Cessna 500 Citation

Shelter Charter Services

The private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight plan in his twin-engine turbojet airplane. The flight was uneventful until the air traffic controller amended the flight plan, which required the pilot to manually enter the new routing information into the GPS. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was having problems with the GPS and asked for a direct route to his destination. The controller authorized the direct route and instructed the pilot to descend from 22,000 ft to 6,000 ft, during which time the sound of the autopilot disconnect was heard on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). During the descent, the pilot told the controller that the airplane had a steering problem and was in the clouds. The pilot was instructed to descend the airplane to 4,100 ft, which was the minimum vectoring altitude. The airplane continued to descend, entered visual meteorological conditions, and then descended below the assigned altitude. The controller queried the pilot about the airplane's low altitude and instructed the pilot to maintain 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that he was unsure if he would be able to climb the airplane back to that altitude due to steering issues. The controller issued a low altitude warning and again advised the pilot to climb back to 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that the autopilot was working again and that he was able to climb the airplane to the assigned altitude. The controller then instructed the pilot to change to another radio frequency, but the pilot responded that he was still having a problem with the GPS. The pilot asked the controller to give him direct routing to the airport. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was barely able to keep the airplane straight and its wings level. The controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, which he did not. The pilot then declared an emergency and expressed concerns related to identifying the landing runway. Afterward, radio contact between the controller and the pilot was lost. Shortly before the airplane impacted the ground, a witness saw the airplane make a complete 360° roll to the left, enter a steep 90° bank to the left, roll inverted, and enter a vertical nose-down dive. Another witness saw the airplane spiral to the ground. The airplane impacted the front lawn of a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued.The pilot held a type rating for the airplane, but the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review. As a result, his overall currency and total flight experience in the accident airplane could not be determined. The airplane was originally certified for operations with a pilot and copilot. To obtain an exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot, a pilot must successfully complete an approved single-pilot exemption training course annually. The accident airplane was modified, and the previous owner was issued a single-pilot conformity certificate by the company that performed the modifications. However, there was no record indicating that the accident pilot received training under this exemption. Several facilities that have single-pilot exemption training for the accident airplane series also had no record of the pilot receiving training for single-pilot operations in the accident airplane. Therefore, unlikely that the pilot was properly certificated to act as a single-pilot. The GPS was installed in the airplane about 3.5 years before the accident. A friend of the pilot trained him on how to use the GPS. The friend said that the pilot generally was confused about how the unit operated and struggled with pulling up pages and correlating data. The friend of the pilot had flown with him several times and indicated that, if an air traffic controller amended a preprogrammed flight plan while en route, the pilot would be confused with the procedure for amending the flight plan. The friend also said the pilot depended heavily on the autopilot, which was integrated with the GPS, and that he would activate the autopilot immediately after takeoff and deactivate it on short final approach to a runway. The pilot would not trim the airplane before turning on the autopilot because he assumed that the autopilot would automatically trim the airplane, which led to the autopilot working against the mis-trimmed airplane. The friend added that the pilot was "constantly complaining" that the airplane was "uncontrollable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and the autopilot system revealed no evidence of any preimpact deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. This information suggests that pilot historically had difficulty flying the airplane without the aid of the autopilot. When coupled with his performance flying the airplane during the accident flight without the aid of the autopilot, it further suggests that the pilot was consistently unable to manually fly the airplane. Additionally, given the pilot's previous experience with the GPS installed on the airplane, it is likely that during the accident flight the pilot became confused about how to operate the GPS and ultimately was unable to properly control of the airplane without the autopilot engaged. Based on witness information, it is likely that during the final moments of the flight the pilot lost control of the airplane and it entered an aerodynamic stall. The pilot was then unable to regain control of the airplane as it spun 4,000 ft to the ground.

Yatish Air

The commercial pilot of the jet reported that he initially requested that 100 lbs of fuel be added to both fuel tanks. During the subsequent preflight inspection, the pilot decided that more fuel was needed, so he requested that the airplane's fuel tanks be topped off with fuel. However, he did not confirm the fuel levels or check the fuel gauges before takeoff. He departed on the flight and did not check the fuel gauges until about 1 hour after takeoff. He stated that, at that time, the fuel gauges were showing about 900-1,000 lbs of fuel per side, and he realized that the fuel tanks had not been topped off as requested. He reduced engine power to conserve fuel and to increase the airplane's flight endurance while he continued to his destination. When the fuel gauges showed about 400-500 lbs of fuel per side, the low fuel lights for both wing fuel tanks illuminated. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane was low on fuel and diverted the flight to the nearest airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was high and fast on the visual approach for landing. He misjudged the height above the ground and later stated that the airplane "landed very hard." The airplane's left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

Norjet

The pilot and 3 passengers boarded the aircraft. At 2126, the pilot obtained an IFR clearance from the CYLW ground controller for the KELOWNA SEVEN DEP standard instrument departure (SID) procedure for Runway 34. The instructions for the runway 34 KELOWNA SEVEN DEP SID were to climb to 9000 feet ASL, or to an altitude assigned by air traffic control (ATC), and to contact the Vancouver Area Control Centre (ACC) after passing through 4000 feet ASL. The aircraft was then to climb and track 330° magnetic (M) inbound to the Kelowna non-directional beacon (LW). From LW, the aircraft was to climb and track 330°M outbound for vectors to the filed or assigned route. At 2127, C-GTNG began to taxi toward Runway 34. At 2131, the CYLW tower controller cleared the aircraft to take off from the intersection of Runway 34 and Taxiway D. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and began the take-off roll on Runway 34 about 1 minute later. Radar data showed that, at 2133:41, the aircraft was 0.5 nautical miles (nm) beyond the departure end of the runway and was climbing at more than 4000 feet per minute (fpm) through 2800 feet ASL, at a climb angle of approximately 16°. In that time, it had deviated laterally by about 3° to the right of the 330°M track associated with the SID. At 2134:01, when the aircraft was 1.2 nm beyond the runway, it had climbed through 3800 feet ASL and deviated further to the right of the intended routing. The aircraft’s rate of climb decreased to about 1600 fpm, and its ground speed was 150 knots. A short time later, the aircraft’s rate of climb decreased to 600 fpm, its climb angle decreased to 2°, and its ground speed had increased to 160 knots. At 2134:22, the aircraft was 2.1 nm beyond the departure end of the runway, and it was climbing through approximately 4800 feet ASL. The aircraft had deviated about 13° to the right of the intended track, and its rate of climb reached its maximum value of approximately 000 fpm, 3 with a climb angle of about 22°. The ground speed was roughly 145 knots. At 2134:39, the aircraft was 2.7 nm beyond the departure end of the runway, passing through 5800 feet ASL, and had deviated about 20° to the right of the intended routing. The rate of climb was approximately 2000 fpm, with a climb angle of about 7°. According to the SID, the pilot was to make initial contact with the ACC after the aircraft had passed through 4000 feet ASL.Initial contact was made when the aircraft was passing through 6000 feet ASL, at 2134:42. At 2134:46, the ACC acknowledged the communication and indicated that the aircraft had been identified on radar. The aircraft was then cleared for a right turn direct to the MENBO waypoint once it was at a safe altitude, or once it was climbing through 8000 feet ASL. The aircraft was also cleared to follow the flight-planned route and climb to 10 000 feet ASL. At 2134:55, the pilot read back the clearance as the aircraft climbed through 6400 feet ASL, with a rate of climb of approximately 2400 fpm. The aircraft was tracking about 348°M at a ground speed of about 170 knots. At 2135:34, the aircraft began a turn to the right, which was consistent with the instruction from the ACC. Flying directly to the MENBO waypoint required the aircraft to be on a heading of 066°M, requiring a right turn of about 50°. At this point, the aircraft was still climbing and was passing through 8300 feet ASL. The rate of climb was about 3000 fpm. The aircraft continued the right turn and was tracking through 085°M. After reaching a peak altitude of approximately 8600 feet ASL, the aircraft entered a steep descending turn to the right, consistent with the characteristics of a spiral dive. At 2135:47, the ACC controller cleared C-GTNG to climb to FL 250. The lack of radar returns and radio communications from the aircraft prompted the controller to initiate search activities. At 2151, NAV CANADA notified first responders, who located the accident site in forested terrain at about midnight. The aircraft had been destroyed, and all of the occupants had been fatally injured.

Ed Dufresne Ministries

After climbing to and leveling at 15,000 feet, the airplane departed controlled flight, descended rapidly in a nose-down vertical dive, and impacted terrain; an explosion and postaccident fire occurred. Evidence at the accident site revealed that most of the wreckage was located in or near a single impact crater; however, the outer portion of the left wing impacted the ground about 1/2 mile from the main wreckage. Following the previous flight, the pilot reported to a maintenance person in another state that he had several malfunctioning flight instruments, including the autopilot, the horizontal situation indicator, and the artificial horizon gyros. The pilot, who was not a mechanic, had maintenance personnel replace the right side artificial horizon gyro but did not have any other maintenance performed at that time. The pilot was approved under an FAA exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot; however, the exemption required that all equipment must be operational, including a fully functioning autopilot, flight director, and gyroscopic flight instruments. Despite the malfunctioning instruments, the pilot chose to take off and fly in instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the loss of control, the airplane had just entered an area with supercooled large water droplets and severe icing, which would have affected the airplane's flying characteristics. At the same time, the air traffic controller provided the pilot with a radio frequency change, a change in assigned altitude, and a slight routing change. It is likely that these instructions increased the pilot's workload as the airplane began to rapidly accumulate structural icing. Because of the malfunctioning instruments, it is likely that the pilot became disoriented while attempting to maneuver and maintain control of the airplane as the ice accumulated, which led to a loss of control.

Airnor - Aeronaves del Noroeste

Based on the information available, at 20:40 the ONT (National Transplant Organization) informed the Santiago Airport (LEST) that they were going to make a “hospital flight”. The aircraft was refueled at the Santiago Airport with 1062 liters of fuel. According to communications, the crew of aircraft EC-IBA contacted the Santiago tower at 21:46 to request permission to start up and information on the weather and the runway in use at Asturias. At 21:54 they were cleared to take off. According to the airport operations office, the aircraft landed in Asturias (LEAS) at 22:27. The hospital flight service commenced at 22:15. The RFFS accompanied the ambulance to the aircraft at 22:30 and at 22:44 the aircraft took off en route to Porto. The aircraft was transferred from Madrid control to Santiago approach at 22:52 at flight level 200 and cleared straight to Porto (LPPR). Based on the information provided by Porto Airport, the aircraft landed at 23:40. While waiting for the medical team to return, the crew remained in the airport’s facilities. According to some of the personnel there, the crew made some comments regarding the bad weather. There was fog, especially on the arrival route. At 01:34 and again at 02:01 the crew was supplied with the flight plan information, information from the ARO-LPPR office and updated weather data. The aircraft was refueled at the Porto Airport with 1,000 l of fuel and took off at 02:34. At 02:44 the aircraft contacted approach control at Santiago to report its position. Four minutes later the crew contacted the Santiago tower directly to ask about the weather conditions at the field (see Appendix C). The aircraft landed once more in Asturias at 03:28. At 03:26 the RFFS was again activated to escort the ambulance to the aircraft. The service was deactivated at 04:00. The crew requested updated weather information from the tower, which provided the information from the 03:00 METAR. According to the flight plan filed, the estimated off-block time (EOBT) for departing from the Asturias Airport was 03:45, with an estimated flight time to Santiago of 40 minutes. The alternate destination airport was Vitoria (LEVT). The aircraft took off from Asturias at 03:38. At 03:56 the crew established contact with Santiago approach control, which provided the crew with the latest METAR from 03:30, which informed that the runway in use was 17, winds were calm, visibility was 4,000 m with mist, few clouds at 600 ft, temperature and dew point of 13° and QNH of 1,019. The aircraft was then cleared to conduct an ILS approach to runway 17 at the Santiago Airport. At 04:15 the crew contacted the tower controller, who reported calm winds and cleared them to land on runway 17. At 04:18 the COSPAS-SARSAT system detected the activation of an ELT. The system estimated the position for the beacon as being in the vicinity of the LEST airport. At 04:38 the tower controller informed airport operations of a call he had received from SAR that a beacon was active in the vicinity of the airport, and requested that a marshaller go to the airport where the airplane normally parked to see if it was there. At 04:44 the marshaller confirmed that the aircraft was not in its hangar and the emergency procedure was activated, with the various parties involved in the search for the airplane being notified. At 05:10 the control tower called the airport to initiate the preliminary phase (Phase I) before activating the LVP. At 05:15 the RFFS reported that the aircraft had been found in the vicinity of the VOR. At 05:30 the LVP was initiated (Phase II). At 07:51 the LVP was terminated. The last flight to arrive at the Santiago Airport before the accident had landed at 23:33, and the next flight to arrive following the accident landed at 05:25.

Ross Aviation - UK

Pilot B arrived at Biggin Hill Airport, Kent, at about 1100 hrs for the planned flight to Pau, France. At about 1130 hrs he helped tow the aircraft from its overnight parking position on the Southern Apron to a nearby handling agent whose services were being used for the flight. A member of staff employed by the handling agent saw Pilot B carry out what was believed to be an external pre-flight check of the aircraft. Pilot B also asked another member of staff to provide a print out of the weather information for the flight. Pilot A arrived at about 1145 hrs and joined Pilot B at the aircraft. Witnesses described nothing unusual in either pilots’ demeanour. Three passengers arrived at the handling agent at about 1300 hrs and waited in a lounge whilst their bags were taken to the aircraft and loaded into the baggage hold in the nose. A member of the handling agency, who later took the passengers to the aircraft, reported that Pilot B met them outside the aircraft. After they had all boarded, the agent heard Pilot B say that he would give them a safety brief. Pilot B then closed the aircraft door. Pilot A called for start at 1317 hrs. He called for taxi at 1320 hrs and the aircraft was cleared to taxi to the holding point A1. No one could be identified as a witness to the aircraft’s start or subsequent taxi to the holding point. At 1331 hrs ATC cleared the aircraft to line up on Runway 21 and at 1332 hrs cleared it to take off. Both clearances were acknowledged by Pilot A. The takeoff was observed by the tower controller who stated that everything appeared normal. No transmissions were made between the aircraft and ATC until one minute after takeoff when, at 1334 hrs, the following exchange was made. Numerous witnesses reported seeing the aircraft at around this time flying over a built-up area, about 2 nm north-north-east of Biggin Hill Airport, where it was observed flying low, passing over playing fields and nearby houses. Witnesses reported that the aircraft was maintaining a normal flying attitude with some reporting that the landing gear was up and others that it was down. Some described seeing it adopt a nose-high attitude and banking away from the houses just before it crashed. Some witnesses stated that there was no engine noise coming from the aircraft whilst others stated that they became aware of the aircraft as it flew low overhead due to the loud noise it was making, as if the engines were at high thrust. Two witnesses described hearing the aircraft make a pulsing, intermittent noise. The location of witnesses and the description of the aircraft noise they heard are also shown in Figure 1. Having flown over several houses at an extremely low height the aircraft’s left wing clipped a house which bordered a small area of woodland. The aircraft then impacted the ground between this and another house and caught fire. There were no injuries to anyone on the ground but all those on board the aircraft were fatally injured.

Southwest Orthopedic %26 Sports Medicine Clinic

On March 4, 2008, about 1515 central standard time, a Cessna 500, N113SH, registered to Southwest Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Clinic PC of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, entered a steep descent and crashed about 2 minutes after takeoff from Wiley Post Airport (PWA) in Oklahoma City. None of the entities associated with the flight claimed to be its operator. The pilot, the second pilot, and the three passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 with an instrument flight rules flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated from the ramp of Interstate Helicopters (a 14 CFR Part 135 on demand helicopter operator at PWA) and was en route to Mankato Regional Airport, Mankato, Minnesota, carrying company executives who worked for United Engines and United Holdings, LLC.

IHR Administrative Services

The twin-engine turbojet airplane was attempting to land on a runway with standing water when the accident occurred. Before the landing attempt, the pilot was told that the runway was wet from a recent rain shower. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane on the runway traveling at a high speed and then increase engine power to abort the landing with about 1/4 of the runway remaining. The surviving passenger reported that the runway was "soaked and shiny with water." He stated that the airplane landed hard and fishtailed during the landing roll. During the aborted landing the airplane impacted a jet-blast deflector located off the departure end of the runway. The airplane then proceeded through the airport perimeter fence and impacted a residential structure before coming to a stop. The airplane and residential structure were destroyed during a postaccident fire. An examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any anomalies associated with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or an anti-skid braking system. Radar track data analysis indicated that when the airplane was about 1/4 mile from the end of the runway it was approximately 16 knots above its target landing reference speed (Vref) and had a descent rate of 1,150 feet per minute. The runway was 4,875 feet long. The calculated landing distance for a runway with standing water is 4,789 feet.

Flite Services

The right main landing gear collapsed on landing. According to the flight crew, after departure they preceded to Mountain Air Airport, where they performed a "touch-and-go" landing. Upon raising the landing gear following the touch-and-go landing, they got an "unsafe gear" light. The crew stated they cycled the gear back down and got a "three green" normal indication. They cycled the gear back up and again got the "gear unsafe" light. They diverted to Greensboro, North Carolina, and upon landing in Greensboro the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed. After the accident, gear parts from the accident airplane were discovered on the runway at Mountain Air Airport. Metallurgical examination of the landing gear components revealed fractures consistent with overstress separation and there was no evidence of fatigue. Examination of the runway at Mountain Air Airport by an FAA Inspector showed evidence the accident airplane had touched down short of the runway.

Houston Cardiac Electrophysiology Associates - HCEA

The 4,100-hour commercial pilot lost directional control of the single-pilot twin-engine turbojet while taking off from runway 22 (7,602-feet long by 150-feet wide), and impacted the ground about 3,750 feet from the point of departure. Several witnesses reported that the airplane climbed to approximately 150 feet, rolled to the right, descended, and then struck the ground inverted. The weather was day VFR and the wind was reported from 170 degrees at 10 knots. Examination of the wreckage revealed that none of the main-entry door latching pins were in their fully locked position. The airplane's flight controls and engines did not disclose any mechanical discrepancies. The flaps were in the takeoff position and the control lock was unlocked. The pilot had not flown the airplane for over nine months because of extensive maintenance; the accident occurred on its first test flight out of maintenance. Since the pilots flight records were not found, it is unknown how much flight time the pilot had flown in the last nine months. The other airplane that the pilot owned was a Cessna 650, but witnesses stated that the pilot was only qualified as a co-pilot. Most of the maintenance records that were located were not completed; an approval for return-to-service was not found. Another airplane that had declared an emergency was on a 10-mile final when the tower cleared the accident airplane for takeoff, with no delay on the takeoff roll. No additional communication or distress calls were reported from the accident airplane. The airplane was not equipped with either a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. No anomalies were found on either engine that could have prevented normal engine operation.

Transportes Inland

On final approach to Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport runway 28, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, while on a second attempt to land, the aircraft broke through the cloud base at 800 feet but was not properly lined up with the runway. To avoid a collision with the tower, the crew made a turn to the right when the aircraft crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

City-Jet Luftfahrt

The aircraft departed Rome-Ciampino Airport on an ambulance flight to Cagliari, carrying three pilots, three doctors and a cooler containing a heart for a patient. The descent to Cagliari-Elmas Airport was initiated by night under VFR mode. After the crew was cleared to descend to 2,500 feet, ATC reported runway 32 in use and asked the crew to report on short final. About two minutes later, at an altitude of 3,333 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Su Baccu Malu located 32 km northeast of Cagliari Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all six occupants were killed.

Ibiza Flights

The aircraft took off at 1000LT from Barcelona (LEBL) on a private flight to Zurich (LSZH). The flight took place under instrument flight rules. Using radar vectors, EC-HFA was cleared at 1205 LT for an approach on the runway 14 instrument landing system (ILS). In the final approach phase, the aircraft entered a snow shower. The aircraft touched down on the grass about 700 metres before the runway threshold and skidded in a wide right turn in the direction of the threshold of runway 16. The aircraft was badly damaged. The three occupants were unharmed.

American Virginia

Following an uneventful flight from Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport, the crew started the descent to Marília Airport by night. Poor weather conditions at destination forced the crew to make a direct approach to runway 03. After landing, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in bushes 143 metres past the runway end. All seven occupants were rescued, among them four were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Marlin Air

The captain said that he flew the VOR approach to runway 32. At 2,500 feet, the captain said that they were out of the clouds and initiated a visual straight-in approach. After aligning the airplane with the runway, the captain said he noticed that there was contamination on the runway, "maybe compacted snow or maybe ice with fresh snow over it." The captain briefed that they would perform a go-around if by midfield they were not decelerating adequately. The captain said that they touched down within the first third of the runway. Close to midfield the airplane fishtailed. Past midfield, the captain called a go-around. The first officer said that the captain added power and he retracted the airbrakes. The first officer exclaimed, "There is not enough runway! I braced myself as the aircraft went into the snow." The first officer said that at about 2 miles out from the runway, the unicom called and said that braking action was nil. A Notice to Airman, in effect at the time of the accident for the airport stated, "icy runway, nil braking."

Skyward Aviation - Canada

The captain said the airplane felt 'sluggish' during the takeoff roll. At V1/Vr, the airplane was rotated for liftoff. It climbed 10 feet, 'shuddered,' and sank. The captain elected to abort the takeoff. He landed the airplane on the runway, applied brakes and deployed the drag chute. The drag chute separated and the airplane went off the runway, down a hill, through a fence, across a road and grassy area, across another road, through a chain link fence, and collided with a power pole. The captain said they had calculated the takeoff performance using inappropriate tables, and failed to consider the wet runway and wind shift. The drag chute riser fractured at a point where it passed through a lightning hole. The lightning hole bore no evidence of a nylon grommet having been installed.

US Motorsports

The pilot initiated an ILS approach with rain and fog. Approach flaps were maintained until the runway was sighted, and then landing flaps were set. The airplane landed long, overran the runway, struck the ILS localizer antenna on the departure end of the runway, and came to rest at the edge of a mobile home park. The airplane and two mobile homes were destroyed by fire. Vref had been computed at 110 Kts. The PIC reported a speed on final of 130 Kts, while the SIC said it was 140 Kts. Radar data revealed a 160 knots ground speed from the outer marker until 1.8 miles from touchdown. The airplane passed the control tower, airborne, with 2,500 feet of runway remaining on the 6,500 foot long runway. Performance data revealed that the airplane would require about 2,509 feet on a dry runway, and 5,520 feet on a wet runway. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or anti-skid brakes. The PIC was the company president, and the SIC was a recent hire who had flown with the PIC three previous times. The PIC was qualified for single-pilot operations in the airplane, and had been trained to fly stabilized approaches.

DM Construtora de Obras

The approach to Canela Airport was completed in marginal weather conditions with rain falls and a visibility estimated to be 1,500 - 2,000 metres. The landing was completed with a tail wind component of 15-20 knots and the aircraft landed too far down a wet runway which is 1,250 metres long. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, went down an embankment, crossed a road and came to rest against houses, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

Riana Táxi Aéreo

During the takeoff roll at Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport, the captain realized that all conditions were not met for a safe takeoff and decided to abort. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in the Guanabara Bay. All five occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aerotaxi del Oriente

After takeoff from Pereira-Matecaña Airport, while climbing, the copilot declared an emergency and reported problems. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed near La Felisa. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

Airspan Corporation

Few minutes after takeoff from Cagayan de Oro Airport, while climbing to a height of 8,000 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Balatukan located about 57 km northeast of Cagayan de Oro Airport. Both pilots were killed.

Aérotaxi Cachanilla

While approaching Ensenada Airport by night and foggy conditions, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck a hill located few km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all eight occupants were killed. It is believed that the crew did not receive any clearance to approach Ensenada Airport and continued the descent at an insufficient altitude.

Táxi Aéreo Weston

En route from Imperatriz to Fazenda Matary, the captain informed the copilot he would perform training upon arrival as there are no passengers on board. On descent, he informed ATC he would perform a touch-and-go manoeuvre. With the flaps down at 15°, the aircraft landed at a speed of 125 knots, about 10 knots above the speed reference of 116 knots. After touchdown, the captain changed his mind and decided to perform a complete stop without informing the copilot. The copilot noted that the speed was dropping so he decided to increase engine power to takeoff. Shortly later, the captain reduced power and initiated a braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest few dozen metres further, bursting into flames. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Transportadora Fruyleg

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Veracruz. After touchdown, the crew encountered difficulties to stop the aircraft within the remaining distance (runway 13/31 is 1,300 metres long). It overran and eventually crashed past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

HiTech Helicopters

The flight was cleared for a loc runway 11 approach. About 3 minutes later, the 2nd-in-command (sic) reported '. . . We don't get the localizer can you see if we're on course.' The LAX ARTCC R-15 controller confirmed the flight was right of course and below the required altitude. The aircraft's mode C indicated an altitude of 1,400 feet; the controller advised the flight crew to maintain at least 2,300 feet until past the final approach fix (faf). The crew then replied that they were in VMC. Radar svc was terminated and a frequency change to tower was approved. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft hit a eucalyptus tree at about 90 feet agl, 2.05 miles from the approach end of the runway and about 195 feet right of the loc. Elevation of the crash site was 101 feet; minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 640 feet. The 0645 pdt weather was, in part: indefinite ceiling, 100 feet obscured, vis 1/8 mile with fog, wind from 220° at 4 kts. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft was found. All four occupants were killed.

Air North Queensland

Cessna 500 VH-ANQ was operating the Proserpine to Mareeba leg of a charter flight The aircraft departed Proserpine at 16:35 hours. The charter flight had been organised to transport members of five local government authorities from the Cairns/Atherton Tablelands area to a Local Government Association Conference at Airlie Beach, Queensland. The flight plan indicated that the flight would follow Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with a planned cruising altitude of FL330. The aircraft was planned to track via overhead Townsville then direct to Mareeba with a flight time interval of 68 minutes. The flight apparently continued normally and at 17:26 the aircraft was cleared to descend to FL170 and instructed to call Cairns Approach. On first contact with Cairns Approach, the pilot advised that the aircraft was tracking for Mareeba via the 163 radial at 41 miles (76 kilometres) DME from Biboohra. (There are no radio navigational aids at Mareeba, the nearest aids for tracking and instrument approach purposes are at Biboohra, about 16 kilometres north of Mareeba). The aircraft was advised to maintain FL170 but a short time later was cleared to descend to FL120. The pilot stated that he would not be closing down the engines at Mareeba and that his estimated departure time was 17:50. At 17:35 hours VH-ANQ was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet and one minute later the pilot advised that the aircraft was "approaching over Mareeba and visual". Cairns Approach advised VH-ANQ that there would be a short delay at 10,000 feet and following a request from the pilot gave approval for the aircraft to circle over Mareeba. At 17:40 hours, Cairns Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to 7,000 feet. This transmission, and other subsequent transmissions to the aircraft, went unanswered. The wreckage of VH-ANQ was ultimately located on the eastern slopes of Mt Emerald, 15 kilometres south of Mareeba Airport, by searching helicopters at 0240 hours on 12 May 1990. The aircraft initially impacted the mountainside with the left wingtip, while travelling on a track of about 340 degrees Magnetic. At the time it was in a wings level attitude at an angle of descent of eight degrees. It then struck the ground just below the apex of a ridge and the wreckage spread in a fan shape, at an angle of 30 degrees, along a centreline track of 350 degrees Magnetic.

Air Carelia

While on a night approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located few km from the airport. The aircraft belly landed in a snow covered field and came to rest, broken in two. All six occupants evacuated the cabin and took refuge in a nearby house before being rescued.

Grondmet Handels

After takeoff from Skiathos Island Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft lost height and crashed in the sea. All 10 occupants were rescued while the aircraft was destroyed.

Air Niagara

The crew departed Toronto-Lester Bowles Pearson Airport at 1107LT on a training flight to Muskoka Airport. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 9,500 feet, the crew was cleared to make a low pass over Orillia Airport. Following a passage at an altitude of about 150-200 feet and a speed of 200 knots, the crew initiated a climb when, at an altitude of 1,000 feet, the aircraft banked right then got inverted and crashed in a near vertical attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

Flight Safety Australia

The aircraft was engaged on a night freighter service from Cairns (CNS) to Brisbane (BNE) with intermediate stops at Townsville (TSV) and Proserpine (PPP). The flight departed Cairns at 18:47 hours. After arriving at Townsville the aircraft was refuelled and additional freight loaded before departing for Proserpine at 19:47 hours. The aircraft was cleared to track direct to Proserpine on climb to FL250. At 20:08 hours the pilot reported that the aircraft had left FL250 on descent into Proserpine and requested a clearance to track to intercept the 310 omni radial inbound for a DME Arrival. This request was approved and a short time later the aircraft reported established on the radial. At 20:16 hours, in answer to a question from Townsville Control, the aircraft reported at 2600 feet and was instructed to call Townsville Flight Service Unit. The aircraft complied with this instruction, and after the initial contact no further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The wreckage was located approximately 4 kilometres north-west of the threshold of runway 11 and in line with that runway. The aircraft had been destroyed by impact forces and the ensuing fire. A witness, who lived near the final approach path of the aircraft, reported that she observed the aircraft when it was on final approach. Analysis of her observations indicated that when she sighted the aircraft it was at a lower height than normal for the type of approach that the pilot reported would be flown. At the time of the sighting she did not notice anything unusual about the operation of the aircraft. Other persons at the Proserpine Aerodrome at the time of the accident reported rainstorms and strong winds in the vicinity.

Trans Europe Air Charter

On the day of the accident, the aircraft left Biggin Hill, U.K. on a private flight at 12:51 hrs with full fuel tanks to fly to Paris-Le Bourget, France, carrying a pilot, a pilot's assistant and two passengers. At Le Bourget, two more passengers embarked and the aircraft departed for Liverpool, without refuelling, at approximately 13:55 hrs. It landed at Liverpool at 15:25 hrs, where it was refuelled with 800 litres of turbine fuel, the pilot being seen to mix anti-icing additive to the fuel as it was dispensed. Two more adult passengers and two infants were embarked and the aircraft left Liverpool at 16:32 hrs en route to Stornoway, Outer Hebrides, Scotland. The pilot had submitted an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan to fly from Liverpool to Stornoway at Flight Level (FL) 310 via Dean Cross and Glasgow. At 16:53 hrs, when approximately over Dean Cross, he reported to the Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre (ScATCC) that he was at FL280 climbing to FL310. This radio call was heard by the pilot of another aircraft, registration N40GS. This aircraft was a Citation 11, which had been leased by the operating company of G-UESS and was carrying other members of the same private party to which the passengers in G-UESS belonged. N40GS had taken off from Biggin Hill and was also en-route to Stornoway via Dean Cross at FL350. When just north of Dean Cross, the pilot of N40GS saw G-UESS ahead of him and established radio contact with its pilot on the company discrete radio frequency. From that point on, the two aircraft remained in intermittent radio contact on this frequency. After passing Dean Cross, both aircraft were given clearance by ScATCC to route direct to Stornoway. At 17:00 hrs G-UESS was asked to climb to FL330 to avoid crossing traffic. At 17:18 hrs the pilot of N40GS reported that he still had G-UESS in sight and would be ready to descend in 3 minutes. At this time, his aircraft was slowly overtaking G-UESS. At 17:20 hrs ScATCC directed both aircraft to maintain a radar heading of 330° (M) so as to provide lateral separation during descent, and cleared N40GS to descend. Three minutes later, G-UESS was cleared to descend. During the descent, N40GS was cleared progressively to FL65 and G-UESS to FL85. At 17:29 hrs ScATCC released both aircraft from their radar headings, advising them that there was no other air traffic to affect them. ScATCC also advised N40GS that G-UESS was 5 miles to his right and slightly behind him. The pilot of G-UESS responded to this message by reporting that he had the other aircraft in sight. ScATCC then instructed both aircraft to establish radio contact with Stornoway. At 17:34 hrs Stornoway ATC passed details of the present Stornoway weather to both aircraft and asked them to report at 25 miles range from Stornoway. The weather as reported was fine with a light wind, good visibility and one eighth of low cloud. The pilot of G-UESS acknowledged the weather but did not repeat back the QNH. At this time, G-UESS was 49 miles from Stornoway descending through FL140. At 17:38 hrs N40GS reported at 25 miles range, and immediately afterwards G-UESS reported 30 miles from the airfield. N40GS was then cleared to 2,000 feet on the QNH of 1001. At 17:40 hrs the pilot of G-UESS reported that his range was 25 miles and that he had N40GS in sight. He asked for clearance to continue his descent and was cleared by the Stornoway controller to descend at his discretion with the aircraft ahead in sight. A moment later he was asked to report when he had the airfield in sight for a visual approach to runway 01. He acknowledged this message. No further communication was received from the aircraft and at 17:51 hrs, after failing to re-establish contact, the Stornoway controller reported to ScATCC that he had lost radio contact with G-UESS. The pilot of N40GS, who had meanwhile landed safely, stated afterwards that during the descent from FL350 they had passed through some layered stratus cloud and patches of altocumulus and cumulus cloud. The co-pilot in N40GS described a layer of lower cloud over the sea with tops between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, lying across the path of their descent into Stornoway. The pilot of N40GS was tracking directly to Stornoway airfield during the descent, using Omega/VLF area navigation equipment. At 17:45 hrs he reported to Stornoway ATC that he was just breaking cloud at 1,400 feet but stated later that he had cleared the base of the lowest cloud at between 1,100 and 1,000 feet, close to Stornoway. He also stated that the visibility below cloud was very good, even though the night was dark and he could not see the sea beneath him. N40GS experienced no icing and no significant turbulence during the descent. An intensive search was made for G-UESS that night, and two bodies were recovered one mile north-west of the last observed radar position. During the next 4 days, five more bodies and some small pieces of aircraft wreckage were found near the same position. The bodies of two more passengers were recovered from the sea bed on 28 February and 5 June 1984, and that of the pilot's assistant on 18 July 1984. Attempts to recover the main wreckage were not successful.

Cessna Aircraft Company

The aircraft collided with the ground during takeoff. The fuel tank in the right wing ruptured and the aircraft burned while sliding to a stop. The day before the accident the aircraft was washed and the thrust reverser doors were polished. After the service, the reverser doors circuit breakers which had been pulled were not reset. It was company policy to leave circuit breakers out that were pulled during servicing. Prior to flight, the aircraft was loaded and the engines started. The reversed unlock lights on both reverser annunciator panels illuminated. The pilot discussed the situation with the copilot and elected to go. He pushed the light assemblies which unlatched the light housing and put out the 'unlock' lights. After takeoff while the gear was retracting the aircraft yawed right and impacted the ground. All occupants evacuated and after the fire was put out a Cessna Aircraft investigator observed the two thrust reverser circuit breakers in the 'out', open position and partially covered by a flight chart. Both thrust reversers were deployed.

Winn Exploration Company

The aircraft was on a flight to a private ranch landing strip at night. The strip had an unlighted windsock at midfield and portable runway edge lights were in use. During arrival, the aircrew estimated the visibility was 3 to 4 miles and reported they would be able to land. Personnel at the ranch heard the aircraft fly over. One of them reported that earlier, the wind had been blowing hard and the air was full of dust, but at the time the aircraft arrived, dust had settled. A deputy sheriff noted that at times, the visibility was good, but at other times, it was poor. The aircraft owner, who was at the ranch, said he could see the aircraft lights at times (in the traffic pattern), but at times, he could not see them. After making two passes, the aircraft crashed in the area where it should have been on a base leg. An exam of the wreckage revealed it was in a left turn during impact. After initial impact, it bounced/slid 663 feet, then hit a tree covered canal levee and burned. No evidence of a preimpact/mechanical malfunction or failure was found. All four occupants were killed.

Georgia Pacific Corporation

The airplane overran the end of runway 23, following an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, crashed, and burned at the Mercer County Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The aircraft touched down between 500 and 2,000 feet on the runway which was covered with wet snow, and it did not decelerate normally. About 1,200 feet from the departure end of the runway, the pilot added engine thrust and rotated the aircraft for liftoff; however, it did not get airborne because of insufficient flying speed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and struck three localizer antennas and a 10-foot embankment before it plunged down a steep, densely wooded hillside. The five occupants were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.

Penarth Commercial Properties

The pilot had completed three flights previous to the accident flight on the same day. He left Jersey at 0729 hrs to fly to Coventry via Cardiff for a day of business meetings in the Midlands and to return, again via Cardiff, to Jersey in the evening. Before leaving Coventry at 1729 hrs he had filed Air Traffic Control (ATC) Flight Plans for the sectors to Cardiff and to Jersey, he also checked the weather conditions at Jersey. The conditions shown in the forecast were of poor weather with low cloud and visibility intermittently falling to 400 metres in drizzle with 7 oktas of cloud below 100 feet. The 1650 hrs weather report for Jersey was noted on the top of his copy of the flight plan, this showed: surface wind 2900 at 11 knots, visibility 6000 metres, cloud 4 oktas at 100 feet, 7 oktas at 200 feet, intermittently becoming 3000 metres visibility in drizzle with 6 oktas cloud at 100 feet. Sufficient fuel for a return flight from Jersey was on-loaded at Cardiff, the pilot remarked, to the Customs Officer, that he might have to return because of the weather at Jersey. The aircraft departed Cardiff for Jersey at 1821 hrs. It could not be established whether the pilot obtained the latest weather reports for Jersey, issued at 1720 hrs and 1750 hrs whilst at Cardiff; or if he availed himself of the in-flight weather broadcast service by London Volmet South, which transmitted the 1820 hrs Jersey weather report whilst en route. Had he done so, he would have been aware of deteriorating landing conditions because the 1820 hrs report for Jersey showed: visibility 300 metres, runway visual range (RVR) 800 metres in drizzle and 8 oktas of cloud below 200 feet. By 1842 hrs the aircraft was descending towards Jersey. The pilot was in radio contact with 'Jersey Zone' ATC, he had received his inbound clearance and had been advised of the latest weather conditions at Jersey. Radar guidance was provided by Jersey Zone, then later, by Jersey Approach Control who also advised that the RVR had fallen to 850 metres and, later, to 650 metres. On receipt of this information the pilot asked for the Guernsey weather. He was informed that the weather at Guernsey had improved to 1800 metres visibility although the cloud base was still below 100 feet. At 1857 hrs, when at 7 miles on the approach to runway 27 at Jersey, the pilot reported that he was established on the Instrument Landing System (lLS). He then contacted Jersey Tower controller who cleared G-BPCP to land. During the final stages of the approach, about 45 seconds before the crash, the Tower controller advised that the RVR had improved to 850 metres. This message was not acknowledged. The approach controller continued to observe the progress of the aircraft towards the runway on his radar screen until it was about one mile from the threshold, at which point it appeared to be on the extended centre line of the runway. The approach controller then left the radar screen and went to the window to watch for the aircraft landing. When the aircraft was half a mile from the runway, it was observed by an eyewitness to be on a normal approach path for runway 27. It was lost to view as it passed behind an adjacent house and almost immediately afterwards there was an increase in engine power. This increase was also heard by a professional pilot who was on the aerodrome, about 500 metres from the end of the runway; he said that the "engines started to spool-up as for an overshoot" and shortly afterwards he saw a flash and heard an explosion. The aircraft struck the roof of a house situated 190 metres to the north of the runway threshold centre line. The house caught fire, the tail of the aircraft lodged in the blazing roof whilst the remaining structure fell into a courtyard where it was destroyed by fire. The four persons occupying the house at the time were able to escape with minor injuries although one, a young girl, was detained in hospital with serious bums. The pilot was killed.

Venezuelan Government

The airplane departed La Carlota-General Francisco de Miranda earlier in the day on an inspection flight on behalf of the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture and Farming. While flying along the Colombia - Venezuela border, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crashed in a mountainous area near Machiques and came to rest in flames. All three passengers, among them Minister Luciano Valero, escaped uninjured while both pilots were killed.

National Jet Industries

The crew was completing a cargo flight from Albuquerque to Castle Rock. On final approach, he encountered poor weather conditions with icing, low ceiling and snow falls, reducing the visibility to one mile in blowing snow. On approach, the airplane crashed in flames few miles short of runway threshold. A pilot was seriously injured while two other occupants were killed.

Taxi Aéreo Jaraguá

After landing at Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest into the Guanabara Bay about 100 metres past the runway end. All eight occupants were quickly rescued and the airplane sank 30 minutes later.

Carlos Ribeiro

The airplane departed Belém-Val de Cans Airport at 0902LT bound for Uberlândia with two passengers and one pilot on board. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot contacted ATC and reported smoke coming from the instrument panel. Due to limited visibility, he elected to return to Belém Airport when control was lost. The airplane crashed into the Acará River near Acará, about 65 km southeast of Belém. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. Crew: Carlos Ribeiro, pilot. Passengers: Oscar Thompson Filho, ex Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Ernst Acklimenhofer.

Alpa Servicios Aéreos

Just after takeoff, the airplane went out of control and crashed in flames near the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.