personnel using mobile phone and informed that the aircraft had overrun the runway and requested for step ladders. The ATC activated fire services and the runway was closed for operation. The Cabin crew carried out check on the passengers in the cabin. The fire services reached the aircraft location and verbal communication was established with the flight crew once the cockpit window was opened. Two Fire Services personnel boarded the aircraft from the L1 door using a fire ladder. An assessment of the aircraft structure and occupants was made and the fire services personnel informed the cabin crew that deplaning was to be carried out using fire ladders. There were no injuries during evacuation or otherwise.

Miami Air International

According to both pilots, the takeoff, climb, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. The No. 1 (left) thrust reverser was not operational and deferred for the flight in accordance with the airplane’s minimum equipment list. The captain was the pilot flying for the accident flight, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. The captain was also performing check airman duties for the first officer who was in the process of completing operating experience training. During the approach to Jacksonville Naval Air Station (NIP), the flight crew had two runway change discussions with air traffic controllers due to reported weather conditions (moderate to heavy precipitation) near the field; the pilots ultimately executed the area navigation GPS approach to runway 10, which was ungrooved and had a displaced threshold 997 ft from the threshold, leaving an available landing distance of 8,006 ft. As the airplane descended through 1,390 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilots configured it for landing with the flaps set at 30º and the landing gear extended; however, the speedbrake handle was not placed in the armed position as specified in the Landing checklist. At an altitude of about 1,100 ft msl and 2.8 nm from the runway, the airplane was slightly above the glidepath, and its airspeed was on target. Over the next minute, the indicated airspeed increased to 170 knots (17 knots above the target approach speed), and groundspeed reached 180 knots, including an estimated 7-knot tailwind. At an altitude of about 680 ft msl and 1.6 nm from the threshold, the airplane deviated further above the 3° glidepath such that the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights would have appeared to the flight crew as four white lights and would retain that appearance throughout the rest of the approach. Eight seconds before touchdown, multiple enhanced ground proximity warning system alerts announced “sink rate” as the airplane’s descent rate peaked at 1,580 fpm. The airplane crossed the displaced threshold 120 ft above the runway (the PAPI glidepath crosses the displaced threshold about 54 ft above the runway) and 17 knots above the target approach speed, with a groundspeed of 180 knots and a rate of descent about 1,450 ft per minute (fpm). The airplane touched down about 1,580 ft beyond the displaced threshold, which was 80 ft beyond the designated touchdown zone as specified in the operator’s standard operating procedures (SOP). After touchdown, the captain deployed the No. 2 engine thrust reverser and began braking; he later reported, however, that he did not feel the aircraft decelerate and increased the brake pressure. The speedbrakes deployed about 4 seconds after touchdown, most likely triggered by the movement of the right throttle into the idle reverse thrust detent after main gear tire spinup. The automatic deployment of the speedbrakes was likely delayed by about 3 seconds compared to the automatic deployment that could have been obtained by arming the speedbrakes before landing. The airplane crossed the end of the runway about 55 ft right of the centerline and impacted a seawall 90 ft to the right of the centerline, 9,170 ft beyond the displaced threshold, and 1,164 ft beyond the departure end of runway 10. After the airplane came to rest in St. Johns River, the flight crew began an emergency evacuation.

Air Niugini

On 28 September 2018, at 23:24:19 UTC2 (09:24 local time), a Boeing 737-8BK aircraft, registered P2-PXE (PXE), operated by Air Niugini Limited, was on a scheduled passenger flight number PX073, from Pohnpei to Chuuk, in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) when, during its final approach, the aircraft impacted the water of the Chuuk Lagoon, about 1,500 ft (460 m) short of the runway 04 threshold. The aircraft deflected across the water several times before it settled in the water and turned clockwise through 210 deg and drifted 460 ft (140 m) south east of the runway 04 extended centreline, with the nose of the aircraft pointing about 265°. The pilot in command (PIC) was the pilot flying, and the copilot was the support/monitoring pilot. An Aircraft Maintenance Engineer occupied the cockpit jump seat. The engineer videoed the final approach on his iPhone, which predominantly showed the cockpit instruments. Local boaters rescued 28 passengers and two cabin crew from the left over-wing exits. Two cabin crew, the two pilots and the engineer were rescued by local boaters from the forward door 1L. One life raft was launched from the left aft over-wing exit by cabin crew CC5 with the assistance of a passenger. The US Navy divers rescued six passengers and four cabin crew and the Load Master from the right aft over-wing exit. All injured passengers were evacuated from the left over-wing exits. One passenger was fatally injured, and local divers located his body in the aircraft three days after the accident. The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia commenced the investigation and on 14th February 2019 delegated the whole of the investigation to the PNG Accident Investigation Commission. The investigation determined that the flight crew’s level of compliance with Air Niugini Standard Operating Procedures Manual (SOPM) was not at a standard that would promote safe aircraft operations. The PIC intended to conduct an RNAV GPS approach to runway 04 at Chuuk International Airport and briefed the copilot accordingly. The descent and approach were initially conducted in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), but from 546 ft (600 ft)4 the aircraft was flown in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The flight crew did not adhere to Air Niugini SOPM and the approach and pre-landing checklists. The RNAV (GPS) Rwy 04 Approach chart procedure was not adequately briefed. The RNAV approach specified a flight path descent angle guide of 3º. The aircraft was flown at a high rate of descent and a steep variable flight path angle averaging 4.5º during the approach, with lateral over-controlling; the approach was unstabilised. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recorded a total of 17 Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alerts, specifically eight “Sink Rate” and nine “Glideslope”. The recorded information from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) showed that a total of 14 EGPWS aural alerts sounded after passing the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA), between 307 ft (364 ft) and the impact point. A “100 ft” advisory was annunciated, in accordance with design standards, overriding one of the “Glideslope” aural alert. The other aural alerts were seven “Glideslope” and six “Sink Rate”. The investigation observed that the flight crew disregarded the alerts, and did not acknowledge the “minimums” and 100 ft alerts; a symptom of fixation and channelised attention. The crew were fixated on cues associated with the landing and control inputs due to the extension of 40° flap. Both pilots were not situationally aware and did not recognise the developing significant unsafe condition during the approach after passing the Missed Approach Point (MAP) when the aircraft entered a storm cell and heavy rain. The weather radar on the PIC’s Navigation Display showed a large red area indicating a storm cell immediately after the MAP, between the MAP and the runway. The copilot as the support/monitoring pilot was ineffective and was oblivious to the rapidly unfolding unsafe situation. He did not recognise the significant unsafe condition and therefore did not realise the need to challenge the PIC and take control of the aircraft, as required by the Air Niugini SOPM. The Air Niugini SOPM instructs a non-flying pilot to take control of the aircraft from the flying pilot, and restore a safe flight condition, when an unsafe condition continues to be uncorrected. The records showed that the copilot had been checked in the Simulator for EGPWS Alert (Terrain) however there was no evidence of simulator check sessions covering the vital actions and responses required to retrieve a perceived or real situation that might compromise the safe operation of the aircraft. Specifically sustained unstabilised approach below 1,000 ft amsl in IMC. The PIC did not conduct the missed approach at the MAP despite the criteria required for visually continuing the approach not being met, including visually acquiring the runway or the PAPI. The PIC did not conduct a go around after passing the MAP and subsequently the MDA although: • The aircraft had entered IMC; • the approach was unstable; • the glideslope indicator on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) was showing a rapid glideslope deviation from a half-dot low to 2-dots high within 9 seconds after passing the MDA; • the rate of descent high (more than 1,000 ft/min) and increasing; • there were EGPWS Sink Rate and Glideslope aural alerts; and • the EGPWS visual PULL UP warning message was displayed on the PFD. The report highlights that deviations from recommended practice and SOPs are a potential hazard, particularly during the approach and landing phase of flight, and increase the risk of approach and landing accidents. It also highlights that crew coordination is less than effective if crew members do not work together as an integrated team. Support crew members have a duty and responsibility to ensure that the safety of a flight is not compromised by non-compliance with SOPs, standard phraseology and recommended practices. The investigation found that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of PNG (CASA PNG) policy and procedures of accepting manuals rather than approving manuals, while in accordance with the Civil Aviation Rules requirements, placed a burden of responsibility on CASA PNG as the State Regulator to ensure accuracy and that safety standards are met. In accepting the Air Niugini manuals, CASA PNG did not meet the high standard of evidence-based assessment required for safety assurance, resulting in numerous deficiencies and errors in the Air Niugini Operational, Technical, and Safety manuals as noted in this report and the associated Safety Recommendations. The report includes a number of recommendations made by the AIC, with the intention of enhancing the safety of flight (See Part 4 of this report). It is important to note that none of the safety deficiencies brought to the attention of Air Niugini caused the accident. However, in accordance with Annex 13 Standards, identified safety deficiencies and concerns must be raised with the persons or organisations best placed to take safety action. Unless safety action is taken to address the identified safety deficiencies, death or injury might result in a future accident. The AIC notes that Air Niugini Limited took prompt action to address all safety deficiencies identified by the AIC in the 12 Safety Recommendations issued to Air Niugini, in an average time of 23 days. The quickest safety action being taken by Air Niugini was in 6 days. The AIC has closed all 12 Safety Recommendations issued to Air Niugini Limited. One safety concern prompting an AIC Safety Recommendation was issued to Honeywell Aerospace and the US FAA. The safety deficiency/concern that prompted this Safety Recommendation may have been a contributing factor in this accident. The PNG AIC is in continued discussion with the US NTSB, Honeywell, Boeing and US FAA. This recommendation is the subject of ongoing research and the AIC Recommendation will remain ACTIVE pending the results of that research.

UTAir

On 31.08.2018 Boeing 737-800 VQ-BJI operated by UTAir Airlines conducted the scheduled flight UT 579 from Moscow (Vnukovo airport) to Sochi (Adler airport). During the preflight briefing (at 19:50) the crew was provided with the necessary weather information. At 20:15, the crew had passed the medical examination at Vnukovo airport mobile RWY medical unit. The Daily Check line maintenance (DY) was done on 30.08.2018 at Vnukovo airport by UTG aviation services, ZAO; job card # 11465742. The A/C takeoff weight was 68680 kg and the MAC was 26.46 %, that was within the AFM limitations for the actual conditions. At 21:33 the takeoff from Vnukovo airport was performed. The flight along he prescribed route was performed on FL350 in auto mode and without any issues. The F/O acted as the pilot flying (PF). When approaching the Sochi aerodrome traffic control area, the flight crew was provided by the aerodrome approach control with the approach and descending conditions, as well as with the weather conditions near the aerodrome. After descending to the height specified by Sochi Approach, the pilot contacted Sochi Radar, waited for the weather that met his minimum and was cleared for landing. In course of the first approach to landing (from the altitude about 30 m) when RVR got down because of heavy showers, the PIC took controls and performed the go-around. In course of the second approach, the crew performed the landing but failed to keep the airplane within the RWY. The airplane had landed at about 1285 m from the RWY threshold, overrun the threshold, broke through the aerodrome fencing, and came to rest in Mzymta river bed. This ended with the fire outbreak of fuel leaking from the damaged LH wing fuel tank. The crew performed the passenger evacuation. The aerodrome alert measures were taken and the fire was brought under control. Eighteen occupants were injured while all other occupants were unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.