United Airlines

Boeing 767-424ER

United Airlines flight UA169, a Boeing 767-400, N77066, struck a light pole and a truck on I95 while conducting an RNAV approach to runway 29 at Newark. The aircraft landed safely and is undergoing an inspection. The truck driver survived with minor injuries. A second vehicle hit the felled light post. The damage to the aircraft is said to be significant and the occurrence has been rated an accident. The approach calls for the turn onto final approach to be completed by about 3km from the runway threshold. The lane the truck was in is 170m from the Runway 29 threshold and some 500m from the runway aiming point.

Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner

A United Airlines Boeing 787-9 experienced turbulence en route, seriously injuring one cabin crew member. Occurred during either Papeete to San Francisco (UA114) or San Francisco to Papeete (UA115)

Boeing 737 MAX 8

United Airlines flight UA1303, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, was involved in a jetblast incident during taxi for departure, leading to a serious injury of a person on the ground.

Boeing 737-824 (WL)

United Airlines flight UA605,a Boeing 737-824(WL),registered N27213,struck a deicing truck at Denver International Airport.The deicing contractor was injured and rushed to the hospital.All 122 passengers and 6 crews left the plane safely.

Boeing 737 MAX 8

On October 16, 2025, at 0643 mountain daylight time (MDT), United Airlines (UAL) flight 1093, a Boeing 737-8, N17327, was involved in a midair collision with an object while in cruise flight near Moab, Utah. Although the captain sustained minor injuries, none of the other 111 occupants onboard the airplane were injured. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 from Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California. Following the incident, the flight diverted to Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Salt Lake City, Utah. According to the captain, while established in cruise flight at flight level 360 (36,000 ft pressure altitude), he noticed an object distant on the horizon. Before he could mention the object to the first officer (FO), there was a significant impact to the FO’s forward windshield along with a loud bang. The impact resulted in both pilots being showered with pieces of glass. The captain sustained multiple superficial lacerations to his right arm; the FO was uninjured. Following the event, the flight crew coordinated with air traffic control and initiated a descent. The cabin pressurization remained stable, with no fluctuations throughout the flight. The captain transferred control of the airplane to the FO while he conducted associated checklists and communicated with dispatch and the flight attendants (FAs). During this time, the FO’s window overheat light illuminated and the crew addressed it per the applicable checklist. After coordination with dispatch, the crew selected SLC as the most suitable diversion airport. The captain notified the passengers of the diversion and FAs were briefed to prepare the cabin for landing. The captain then initiated self-care to clean, sterilize, and bandage his wounds on his arm. The captain subsequently resumed pilot flying duties for descent and landing. The flight was vectored for an ILS approach to runway 16L at SLC. The approach and landing were uneventful. The aircraft taxied to the gate under its own power, escorted by airport rescue and firefighting vehicles. Upon arrival at the gate, emergency medical personnel provided the captain with first aid. There were no other reported injuries. After the event was reported, data was requested for the position of weather balloons, any other aircraft, and for any known reentry objects that were large enough to have signification portions survive that might have been in the area of the collision. WindBorne Systems Inc. reported that they lost contact with one of their global sounding balloons (GSBs) that was in the vicinity of the airplane at the time of the accident. The GSB was launched from Spokane, Washington at 1129 MDT on October 15, 2025. The balloon traveled south from Washington, down through Oregon and Nevada before turning northeast, and was crossing though Utah at the time of the accident. There was a Notice to Airman, GEG 10/068, issued at 816 MDT for the balloon launch operations at Spokane that expired at 1700 MDT the same day, October 15, 2025. The GSB stopped communicating with the ground on October 16, 2025, between 0636:16 and 0643:36 MDT. The last communication from the GSB reported that the pressure altitude was 35,936 ft (which had been oscillating between 35,800 and 36,200 ft over the preceding hour). The GSB self-reported location was latitude 38.53142N and longitude 109.41600W and the wind was 73 knots from the southwest. According to WindBorne, the GSB is a lightweight, long duration high-altitude weather balloon platform operated under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 101.1. It is an unmanned free balloon. The GSB system consists of a balloon envelope filled with lift gas, an avionics package for flight control, communications, and sensing, and a ballast system for altitude control. According to Windborne the GSBs are designed with the intent to minimize harm in the event of an impact during flight or landing. No large metal or high-stiffness structural elements are employed. The balloon envelope and the ballast container are a thin, low tensile strength, plastic film. The silica ballast is relatively low density and low grain-size. The windshield installed in N17327 was manufactured by PPG Aerospace and was designed to withstand the flight and pressurization loads encountered during flight while providing visibility for the pilots. From outboard to inboard, the windshield consists of a thermally tempered glass pane, a conductive heating film for deice capabilities, a urethane interlayer, a vinyl interlayer, a urethane interlayer, and a thermally tempered glass pane. The windshield is surrounded by a stainless-steel z-bar encased in a moisture seal to attach it to the fuselage. A coating is applied to the outer surface of the outboard pane to improve the ability to shed water in rainy conditions. Windshields are certified to withstand the impact of a four-pound bird without penetration, to be capable of withstanding the maximum cabin pressurization loads with the failure of a single pane, and the internal pane must be non-splintering. The inboard pane of glass is considered a structural pane, the vinyl interlayer is considered a structural fail-safe pane, and the outboard pane of glass is considered a non-structural pane for this design. The damaged right windshield from the accident airplane, P/N 29-5612-9-9008, S/N 23089H0823, was manufactured on March 30, 2023. The damaged windshield was removed from the airplane and sent to the NTSB Materials Lab in Washington, DC for examination. In addition, the flight data and the cockpit voice recorder were sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC. A preliminary review of the data from the cockpit voice and flight data recorders revealed that at the time of the collision, the airplane’s track was to the southwest at 233° magnetic (nearly the reciprocal of the balloon track), at a pressure altitude of 36,002 ft, and a groundspeed of 395 knots. This investigation is ongoing.

Boeing 757-200

The Boeing 757 departed Newark Airport at 0847LT on a regular schedule service to San Francisco, carrying 37 passengers and a crew of seven. Few minutes later, the aircraft was hijacked by terrorists who modified the flight path and apparently attempted to fly over Washington DC. At 1030LT, the aircraft crashed in an open field located about 4 km north of Shanksville. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 45 occupants were killed. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and this material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI. The Safety Board does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket.

Boeing 767-200

The Boeing 767 departed Boston-Logan Airport at 0814LT on a regular schedule service to Los Angeles, carrying 56 passengers and a crew of nine. Few minutes later, the aircraft was hijacked by terrorists who modified the flight path and flew direct over New York. At 0903LT, the aircraft struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center, between 78th and 84th floor. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 65 occupants were killed. The tower later collapsed. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and this material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI. The Safety Board does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket.

Boeing 737-200

On March 3, 1991, a United Airlines Boeing 737, registration number N999UA, operating as flight 585, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver, Colorado, to Colorado Springs, Colorado. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and the flight was on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Numerous witnesses reported that shortly after completing its turn onto the final approach course to runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, about 0944 mountain standard time, the airplane rolled steadily to the right and pitched nose down until it reached a nearly vertical attitude before hitting the ground in an area known as Widefield Park. The airplane was destroyed, and the 2 flight crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and 20 passengers aboard were fatally injured.

Douglas DC-10

United Flight 232 departed Denver-Stapleton International Airport, Colorado, USA at 14:09 CDT for a domestic flight to Chicago-O'Hare, Illinois and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There were 285 passengers and 11 crew members on board. The takeoff and the en route climb to the planned cruising altitude of FL370 were uneventful. The first officer was the flying pilot. About 1 hour and 7 minutes after takeoff, at 15:16, the flightcrew heard a loud bang or an explosion, followed by vibration and a shuddering of the airframe. After checking the engine instruments, the flightcrew determined that the No. 2 aft (tail-mounted) engine had failed. The captain called for the engine shutdown checklist. While performing the engine shutdown checklist, the flight engineer observed that the airplane's normal systems hydraulic pressure and quantity gauges indicated zero. The first officer advised that he could not control the airplane as it entered a right descending turn. The captain took control of the airplane and confirmed that it did not respond to flight control inputs. The captain reduced thrust on the No. 1 engine, and the airplane began to roll to a wings-level attitude. The flightcrew deployed the air driven generator (ADG), which powers the No. 1 auxiliary hydraulic pump, and the hydraulic pump was selected "on." This action did not restore hydraulic power. At 15:20, the flightcrew radioed the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested emergency assistance and vectors to the nearest airport. Initially, Des Moines International Airport was suggested by ARTCC. At 15:22, the air traffic controller informed the flightcrew that they were proceeding in the direction of Sioux City; the controller asked the flightcrew if they would prefer to go to Sioux City. The flightcrew responded, "affirmative." They were then given vectors to the Sioux Gateway Airport (SUX) at Sioux City, Iowa. A UAL DC-10 training check airman, who was off duty and seated in a first class passenger seat, volunteered his assistance and was invited to the cockpit at about 15:29. At the request of the captain, the check airman entered the passenger cabin and performed a visual inspection of the airplane's wings. Upon his return, he reported that the inboard ailerons were slightly up, not damaged, and that the spoilers were locked down. There was no movement of the primary flight control surfaces. The captain then directed the check airman to take control of the throttles to free the captain and first officer to manipulate the flight controls. The check airman attempted to use engine power to control pitch and roll. He said that the airplane had a continuous tendency to turn right, making it difficult to maintain a stable pitch attitude. He also advised that the No. 1 and No. 3 engine thrust levers could not be used symmetrically, so he used two hands to manipulate the two throttles. About 15:42, the flight engineer was sent to the passenger cabin to inspect the empennage visually. Upon his return, he reported that he observed damage to the right and left horizontal stabilizers. Fuel was jettisoned to the level of the automatic system cutoff, leaving 33,500 pounds. About 11 minutes before landing, the landing gear was extended by means of the alternate gear extension procedure. The flightcrew said that they made visual contact with the airport about 9 miles out. ATC had intended for flight 232 to attempt to land on runway 31, which was 8,999 feet long. However, ATC advised that the airplane was on approach to runway 22, which was closed, and that the length of this runway was 6,600 feet. Given the airplane's position and the difficulty in making left turns, the captain elected to continue the approach to runway 22 rather than to attempt maneuvering to runway 31. The check airman said that he believed the airplane was lined up and on a normal glidepath to the field. The flaps and slats remained retracted. During the final approach, the captain recalled getting a high sink rate alarm from the ground proximity warning system (GPWS). In the last 20 seconds before touchdown, the airspeed averaged 215 KIAS, and the sink rate was 1,620 feet per minute. Smooth oscillations in pitch and roll continued until just before touchdown when the right wing dropped rapidly. The captain stated that about 100 feet above the ground the nose of the airplane began to pitch downward. He also felt the right wing drop down about the same time. Both the captain and the first officer called for reduced power on short final approach. The check airman said that based on experience with no flap/no slat approaches he knew that power would have to be used to control the airplane's descent. He used the first officer's airspeed indicator and visual cues to determine the flightpath and the need for power changes. He thought that the airplane was fairly well aligned with the runway during the latter stages of the approach and that they would reach the runway. Soon thereafter, he observed that the airplane was positioned to the left of the desired landing area and descending at a high rate. He also observed that the right wing began to drop. He continued to manipulate the No. 1 and No. 3 engine throttles until the airplane contacted the ground. He said that no steady application of power was used on the approach and that the power was constantly changing. He believed that he added power just before contacting the ground. The airplane touched down on the threshold slightly to the left of the centerline on runway 22 at 16:00. First ground contact was made by the right wing tip followed by the right main landing gear. The airplane skidded to the right of the runway and rolled to an inverted position. Witnesses observed the airplane ignite and cartwheel, coming to rest after crossing runway 17/35. Firefighting and rescue operations began immediately, but the airplane was destroyed by impact and fire. The accident resulted in 111 fatal, 47 serious, and 125 minor injuries. The remaining 13 occupants were not injured.

Douglas DC-8

United Flight 2885 departed Cleveland at 01:15 for a cargo flight to Los Angeles via Detroit. The DC-8 arrived at Detroit at 01:52. Cargo for Detroit was unloaded, the airplane was refueled, and cargo for Los Angeles was loaded. The engines were started, and then the crew called for taxi instructions at 02:45:58. During the taxi, the flightcrew accomplished the before takeoff checklist. The second officer called "trim" and the first officer responded "set". The flightcrew however, inadvertently overlooked setting the stabilizer trim for takeoff, and the setting of 7.5 units ANU was the previous landing trim setting. At 02:49:16, the captain, the first officer, and the second officer discussed the idea of the first officer switching seats with the second officer. They then switched seats about 02:49:40. United 2885 called for clearance onto runway 21R at 02:49:58 and was cleared for takeoff at 02:50:03. The throttles were advanced for takeoff at 02:51:05 and power stabilized 7 seconds later. Speed callouts "eighty knots" and "Vee One" were called by the captain and the airplane broke ground about 02:51:41. The airplane continued to climb with wings level to about 1,000 feet. The airplane then rolled to the right in a gradual right turn until it was in a wings vertical position (right wing down, left wing up) and crashed into a freshly plowed farm field.