Douglas DC-8

TAMPA Cargo

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Medellín-José María Córdova (Rionegro) Airport, the crew completed the approach and landing on runway 09R at Miami-Intl Airport. After touchdown, following a course of 100-120 metres, the crew activated the thrust reverser systems when the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered to the right and came to rest near the taxiway U. All three crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

United Parcel Service - UPS

On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Arrow Air

The crew started their duty for the flight from Yokota, near Tokyo, Japan to Singapore at 1000 hours local time (0900 hours Singapore time) on 13 December 2002. The aircraft departed Yokota at 1125 hours local time (1025 hours Singapore time). The FO was the handling pilot for the flight. The expected flight time was about 7 hours. The departure and en route segments of the flight proceeded normally. The crew was aware of Changi Airport’s ATIS ‘Y’ weather information provided at about 1640 hours through Changi Airport’s there were thunderstorm activity, low level windshear and heavy rain in Singapore. The aircraft was given clearance to land on Runway 20R. The FO briefed the other crew members on landing on 20R. At about 7 miles from the airport, Changi Tower advised the aircraft that the wind was from 350 degrees at 5 knots, that the runway surface was wet, that the visibility from the Tower was about 1,000 metres and that landing traffic had reported the braking action at the end of Runway 20R to be from medium to poor. The approach and landing was carried out in heavy rain. The approach was stabilized and normal. Approach speed was about 148 knots. Flaps 35 were used. At about 300 feet above ground, the PIC reported having the approach lights and runway lights in sight while the FO still could not see the lights as the rain removal for the windshield on the FO’s side was not effective. According to the FO, he felt the PIC was putting his hands on the controls of the aircraft. The PIC noticed that the aircraft had drifted slightly left of the runway centreline and told the FO to make the correction back to the centerline. Although the FO made the correction, he was still unable to see the approach lights clearly at about 200 feet. The FO indicated he felt the PIC was in control of the aircraft and making corrections and so he let go of the controls. The CVR recording suggested that the PIC was aware the aircraft was floating down the runway and that the PIC informed the crew that “We are floating way down the runway.” The PIC subsequently moved the control column forward to make a positive landing. The aircraft landed at 1743 hours. The aircraft was observed by an air traffic controller to have touched down on the runway at a point roughly abeam the Control Tower and just before the turn-off for Taxiway W6, which was about 1,500 metres from the end of the runway. Two Airport Emergency Service officers of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore also observed that while most aircraft landing on Runway 20R would touch down at a point between the turn-offs for Taxiways W3 and W4, the Arrow Air aircraft floated way beyond the normal touchdown zone. The aircraft’s speed at the time of touchdown was estimated from flight data recorder data to be about 135 knots. Upon touchdown, the PIC deployed spoilers and thrust reversers. The thrust reversers for Engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 deployed almost immediately while that of Engine No. 4 was reportedly slow in deployment. The PIC and FO also pushed hard on the brake pedals, but they felt that there was no braking response. The aircraft did not stop before reaching the end of the runway. It veered slightly to the right as it exited the runway. The speed of the aircraft when it left the runway was about 60 knots. The aircraft rolled in mud during the overrun. The nose landing gear broke off half way during the overrun and the aircraft came to rest in a grass and soggy area at about 300 metres from the end of the runway. There was no fire. After the aircraft had come to a complete stop, the PIC stowed the thrust reversers. The crew completed the evacuation checklist and exited the aircraft from Door L1 with the assistance of the Airport Emergency Service personnel who had already arrived by then.

Emery Worldwide Airlines

On February 16, 2000, about 1951 Pacific standard time, Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., (Emery) flight 17, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F (DC-8), N8079U, crashed in an automobile salvage yard shortly after takeoff, while attempting to return to Sacramento Mather Airport (MHR), Rancho Cordova, California, for an emergency landing. Emery flight 17 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight from MHR to James M. Cox Dayton International Airport (DAY), Dayton, Ohio. The flight departed MHR about 1949, with two pilots and a flight engineer on board. The three flight crew members were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

Continental Cargo Airlines

While on an ILS approach to runway 24 at Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. While in a circuit in the vicinity of the airport, the pilot informed ATC he would complete the second approach visually and made a short pattern because of low fuel reserve. On approach with a 6 knots tailwind, the aircraft was unstable and not properly aligned when it landed hard on the left of the centerline. Out of control, it veered off runway to the left, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few hundred metres further, bursting into flames. All eight occupants were rescued, among them one was slightly injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

Cougar Air Cargo International

The aircraft was f1ying from Entebbe (Uganda) to Mwanza (Tanzania) for the purpose of uplifting some cargo of fish fillet which was bound for Ostend, Belgium. It was carrying a crew of four including two pilot s and two engineers. The Commander said that the flight from Entebbe to Mwanza was normal except for the n°1 generator warning light which came on 10 minutes after takeoff from Entebbe. The relevant generator was subsequently switched off and the flight was continued. The aircraft flew IFR, cruising at FL250. Shortly before landing at Mwanza the commander obtained the weather information from the Mwanza Tower. The wind was calm. The controller who was handling the flight said that whilst approaching runway 12 of Mwanza airport the aircraft was swaying from side to side. When EL-WVD touched down on the runway a loud bang was heard and one engine was observed to separate and roll down the runway whilst it was on fire. Examination of the impact and tire marks showed that the right wing tip impacted the runway first followed by the n°4 engine. The right main landing gear subsequently contacted the grass surface off the left edge of the runway followed by the left main landing gear. The aircraft continued to roll in a direction almost parallel to the runway centreline for 250 metres before it crossed the runway at an angle. It was also evident from the tyre marks that as it reached the runway the aircraft made a 180° turn to point in the opposite direction whilst sliding sideways at an angle with the centreline under its own momentum. As it did so, the main landing gear collapsed and three wing pylons sheared causing the engines to separate. EL-WVD finally settled at the edge of the runway pointing 310° with the right wing projecting 2.5 metres inside the runway. There was fuel leakage but no fire. The four crew members disembarked with minor injuries.

Fine Air

Fine Air Flight 101 was originally scheduled to depart Miami for Santo Domingo at 09:15 using another DC-8 airplane, N30UA, to carry cargo for Aeromar. Due to a delay of the inbound aircraft, Fine Air substituted N27UA for N30UA and rescheduled the departure for 12:00. N27UA arrived at Miami at 09:31 from San Juan, Puerto Rico, and was parked at the Fine Air hangar ramp. The security guard was not aware of the airplane change, and he instructed Aeromar loaders to load the airplane in accordance with the weight distribution form he possessed for N30UA. The first cargo pallet for flight 101 was loaded onto N27UA at 10:30 and the last pallet was loaded at 12:06. The resulting center of gravity (CG) of the accident airplane was near or even aft of the airplane’s aft CG limit. After the three crew members and the security guard had boarded the plane, the cabin door `was closed at 12:22. Eleven minutes later the flight obtained taxi clearance for runway 27R. The Miami tower controller cleared flight 101 for takeoff at 12:34. Takeoff power was selected and the DC-8 moved down the runway. The flightcrew performed an elevator check at 80 knots. Fourteen seconds later the sound of a thump was heard. Just after calling V1 a second thump was heard. Two seconds later the airplane rotated. Immediately after takeoff the airplane pitched nose-up and entered a stall. The DC-8 recovered briefly from the stall, and stalled again. The airplane impacted terrain in a tail first, right wing down attitude. it slid west across a road (72nd Avenue) and into the International Airport Center at 28th Street and burst into flames. Investigation showed that the center of gravity resulted in the airplane’s trim being mis-set by at least 1.5 units airplane nose up, which presented the flightcrew with a pitch control problem on takeoff.

Airborne Express

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

MK Airlines

While descending to Port Harcourt Airport, the pilot-in-command established a visual contact with the runway lights at an altitude of 2,500 feet. The approach was continued when few seconds later, while the crew was thinking his altitude was 390 feet, the aircraft collided with trees. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure but all four engines failed to respond properly. The aircraft continued to descend and struck the ground 250 metres short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the aircraft was unstable on final approach.

LAC Colombia - Lineas Aéreas del Caribe

The aircraft was completing a positioning flight from Asunción to Campinas on behalf of Alas Paraguayas, under flight number ALA028. As there was no cargo on board, the crew decided to make profit of the situation to perform training upon takeoff. During the takeoff roll on runway 02, at Vr speed, the captain reduced the power on engine n°1 and after liftoff, he reduced power on engine n°2. With the undercarriage still down and the flaps at 15°, the aircraft became unstable, lost height and crashed in the district of Mariano Roque Alonso, about 1,500 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed as well as 18 people on ground, most of them children taking part to a volleyball game.

Affretair

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Johannesburg, the crew started the approach to Harare Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. After landing on runway 05, the aircraft encountered difficulties and was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 05 is 4,750 metres long). It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All five crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Millon Air

The aircraft departed Miami-Intl Airport on a cargo flight to Lima with an intermediate stop in Guatemala City, carrying three crew members and various goods on behalf of Lineas Aéreas Mayas. After touchdown on runway 19 at Guatemala City-La Aurora Airport, spoilers were deployed as well as reverse thrust on engine n°2 and 3. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran, went through a fence and down an embankment before crashing onto several houses. All three crew members were injured as well as seven people on the ground. Six other people on the ground were killed.

Air Transport International

The airplane crashed immediately after liftoff during a three-engine takeoff. Flightcrew had shortened rest break; rest periods not required for ferry flights. Flight crew fatigue from lack of rest, sleep, and disruption of circadian rhythms. Flightcrew did not have adequate, realistic training in three-engine takeoff techniques or procedures. Flight crew did not adequately understand three-engine takeoff procedures, including significance of vmcg. Flight engineer improperly determined vmcg speed, resulting in value 9 knots too low. During first takeoff attempt, captain applied power to asymmetrical engine too soon, was unable to maintain directional control, and rejected the takeoff. Captain agreed to modify procedure by allowing flight engineer to advance throttle, a deviation of prescribed procedure. FAA oversight of operator was inadequate because the poi and geographic inspectors were unable to effectively monitor domestic crew training and international operations. Existing far part 121 flight time limits & rest requirements that pertained to the flights that the flightcrew flew prior to the ferry flights did not apply to the ferry flights flown under far part 91. Current one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures do not provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. All three crew members were killed.

Kalitta Air

Flight 808 took off from Norfolk at 14:13 for a cargo flight to Guantánamo Bay. The flight and arrival into the Guantánamo terminal area was uneventful. At 16:34, while the flight was descending from FL320, radio contact was established with the Guantánamo radar controller. The radar controller instructed flight 808 to maintain VFR 12 miles off the Cuban coast and report at East Point. The runway in use was runway 10. The flight crew then requested a runway 28 approach, but changed this back to a runway 10 approach a couple of minutes later. Clearance was given at 16:46 with wind reported at 200°/7 knots. The runway 10 threshold was located 0,75 mile East of Cuban airspace, designated by a strobe light, mounted on a Marine Corps guard tower, located at the corner of the Cuban border and the shoreline. On the day of the accident, the strobe light was not operational (both controller and flight crew were not aware of this). The aircraft was approached from the south and was making a right turn for runway 10 with an increasing angle of bank in order to align with the runway. At 200-300 feet agl the wings started to rock towards wings level and the nose pitched up. The right wing appeared to stall, the aircraft rolled to 90deg. angle of bank and the nose pitched down. The aircraft then struck level terrain 1400 feet west of the approach end of the runway and 200 feet north of the extended centreline.

LAC Colombia - Lineas Aéreas del Caribe

After touchdown at Medellín-Enrique Olaya Herrera Airport, the crew lost directional control and the airplane deviated to the left. Suspecting an asymmetrical thrust, the captain decided to deactivate the reverse thrust systems when the aircraft veered off runway, collided with runway lights, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Export Air Cargo

After landing at Iquitos-Coronel Francisco Secada Vignetta runway 06, the crew started the braking procedure when, at a speed of about 100 knots, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Transport International

ATI Flight 805 departed from Seattle at 23:20 for a flight to Toledo. The 1st officer was flying the ILS approach to runway 07. For undetermined reasons, he failed to properly capture the ILS localizer and/or glide slope during the approach. At 03:13 the captain decided to carry out a go-around. The aircraft was vectored onto a base leg and given a heading of 100° to intercept the final approach course again. With a 35 knots crosswind (at 180°) on the approach the 1st officer had trouble capturing the localizer/glide slope. At 03:24, as the 1st officer was attempting to stabilize the approach, 3 GPWS glideslope warnings and sink rate warnings sounded. The captain took over control at 03:24:17 and performed another missed approach manoeuvre. He became spatially disoriented and inadvertently allowed an unusual attitude to develop with bank angles up to 80° and pitch angles up to 25°. When in a nose-low and left bank angle attitude, control of the airplane was transferred back to the 1st officer who began levelling the wings and raising the nose of the airplane. Impact with the ground occurred before the unusual attitude recovery was completed. All four occupants were killed.

MK Airlines

On approach to Kano Airport, while in a flat attitude about 8 km from the runway threshold, the crew lowered the flaps when the aircraft lost height and struck trees. It descended into the ground, lost its undercarriage and slid for 150 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames against trees. All five crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Nigeria Airways

A McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 passenger plane, registered C-GMXQ was destroyed in an accident near Jeddah-King Abdulaziz International Airport (JED), Saudi Arabia. All 261 on board were killed. The DC-8 jetliner was owned by Canadian airline Nationair which operated the plane on behalf of Nigeria Airways to fly hajj pilgrims between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Nigeria Airways flight 2120 took off from Jeddah's runway 34L at 08:28, bound for Sokoto (SKO), Nigeria. About 15 seconds after brake release an oscillating sound was heard in the cockpit. Within two seconds, the flight engineer said: "What's that?" The first officer replied: "We gotta flat tire, you figure?" Two seconds later, an oscillating sound was again heard. The captain asked the first officer: "You're not leaning on the brakes, eh?" The first officer responded: "No, I 'm not, I got my feet on the bottom of the rudder." By this time, the aircraft had accelerated to about 80 knots. Marks on the runway showed that the No.1 wheel started to break up at about this time. In addition, the left and right flanges of No.2 wheel began to trace on the runway; rubber deposit from No.2 tire continued which appeared to be from a deflated tire between the flanges. At 28 seconds after brake release, a speed of 90 knots was called by the captain and acknowledged by the first officer. The captain called V1 about 45 seconds after brake release. Two seconds later, the first officer noted "sort of a shimmy like if you're riding on one of those ah thingamajigs." The captain called "rotate" 51 seconds after brake release and the airplane lifted off the runway. Witnesses noticed flames in the area of the left main landing gear. The flames disappeared when the undercarriage was retracted. During the next three minutes several indications of system anomalies occurred, which included a pressurization system failure, a gear unsafe light and a loss of hydraulics. The captain requested a level-off at 2000 feet because of the pressurization problem. In his radio call the captain used the callsign "Nationair 2120" instead of "Nigerian 2120" and the controller mistook the transmission to be from a Saudi flight returning to Jeddah and cleared The Jeddah bound aircraft to 3000 feet. The captain of the accident aircraft, however, acknowledged the ATC transmission without a call sign, saying "understand you want us up to 3000 feet." This misunderstanding continued for the next three minutes with ATC assuming that all calls were from the Saudi flight, not from the accident aircraft. About four minutes after brake release the captain called ATC and reported that the aircraft was leveling at 3000 feet. The first officer then interrupted with " ... declaring an emergency. We 're declaring an emergency at this time. We believe we have ah, blown tires." As the aircraft continued on the downwind heading, a flight attendant came into the cockpit and reported "smoke in the back ... real bad." A few moments later, the first officer said "I've got no ailerons." The captain responded: "OK, hang on, I've got it." It was the last record on the CVR, which failed (along with the flight data recorder [FDR]) at 08:33:33. The ATC controller gave a heading to intercept the final approach and thereafter continued to give heading information. Meanwhile, during the downwind and base legs, the fire had consumed the cabin floor above the wheel wells , permitting cabin furnishing to sag into the wheel wells. When the gear was probably extended at 11 miles on the final approach, the first body fell out because fire had burned through the seat harness. Subsequently, with the gear down and a forceful air supply through the open gear doors, rapid destruction of more floor structure permitted the loss of more bodies and seat assemblies. Despite the considerable destruction to the airframe, the aircraft appeared to be controllable. Eight minutes after brake release and 10 miles from the runway, the captain declared an emergency for the third time, saying, "Nigeria 2120 declaring an emergency, we are on fire, we are on fire, we are returning to base immediately." The aircraft came in nose down and crashed 9,433 feet (2,875 meters) short of the runway at 08:38.

Air Transport International

Before flight, the flight engineer (f/e) had calculated 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for takeoff, but neither the captain nor the 1st officer (f/o) had verified them. During rotation for takeoff, the captain noted that the forced needed to pull the yoke aft was greater than normal and that the aircraft would not fly (at that speed). Subsequently, he aborted the attempted takeoff. Realizing the aircraft would not stop on the remaining runway, he elected to steer it to the right to avoid hitting traffic on a highway near the departure end. The aircraft struck ILS equipment; the landing gear collapsed and all 4 engines tore away. Subsequently, the aircraft was destroyed by fire. Investigations revealed the f/e had improperly computed the takeoff data. He had calculated the 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for 242,000 lbs; however, the actual takeoff wt was 342,000 lbs. Rotation speed (Vr) for this weight was 28 knots above the speed that was used. Investigations revealed shortcomings in the operator's flightcrew training program and questionable scheduling of qualified (but marginally experienced) crew members for the accident flight.

Apisa Air Cargo

The four engine aircraft landed too far down a wet runway at Iquitos-Coronel Francisco Secada Vignetta Airport. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen meters further. All four crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

SLM Surinam Airways - Surinaamse Luchtvaart Maatschappij

Surinam Airways (SLM) carried out regular flights between Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS) and Paramaribo (PBM) using McDonnell Douglas DC-8-60 planes. One of these was a US-registered plane, N1809E, named "Anthony Nesty". The air crew was furnished by Air Crew International (ACI). The contract between Surinam Airways and ACI stipulated that ACI would furnish SLM with qualified crew members who held FAA certificates and who met the regulatory requirements to fly the DC-8. ACI did not provide for proficiency checks but left it to the individual pilots to meet the training and other requirements of their profession. One of the captains provided by ACI was involved in several incidents while operating on SLM flights. After investigation, SLM instructed ACI not to use this captain in future SLM assignments. However, he still acted as a crew member on several flights since. The captain was again scheduled on the accident flight PY764. According to regulations, the captain was not even qualified to act as pilot-in-command of that flight because of his age. He was 66 years old and Surinam regulations stipulated that "the holder of a pilot certificate is not authorized to act as pilot during commercial flights when he/she has reached age 60". Also, his most recent proficiency check flight was on a GA-7 Cougar twin instead of a DC-8. Flight 764 departed Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport at 23:25 (June 6) on a flight to Paramaribo (PBM). The en route part of the flight was uneventful and about 20 minutes before arrival in Paramaribo the crew received the 07:00 UTC weather for Zanderij Airport: Wind calm, visibility 900 m in fog, temperature/dewpoint 22°C/22°C. This caught the crew by surprise since the previous weather information had included a visibility of 6 km. Because the ILS was not to be used for operational purposes, the copilot said: "We don't legally have an ILS ... we have to use it". The captain responded affirmatively. The crew were confident that they could land because they assumed that the fog was localized given the fact that they were able to see the airport during the descent. Zanderij Tower then cleared the flight for a VOR/DME approach to runway 10. The captain tuned in to the ILS and instructed the first officer to set the final approach course for the published VOR/DME approach on the first officer's side. During the approach the first officer reported that he could see the airport:"Runway's at twelve o'clock". A minute later he commented "A little bit of low fog comin' up I reckon just a little bit". He was still able to see the runway and reported the runway in sight. The DC-8 then entered some stratus clouds the captain told the first officer to "Tell him [tower controller] to turn the runway lights up ... Tell him to put the runway lights bright". The captain attempted to capture the unreliable ILS glide slope signal, but failed to capture it. The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded several times: "Glideslope ... glideslope..." until it was deactivated. The captain was flying the aircraft below the minimum altitude for the ILS/DME approach procedure (260 ft asl) as well as below the minimum descent altitude for the VOR/DME approach procedure (560 ft). The first officer called out: "Two hundred feet". Thirteen seconds later the no. 2 engine contacted a tree. The right wing then struck another tree, causing the aircraft to roll, striking the ground inverted. The airplane broke up and a fire erupted.

Arax Airlines

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Billund to Sharjah with an intermediate stop in Cairo, carrying a crew of four and a load of about 100 Danish cows. Just after a night takeoff from runway 27R, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed 700 meters past the runway end, bursting into flames. All four occupants and all animals were killed.

Arrow Air

On 11 December 1985, Arrow Air Flight MF1285R, a Douglas DC-8-63, U.S. registration N950JW, departed Cairo, Egypt on an international charter flight to Fort Campbell, Kentucky (Ky), U.S.A. via Cologne, Germany, and Gander, Newfoundland. On board were 8 crew members and 248 passengers. The flight was the return portion of the second in a series of three planned troop rotation flights originating at McChord Air Force Base (AFB), Washington, U.S.A. and terminating in Fort Campbell. The flight had been chartered by the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to transport troops, their personal effects, and some military equipment to and from peacekeeping duties in the Sinai Desert. All 248 passengers who departed Cairo on 11 December 1985 were members of 101st Airborne Division (United States Army), based in Fort Campbell. The flight departed Cairo at 2035 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and arrived at Cologne at 0121, 12 December 1985 for a planned technical stop. A complete crew change took place following which the flight departed for Gander at 0250. The flight arrived at Gander at 0904. Passengers were deplaned, the aircraft was refuelled, trash and waste water were removed, and catering supplies were boarded. The flight engineer was observed to conduct an external inspection of portions of the aircraft. The passengers then reboarded. Following engine start-up, the aircraft was taxied via taxiway "D" and runway 13 to runway 22 for departure. Take-off on runway 22 was begun from the intersection of runway 13 at 1015. The aircraft was observed to proceed down the runway and rotate in the vicinity of taxiway "A". Witnesses to the take-off reported that the aircraft gained little altitude after rotation and began to descend. Several witnesses, who were travelling on the Trans-Canada Highway approximately 900 feet beyond the departure end of runway 22, testified that the aircraft crossed the highway, which is at a lower elevation than the runway, at a very low altitude. Three described a yellow/orange glow emanating from the aircraft. Two of the witnesses testified that the glow was bright enough to illuminate the interior of the truck cabs they were driving. The third attributed the glow to the reflection of the runway approach lighting on the aircraft. Several witnesses observed the aircraft in a right bank as it crossed the Trans-Canada Highway. The pitch angle was also seen to increase, but the aircraft continued to descend until it struck downsloping terrain approximately 3,000 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a severe fuel-fed fire. All 256 occupants on board sustained fatal injuries.

Aeroservicios Ecuatorianos

The DC-8 landed at Quito at 06:52 after a flight from Miami. Shortly after scheduled departure time of 09:00 members of the Ecuadorian Federation of Aircrews (FEDTA) requested and were granted permission to board the aircraft and discuss subjects relating to the aircrews' strike. The four Aeroservicios Ecuatorianos crew members didn't comply with the strike, after consulting AECA management. After a delay of about two hours, the n°4 engine was started. The crew then ordered the aircraft to be towed to the runway, perhaps in order to hasten the departure. The other engines were started during the towing operation. Pre-takeoff checks were not (or improperly) carried out. This caused the 0.5° horizontal stabilizer nose-up to go undetected, while 8° nose-up is required for takeoff. The DC-8 thus barely climbed after a ground run, extended to 48 meters beyond the runway end. The horizontal stabilizer struck the wooden structure of the ILS aerial, 83 meters past the runway 35 end. The aircraft then crashed into houses, 460 meters past the runway end and 35 meters to the right of the extended centreline. A total of 25 houses were demolished. All four crew members as well as 49 people on the ground were killed. At least 50 other people on the ground were injured, some of them seriously.

LAC Colombia - Lineas Aéreas del Caribe

The approach to Barranquilla-Ernesto Cortissoz Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with a limited visibility due to heavy rain falls. The aircraft was too high on the glide and landed too far down the runway. The captain attempted to veer off runway to the left but on a wet surface, the aircraft overran the runway, lost two engines and its undercarriage before coming to rest. All four crew members evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed.

United Airlines

United Flight 2885 departed Cleveland at 01:15 for a cargo flight to Los Angeles via Detroit. The DC-8 arrived at Detroit at 01:52. Cargo for Detroit was unloaded, the airplane was refueled, and cargo for Los Angeles was loaded. The engines were started, and then the crew called for taxi instructions at 02:45:58. During the taxi, the flightcrew accomplished the before takeoff checklist. The second officer called "trim" and the first officer responded "set". The flightcrew however, inadvertently overlooked setting the stabilizer trim for takeoff, and the setting of 7.5 units ANU was the previous landing trim setting. At 02:49:16, the captain, the first officer, and the second officer discussed the idea of the first officer switching seats with the second officer. They then switched seats about 02:49:40. United 2885 called for clearance onto runway 21R at 02:49:58 and was cleared for takeoff at 02:50:03. The throttles were advanced for takeoff at 02:51:05 and power stabilized 7 seconds later. Speed callouts "eighty knots" and "Vee One" were called by the captain and the airplane broke ground about 02:51:41. The airplane continued to climb with wings level to about 1,000 feet. The airplane then rolled to the right in a gradual right turn until it was in a wings vertical position (right wing down, left wing up) and crashed into a freshly plowed farm field.

Japan Airlines

The airplane departed Shanghai-Hongqiao Airport at 1357LT on a flight to Tokyo, carrying 113 passengers and a crew of 11. Nine minutes after takeoff, the crew heard a strange noise coming from the lower middle part of the aircraft. This was immediately followed by a hydraulic low level warning, a hydraulic reservoir air low pressure warning, a complete loss of hydraulic system pressure, abnormal flap position indications, and a complete loss of air brake pressure. The crew elected to return to Shanghai for a emergency landing. The DC-8 touched down fast on runway 36, overran and came to rest in a drainage ditch. All 124 occupants were evacuated, 23 of them were injured.

Japan Airlines

JAL Flight 350 took off from Fukuoka (FUK) runway 16 at 07:34 for a regular flight to Tokyo-Haneda (HND). The aircraft climbed to the cruising altitude of FL290. At 08:22 the crew started their descend to FL160. After reaching that altitude, they were cleared to descend down to 3000 feet. The aircraft was cleared for a runway 33R ILS approach and 5° of flaps were selected at 08:35, followed by 25 degrees of flaps one minute later. The landing gear was lowered at 08:39 and 50 degrees of flaps were selected two minutes after that. At 08:42 the aircraft descended through 1000 feet at an airspeed of 135 knots with wind from a direction of 360deg at 20 knots. The co-pilot called out "500 feet" at 08:43:25 but the captain did not make the "stabilized" call-out as specified by JAL operational regulations. The airspeed decreased to 133 knots as the aircraft descended through 300 feet at 08:43:50 and the co-pilot warned the captain that the aircraft was approaching the decision height. At 08:43:56 the radio altimeter warning sounded, followed by the flight engineer calling out "200 feet", which was the decision height, three seconds later . At 08:44:01 the aircraft descended through 164 feet at 130 KIAS. At that moment the captain cancelled autopilot, pushed his controls forward and retarded the throttles to idle. The co-pilot tried to regain control but the aircraft crashed into the shallow water of Tokyo Bay, 510 m short of the runway 33R threshold. The nose and the right hand wing separated from the fuselage. The captain had recently suffered a psychosomatic disorder; preliminary reports suggested that the captain experienced some form of a mental aberration. He had been off duty from November 1980 to November 1981 for these reasons.

Aeronaves del Peru

On approach to Iquitos-Coronel Francisco Secada Vignetta Airport, the crew encountered limited visibility due to poor weather conditions. He failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane struck trees and crashed in a jungle located few km from the runway threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

AeroPeru

On approach to Mexico City-Benito Juarez Airport, the crew was cleared to descend from 11,000 to 9,000 feet when the aircraft struck tree tops and crashed on the slope of Mt Lilio located about 24 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all eight occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the mountain was shrouded by clouds. For unknown reasons, the crew was approaching the airport at a too low altitude.

Swissair

The approach to runway 15L was unstable. At an excessive speed of 150 knots, the four engine airplane landed about 800-900 meters down the runway 15L, on a wet surface. The crew failed to use all available braking systems and unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran at a speed of 40 knots, went through a perimeter fence and descended a ravine before coming to rest in flames. 20 passengers were injured while 120 other occupants escaped uninjured. Unfortunately, 14 passengers were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

United Airlines

United Airlines Flight 173, departed New York-JFK on a scheduled flight to Portland International Airport (PDX), with an en route stop at Denver (DEN). The DC-8-61 took off from Denver about 14:47. The planned time en route was 2 hrs 26 min. The planned arrival time at Portland was 17:13. There was 46,700 lb of fuel on board the aircraft when it departed the gate at Denver. This fuel included the Federal Aviation Regulation requirement for fuel to destination plus 45 min and the company contingency fuel of about 20 min. At 17:05, Flight 173 called Portland Approach and advised that its altitude was 10,000 ft and its airspeed was being reduced. Portland responded and told the flight to maintain its heading for a visual approach to runway 28. Flight 173 acknowledged the approach instructions and stated, "...we have the field in sight." At 17:07, Portland Approach instructed the flight to descend and maintain 8,000 ft. Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions and advised that it was "leaving ten." At 17:09, Flight 173 received and acknowledged a clearance to continue its descent to 6,000 ft. When the DC-8 was descending through about 8,000 ft, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, requested the wing flaps be extended to 15 degrees, then asked that the landing gear be lowered. As the landing gear extended, an unusual sound was heard and the aircraft yawed. At 17:12, Portland Approach requested, "United one seven three heavy, contact the tower, one one eight point seven." The flight responded, "negative, we'll stay with you. We'll stay at five. We'll maintain about a hundred and seventy knots. We got a gear problem. We'll let you know." Portland Approach replied, "United one seventy-three heavy roger, maintain five thousand. Turn left heading two zero zero." The flight acknowledged the instructions. At 17:14, Portland Approach advised, "United one seventy three heavy, turn left heading, one zero zero and I'll just orbit you out there 'til you get your problem." Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions. For the next 23 min, while Portland Approach was vectoring the aircraft in a holding pattern south and east of the airport, the flight crew discussed and accomplished all of the emergency and precautionary actions available to them to assure themselves that all landing gear was locked in the full down position. The second officer checked the visual indicators on top of both wings, which extend above the wing surface when the landing gear is down-and-locked. About 17:38, Flight 173 contacted the United Airlines Systems Line Maintenance Control Center in San Francisco. The captain explained to company dispatch and maintenance personnel the landing gear problem and what the flight crew had done to assure that the landing gear was fully extended. He said they were planning to land in about twenty minutes. About 17:44, the captain and the first flight attendant discussed passenger preparation, crash landing procedures, and evacuation procedures. At 17:46, the first officer asked the flight engineer, "How much fuel we got...?" The flight engineer responded, "Five thousand." About 17:50, the captain asked the flight engineer to "Give us a current card on weight. Figure about another fifteen minutes." The first officer responded, "Fifteen minutes?" To which the captain replied, "Yeah, give us three or four thousand pounds on top of zero fuel weight." The flight engineer then said, "Not enough. Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here." Some calculations were made and at 17:52 the flight engineer talked to Portland and discussed the aircraft's fuel state, the number of persons on board the aircraft, and the emergency landing precautions at the airport. A fuel check at 17:57 learned that there were 1,000 lb in each tank, totalling 4,000 lb of fuel. From 17:57 until 18:00, the captain and the first officer engaged in a conversation which included discussions of giving the flight attendants ample time to prepare for the emergency, cockpit procedures in the event of an evacuation after landing, whether the brakes would have antiskid protection after landing, and the procedures the captain would be using during the approach and landing. At 18:01, the flight engineer reported that the cabin would be ready in "another two or three minutes." At 18:02, the flight engineer advised, "We got about three on the fuel and that's it." The aircraft was then about 5 nmi south of the airport on a southwest heading. Portland Approach then asked Flight 173 for a status report. The first officer replied, "Yeah, we have indication our gear is abnormal. It'll be our intention, in about five minutes, to land on two eight left. We would like the equipment standing by. Our indications are the gear is down and locked. We've got our people prepared for an evacuation in the event that should become necessary." At 18:03 Portland Approach asked that Flight 173 advise them when the approach would begin. The captain responded, "...They've about finished in the cabin. I'd guess about another three, four, five minutes." At this time the aircraft was about 8 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. At 18:06, the first flight attendant entered the cockpit and reported that they were ready in the passenger cabin. At this time the aircraft was about 17 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. The captain then said, "Okay. We're going to go in now. We should be landing in about five minutes." Almost simultaneous with this comment, the first officer said, "I think you just lost number four ..." followed immediately by advice to the flight engineer, "... better get some crossfeeds open there or something." At 18:06:46, the first officer told the captain, "We're going to lose an engine..." At 18:06:49, the first officer again stated, "We're losing an engine." Again the captain asked, "Why?" The first officer responded, "Fuel." The captain replied, "Why?" Between 18:06:52 and 18:07:06, the CVR revealed conflicting and confusing conversation between flight crewmembers as to the aircraft's fuel state. At 18:07:06, the first officer said, "It's flamed out." At 18:07:12, the captain called Portland Approach and requested, "...would like clearance for an approach into two eight left, now." The aircraft was about 19 nmi south southwest of the airport and turning left. This was the first request for an approach clearance from Flight 173 since the landing gear problem began. Portland Approach immediately gave the flight vectors for a visual approach to runway 28L. The flight turned toward the vector heading of 010 degrees. At 18:09:21, the captain advised Portland Approach, "United, seven three is going to turn toward the airport and come on in." After confirming Flight 173's intentions, Portland Approach cleared the flight for the visual approach to runway 28L. At 18:10:17, the captain requested that the flight engineer "reset that circuit breaker momentarily. See if we get gear lights." The flight engineer complied with the request. At 18:10:47, the captain requested the flight's distance from the airport. Portland approach responded, "I'd call it eighteen flying miles." At 18:12:42, the captain made another request for distance. Portland Approach responded, "Twelve flying miles." The flight was then cleared to contact Portland tower. At 18:13:21, the flight engineer stated, "We've lost two engines, guys." At 18:13:25, he stated, "We just lost two engines - one and two." At 1813:38, the captain said, They're all going. We can't make Troutdale." The first officer said, "We can't make anything." At 18:13:46, the captain told the first officer, "Okay. Declare a mayday." At 18:13:50, the first officer called Portland International Airport tower and declared, "Portland tower, United one seventy three heavy, Mayday. We're--the engines are flaming out. We're going down. We're not going to be able to make the airport." This was the last radio transmission from Flight 173. About 18:15, the aircraft crashed into a wooded section of a populated area of suburban Portland about 6 nmi east southeast of the airport. There was no fire. The wreckage path was about 1,554 ft long and about 130 ft wide. Two crew members and eight passengers were killed, 34 other occupants were injured.

Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines

The four engine airplane was chartered by Garuda Indonesia Airways to fly back to Surabaya 249 Indonesian pilgrims who were returning home following a 'haj' in Mecca. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared to descend from FL330 to FL220 then was informed that runway 04 was in use. The captain requested a runway 22 landing and was cleared for. On final approach by night, while at an altitude of 650 feet, the crew was cleared to land on runway 22, a clearance that was acknowledged by the crew. Few seconds later, the approach controller realized that the aircraft was too low and tried to contact the crew. Unfortunately, this was not possible as the crew already switched to the tower frequency. On short final, the airplane struck tree tops and crashed in a huge explosion in a coconut grove located 2,1 km short of runway 22 threshold. 79 occupants were rescued while 183 others were killed, among them eight crew members. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

Iberia - Lineas Aéreas de Espana

After touchdown on a wet runway at Santiago de Compostela Airport, the crew activated the thrust reverser systems and started the braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in flames in a wooded area, broken in two. All 223 occupants were evacuated, 52 of them were injured, some seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.

United Airlines

About 0138:28 m.s.t. on December 18, 1977, a United Airlines, Inc., DC-8F-54 cargo aircraft, operating as Flight 2860, crashed into a mountain in the Wasatch Range near Kaysville, Utah. The three flightcrew members, the only persons aboard the aircraft, were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed. Flight 2860 encountered electrical system problems during its descent and approach to the Salt Lake City Airport. The flight requested a holding clearance which was given by the approach controller and accepted by the flight crew. The flight then requested and received clearance to leave the approach control frequency for a "little minute" to communicate with company maintenance. Flight 2860 was absent from the Approach control frequency for 7 1/2 minutes. During that time, the flight entered an area near hazardous terrain. The approach controller recognized Flight 2860's predicament but was unable to contact the flight. When flight 2860 returned to approach control frequency, the controller told the flight that it was too close to terrain on its right and to make a left turn. After the controller repeated the instructions, the flight began a left turn and about 15 seconds later the controller told the flight to climb immediately to 8,000 feet. Eleven seconds later, the flight reported that it was climbing from 6,000 feet to 8,000 feet. The flight crashed into a 7,665-foot mountain near the 7,200-foot level. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

Japan Airlines

While descending to Kuala Lumpur-Subang Airport on a flight from Tokyo via Hong Kong, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility. On final approach, the captain descended below the MDA when the four engine airplane struck tree tops and crashed in a rubber plantation located about 6 km from runway 15 threshold. The aircraft broke into several pieces and 34 occupants were killed, among them eight crew members. All 45 other people were injured.

Philippine Airlines - PAL

The crew was cleared to takeoff from runway 15L and started the takeoff procedure. After a course of about 1,000 meters, the airplane lifted off prematurely. It banked left, causing the left wing to struck the ground. Out of control, the airplane landed back onto the runway then went out of control. It veered off runway to the left and while contacting soft ground, all landing gear were torn off as well as all four engines. The airplane slid for about 800 meters before coming to rest. All 140 occupants were evacuated, three of them were injured. The aircraft was written off.

Overseas National Airways - ONA

The four engine airplane was completing a cargo flight from Paris to Lagos with an intermediate stop in Niamey, carrying various goods on behalf of Union des Transports Aériens (UTA). On final approach by night, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck the ground 800 metres short of runway 09. Upon impact, it lost its undercarriage and slid for dozen metres before coming to rest in flames. Two crew members were killed while two others were injured.

Japan Airlines

On January 13, 1977, a Japan Air Line (JAL) McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-62F, JA 8054, operated as an international charter cargo flight from Moses Lake, Washington, U.S.A., to Tokyo, Japan. An en route stop and crew change were scheduled at Anchorage, Alaska. The aircraft arrived at Anchorage at 0503. The incoming flightcrew reported that the only weather they encountered en route was a layer of fog on the final approach at 800 feet, and that they did not encounter any precipitation or icing. The aircraft was serviced and a walk-around inspection was performed by JAL maintenance personnel and contract mechanics. The two contract mechanics stated that there was ice on the inlet guide vanes, the engine cowlings, and the engine bullet noses, but no ice was reported on the airfoil surfaces. The JAL personnel stated that they did not see any ice on the aircraft. One contract mechanic advised the JAL representative that the engine anti-icing system should be used by the next crew to clear the ice in the engine inlets. No maintenance was performed on the aircraft. The outbound flightcrew was wakened about 0330, left the hotel by taxi about 0430, and arrived at the JAL dispatch office about 0 0500. The taxicab driver who brought the outbound crew to the airport stated that he became concerned by the captain's actions in the taxi and called his dispatcher to report his impressions. He stated that the captain's movements were uncoordinated; that his face was flushed and his eyes were glazed; that his conversation was garbled and incoherent; that his movements were jerky and unstable; and that he had trouble getting out of the cab and had to steady himself on the car door. About 0450 the taxi dispatcher called the operations agent for the contract maintenance company and reported that one of her drivers had taken an "intoxicated" JAL captain to the airport. The operations agent stated that "...it seemed logical that JAL would detect anything unusual and act accordingly." He further stated that a 0620, he notified his line manager of the conversation with the taxi dispatcher and that "I felt that if the captain was intoxicated JAL OPS...or his first officer would have stopped the flight immediately." The JAL dispatch personnel and the inbound JAL crew stated that they noted nothing unusual about the outbound crew. The dispatch briefing proceeded smoothly and no significant questions were asked by the outbound crew. The outbound crew consisted of an American captain and a Japanese first officer and flight engineer. They went to the aircraft about 0515 and boarded the aircraft with the two cattle handlers. The driver of the crew car, a friend of the captain, stated that "...he was in good condition as far as way's I've seen him sometimes and I made that statement before I ever heard any rumors that he was supposedly drunk or had been partying or whatever." A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that about 0603 the captain and first officer were checking the inputs to the inertial navigation system. They also checked the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) for local visibility, received their clearance, and began their prestart checklists about 0609. The weather on the ATIS report was in part: "...sky partially obscured, visibility one-quarter mile, fog...". The checklists were completed and the takeoff data reviewed. About 0615 the engines were started and the stickshaker (stall warning system) was tested. The after-start checklist was completed and the aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 24L. During the taxi, the flight engineer requested and received permission from the captain to turn the engine anti-ice system on because of the ice on the inlet guide vanes. The flight controls and spoilers were checked while taxiing and the flaps were extended to 23°. The taxi checklist was completed and the takeoff data, the flap settings, and the trim settings were again reviewed. The captain, in response to the challenge "anti-ice, de-ice, and rain removal," said, "Ok, we will use engine anti-ice." The de-ice system was reported "off'' by the flight engineer. The captain briefed the crew on the takeoff and abort procedures he would use. He commented that the runway was slippery and he didn't think they would abort. The captain taxied the aircraft southeast on the ramp, past the terminal toward runway 24L. He stopped on the ramp after being instructed to hold short of runway 24R. After several communications with the controller, the aircraft taxied onto runway 24R, and reported ''...ready for takeoff." The tower advised the captain that he was on runway 24R which the captain contradicted. The controller then issued taxi instructions to get the aircraft to runway 24L. The captain made a 180° turn on runway 24R before he finally taxied to the taxiway which leads to the approach end of runway 24L. The crew again reported that they were ready for takeoff at 0633:37. Takeoff was initiated and at 0634:32 the captain called "maximum power". At 0634:50 the captain announced, "I have" and at 0634:52, "80" (knots) was called by the copilot. At 0635:10, "Vee one" was called by the copilot and at 0635:16 rotation was called and acknowledged by the captain. At 0635:19.5 the captain called "Ten degrees" and at 0635:21.4 the first officer called V2. At 0635:26.2 a sound similar to aircraft buffet was recorded. This sound became more frequent and continued until the sounds of impact. At 0635:32 the first officer called "Gear up" and at 0635:33 the flight engineer said "Too much speed (steep)".' At 0635: 38 the engineer called "stall" simultaneously the stickshaker sounded and continued until 0635:39.3, when impact was recorded. A witness near the departure end of the runway saw the aircraft climb to an estimated altitude of about 100 feet above the ground, veer to the left, and then slide '... out of the air." The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all five occupants were killed as well as the 56 cows.

Cubana de Aviación

The four engine airplane departed Bridgetown-Grantley Adams Airport at 1715LT on a schedule flight to Havana via Kingston, Jamaica. Nine minutes later, the captain declared an emergency and informed ATC about an explosion on board. He was cleared to return for an emergency landing when shortly later, the airplane entered a right turn, lost height and plunged into the sea about 8 km offshore. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 73 occupants were killed, among them 24 members of the Cuban National Fencing Team.

Cubana de Aviación

While approaching Havana-José Martí-Rancho Boyeros Airport following an uneventful flight from Montreal, the four engine airplane collided with a Cubana Antonov AN-24B that was completing a local training flight with a crew of five on board. While the DC-8 was able to continue the approach and to land without further problems, the Antonov crashed, killing its entire crew.

Martinair Holland

The airplane was completing a charter flight (hadj flight) from Surabaya to Jeddah with an intermediate stop in Colombo, carrying 182 Indonesian pilgrims on behalf of Garuda Indonesian Airways, and a crew of nine (seven Dutch citizens and two Indonesian). The descent to Colombo-Bandaranaike Airport was initiated by night and marginal weather conditions. The crew was cleared to descent to 5,000 feet and must report once the altitude of 8,000 feet was reached on descent. Then the crew was cleared to descent to 2,000 feet in view of a landing on runway 04. In poor visibility, the airplane struck the slope of Mt Anjimalai located about 85 km southeast of Bandaranaike Airport, near the city of Maskeliya. The wreckage was found few hours later in a quite unreachable area. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 191 occupants have been killed.

World Airways

On behalf of the USAF, the four engine airplane departed Travis AFB on a cargo flight to Clark AFB, Philippines, with intermediate stops in Cold Bay and Yokota AFB. While approaching Cold Bay by night at an altitude of 3,500 feet, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions when the airplane struck the slope of Mt Dutton (4,941 feet high) located 18 miles east of Cold Bay Airport. At impact, the aircraft's speed was 185 knots and it was heading 275°. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all six occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the airplane was off course by 12°.

Thai Airways International

After touchdown at Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport, the four engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and one engine before coming to rest in a dump. Onee people on the ground was killed and four passengers were injured. The aircraft was written off.

Japan Airlines

A McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62 passenger plane, JA8040, was destroyed when it crashed on takeoff from Moscow's -Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO), Russia. Five of the 14 crew members and ten of the 62 passengers survived the accident. JAL flight JL446 was a scheduled international flight from Copenhagen (CPH), Denmark to Tokyo-Haneda (HND), Japan with an en route stop in Moscow. The flight to Moscow was uneventful and the airplane landed at 18:17. After servicing of the aircraft startup and taxi clearance was received at 19:38. JL446 was cleared for takeoff from runway 25 at 19:49. On takeoff the DC-8 climbed to 100 m with a supercritical angle of attack and lost height abruptly. It hit the ground and burst into flames.

Japan Airlines

On approach to Bombay by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and limited visibility to 1,500 meters. Following a succession of errors, the crew completed the approach to Bombay-Juhu Airport runway 08 (1,143 meters long) instead of Bombay-Santa Cruz International Airport runway 09. After touchdown, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in flames into a ravine. All 122 occupants were evacuated, 9 of them were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aviaco - Aviacion y Comercio

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Madrid-Barajas Airport to Las Palmas to pick up German tourists back to Hamburg. While on a night approach to Las Palmas-Gando Airport, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances into the sea some 22 km east of Arinaga. Few debris were found floating on water and none of the 10 occupants survived the crash. The wreckage sank by a depth of 1,560 meters.

Japan Airlines

During a night approach to runway 28 at New Delhi-Palam Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck several houses and crashed in flames on the west shore of the Yamuna River, some 22 km east of the airport. Ten crew members and 72 passengers as well as four people on the ground were killed. Five other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. At the time of the accident, the copilot was the pilot-in-command.

Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane

Following an uneventful flight from Rome-Fiumicino Airport, the crew started the approach to Palermo-Punta Raisi by night. The four engine airplane was too low and struck the slope of Mt Longa (600 meters high) located 7 km south of the airport, west of the village of Carini. It was determined that the aircraft struck the mountain just few meters below its summit and disintegrated on impact. All 115 occupants have been killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was limited to 5 km with clouds down to 1,500 feet.