Boeing 737-200

Transair

The aircraft departed Honolulu-Daniel K. Inouye International Airport at 0133LT on a cargo service (flight MUI810) to Kahului. While climbing by night, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency following the failure of the left engine, and was cleared to return. Due to the position of the aircraft, the crew was suggested to divert to Kalaeloa Airport located about 15 km west of Honolulu Intl Airport. Eventually, the crew elected to ditch the aircraft that came to rest about 3 km south of Kalaeloa Airport. Both pilots were seriously injured and rescued by USCG. The aircraft sank and was lost. Operations to recover the wreckage are under way.

Cubana de Aviación

After takeoff from runway 06 at Havana-José Martí Airport, while in initial climb, the undercarriage were raised when the aircraft entered an excessive nose-up angle of 30°. It rolled to the right then descended until it struck power cables and a railway track before it disintegrated in a field located less than one km east from the airport. Three female passengers were seriously injured while 110 other occupants were killed, among them 102 Cubans, 6 Mexicans (crew) and 2 Argentinians. Three days after the accident, one of the three survivors died from her injuries. A second survivor died one week later, on May 25. The aircraft was operated by Cubana de Aviacíon under a wet lease contract from the Mexican operator Global Air (Damojh Aéreolíneas), and the service was operated under callsign DMJ972.

Bhoja Airlines - Bhoja Air

On 20th April, 2012, M/s Bhoja Air Boeing 737-236A Reg # AP-BKC was scheduled to fly domestic Flight BHO-213 from Jinnah International Airport (JIAP) Karachi to Benazir Bhutto International Airport (BBIAP) Islamabad. The aircraft had 127 souls onboard including 06 flight crew members. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) took off for Islamabad at 1705 hrs Pakistan Standard Time (PST) from Karachi. The reported weather at Islamabad was thunderstorm with gusty winds. During approach for landing at BBIAP, Islamabad (OPRN), Flight BHO-213 was cleared by Islamabad Approach Radar for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for Runway 30. The MA, while established on ILS (aligned with Runway 30 at prescribed altitude), at 6 miles to touchdown was asked by the Approach Radar to change over to Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower frequency for final landing clearance. The cockpit crew came on ATC Tower frequency and flight was cleared to land at BBIAP, Islamabad, but the cockpit crew did not respond to the landing clearance call. The ATC Tower repeated the clearance but there was no response. After a few minutes, a call from a local resident was received in ATC Tower, stating that an aircraft had crashed close to Hussain Abad (A population around 4 nm short of runway 30 BBIAP, Islamabad). It was later confirmed that Flight BHO-213 had crashed and all 127 souls onboard (121 passengers + 6 flight crew) had sustained fatal injuries along with complete destruction of aircraft.

First Air

The First Air Boeing 737-210C combi aircraft departed Yellowknife (CYZF), Northwest Territories, at 1440 as First Air flight 6560 (FAB6560) on a charter flight to Resolute Bay (CYRB), Nunavut, with 11 passengers, 4 crew members, and freight on board. The instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from CYZF was flight-planned to take 2 hours and 05 minutes at 426 knots true airspeed and a cruise altitude of flight level (FL) 310. Air traffic control (ATC) cleared FAB6560 to destination via the flight-planned route: CYZF direct to the BOTER intersection, then direct to the Cambridge Bay (CB) non-directional beacon (NDB), then direct to 72° N, 100°45' W, and then direct to CYRB (Figure 1). The planned alternate airport was Hall Beach (CYUX), Nunavut. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) at CYRB was 1645. The captain occupied the left seat and was designated as the pilot flying (PF). The first officer (FO) occupied the right seat and was designated as the pilot not flying (PNF). Before departure, First Air dispatch provided the crew with an operational flight plan (OFP) that included forecast and observed weather information for CYZF, CYRB, and CYUX, as well as NOTAM (notice to airmen) information. Radar data show that FAB6560 entered the Northern Domestic Airspace (NDA) 50 nautical miles (nm) northeast of CYZF, approximately at RIBUN waypoint (63°11.4' N, 113°32.9' W) at 1450. During the climb and after leveling at FL310, the crew received CYRB weather updates from a company dispatcher (Appendix A). The crew and dispatcher discussed deteriorating weather conditions at CYRB and whether the flight should return to CYZF, proceed to the alternate CYUX, or continue to CYRB. The crew and dispatcher jointly agreed that the flight would continue to CYRB. At 1616, the crew programmed the global positioning systems (GPS) to proceed from their current en-route position direct to the MUSAT intermediate waypoint on the RNAV (GNSS) Runway (RWY) 35 TRUE approach at CYRB (Appendix B), which had previously been loaded into the GPS units by the crew. The crew were planning to transition to an ILS/DME RWY 35 TRUE approach (Appendix C) via the MUSAT waypoint. A temporary military terminal control area (MTCA) had been planned, in order to support an increase in air traffic at CYRB resulting from a military exercise, Operation NANOOK. A military terminal control unit at CYRB was to handle airspace from 700 feet above ground level (agl) up to FL200 within 80 nm of CYRB. Commencing at 1622:16, the FO made 3 transmissions before establishing contact with the NAV CANADA Edmonton Area Control Centre (ACC) controller. At 1623:29, the NAV CANADA Edmonton ACC controller cleared FAB6560 to descend out of controlled airspace and to advise when leaving FL270. The crew were also advised to anticipate calling the CYRB terminal control unit after leaving FL270, and that there would be a layer of uncontrolled airspace between FL270 and FL200. The FO acknowledged the information. FAB6560 commenced descent from FL310 at 1623:40 at 101 nm from CYRB. The crew initiated the pre-descent checklist at 1624 and completed it at 1625. At 1626, the crew advised the NAV CANADA Edmonton ACC controller that they were leaving FL260. At 1627:09, the FO subsequently called the CYRB terminal controller and provided an ETA of 1643 and communicated intentions to conduct a Runway 35 approach. Radio readability between FAB6560 and the CYRB terminal controller was poor, and the CYRB terminal controller advised the crew to try again when a few miles closer. At 1629, the crew contacted the First Air agent at CYRB on the company frequency. The crew advised the agent of their estimated arrival time and fuel request. The crew then contacted the CYRB terminal controller again, and were advised that communications were now better. The CYRB terminal controller advised that the MTCA was not yet operational, and provided the altimeter setting and traffic information for another inbound flight. The CYRB terminal controller then instructed the crew to contact the CYRB tower controller at their discretion. The FO acknowledged the traffic and the instruction to contact CYRB tower. At 1631, the crew contacted the CYRB tower controller, who advised them of the altimeter setting (29.81 inches of mercury [in. Hg]) and winds (estimated 160° true [T] at 10 knots), and instructed them to report 10 nm final for Runway 35T. The crew asked the tower controller for a runway condition report, and was advised that the runway was a little wet and that no aircraft had used it during the morning. The FO acknowledged this information. The crew initiated the in-range checklist at 1632 and completed it at 1637. At 1637, they began configuring the aircraft for approach and landing, and initiated the landing checklist. At 1638:21, FAB6560 commenced a left turn just before reaching MUSAT waypoint. At the time of the turn, the aircraft was about 600 feet above the ILS glideslope at 184 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The track from MUSAT waypoint to the threshold of Runway 35T is 347°T, which coincides with the localizer track for the ILS/DME RWY 35 TRUE approach. After rolling out of the left turn, FAB6560 proceeded on a track of approximately 350°T. At 1638:32, the crew reported 10 nm final for Runway 35T. The captain called for the gear to be lowered at 1638:38 and for flaps 15 at 1638:42. Airspeed at the time of both of these calls was 177 KIAS. At 1638:39, the CYRB tower controller acknowledged the crew’s report and instructed them to report 3 nm final. At 1638:46, the FO requested that the tower repeat the last transmission. At 1638:49, the tower repeated the request to call 3 nm final; the FO acknowledged the call. At this point in the approach, the crew had a lengthy discussion about aircraft navigation. At 1640:36, FAB6560 descended through 1000 feet above field elevation. Between 1640:41 and 1641:11, the captain issued instructions to complete the configuration for landing, and the FO made several statements regarding aircraft navigation and corrective action. At 1641:30, the crew reported 3 nm final for Runway 35T. The CYRB tower controller advised that the wind was now estimated to be 150°T at 7 knots, cleared FAB6560 to land Runway 35T, and added the term “check gear down” as required by the NAV CANADA Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations (ATC MANOPS) Canadian Forces Supplement (CF ATC Sup) Article 344.3. FAB6560’s response to the tower (1641:39) was cut off, and the tower requested the crew to say again. There was no further communication with the flight. The tower controller did not have visual contact with FAB6560 at any time. At 1641:51.8, as the crew were initiating a go-around, FAB6560 collided with terrain about 1 nm east of the midpoint of the CYRB runway. The accident occurred during daylight hours and was located at 74°42'57.3" N, 94°55'4.0" W, at 396 feet above mean sea level. The 4 crew members and 8 passengers were fatally injured. Three passengers survived the accident and were rescued from the site by Canadian military personnel, who were in CYRB participating in Operation NANOOK. The survivors were subsequently evacuated from CYRB on a Canadian Forces CC-177 aircraft.

Africa Charter Airline

The aircraft was flown on a non-scheduled charter flight from O. R. Tambo International Airport to Hoedspruit military aerodrome, where it landed safely and all 97 passengers disembarked. The crew then prepared to return to O. R. Tambo International Airport with no passengers on board. Whilst taxiing to the cleared holding point for takeoff, the pilot switched off the landing lights to avoid blinding an approaching aircraft. As a result, he overshot the turning point in the darkness and found himself at the end of the taxiway with insufficient space to turn around. According to him, he decided to manoeuvre the aircraft out of the "dead end" by turning into the last taxiway, which led to military hangars, and then reversing the aircraft to carry out a 180° turn. This was to be done without external guidance. Whilst reversing the aircraft, the pilot failed to stop it in time, the main wheels rolled off the edge of the taxiway and the aircraft slipped down a steep embankment, coming to rest with the nose-wheel still on the taxiway. The aeroplane was substantially damaged, but no-one was injured.

Air Tanzania

After landing at Mwanza Airport, the crew encountered control problems. The aircraft deviated to the left then veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest near a taxiway. All 80 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Bako Air

The aircraft departed Bangui on a ferry flight to Harare with an intermediate stop in Brazzaville, carrying five technicians and two pilots. After being parked at Bangui Airport for almost a year without flying, the aircraft should be transferred to Harare for maintenance purposes. While in cruising altitude over DRC, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a dense wooded area near Massamba, Bandundu Province. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 7 occupants were killed.

Magnicharters

On approach to Guadalajara-Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Airport, the pilots encountered technical problems with the landing gear and elected to perform a low pass in front of the tower. ATC confirmed that the landing gear were not fully deployed and locked. The captain decided to perform a wheels up landing. After touchdown on runway 28, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. The left engine was destroyed by fire and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All 116 occupants escaped uninjured.

Rutaca - Rutas Aéreas

After landing on runway 28R at Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport, the aircraft deviated to the left. It eventually veered off runway to the left and went down a slope, coming to rest with its nose gear torn off. All 54 occupants evacuated safely and aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Conviasa - Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos

The aircraft was parked at Caracas Airport for a while and had just been sold to an Ecuadorian operator. A crew of three departed Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport in the evening on a delivery flight to Latacunga, Ecuador. After being cleared to descend to FL180, FL150 then FL130, the crew was flying over a mountainous area when the GPWS alarm sounded. The crew apparently elected to gain height but the alarm sounded for 22 seconds when the aircraft collided with the Iliniza Volcano. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed. The wreckage was found the following day at an altitude of 3,992 metres.

Sriwijaya Air

On 27 August 2008, a Boeing 737-200 aircraft, registered PK-CJG, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta to Sultan Thaha Airport, Jambi with flight number SJY062. On board the flight were two pilots, four flight attendants, and 124 passengers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). The flight time from Jakarta to Jambi was estimated to be about one hour and the aircraft was dispatched with approximately 4 hours of fuel endurance. The number one electrical engine driven generator was unserviceable, as such the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) generator was used during the flight to maintain two generators operation. Prior to descent into Jambi, the PIC conducted the crew briefing and stated a plan for Makinga straight-in approach to runway 31 with flap 40°, reviewed the go-around procedures and stated that Palembang was the alternate airport.There was no abnormality recorded nor reported until the PIC commenced the approach to Jambi. At 09:18 UTC, the SIC contacted Thaha Tower controller and reported that the aircraft was descending and passing FL160 and had been cleared by Palembang Approach control to descend to 12,000 feet. The Thaha Tower controller issued a clearance to descend to 2500 feet and advised that runway 31 was in use. The SIC asked about the weather conditions and was informed that the wind was calm, rain over the field and low cloud on final approach to runway 31. The PIC flew the aircraft direct to intercept the final approach to runway 31. While descending through 2500 feet, and about 8 miles from the VOR, the flap one degree and flap 5° were selected. Subsequently the landing gear was extended and flap 15° was selected. 13 seconds after flap 15 selection, the pilots noticed that the hydraulic system A low pressure warning light illuminated, and also the hydraulic system A quantity indicator showed zero. The PIC commanded the SIC to check the threshold speed for the existing configuration of landing, weight and with flap 15°. The SIC called out that the threshold speed was 134 kts and the PIC decided to continue with the landing. The PIC continued the approach and advised the SIC that he aimed to fly the aircraft slightly below the normal glide path in order to get more distance available for the landing roll. The aircraft touched down at 0930 UTC and during the landing roll, the PIC had difficulty selecting the thrust reversers. The PIC the applied manual braking. During the subsequent interview, the crew reported that initially they felt a deceleration then afterward a gradual loss of deceleration. The PIC reapplied the brakes and exclaimed to the SIC about the braking condition, then the SIC also applied the brakes to maximum in responding to the situation. The aircraft drifted to the right of the runway centre line about 200 meters prior to departing off the end of the runway, and stopped about 120 meters from the end of the runway 31 in a field about 6 meters below the runway level. Three farmers who were working in that area were hit by the aircraft. One was fatally injured and the other two were seriously injured. The pilots reported that, after the aircraft came to a stop, they executed the Emergency on Ground Procedure. The PIC could not put both start levers to the cut-off position, and also could not pull the engines and APU fire warning levers. The PIC also noticed that the speed brake lever did not extend. The radio communications and the interphone were also not working. The flight attendants noticed a significant impact before the aircraft stopped. They waited for any emergency command from the PIC before ordering the evacuation. However, the passengers started to evacuate the aircraft through the right over-wing exit window before commanded by the flight attendants. The flight attendants subsequently executed the evacuation procedure without command from the PIC. The left aft cabin door was blocked by the left main landing gear that had detached from the aircraft and the flight attendants were unable to open the door. The right main landing gear and both engines were also detached from the aircraft. The Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) come to the crash site and activated the extinguishing agent while the passengers were evacuating the aircraft. The PIC, SIC and FA1 were the last persons to evacuate the aircraft. The APU was still running after all passengers and crew evacuation completed, afterward one company engineer went to the cockpit and switched off the APU. All crew and passengers safely evacuated the aircraft. No significant property damage was reported.

Itek Air

On 24 August, 2008 the Boeing 737-200 aircraft registered <U+0415><U+0425>-009 and operated by a crew including a PIC and a Co-pilot of Itek Air was flying a scheduled passenger flight IRC 6895 from Bishkek to Tehran. Also on board there was the cabin crew (3 persons) as well as 85 passengers including two service passengers: a maintenance engineer and a representative of the Iran Aseman Airlines. Flight IRC 6895 was executed in compliance with the leasing agreement No. 023/05 of 15 July, 2005 for the Boeing 737-200 <U+0415><U+0425>-009 between the Kyrgyz airline, Itek Air, and the Iran Aseman Airlines. The crew passed a medical examination in the ground medical office of Manas Airport. The crew did not have any complaints of their health. The crew received a complete preflight briefing. The weather at the departure airport Manas, the destination airport and at alternate aerodromes was favourable for the flight. Total fuel was 12000 kg, the takeoff weight was 48371 kg with the CG at 24,8% MAC, which was within the B737-200 AFM limitations. After the climb to approximately 3000 m the crew informed the ATC about a pressurization system fault and decided to return to the aerodrome of departure. While they were descending for visual approach the aircraft collided with the ground, was damaged on impact and burnt. As a result of the crash and the following ground fire 64 passengers died. The passenger who was transferred on 29 August, 2008 to the burn resuscitation department of the Moscow Sklifasovsky Research Institute died of burn disease complicated by pneumonia on 23 October, 2008, two months after he got burn injuries. Thus, his death is connected with the injuries received due to the accident.

Chanchangi Airlines

On 14th July, 2008 at 16:49 h, a Boeing 737–282 aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-BIG, operated by Chanchangi Airlines Ltd, commenced a scheduled domestic flight from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, (DNMM) with call sign NCH138 for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO). Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight. There were 47 persons on board (41 passengers, 2 flight crew and 4 flight attendants) and 3 hours fuel endurance. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) and The First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The FO stated that NCH138 was initially scheduled to depart at 15:30 h, but the flight was delayed due to loading of passenger baggage. The Captain stated that NCH138 was cleared to FL290 and the flight continued normally. According to the DNPO Air Traffic Control (ATC) watch supervisor on duty, NCH138 contacted DNPO Approach Control (APP) at 17:05 h with flight information estimating POT at 17:50 h. NCH138 was issued an inbound clearance to POT1 VOR2 with the following weather information for 17:00 h as: Wind calm, Visibility 10 km, Broken clouds 270 m, Scattered clouds 600 m, Cumulonimbus clouds scattered, temperature 25/24°C, Thunderstorms, Temporarily Variable 8 kt, gusting 18 kt, Visibility 3000 m, Thunderstorms and rain, and expect runway (RWY) 21 for landing. According to the First Officer NCH138 requested descent into POT at about 100 NM. The Captain added that due to ATC delay, the descent commenced at about 80 NM. The Control Tower Watch Supervisor stated that at 18:00 h, NCH138 requested to hold over POT at 3500 ft for weather improvement, because there was rain overhead the station with build-up closing in at the threshold of RWY 21. At about 15 NM, between radials 180° and 210°, NCH138 reported breaking out of weather. At 18:19 h, NCH138 requested weather information from the Tower. Tower advised the flight crew that RWY 03 was better for landing. At this time, NCH138 requested RWY 03 for approach and Approach Control cleared NCH138 for the approach to RWY 03. At 18:27 h, the flight crew reported established on approach to RWY 03, leaving 2000 ft. The Approach Control then transferred NCH138 to DNPO Tower for landing instructions. At 18:28 h, the Tower instructed NCH138 to report field in sight. The flight crew acknowledged and reported RWY 03 in sight. Tower cleared NCH138 to land on RWY 03 and NCH138 was cautioned that the runway was wet. At 18:34 h, NCH138 executed and reported a missed approach. NCH138 requested a climb to 3500 ft. NCH138 was cleared to climb and instructed to report overhead POT. At 18:39 h, NCH138 requested a descent and clearance for an approach to RWY 21. Approach Control cleared NCH138 to descend to 2000 ft and report to Tower when established on the approach and also to report leaving 2000 ft. At 18:42 h, NCH138 reported inbound maintaining 2000 ft. The Approach Control requested the distance from the runway and sought consent of NCH138 for Arik 514 at the holding point to take off. NCH138 declined, as they were about 10 miles to touchdown. At 18:45 h, NCH138 reported five miles to touchdown. Approach Control acknowledged and instructed NCH138 to report field in sight and thereafter handed over to Tower on 119.2 MHz. When contacting the Tower, NCH138 was cleared to land on RWY 21, wind 0100 /10 kt and was advised to exercise caution due to wet runway. NCH138 acknowledged the clearance. NCH138 landed hard and bounced three times on the runway. According to the ATC controller, after touch down the aircraft rolled in an s-pattern before it overran the runway. NCH138 made a 180° turn with the right engine hitting the ground. The aircraft came to a final stop on the left side and 10 m beyond the stopway. The accident occurred at night in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (ARFFS) arrived the scene and commenced rescue operations immediately. All occupants on board were evacuated; one passenger sustaining a minor injury.

Mandala Airlines

On 1 November 2007, a Boeing Company B737-200 aircraft, registered PK-RIL, operated by PT. Mandala Airlines as flight number MDL 260, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, to Abdurrachman Saleh Airport, Malang, East Java. The pilot in command (PIC) was the handling pilot, and the copilot was the support/monitoring pilot. There were 94 persons on board the aircraft, consisting of two pilots, three cabin crew, and 89 passengers. The aircraft landed at Malang at 1324 Western Indonesian Standard Time (06:24 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). It was reported to have been raining heavily when the aircraft landed on runway 35 at Malang. The aircraft bounced twice after the initial severe hard landing, and the lower drag strut of the nose landing gear fractured, resulting in the rearwards collapse of the nose landing gear and separation of the lower nose landing gear shock strut and wheel assembly. The aircraft’s nose then contacted the runway, and the aircraft came to rest 290 metres before the departure end of runway 17. The crew subsequently reported that during the visual segment of the landing approach, they realized that the aircraft was too high with reference to the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) for runway 35. The PIC increased the aircraft’s rate of descent (ROD) to capture the PAPI. The high ROD was not arrested, and as a consequence, the severe hard landing occurred which substantially damaged the aircraft. No one of the passengers or crew was injured.

Magnicharters

On approach to Guadalajara-Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Airport, the crew selected flaps and slats down but noticed an asymmetry. During the second approach, flaps were selected down via the alternate system. The airplane landed with the landing gear in a transit position, causing both engines to struck the ground after touchdown. After a course of few hundred metres, the aircraft came to rest, bursting into flames due to the engine friction on the ground. The fire was quickly extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All 109 occupants evacuated safely.

TAAG Angola Airlines - Transportes Aéreos de Angola

After landing on runway 16/34 (1,800 metres long) at M'Banza Congo Airport, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with cars and two houses and came to rest. A crew member, five passengers and one people on the ground were killed while 25 other passengers were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Gading Sari Aviation Services - GSAS

Following an uneventful mail flight from Kuala Lumpur, the crew initiated a night approach to Kuching Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway due to recent heavy rain falls, the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, both main gears collapsed, the left engine was torn off and the aircraft came to rest 1,500 metres past the runway threshold. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

ADC Airlines - Aviation Development Company

The B737-200 aircraft which night-stopped at Calabar on Saturday the 28th of October, 2006, departed for Lagos in the morning of the 29th of October, 2006, and landed in Lagos at 0825 hrs. While on ground in Lagos, it uplifted some fuel. There was only cabin crew change. The aircraft departed Lagos on scheduled passenger service as ADK 063 at 0929 hrs and landed in Abuja at 1020 hrs. The aircraft uplifted 5000 litres of fuel and had 11000kg fuel for departure as ADK 053, a scheduled service to Sokoto. After boarding, it started raining and this compelled the crew to close the aircraft doors. Shortly after the rain had subsided, the doors were opened for the ground personnel to disembark. The crew then requested for start-up clearance. At 1115 hrs the aircraft was given a start up clearance for Sokoto. At 1121 hrs, the aircraft was given taxi clearance to holding position Runway 22. The pilot immediately requested for the wind, which was given as “210 variable at 8 kts”. Shortly after, the Control Tower transmitted the wind as south-westerly at 15 kts. While taxiing, the control tower advised Flight ADK 053 of gusty wind. The wind was initially given as 35 kts and then changed to 28 kts within 1 minute. At 1125 hrs while the aircraft was at the holding point, the crew was again advised of South-Westerly wind at 15 kts. At this juncture, the pilot of Virgin Nigeria 042 was heard on the radio saying “it looks like 35 kts to me” and then stated that he was going to wait for improvement in the weather, which he did. Thereafter, the ADK 053 crew requested for takeoff clearance and was cleared with right turn-out on course. Flight ADK 053 was airborne at 1129 hrs and was transferred to the Approach Control on 119.8MHZ but there was no acknowledgement from the crew. After three unsuccessful attempts to contact the aircraft, the Tower advised the Approach Control to call ADK 053. Other aircraft on the apron (Virgin Nigeria 042 and Trade Wings 2401), which were on that frequency were also asked to assist in contacting the aircraft but all attempts were unsuccessful. Kano and Lagos Area Controls were requested to contact ADK 053, but there was no response from the aircraft. Abuja Flight Communication Centre was then advised to inform National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Kano about the loss of contact with the aircraft. At 1138 hrs, Flight Communication Centre called the Control Tower that someone came from a nearby village (Tungar Madaki) near the radar site and reported that a plane had crashed in their village. A search party from the airport was dispatched and they found and confirmed that the plane had crashed shortly after takeoff. The accident resulted in 96 fatalities out of 105 persons on board (POB). The accident occured at latitude N 08 59.691’ longitude E 007 14.772’ on an elevation of 1123 ft (ASL). The time of the accident was 1130 hrs during daylight and in rain.

Mandala Airlines

On approach to Tarakan-Juwata Airport, the crew was informed of the poor visibility due smoke emanating from forest fire. After touchdown on runway 06/24 which is 1,845 metres long, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and one engine and came to rest. All 110 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reported to be about 400 metres, below minimums.

Bellview Airlines

The accident was reported to erstwhile Accident Investigation and Prevention Bureau (AIPB) now Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB) on Saturday 22nd of October, 2005. The site of the wreckage was located on the 23rd of October, 2005 and investigation began the same day. On October 22, 2005, at 2040 hrs, Bellview Airlines (BLV) Flight 210, a Boeing B737-200, 5N-BFN, crashed while climbing to cruise altitude shortly after take-off from Murtala Muhammed Airport, Lagos (LOS). The flight was operating under the provisions of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from LOS to Abuja International Airport (ABV). The flight departed LOS for ABV at 2035 hrs, with 2 pilots, 1 licensed engineer, 3 flight attendants, and 111 passengers on board. The airplane entered a descent and impacted open terrain at Lisa Village, Ogun State. All 117 persons were killed and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was operated on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) plan. The accident occurred on the final leg of a one-day round trip from Abuja to Abidjan with intermediate stops at Lagos and Accra for both the outbound and inbound segments. The trip through the second stop at Accra (the fourth leg) was reported without incident. On the fifth leg, during the taxi for takeoff at Accra, the pilot and the engineer discussed the low pressure reading of 650 psi in the brake accumulator system according to the pilot that flew the aircraft from Accra to Lagos. Normal accumulator brake pressure is 1000 psi. The captain continued the flight to the destination, LOS, without incident, where the discrepancy was logged. The engineer briefed the maintenance crew about the low pressure reading. The crew consisted of two Licensed Aircraft Engineers (LAEs) and the outbound engineer for Flight 210. LAEs and engineer on riding coverage worked together to troubleshoot the brake system, which included verifying the pressure reading with the pressure gauge from another Boeing 737 (5N-BFM) in the fleet. It was determined that the source of the low pressure was due to a faulty brake accumulator. On checking the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), the maintenance engineers decided that the aircraft could be released for operation with the fault. Before Flight 210 departed, the captain discussed en-route weather with another pilot who had just completed a flight from Port Harcourt to Lagos. The other pilot informed the accident captain of a squall line in the vicinity of Benin. The accident captain indicated that he experienced the same weather condition on his previous flight from Abuja to Lagos. The chronology of the flight was determined from the transcript of the recorded radio communications between Air Traffic Control and Flight 210 and post accident interviews of air traffic personnel. According to the transcript, the pilot of Flight 210 contacted the tower at 1917:02 UTC and requested for startup and clearance was given. The controller gave him the temperature and QNH, which were 27 degrees Centigrade and 1010 millibars respectively. At 1924:08 UTC, the Pilot requested and got approval for taxi to Runway 18L. At 1927 UTC, the tower requested for Persons on Board (POB), endurance and registration. In response, the pilot indicated the number of persons on board as 114 minus 6 crew, fuel endurance as 3 hours and 50 minutes and registration 5N-BFN. The tower acknowledged the information and issued the route clearance via Airway UR778, Flight Level 250, with a right turn-out on course. The pilot read back the clearance and the controller acknowledged and instructed the pilot to report when ready for takeoff. At 1927:55 UTC, the pilot requested “can we have a left turn out please?” and soon afterwards his request was granted by the controller. At 1928:08 UTC, the tower cleared BLV 210 as follows: "BLV 210 RUNWAY HEADING 3500FT LEFT TURN ON COURSE" At 1928;12 UTC, BLV 210 replied "3500FT LEFT TURN ON COURSE 210". 1928:47 UTC, the pilot reported ready for takeoff, and after given the wind condition as 270 degrees at 7 knots the controller cleared Flight 210 for departure at 1928:50 UTC. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and at 1929:14 UTC requested “And correction, Bellview 210, please we will take a right turn out. We just had a sweep around the weather and right turn out will be okay for us.” The controller responded “right turn after departure, right turn on course” and the pilot acknowledged. According to the transcript, at 1931:52 UTC, the controller reported Flight 210 as airborne and instructed the pilot to contact LOS Approach Control. During the post-crash interview, the controller indicated he saw the airplane turn right, but was unable to determine its attitude due to darkness. He indicated the airplane sounded and appeared normal. At 1932:22 UTC, the pilot made initial contact with Approach Control and reported “Approach, Bellview 210 is with you on a right turn coming out of 1600 (feet)”. The Approach Control replied “report again passing one three zero.” The pilot acknowledged at 1932:35 UTC, and that was the last known transmission from the flight. According to the transcript, the controller attempted to regain contact with the flight at 19:43:46 UTC. Repeated attempts were unsuccessful. Emergency alert was then sent out to relevant agencies including the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for search and rescue operations to commence. The airplane struck the ground on flat terrain in a relatively open and wooded area, 14NM north of the airport (6° 48’ 43” N and 3° 18’ 19” E).

Mandala Airlines

On 5 September 2005, at 03:15 UTC, Mandala Airlines registered PK-RIM, operating as flight number MDL 091, a Boeing 737-200 departing for Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta from Medan. The previous flight was from Jakarta and arrived at Medan uneventfully. The same crew have flight schedule on the same day and returned to Jakarta. The flight was a regular scheduled passenger flight and was attempted to take-off from Polonia Airport, Medan, North Sumatra to Jakarta and it was the second trip of the day for the crew. At 02.40 UTC information from dispatcher, those embarking passengers, cargo process and all flight documents were ready. At 02.52 UTC, Mandala/MDL 091 asked for push back and start up clearance bound for Jakarta from the Air Traffic Controller/ATC, after received the approval from the ATC they began starting the engines. At 02.56 UTC, the controller cleared MDL 091 taxi into position on runway 23 via Alpha. At 03.02 UTC, MDL 091 received clearance for take off with additional clearance from ATC to turn left heading 120º and maintain 1500 ft. The MDL 091 read back the clearance heading 120º and maintains 1000 ft. The ATC corrected the clearance one thousand five hundred feet. The MDL 091 reread back as 1500 ft. Some of the passengers and other witnesses stated that the aircraft has lifted its nose in an up attitude and take off roll was longer than that normally made by similar airplanes. Most of them stated that the aircraft nose began to lift-off about few meters from the end of the runway. The ATC tower controller recalled that after rotation the plane began to “roll” or veer to the left and to the right. Some witnesses on the ground recalled that the airplane left wing struck a building before it struck in the busy road, then heard two big explosions and saw the flames. Persons on board in MDL 091, 5 crew and 95 passengers were killed, 15 passengers seriously injured and 2 passengers (a mother and child) were reported survived without any injuries; and other 49 persons on ground were killed and 26 grounds were serious injured.

Transportes Aéreos Nacionales de la Selva - TANS

Following an uneventful flight from Lima, the aircraft was descending to Pucallpa-Capitán David Abensur Rengifo Airport runway 02, an intermediate stop on the flight from Lima to Iquitos. As the crew approached the destination, weather conditions deteriorated with heavy rain falls, CB's and turbulences. On final approach, the aircraft was unstable and descended below the glide until it crashed in a swampy and wooded area located 3,5 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. 58 people were injured, some seriously, while 40 other occupants including five crew members were killed, among them 34 Peruvian, three American, one Australian, one Colombian and one Spanish.

Kam Air

On February 3, 2005, a Boeing 737-242 aircraft (the "Aircraft") with Kyrgyz Republic registration EX-037, operated by Phoenix Aviation, was conducting Kam Air Flight 904 from Herat to Kabul. There were a total of 105 occupants on board the Aircraft, including eight crew members and ninety-seven passengers. The Aircraft was cruising at flight level 270 when it contacted Bagram Radar Approach Control ("Bagram") for descent and landing. The flight was normal until it failed to level at flight level 130 during the VOR/DME approach. At 1043:24 UTC, Bagram cleared the flight to descend at its discretion and to expect the VOR approach to runway 29. The prevailing weather was also passed on to the Aircraft. Visibility was reported 2 kilometers with snow, ceiling 2,200 feet broken. wind calm and altimeter setting QNH 1016. AT 1043:58 UTC, when the Aircraft was 35 miles west of the Kabul VOR. radar contact was established with Ba9ram. The Aircraft was advised by Bagram to cross the VOR at or above flight level 130 and cleared it for the VOR/DME approach to runway 29. At 1048:41 UTC the Aircraft reported flight level 130. Bagram again cleared the Aircraft for the VOR approach to runway 29 and advised the Aircraft to report procedure turn inbound. The crew replied that they would report proceeding inbound for the VOR approach to runway 29. This was the last transmission from the Aircraft. At about 1050:11 UTC, Bagram stated that radar contact had been lost with the Aircraft. Bagram and Kabul Air Traffic Control Tower attempted to locate the Aircraft through radar and radio communication, but were not successful. Search for the Aircraft was delayed and hampered due to a severe snowstorm in the region. The Aircraft was located approximately three days later by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helicopter approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Kabul International Airport at N 36 27.900 E 69 30.185. The Aircraft was destroyed by force of impact from colliding with the mountain. All 105 occupants on board the Aircraft had received fatal injuries. Subsequently, all bodies were recovered and identified. The wreckage was found at the altitude of 9,960 feet (3,035 metres) on the summit of Mt Shapiri Ghar located about 30 km southeast of Kabul Airport.

Tri-MG Intra Asia Airlines

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight to Banda Aceh, taking part to relief operation following the recent tsunami that affected the Aceh province. After landing by night, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft collided with a buffalo. Upon impact, the left main gear was torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Guinée Express

Due to poor weather conditions in Freetown, the flight was delayed for hours. Finally, the crew was cleared for takeoff from runway 12/30 which is 3,200 metres long. During the takeoff roll, the captain decided to abort for unknown reasons. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its right main gear and right engine before coming to rest in a grassy area located 100 metres past the runway end. All 127 occupants were rescued, among them 50 passengers were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aero Continente

Following an uneventful flight from Caracas, the crew started the approach to Lima-Callao-Jorge Chávez Airport when the crew noted an asymmetric warning with the flaps. The crew decided to continue the approach but failed to lower the undercarriage. The aircraft belly landed at a speed of 190 knots and slid on runway 15 for 2,347 metres before coming to rest. All 100 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sudan Airways

The aircraft departed Port Sudan Airport at 0407LT on a schedule service to Khartoum with 105 passengers and 11 crew members on board. During climbout, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing on runway 33. On final approach in limited visibility, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed about 5 km from the runway threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces. A boy aged two was injured while 116 other occupants were killed, among them eight EU citizens and one high ranking officer of the Sudan Army.

Air Algérie

The aircraft was taking off from Tamanrasset to undertake, with a three-hour delay, scheduled flight DAH 6289 to Ghardaïa and Algiers. Six crew members (two flight crew and four cabin crew) and 97 passengers were on board. The co-pilot was pilot flying. No technical exemptions or deferred maintenance items applied to the airplane; on departure from Algiers it had been subject to routine maintenance for a minor technical problem, a hydraulic pump having been changed in the circuit B landing gear bay. The speeds decided on by the crew were V1 = 144 kt, VR = 146 kt, V2 = 150 kt. The EPR displayed was 2.18, that is to say nominal maximum thrust on take-off. At 14 h 01 min 37 s, the crew requested start-up clearance. At 14 h 08 min 36 s, the tower cleared the airplane to taxi, enter and taxi up runway 02. The wind was 330 at 12 kt. At 14 h 12 min 30 s, the co-pilot called out “we’re ready”. At 14 h 12 min 31 s, the tower cleared flight 6289 to line up and take off. At 14 h 13 min 36 s, flight DAH 6289 announced take-off. About five seconds after airplane rotation, at the moment when gear retraction was requested, a sharp thumping noise was recorded on the CVR. The airplane’s heading veered to the left, followed by a track correction. The Captain announced that he was taking over the controls. A short time later, the co-pilot told the control tower “we have a small problem”. The airplane continued to climb and reached a recorded height of about 400 ft. The speed dropped progressively from 160 kt during airplane lift-off to stall speed at the end of the recording. In fact, about ten seconds before, the noise of the stick shaker is heard on the CVR (which usually indicates that the airplane is 7% from its stall speed). The “Don’t Sink” aural warning, which normally indicates a loss of altitude during take-off when the airplane is below nine hundred feet, appeared about six seconds before the end of the recording. The airplane, with landing gear extended, struck the ground on its right side. A severe fire broke out immediately. The airplane slid along, losing various parts, struck and knocked over the airport perimeter fence then crossed a road before coming to a halt in flames. The control tower immediately sounded the alert.

VASP - Viação Aérea de São Paulo

Following an uneventful flight from Manaus, the crew started the descent to Rio Branco-Presidente Médici Airport runway 06 in marginal weather conditions with limited visibility due to fog. After passing the MDA at 1,150 feet, the crew continued the approach with an excessive rate of descent of 1,222 feet per minute. At a height of 57 feet, the aircraft struck trees located 360 metres short of runway 06 threshold. The engines lost power, the aircraft lost speed and height then struck the ground about 100 metres short of runway. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid on a distance of 600 metres before coming to rest. All 95 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

Lion Air

The flight was a second route of four routes on a first day of two days schedule flight for the crew. All crew have flight schedule on the previous day and returned to Jakarta. The first flight was from Jakarta to Pekanbaru with departure schedule on 08.00 LT (01.00 UTC). All crew did the pre-flight check completely but did not check the audio warning and departed Jakarta on schedule. The flight was normal and landed in Pekanbaru on schedule. There was no problem reported. Transit in Pekanbaru for about 30 minutes and the flight was ready to continue the next flight to Batam. At 10.15 LT (03.05) the boarding process has been completed and all flight documents have ready. First Officer asked for start clearance and received weather information in Syarif Kasim Airport. The weather was fine, wind calm and clear. After start completed, the aircraft taxi to the beginning of runway 18. Flight crews have set the V1, VR, V2 and V2+15 speed bugs according to the load sheet. Take off power decide to use “reduced take off power” with assumed temperature 35o C while the actual temperature was 27° C. flight Attendant have completed the passenger briefing includes rearrange seat for the seats near the “over wing exit windows”. The checklist was done, but flight crews were not sure the indication of flap setting. When ready for take off, flight crew gave a warning to the flight attendants to take their seats. First Officer acted as “Pilot Flying”. PIC opened the power and adjusted to the required take off power setting. The aircraft rolled normal and there was no abnormal indication. PIC called “V1” and “ROTATE” at speed bugs value setting, and the First Officer rotated the control column and set to 150 ANU (Aircraft Nose Up) pitch. The aircraft’s nose was lifted up but the aircraft did not airborne. Flight attendant who was sitting at the rear felt that the nose was higher than normal. Officer also felt stick shaker, warning for approaching stall. First Officer suddenly noticed a warning light illuminated and cross-checked. He found than the warning came from the problem on the air conditioning system. Both pilots also felt pain in the ear. Recognizing this situation, PIC decided to continue the take off and called to the First Officer “disregard”. Realized that the aircraft did not airborne PIC added the power by moving power levers forward. The speed was increasing and passed the speed bug setting for V2+15 ( ± 158 KIAS) but the aircraft did not get airborne. PIC noticed that the runway end getting closer and he thought that the aircraft would not airborne, he decided to abort the take off and called “STOP”. PIC retarded the power levers to idle and set to reverse thrust, extended the speed brake and applied brake. Nose of the aircraft went down hard and made the front left door (L1) opened and 2 trolleys at front galley move forward and blocked the cockpit door. Flight crew turns the aircraft slightly to the right to avoid approach lights ahead. The aircraft moved out or the runway to the right side of the approach lights. After hit some trees the aircraft stopped at ± 275 meters from the end of runway on heading 285°. One passenger had serious injury and the rest had minor injury, all crew were safe and not injured. No one killed in this accident, while the aircraft considered total loss.

VARIG - Viação Aérea Rio Grandense

On final approach to Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a limited visibility due to rain. The aircraft landed about 500 metres past the runway threshold but as it was misaligned, the right main gear touched down on the left side of the runway. The crew attempted to steer the plane back onto the runway when the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft went out of control, lost its right engine then its nose gear and came to rest on the runway. All 67 occupants evacuated safely.

First Air

First Air Flight 953, a Boeing 737-210C, serial number 21066, was on a scheduled flight from Edmonton, Alberta, to Yellowknife, Northwest Territories. On board were 2 flight crew, 4 cabin crew, and 98 passengers. The flight departed Edmonton at 1130 mountain daylight time, with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 35 minutes. As the aircraft approached Yellowknife, the spoilers were armed, and the aircraft was configured for a visual approach and landing on Runway 33. The computed Vref was 128 knots, and target speed was 133 knots. While in the landing flare, the aircraft entered a higher-than-normal sink rate, and the pilot flying (the first officer) corrected with engine power and nose-up pitch. The aircraft touched down on the main landing gear and bounced twice. While the aircraft was in the air, the captain took control and lowered the nose to minimize the bounce. The aircraft landed on its nose landing-gear, then on the main gear. The aircraft initially touched down about 1300 feet from the approach end of Runway 33. Numerous aircraft rubber scrub marks were present in this area and did not allow for an accurate measurement. During the third touchdown on the nose landing-gear, the left nose-tire burst, leaving a shimmy-like mark on the runway. The aircraft was taxied to the ramp and shut down. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There were no reported injuries to the crew or the passengers. The accident occurred at 1325, during the hours of daylight.

Royal Aviation

At 2320, Newfoundland daylight time, on 03 April 2001, the Royal Cargo flight, a Boeing 737-200, left Mirabel, Quebec, for a scheduled instrument flight rules cargo flight with two pilots on board. The flight was headed for Hamilton, Ontario; Mirabel; Halifax, Nova Scotia; St. John's, Newfoundland; and Mirabel. The flights from Mirabel to Halifax were uneventful. Before departure from Halifax, the pilot flying (PF) received the latest weather information for the flight to St. John's from the company dispatch; he did not ask for, or receive, the latest notices to airmen (NOTAMs). At 0545, the aircraft departed Halifax for St. John's. The PF was completing his line indoctrination training after having recently upgraded to captain. The training captain, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), occupied the right seat. After departure from Halifax, he contacted Halifax Flight Service Station (FSS) and received the latest weather report for St. John's, the 0530 aviation routine weather report (METAR). The weather was as follows: wind 050° magnetic (M) at 35, gusting to 40, knots; visibility 1 statute mile in light snow and blowing snow; ceiling 400 feet overcast; temperature -1°C; dew point -2°C; and altimeter 29.41 inches of mercury. The FSS passed runway surface condition (RSC) reports for both runways (11/29 and 16/34), including Canadian runway friction index (CRFI) readings of 0.25 for Runway 11/29 and 0.24 for Runway 16/34. The FSS specialist also provided the NOTAMs for St. John's, which included a NOTAM released more than five hours earlier advising of the unserviceability of the instrument landing system (ILS) for Runway 11. The flight crew had initially planned an ILS approach, landing on Runway 11 at St. John's. Because of the marginal weather, the loss of Runway 11/29, and his greater experience, the training captain decided to switch seats and assume the duties and full responsibilities as captain and PF. Returning to Halifax was not considered because the aircraft would be overweight for landing there. The option of diverting the flight to the alternate airport was also discussed by the crew; however, in the end, they felt that a safe landing was achievable in St. John's. At 0638:27, the PF contacted St. John's tower to ask if the approach to Runway 34 was still an option. The response indicated that Runway 34 was probably the only option because of the wind: 050°M (estimated) at 35, gusting to 40, knots. The ILS on Runway 11 was unserviceable, and the glidepath for Runway 29 was unserviceable. The only instrument approaches available were the localizer back course Runway 34 and the ILS Runway 16. Also, at about 0638, the Gander Area Control Centre (ACC) controller suggested to the crew that they obtain the 0630 automatic terminal information service (ATIS) for St. John's. The ATIS was reporting surface winds of 055°M at 20, gusting to 35, knots. The PNF attempted to obtain the ATIS information; however, because of a simultaneous radio transmission on the second VHF radio between the PF and St. John's tower, the ATIS information was not obtained. At 0641, the PNF contacted Gander ACC, which reported the winds at St. John's as 040°M at 13, gusting to 18, knots. The PNF pointed out the discrepancy in the two wind reports to the PF; however, there was no acknowledgement of the significance of the discrepancy. It was later determined that the discrepancy was an unserviceable anemometer at the St. John's airport due to ice accretion on the anemometer. The anemometer was providing a direct reading of the incorrect wind information to Gander ACC. Gander ACC was unaware of the unserviceability and unknowingly passed the incorrect wind information on to the flight crew. At 0644, Gander ACC transmitted a significant meteorological report (SIGMET), issued at 0412 and valid from 0415 to 0815, that included St. John's. The SIGMET forecast severe mechanical turbulence below 3000 feet due to surface wind gusts in excess of 50 knots. However, the crew may not have been listening to the SIGMET broadcast: while the ACC transmitted the SIGMET, the crew were discussing the application of an 18-knot quartering tailwind for the approach to Runway 16. This tailwind was well under the 50 knots described by the SIGMET. The crew did not acknowledge receipt of the SIGMET until prompted by the controller. Before the descent into St. John's, the crew discussed approach options. The approach to Runway 11 was discounted because of the unserviceability of the ILS, and Runway 34 was eliminated as an option because the weather was below its published approach minimums. The crew discussed the ILS approach to Runway 16. Although the PNF expressed concern about the tailwind, it was decided to attempt the approach because the wind reported by Gander ACC was within the aircraft's landing limits. In calculating the approach speed in preparation for the approach, there was confusion during the application of the tailwind and gust corrections to the landing reference speed (Vref ). The crew had correctly established a flap-30 Vref of 132 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and ultimately an approach speed of 142 KIAS. The approach speed calculations were derived using the incorrect wind information from Gander ACC; further, the crew added five knots for the gust increment to the nominal approach speed (Vref + 5 knots), that is, Vref + 10 knots. This incorrect calculation (adding the gust factor) was consistent with company practice at the time of the accident. During the descent, the crew also had difficulty completing the descent and approach checklists; there were several missteps and repeated attempts at completion of checks. Clearance for an ILS approach to Runway 16 was obtained from Gander ACC , and the crew was advised to contact St. John's tower. Just over two minutes before landing, the tower advised that the wind was 050°M (estimated) at 20, gusting to 35, knots and provided the following RSC report for Runway 16: Full length 170 feet wide, surface 30% very light dusting of snow and 70% compact snow and ice; remainder is 20% light snow, 80% compact snow and ice, windrow along the east side of the runway; friction index 0.20; and temperature -1°C at 0925. The aircraft crossed the final approach fix on the ILS glideslope at 150 KIAS. During the final approach, the airspeed steadily increased to 180 KIAS (ground speed 190 knots); the glidepath was maintained with a descent rate of 1000 feet per minute. From 1000 feet above sea level, no airspeed calls were made; altitude calls were made and responses were made. The Royal Boeing 737 operations manual states that the PNF shall call out significant deviations from programmed airspeed. In the descent, through 900 feet above sea level, the aircraft encountered turbulence resulting in uncommanded roll and pitch deviations and airspeed fluctuations of +/- 11 knots. At about 300 feet above decision height, the crew acquired visual references for landing. Approximately one minute before landing, St. John's tower transmitted the runway visual range, repeated the estimated surface wind (050°M [estimated] at 20, gusting to 35, knots), and issued a landing clearance to the aircraft; the PNF acknowledged this information. The aircraft touched down at 164 KIAS (27 KIAS above the desired touchdown speed of Vref), 2300 to 2500 feet beyond the threshold. Radar ground speed at touchdown was 180 knots. The wind at this point was determined to be about 050°M at 30 knots. Shortly after touchdown, the speed brakes and thrust reversers were deployed, and an engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.7 was reached 10 seconds after touchdown. Longitudinal deceleration was -0.37g within 1.3 seconds of touchdown, suggesting that a significant degree of effective wheel braking was achieved. With approximately 1100 feet of runway remaining, through a speed of 64 KIAS, reverse thrust increased to about 1.97 EPR on engine 1 and 2.15 EPR on engine 2. As the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the captain attempted to steer the aircraft to the right, toward the Delta taxiway intersection. Twenty-two seconds after touchdown, the aircraft exited the departure end of the runway into deep snow. The aircraft came to rest approximately 75 feet beyond and 53 feet to the right of the runway centreline on a heading of 235°M.

Alliance Air

Alliance Air Flight No. CD-7412 departed Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose International Airport, Kolkata at 0651 hrs. on 17th July, 2000 bound for Patna-Lucknow-Delhi. After normal departure from Runway 01R, the aircraft climbed to FL260 on track to Patna via route W52. The aircraft was under the control of Kolkata Radar from 0652 hrs. to 0659 hrs. It changed over to Kolkata Area Control Centre. The aircraft reported position SAREK at FL 260 at 0712 hrs. and changed over to Patna Control with information that there was no reported traffic for descent. The aircraft contacted Patna ATC at 0713 hrs. and gave it’s ETA at Patna as 0736 hrs. Patna ATC cleared the aircraft to PPT VOR ILS/DME ARC Approach for R/W 25. The ATC Officer communicated that Patna METAR originated at 0650 hrs. stated “Wind calm, Visibility 4000 metres, Weather Haze, Clouds Broken 25000 feet, temp 29ºC, Dew Point 27º, QNH 996 hPa, No Sig”. The aircraft was cleared to descend to 7500’ and report 25 DME from PPT VOR. The aircraft reported 25 DME at 0726 hrs. The aircraft then descended to 4000’ on QNH 996 hPa and was asked to report 13 DME for ILS/DME ARC Approach R/W 25. The aircraft reported commencing the ARC at 0728 hrs. The aircraft reported crossing lead radial 080 at 0731 hrs. and coming on to the Localizer. The aircraft was then asked to descend to 1700’ on QNH 997 hPa with instructions to call established on Localizer. The aircraft informed Patna ATC at 0732 hrs. that it would like to do a 360º turn due to being high on approach. Patna ATC sought confirmation from the aircraft whether it had the airfield in sight and on receiving an affirmative reply, asked the aircraft to report on finals for R/W 25 after carrying out a 360º turn. This was acknowledged by the aircraft at 0732 hrs. This was the last communication from the aircraft. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft was spotted by the Air Traffic Controller in normal descent aligned with the R/W 25. It, however, appeared to be high on approach. The aircraft then turned steeply to the left losing height all of a sudden and disappeared from sight behind a row of trees. The Air Traffic Controller observed a huge column of smoke rising from the Gardani Bagh area outside the airfield perimeter and initiated crash action. All six crew members and 49 passengers were killed as well as five people on the ground. Three passengers escaped with serious injuries.

Yemenia Yemen Airways

Following an uneventful flight from Sana'a, the crew was cleared for an approach to runway 18. Weather conditions were poor with a sandstorm upon arrival. For unknown reasons, the captain decided to perform a straight-in approach to runway 36. After touchdown, The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and collided with small concrete blocks, causing the nose gear to collapse. All five crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Philippines

The aircraft was being flown as a route check for for a captain. Another captain was acting as Pilot Monitoring on the flight. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The aircraft was conducting an ILS approach to runway 05 and the controller reported that they would be behind Philippine Airlines flight 809, an Airbus A319. As the Boeing 737 broke out of clouds, the A319 was observed on runway 05. The Pilot Flying informed ATC of his intention to perform a 360° maneuver, but the Pilot Monitoring advised ATC of the opposite, stating that the aircraft would turn right instead of following the missed approach procedure, which called for a left hand turn to a 020° heading. The aircraft re-entered clouds and attempted to fly visually at a lower altitude in instrument conditions when in fact it should have climbed to 4,000 feet. The flight continued over Samal Island and the flight requested a VOR/DME approach and landing in the opposite direction (runway 23), which was approved by the controller. After having aligned with the runway heading, the aircraft descended below the normal glide path for this approach. It continued down to 570 feet at a point where the aircraft should have been at 1,500 feet. The aircraft crashed into a coconut plantation on a hillside in Barangay San Isidro, disintegrated and caught fire. All 131 occupants were killed.

Lineas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas - LAPA

LAPA flight 3142 was scheduled to depart from Buenos Aires-Jorge Newbery Airport at 20:36 for a 1 hour and 15 minute flight to Córdoba, Argentina. The first officer and cabin crew were the first to arrive at the Boeing 737-200. The first officer notified one of the mechanics that the total fuel requirement was 8,500 kg, all to be stored in the wing tanks. The mechanic noticed there was still some fuel in the central tank and commenced transferring the fuel from the central to the wing tanks. At that moment the captain boarded the flight. He threw his paperwork on the ground, showing annoyance, confirming that attitude by later shutting off the fuel transfer between the main tank and the wing tanks. During their first four minutes on board, the captain, the co-pilot and the purser talked about trivial matters in good spirits, focusing on the purser's personal issues. When the purser left the cockpit, the conversation changed tone as they discussed a controversial situation about the family problems of the captain. The captain said that he was "going through bad times", to which the copilot replied that he was also having a bad day. Without interrupting the conversation, the crew began working the checklists, mixed with the personal issues that worried them and that led them to misread the checklist. In the process they omitted to select the flaps to the appropriate takeoff position. This confusing situation, in which the checklist procedure was mixed with conversation irrelevant to the crew's task, persisted during push back, engine start and taxiing, up to the moment of take-off, which was delayed by other aircraft waiting ahead of the LAPA flight and heavy arriving traffic. During this final wait, the crew members were smoking in the cockpit and continued their conversation. Take-off was started on runway 13 at 20:53 hours. During the takeoff roll the Take-off warning system sounded because the flaps had not been selected. The crew ignored the warning and continued the takeoff. After passing Vr, the pilot attempted to rotate the aircraft. The stick shaker activated as the aircraft entered a stall. It successively impacted the ILS antenna, the perimeter fence, a waiting shelter for buses, two automobiles, two excavators and an embankment where it stopped. Immediately a fire erupted. Three flight crew members, 60 passengers and two persons inside an automobile were killed.

Mexican Air Force - Fuerza Aérea Mexicana

The crew was completing a local training flight at Loma Bonita Airport which has a 1,400 metres long 18/36 runway. After touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, rolled for about 100 metres then came to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured. A fire erupted and destroyed the aircraft in few minutes as local firebombers were not sufficiently trained and well equipped.

Air France

Air France Flight 7638, a Boeing 737-228, operated on a domestic flight from Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport to Biarritz. The co-pilot on the flight was Pilot Flying (PF). While en route, about an hour before arrival, the flight crew listened out the ATIS frequency. The latest report mentioned a visibility of 10 km, a headwind of 15 to 30 kt and rain. When descending towards Biarritz the crew obtained an avoidance heading to bypass a thunderstorm cell. The flight was subsequently cleared for an ILS DME Cat I for runway 27. In the four minutes before landing, the visibility was 1500 metres in a squall, wind 6 kt with gusts to 3 kt, its direction changing from 250° to 290°, with variations up to 330°. The Vref is 129 kt and the Vapp 149 kt. The controller cleared the flight for landing and indicated a wind of 250° at 16 kt, gusts to 30 kt and heavy rain. The first officer disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle at an altitude of approximately 1200 ft, while established on the ILS. As the aircraft descended through 1100 feet, the captain was able to see the runway ahead. On short final, the controller reported a wind of 280° at 15 to 30 kt. The aircraft gradually deviated to the left of the centre line. The captain said: "a little to the left". The aircraft then gradually returned to align with the runway centreline. The PF banked the aircraft to the left as it slightly overshot the runway centreline. The aircraft passed the threshold approximately 4 m to the right of the centreline, parallel to it, with its wings horizontal. The PF started the flare with a slight bank to the left. The thrust reduction occurred a few seconds later. The left main gear touched the runway first at an indicated airspeed of 148 kt, while the aircraft was 12 m to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft moved 7 m to the left, rolling on the only left main gear for about two seconds. The PF used the control column and the rudder pedals to steer the airplane to the right. The right main gear touched the runway while the left wheels were about 3 m from the edge of the runway. The PF corrected the trajectory using the rudders, without using the full amplitude. The aircraft exited the runway on the left at a speed of 133 kt. The nose gear struck the concrete support of a light and broke. The right gear was damaged and the aircraft rolled approximately 400 m off the runway and came to rest near the runway, 1150 m from the threshold.

Airtran Airways

The first officer of AirTran Airways flight 890, which preceded AirTran flight 867 in the accident airplane, identified and reported a leak from the right engine of the Boeing 737-200 during a postflight inspection at William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Georgia. AirTran mechanics at ATL identified the source of the leak as a chafed hydraulic pressure line to the right thrust reverser. They found the part in the illustrated parts catalog (IPC), which was not designed as a troubleshooting document and does not contain sufficient detail for such use. One of the mechanics telephoned an AirTran maintenance controller in Orlando, Florida, for further instructions. The mechanics who initially identified the source of the leak had little experience working on the Boeing 737 because they had worked for ValuJet Airlines, which flew DC-9s only, until ValuJet and AirTran merged in September 1997. On the basis of the information provided by the mechanic, and without questioning his description of the line or verifying the part number that he had provided against the IPC or some other appropriate maintenance document, the maintenance controller instructed the mechanic to cap the leaking line and deactivate the right thrust reverser in accordance with AirTran's Minimum Equipment List procedures. However, instead of capping the hydraulic pressure line, the mechanics capped the right engine hydraulic pump case drain return line. The mechanics performed a leak check by starting the auxiliary power unit and turning on the electric hydraulic pumps to pressurize the airplane's hydraulic systems; no leaks were detected. Although the mechanics were not required by company procedures to test their repair by running the engines, this test would have alerted the mechanics that they had incorrectly capped the hydraulic pump case drain line, which would have overpressurized the hydraulic pump and caused the hydraulic pump case seal to rupture. However, because the mechanics did not perform this test, the overpressure and rupture occurred during the airplane's climb out, allowing depletion of system A hydraulic fluid. Depletion of system A hydraulic fluid activated the hydraulic low-pressure lights in the cockpit, which alerted the flight crew that the airplane had a hydraulic problem. The crew notified air traffic control that the airplane would be returning to ATL and subsequently declared an emergency. The flight crew's initial approach to the airport was high and fast because of the workload associated with performing AirTran's procedures for the loss of hydraulic system A and the limited amount of time available to perform the procedures. Nevertheless, the crew was able to configure and stabilize the airplane for landing. However, depletion of system A hydraulic fluid disabled the nosewheel steering, inboard flight spoilers, ground spoilers, and left and right inboard brakes. The flight crew was able to land the airplane using the left thrust reverser (the right thrust reverser was fully functional but intentionally deactivated by the mechanics), outboard brakes (powered by hydraulic system B), and rudder. The flight crew used the left thrust reverser and rudder in an attempt to control the direction of the airplane down the runway, but use of the rudder pedals in this manner had depleted the system A accumulator pressure, which would have allowed three emergency brake applications. The use of the right outboard brake without the right inboard brake at a higher-than-normal speed (Vref for 15-degree flaps is faster than Vref for normal landing flaps) and with heavy gross weight (the airplane had consumed only 4,650 pounds of the 28,500 pounds of fuel on board at takeoff) used up the remaining friction material on the right outboard brake, causing it to fail. (The left outboard brake was still functional at this point.) The lack of brake friction material on the right outboard brake caused one of the right outboard brake pistons to overtravel and unport its o-ring, allowing system B hydraulic fluid to leak out; as a result, the left outboard brake also failed. Loss of the left and right inboard and outboard brakes, loss of nosewheel steering, and use of asymmetric thrust reverse caused the flight crew to lose control of the airplane, which departed the left side of the runway and came to rest in a ditch.

Sudan Airways

Shortly after takeoff from Khartoum-Haj Yussuf Airport, while climbing, the captain reported hydraulic problems and was cleared by ATC for an immediate return. After touchdown, several tires burst and the crew thought it was an engine malfunction so he deactivated the thrust reverser systems. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with construction machines before coming to rest near a telecommunication relay. All 100 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Peruvian Air Force - Fuerza Aérea del Perú

The aircraft was completing a charter flight from Iquitos to Andoas on behalf of the Occidental Petroleum Company, carrying eight crew members and 80 employees of this company and their subcontractors. While descending to Andoas-Alferez FAP Alfredo Vladimir Sara Bauer Airport by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rains falls and limited visibility. On final, the aircraft descended below the glide, collided with trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located 5 km short of runway 12. First rescuers arrived on site three hours later. Thirteen occupants included two crew members were seriously injured while 75 other occupants were killed.

Orient Eagle Airways

After touchdown on a wet runway surface, the crew aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran at a speed of 80 knots, lost its right main gear and right engine before coming to rest few dozen metres further. All 88 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Chanchangi Airlines

The Boeing 737 completed a flight from Lagos (LOS) through Abuja (ABV) to Kaduna (KAD) and was parked for over an hour. At 14:45 UTC, the Chief Pilot of Chanchangi Airline approached the Air Traffic Controller stating that he would like to fly around the circuit for a training flight. He was told that the visibility was 600 meters which was below the landing minima and was then advised against it. The pilot then suggested that he would carry out a "Rejected Takeoff" training. Additional persons boarded the flight to witness the exercise. At 15:37 UTC the pilot requested a take off clearance which was granted, and was directed to proceed to the holding point of runway 05. The prevailing visibility was 600 meters and the wind was 090 at 10 knots. Four rejected take off training runs were carried out within an interval of twelve minutes. In the conditions at Kaduna, a single exercise of a rejected take off would have required a cooling period of at least ten minutes. At the end of the fourth run, the left main landing gear number 2 brake unit had started to burn. The pilot steered the airplane off the runway into the last taxiway. Fifty meters from the runway 05 threshold the left inner wheel failed and leaving a molten rubber footprint on the taxiway and at the same time the hydraulic fluid of the brake units started to spill tracing an oily track along. Pieces of broken wheel rim were randomly shed for a distance of 150 meters when the rims appeared to undergo a major collapse. The footprint of the two left wheels became more pronounced for a distance of 120 meters when there was a positive turn to the left indicating a total failure in roll from the left wheel assembly. The zigzag motion continued for about 699 meters until the aircraft could no longer be easily moved and the pilot called for the fire trucks. The aircraft burnt to ashes on the spot.

Saudi Arabian Airlines - SAUDIA

During the takeoff roll from Najran Airport runway 06/24, at a speed of 95 knots, the right engine thrust suddenly increased. Few seconds later, at a speed of 120 knots, the exhaust gas temperature warning came on in the cockpit panel. The captain decided to abort and initiated an emergency landing procedure. Speed brakes were deployed but the thrust reversers could not be activated. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and right engine before coming to rest. All 85 occupants evacuated safely.

Air Afrique

During the takeoff roll on runway 23 at Douala Airport, at a speed of 110 knots, the crew noted a loud bang and decided to abort. The crew initiated an emergency braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and both engines before coming to rest 130 metres further, bursting into flames. All 114 occupants were evacuated, among them 20 were slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

VARIG - Viação Aérea Rio Grandense

The aircraft departed Belém-Val de Cans Airport on a flight to Brasília with intermediate stops in Marabá and Carajás, carrying 48 passengers and a crew of six. The approach to Carajás-Parauapebas Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with rain falls, clouds down to 120 metres and a limited visibility due to rain and fog. On final the aircraft was unstable and landed hard on runway 10. On touchdown, the right main gear was torn off and the aircraft went out of control. It veered off runway to the right, collided with trees and eventually came to rest in a wooded area. The copilot was killed as the right side of the cockpit was destroyed upon impact. Ten other people were injured and 43 escaped unhurt. The aircraft was destroyed.

Air Algérie

During the takeoff roll, the captain noted a difference in the engine N1 readings. He decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest 40 metres further. All 106 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

United States Air Force - USAF

A United States Air Force Boeing T-43A (USAF designation for the Boeing 737-200) was destroyed after impacting a hillside during an NDB approach to Dubrovnik Airport, Croatia. All 35 on board were killed. The aircraft was engaged in a mission to fly United States Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and a delegation of industry executives around the region for visits. The party was to be flown from Zagreb to Tuzla and Dubrovnik before returning to Zagreb. Operating with a call sign of IFO21, the accident aircraft departed Zagreb at 06:24 hours. The crew landed at Tuzla at 07:15 after an uneventful flight. The passengers deplaned, and the aircraft was then repositioned to Split because of insufficient ramp space at Tuzla to park the aircraft for the duration of the visit. At 12:47, the aircraft landed at Tuzla, where the passengers reboarded. The accident flight departed Tuzla for Dubrovnik at 13:55. After crossing Split at 14:34 the flight was cleared to descend from FL210 to FL140. Further descent clearance was given to FL100. After the aircraft reached FL100 at 14:45, south of Split VOR, Zagreb Center transferred control to Dubrovnik Approach/Tower. The controller cleared IFO21 direct to the Kolocep (KLP) NDB. After opposite-direction traffic had been cleared, IFO21 was cleared to descend to 5000 feet. At 14:52, the crew told Dubrovnik Approach/Tower that they were 16 NM from the airport. They were cleared to descend to 4,000 feet and told to report crossing the KLP beacon. At 14:53, the aircraft crossed KLP, which was the Final Approach Fix (FAF), at 4100 feet and began the approach without approach clearance from Dubrovnik Tower. At that point the aircraft was slightly high and fast and not completely configured for the approach, as it should have been. At 14:54, the copilot of IFO21 called Dubrovnik Approach/Tower and said, "We’re inside the locator, inbound." IFO21 was then cleared for the NDB approach to runway 12. The aircraft tracked a course of 110 degrees after crossing KLP, instead of tracking the published course of 119 degrees. The aircraft maintained this track from KLP to the point of impact. The accident aircraft descended to 2200 feet which was consistent with the published minimum descent altitude of 2,150 feet. At 14:57, the aircraft impacted a rocky mountainside approximately 1.7 NM to the left (northeast) of the extended runway centerline and 1.8 NM north of the approach end of runway 12 at Dubrovnik Airport.

Faucett

The approach to Arequipa-Rodríguez Ballón Airport was completed by night and poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. On final approach, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck a hill and crashed 6,3 km from runway 09 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 123 occupants were killed.