Lockheed P-2 Neptune

Minden Air

The captain reported that, while returning to the departure airport following an uneventful aerial drop, he noticed that the hydraulic pressure gauge indicated 0. The first officer subsequently verified that the sight gauge for the main hydraulic fluid reservoir was empty. The flight crew began performing the emergency gear extension checklist and verified that the nosewheel landing gear was extended. The captain stated that the first officer then installed the pin in the nosewheel landing gear as part of the emergency checklist. As the flight crewmembers diverted to a nearby airport because it had a longer runway and emergency resources, they briefed the no-flap landing. The first officer extended the main landing gear using the emergency gear release, which resulted in three down-and-locked landing gear indications. Subsequently, the airplane landed normally; however, during the landing roll, the nosewheel landing gear collapsed, and the airplane then came to rest nose low. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the nosewheel landing gear pin was disengaged from the nosewheel jury strut, and the pin was not located. The disengagement of the pin allowed the nosewheel landing gear to collapse on landing. It could not be determined when or how the pin became disengaged from the jury strut. Installation of the pin would have required the first officer to maneuver in a small area and install the pin while the nose landing gear door was open and the gear extended. Further, the pin had a red flag attached to it. When inserted during flight, the flag encounters a high amount of airflow that causes it to vibrate; this could have resulted in the pin becoming disengaged after it was installed. Evidence of a hydraulic fluid leak was observed around the right engine cowling drain. The right engine hydraulic pump case was found cracked, and the backup ring was partially extruded, which is consistent with hydraulic system overpressurization. The reason for the overpressurization of the hydraulic system could not be determined during postaccident examination.

Neptune Aviation Charter

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain while conducting firefighting operations, 20 miles north of Modena, Utah. The airplane was operated by Neptune Aviation Services under contract with the US Forest Service as an exclusive public-use fixed-wing airtanker service contract conducted under the operational control of the Bureau of Land management (BLM). Both pilots were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed. The flight originated in Cedar City, Utah, at 1315. The crew of Tanker 11 consisted of the pilot, copilot, and crew chief. They were based out of Missoula, MT, and had been together as a crew for the previous 3 weeks. Normally, the crews stay together for the entire fire season. Tanker 11 crew had operated out of Reno for the 2 weeks prior to the accident. During fire drop operations the tanker is manned by the pilot and copilot, while the crew chief remains at the fire base as ground personnel. The day before the accident while en route from Reno to Cedar City they performed one retardant drop on the White Rock fire, then landed at Cedar City. The crew departed the Cedar City tanker base and arrived at their hotel in Cedar City around 2230. The following morning, the day of the accident, the crew met at 0815, and rode into the Cedar City tanker base together. Tanker 11 took off at 1214 on its first drop on the White Rock fire, and returned at 1254. The crew shut down the airplane, reloaded the airplane with retardant, and did not take on any fuel. Tanker 11 departed the tanker base at 1307 to conduct its second retardant drop of the day, which was to be in the same location as the first drop. Upon arriving in the Fire Traffic Area (FTA) Tanker 11 followed the lead airplane, a Beech Kingair 90, into the drop zone. The drop zone was located in a shallow valley that was 0.4 miles wide and 350 feet deep. The lead airplane flew a shallow right-hand turn on to final, then dropped to an altitude of 150 feet above the valley floor over the intended drop area. While making the right turn on to final behind the lead plane, Tanker 11's right wing tip collided with terrain that was about 700 feet left of the lead airplane's flight path, which resulted in a rapid right yaw, followed by impact with terrain; a fire ball subsequently erupted. Tanker 11 created a 1,088-foot-long debris field and post impact fire.

Neptune Aviation Charter

The multi-engine fire bomber, which was not carrying retardant, was established at its cruise altitude while en route to a fire base where it would be used as part of the effort to fight a local fire. While en route, the flight crew encountered a forecast area of instrument meteorological conditions, whereupon they began a series of descents to lower altitudes in order to stay in visual flight rules (VFR) conditions beneath the clouds. During the last few minutes of their flight, the flight crew had descended to an altitude that was less than 1,300 feet above ground level (agl) over nearly level terrain. As they approached rapidly rising terrain at the end of the broad open valley they had been flying over, they inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Soon thereafter, while still in a nearly wings-level attitude, the airplane impacted a ridge about 240 feet below its top. The First Officer, who was flying at the time, had asked the Captain about ten minutes prior to the impact if their altitude was high enough to clear the upcoming terrain, but the Captain did not respond, and the First Officer did not challenge the Captain about the issue. Witnesses in the area reported low clouds with ceilings about 200 feet above ground level with a visibility of one-quarter mile or less, with rain and fog. One of the witnesses reported momentarily viewing the airplane flying "very low," while the others reported only being able to hear the airplane.

Neptune Aviation Charter

Just after the airplane's landing gear was retracted during takeoff for a retardant drop mission, a ball of fire was observed coming out of the left jet engine before the airplane rolled steeply to the left and descended into the terrain. Prior to takeoff, the captain said he would make the takeoff and provided a takeoff briefing concerning the runway to be used and his intentions should an emergency develop. Shortly thereafter, the captain informed the co-pilot that this would actually be his (the co-pilot's) takeoff. On the cockpit voice recorder, the co-pilot stated "Same briefing (sound of laughter)". The co-pilot did not give an additional takeoff briefing beyond the one given by the captain and the captain did not ask the co-pilot to give one. During the initial climb, the captain said he detected a fire on the left side of the airplane and the copilot responded that he was holding full right aileron. At no point did either pilot call for the jettisoning of the retardant load as required by company standard operating procedures, or verbally enunciate the jet engine fire emergency checklist. Recorded data showed that the airplane's airspeed then decayed below the minimum air control speed, which resulted in an increased roll rate to the left and impact with terrain. The 11th stage compressor disc of the left jet engine failed in fatigue, which caused a catastrophic failure of the compressor section and the initiation of the engine fire. Metallurgical examination of the fracture identified several origin points at scratches in the surface finish of the disk. The scratches were too small to have been observed with the approved inspection procedures used by the company. A review of the FAA sanctioned Approved Aircraft Inspection Program, revealed no shortcomings or anomalies in the performance or documentation of the program. A post-accident examination of the airframe and three remaining engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operations.

Minden Air

The fire tanker airplane was on a cross-country positioning flight and collided with mountainous terrain while maneuvering in a canyon near the destination airport. Witnesses who held pilot certificates were on a mountain top at 7,900 feet and saw a cloud layer as far to the south as they could see. They used visual cues to estimate that the cloud tops were around 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). They noted that the clouds did not extend all the way up into the mountain canyons; the clouds broke up near the head of some canyons. When they first saw the airplane, they assumed that it came from above the clouds. It was proceeding north up a canyon near the edge of clouds, which were breaking up. They were definitely looking down at the airplane the whole time. They saw the airplane make a 180-degree turn that was steeper than a standard rate turn. The wings leveled and the airplane went through one cloud, reappeared briefly, and then entered the cloud layer. It appeared to be descending when they last saw it. About 2 minutes later, they saw the top of the cloud layer bulge and turn a darker color. The bulge began to subside and they observed several smaller bulges appear. They notified local authorities that they thought a plane was down. Searchers discovered the wreckage at that location and reported that the wreckage and surrounding vegetation were on fire. The initial responders reported that the area was cloudy and the visibility was low. Examination of the ground scars and wreckage debris path disclosed that the airplane collided with the canyon walls in controlled flight on a westerly heading of 260 degrees at an elevation of 3,400 feet msl. The operator had an Automated Flight Following (AFF) system installed on the airplane. It recorded the airplane's location every 2 minutes using a GPS. The data indicated that the airplane departed Prescott and flew direct to the Twentynine Palms VORTAC (very high frequency omnidirectional radio range, tactical air navigation). The flight changed course slightly to 260 degrees, which took it to the northeast corner of the wilderness area where the accident occurred. At 1102:57, the data indicated that the airplane was at 11,135 feet msl at 204 knots. The airplane then made three left descending 360-degree turns. The third turn began at 6,010 feet msl. At 1116:57, the last recorded data point indicated that the airplane was at an altitude of 3,809 feet heading 256 degrees at a speed of 128 knots.

Neptune Aviation Charter

The airplane had made a dry pass on the fire zone, then circled around to make a second pass and release its load of 2,450 gallons of retardant. According to witnesses, the airplane struck trees while in a nose low, right wing low attitude. Upon ground impact, the airplane exploded and burned. Investigation revealed no evidence of preimpact airframe, engine, propeller, or flight control failure/malfunction. The first officer, an initial attack trainee pilot, was in the left seat and the captain was in the right seat. Toxicology tests of the first officer indicated 0.031 ug/ml brompheniramine, 0.011 ug/ml chlorpheniramine in kidney fluid, and 0.142 brompheniramine, 0.072 chlorpheniramine in liver fluid. Both medications are over-the-counter antihistamines with sedative effects.

Neptune Aviation Charter

The aircraft departed Missoula on a fire fighting mission under callsign Tanker 04. The crew apparently became fixated on the malfunction of the retardant-release doors and did not realize the tanker was entering a narrow box canyon when it struck the slope of Mt Squaw located about 20 miles northwest of Missoula Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

Hawkins %26 Powers Aviation

The flight had departed Tucson, AZ, on a special VFR ferry flight to Greybull, WY. The airplane was not instrumented for IFR flight. When the flight reported over Winslow, it was advised that VFR flight was not recommended northbound from its present position. Surface weather conditions in southcentral wyoming/northwestern Colorado at the time of the accident were consistent with low ceilings, clouds and snow as reported by witnesses and surface weather observations. The witnesses, located near the Dixon Airport, reported hearing a low flying aircraft travelling west to east, and another witness northeast of the arpt heard an aircraft 'revving' its engines. Radar data shows the aircraft tracking northbound slightly east of the Dixon airport, and executing a clockwise 360° turn northeast of the airport and in the vicinity of one of the witnesses. The last radar target received placed the aircraft approximately one mile north-northeast of the accident site. The aircraft impacted snow covered terrain in a steep nose-down attitude. Both pilots were killed.

Black Hills Aviation

A Cessna 172N registered N738AQ crashed in the Olympic National Forest earlier that day and a fire erupted. The crew was dispatched in the region of Lake Wynoochee to proceed in a fire fighting mission. After the retardant was dropped, the crew initiated a climb when control was lost and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located near the Wynoochee Dam. Both pilots were killed.

Black Hills Aviation

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on September 10, 1987, the Army called Black Hills Aviation to suppress a fire started by a FAADS missile. The missile was fired more than two hours before the crash. A P2V aircraft, Forest Service Number N96271 ["Tanker 07"], owned by Black Hills, was dispatched in response to the request for aerial fire suppression. Tanker 07 was piloted by Nathan Kolb and co-piloted by Woodard Miller, employees of Black Hills Aviation who were not Department of Defense personnel. Tanker 07 obtained authorization to enter the missile range's airspace from the missile range air controller. During the flight, Tanker 07 crashed on the missile range and both pilots were killed. The crash site was located approximately fifteen miles into the interior of the missile range, and was inside the testing site for the FAADS Project.