Airbus A320

Pakistan International Airlines - PIA

On 22 May 2020 at 13:05 hrs PST, the Pakistan International Airlines aircraft Airbus A320-214, registration number AP-BLD, took off from Lahore (Allama Iqbal International Airport – AIIAP) Pakistan to perform a regular commercial passenger flight (PK8303) to Karachi (Jinnah International Airport – JIAP) Pakistan, with 8 crew members (01 Captain, 01 First Officer, and 06 flight attendants) and 91 passengers on board. At 14:35 hrs the aircraft performed an ILS approach for runway 25L and touched down without landing gears, resting on the engines. Both engines scrubbed the runway at high speed. Flight crew initiated a go-around and informed “Karachi Approach” that they intend to make a second approach. About four minutes later, during downwind leg, at an altitude of around 2000 ft, flight crew declared an emergency and stated that both engines had failed. The aircraft started losing altitude. It crashed in a populated area, short of runway 25L by about 1340 meters. An immediate subsequent post impact fire initiated. Out of 99 souls on-board, 97 were fatally injured and 02 passengers survived. On ground 04 persons were injured however 01 out of these reportedly expired later at a hospital. Below, the preliminary report published by the Pakistan AAIB.

Smartlynx Airlines

On 28th February 2018 at 10:021, the Smartlynx Airlines Estonia Airbus A320-214 registered ES-SAN took off from Tallinn airport Estonia to perform training flights with 2 crew members (captain and safety pilot), 4 students and 1 ECAA inspector on board. Following several successful ILS approaches and touch-and-go cycles, at 15:04, after a successful touch down with the runway, the aircraft did not respond as expected to sidestick inputs when reaching rotation speed. After a brief lift-off, the aircraft lost altitude and hit the ground close to the end of the runway. In the impact, the aircraft engines impacted the runway and the landing gear doors were damaged. After the initial impact, the aircraft climbed to 1590 ft from ground level and pitched down again. The pilots were able to stabilize the flight path by using manual pitch trim and engine thrust and make a U-turn back towards the runway. The crew declared an emergency and the aircraft was cleared for an emergency landing. During the approach, the aircraft lost power in both engines. The aircraft landed 150 m before the threshold of runway at 15:11. On landing, aircraft tires burst, and the aircraft veered off the runway and finally came to a stop 15 m left to the runway. The safety pilot and one of the students suffered minor impact trauma in this accident. The aircraft landing gear doors, landing gears, both engine nacelles, engines and aircraft fuselage suffered severe damage in this accident resulting in aircraft hull loss.

Egyptair

The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 2321LT on May 18 on an international schedule flight to Cairo. carrying 56 passengers and 10 crew members. The crew maintained radio contacts with the Greek ATC and was transferred to the Egyptian ATC but failed to respond. Two minutes after the airplane left the Greek Airspace, the aircraft descended from FL370 to FL220 in few seconds, apparently making a first turn to the left and then a 360 turn to the right before disappearing from the radar screen at 0229LT while at an altitude of 10'000 feet. It is believed that the aircraft crashed in the Mediterranean sea about 200 km north of Egyptian coast. The crew did not send any mayday message, thereby all assumptions remains open. It appears that some various debris such as luggage were found on May 20 about 290-300 km north of Alexandria. Two days after the accident, it is confirmed that ACARS messages reported smoke on board, apparently in the lavatory and also in a technical compartment located under the cockpit area. Above that, several technical issues were reported by the ACARS system. The CVR has been recovered on June 16, 2016, and the DFDR a day later. As both recorder systems are badly damaged, they will need to be repaired before analyzing any datas. On December 15, 2016, investigators reported that traces of explosives were found on several victims. Egyptian Authorities determined that there had been a malicious act. The formal investigation per ICAO Annex 13 was stopped and further investigation fell within the sole jurisdiction of the judicial authorities. Contradicting the Egyptian finding, the French BEA considered that the most likely hypothesis was that a fire broke out in the cockpit while the aircraft was flying at its cruise altitude and that the fire spread rapidly resulting in the loss of control of the aircraft.

Turkish Airlines - THY Türk Hava Yollari

The aircraft departed Milan-Malpensa Airport at 0700LT and proceeded to the east. Following an uneventful flight, the crew initiated the approach to Istanbul-Atatürk Airport Runway 05. At a height of 100 feet above the runway, the aircraft banked to the right, stalled and struck the runway surface. On impact, the right main gear was severely damaged and punctured the right wing. In such condition, the captain decided to abandon the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. The aircraft climbed to an assigned altitude of 3,800 feet then the crew declared an emergency and confirmed that the right engine was out of service. Few minutes later, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed a 20-minutes holding circuit over the bay of Marmara before a second approach to runway 35L. After touchdown, the right main gear collapsed, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres then veered off runway to the right, completed a 180 turn before coming to rest in a grassy area. All 97 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to the operator, the loss of control during the last segment was caused by turbulences from a preceding Boeing 787 that landed on the same runway 05.

Asiana Airlines

The approach to Hiroshima Airport was completed in marginal weather conditions. The autopilot was disengaged at 2,100 feet MSL when the aircraft descended below the glide path and hit approach lights and the localiser antenna located 325 meters short of runway 28. The aircraft continued the descent, hit the soft ground short of runway. Then it rolled on runway for some 1,154 meters, veered to the left, went off runway and came to rest 130 meters to the left of the concrete runway, some 1,477 meters past the runway threshold. All 82 occupants were evacuated, among them 27 (25 passengers and 2 crew members) were injured. The aircraft was considered as written off due to severe damages on both engines, ailerons, wings and the bottom of the fuselage. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were difficult with visibility up to 4 km, RVR on runway 28 variable from 300 to 1,800 meters, light rain, partial fog, one octa cloud at 0 feet, 4 octas at 500 feet, 6 octas at 1,200 feet.

Germanwings

The aircraft left Barcelona at 1000LT on a scheduled flight to Düsseldorf (flight 4U9525/GWI18G). At 1032LT, one minute after reaching its assigned cruising altitude of 38,000 feet near Toulon (level off), the aircraft started to lose altitude and continued a straight in descent during nine minutes, until it reached the altitude of 6,800 feet. It was later confirmed that no distress call was sent by the crew. Radar contact was lost at a height of 6,800 feet at 1041LT when the aircraft hit a mountain slope located near Prads-Haute-Bléone, northeast of Digne-les-Bains. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as good with no storm activity, reasonable wind component and no turbulence. The crash site was reached by first rescuers in the afternoon and the aircraft disintegrated on impact. None of the 150 occupants survived the crash. The second black box (DFDR) was found on April 2, nine days after the accident.

Air Asia Indonesia

The aircraft left Surabaya-Juanda Airport at 0535LT and climbed to its assigned altitude of FL320 that he reached 19 minutes later. The crew contacted ATC to obtain the authorization to climb to FL380 and to divert to 310° due to bad weather conditions. At 0617, the radio contact was lost with the crew and a minute later, the transponder stopped when the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. At this time, the aircraft was flying at the altitude of 36,300 feet and its speed was decreasing to 353 knots. It is believed the aircraft crashed some 80 nautical miles southeast off the Pulau Belitung Island, some 200 km from the Singapore Control Area. The Indonesian Company confirmed there were 156 Indonesian Citizens on board, three South Korean, one Malaysian, one Singapore and one French (the copilot) as well. At the time of the accident, the weather conditions were marginal with storm activity, rain falls and turbulence in the area between Pulau Belitung and Kalimantan. First debris were spotted by the Indonesian Navy some 48 hours later, about 150 NM east-south-east off the Pulau Belitung Island. About forty dead bodies were found up to December 30. The tail was recovered on January 10, 2015 and the black boxes were localized a day later. On January 12 and 13 respectively, the DFDR and the CVR were out of water and sent to Jakarta for analysis and investigations.

USAir - US Airways

Before pushback from the gate, the first officer, who was the pilot monitoring, initialized the flight management computer (FMC) and mistakenly entered the incorrect departure runway (27R instead of the assigned 27L). As the captain taxied onto runway 27L for departure, he noticed that the wrong runway was entered in the FMC. The captain asked the first officer to correct the runway entry in the FMC, which she completed about 27 seconds before the beginning of the takeoff roll; however, she did not enter the FLEX temperature (a reduced takeoff thrust setting) for the newly entered runway or upload the related V-speeds. As a result, the FMC's ability to execute a FLEX power takeoff was invalidated, and V-speeds did not appear on the primary flight display (PFD) or the multipurpose control display unit during the takeoff roll. According to the captain, once the airplane was cleared for takeoff on runway 27L, he set FLEX thrust with the thrust levers, and he felt that the performance and acceleration of the airplane on the takeoff roll was normal. About 2 seconds later, as the airplane reached about 56 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data indicate that the flight crew received a single level two caution chime and an electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message indicating that the thrust was not set correctly. The first officer called "engine thrust levers not set." According to the operator's pilot handbook, in response to an "engine thrust levers not set" ECAM message, the thrust levers should be moved to the takeoff/go-around (TO/GA) detent. However, the captain responded by saying "they're set" and moving the thrust levers from the FLEX position to the CL (climb) detent then back to the FLEX position. As the airplane continued to accelerate, the first officer did not make a callout at 80 KIAS, as required by the operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs). As the airplane reached 86 KIAS, the automated RETARD aural alert sounded and continued until the end of the CVR recording. According to Airbus, the RETARD alert is designed to occur at 20 ft radio altitude on landing and advise the pilot to reduce the thrust levers to idle. The captain later reported that he had never heard an aural RETARD alert on takeoff, only knew of it on landing, and did not know what it was telling him. He further said that when the RETARD aural alert sounded, he did not plan to reject the takeoff because they were in a high-speed regime, they had no red warning lights, and there was nothing to suggest that the takeoff should be rejected. The first officer later reported that there were no V-speeds depicted on the PFD and, thus, she could not call V1 or VR during the takeoff. She was not aware of any guidance or procedure that recommended rejecting or continuing a takeoff when there were no V-speeds displayed. She further said she "assumed [the captain] wouldn't continue to takeoff if he did not know the V-speeds." The captain stated that he had recalled the V-speeds as previously briefed from the Taxi checklist, which happened to be the same V-speeds for runway 27L. The captain continued the takeoff roll despite the lack of displayed V-speeds, no callouts from the first officer, and the continued and repeated RETARD aural alert. FDR data show that the airplane rotated at 164 KIAS. However, in a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he "had the perception the aircraft was unsafe to fly" and that he decided "the safest action was not to continue," so he commenced a rejected takeoff. FDR data indicate that the captain reduced the engines to idle and made an airplane-nose-down input as the airplane reached 167 KIAS (well above the V1 speed of 157 KIAS) and achieved a 6.7 degree nose-high attitude. The airplane's pitch decreased until the nose gear contacted the runway. However, the airplane then bounced back into the air and achieved a radio altitude of about 15 ft. Video from airport security cameras show the airplane fully above the runway surface after the bounce. The tail of the airplane then struck the runway surface, followed by the main landing gear then the nose landing gear, resulting in its fracture. The airplane slid to its final resting position on the left side of runway 27L. The operator's SOPs address the conditions under which a rejected takeoff should be performed within both low-speed (below 80 KIAS) and high-speed (between 80 KIAS and V1) regimes but provide no guidance for rejecting a takeoff after V1 and rotation. Simulator testing performed after the accident demonstrated that increasing the thrust levers to the TO/GA detent, as required by SOPs upon the activation of the "thrust not set" ECAM message, would have silenced the RETARD aural alert. At the time of the accident, neither the operator's training program nor manuals provided to flight crews specifically addressed what to do in the event the RETARD alert occurred during takeoff; although, 9 months before the accident, US Airways published a safety article regarding the conditions under which the alert would activate during takeoff. The operator's postaccident actions include a policy change (published via bulletin) to its pilot handbook specifying that moving the thrust levers to the TO/GA detent will cancel the RETARD aural alert. Although simulator testing indicated that the airplane was capable of sustaining flight after liftoff, it is likely that the cascading alerts (the ECAM message and the RETARD alert) and the lack of V-speed callouts eventually led the captain to have a heightened concern for the airplane's state as rotation occurred. FDR data indicate that the captain made erratic pitch inputs after the initial rotation, leading to the nose impacting the runway and the airplane bouncing into the air after the throttle levers had been returned to idle. Airbus simulation of the accident airplane's acceleration, rotation, and pitch response to the cyclic longitudinal inputs demonstrated that the airplane was responding as expected to the control inputs. Collectively, the events before rotation (the incorrect runway programmed in the FMC, the "thrust not set" ECAM message during the takeoff roll, the RETARD alert, and the lack of required V-speeds callouts) should have prompted the flight crew not to proceed with the takeoff roll. The flight crewmembers exhibited a self-induced pressure to continue the takeoff rather than taking the time to ensure the airplane was properly configured. Further, the captain initiated a rejected takeoff after the airplane's speed was beyond V1 and the nosewheel was off the runway when he should have been committed to the takeoff. The flight crewmembers' performance was indicative of poor crew resource management in that they failed to assess their situation when an error was discovered, to request a delayed takeoff, to communicate effectively, and to follow SOPs. Specifically, the captain's decision to abort the takeoff after rotation, the flight crew's failure to verify the correct departure runway before gate departure, and the captain's failure to move the thrust levers to the TO/GA detent in response to the ECAM message were all contrary to the operator's SOPs. Member Weener filed a statement, concurring in part and dissenting in part, that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Chairman Hart, Vice Chairman Dinh-Zarr, and Member Sumwalt joined the statement.

East Air

Following an uneventful flight from Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 01 at Kulob Airport. In heavy snow falls, the aircraft landed 230 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 255 km/h. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when, after a course of 520 metres, the right main gear contacted a snow berm. Simultaneously, both engines impacted a snow berm (up to 95 cm high) and stopped due to the high quantity of snow ingested. The aircraft veered to the right, lost its nose gear and came to rest in snow, 20 metres to the right of the runway and 1,190 metres from its threshold. All 192 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air India

On 05.01.2014, Air India Ltd. Airbus A-320-231 aircraft was scheduled to operate flight AI-889 (Delhi – Guwahati – Imphal) and return flight, AI-890 (Imphal – Guwahati – Delhi). Air India dispatch section at Delhi, which has received the roster of flight crew for the flights, had prepared the operational and ATC flight plans by using FWz flight planning software and taking into account the weight & weather (forecast winds). Same set of flight crew and cabin crew was rostered to operate the four sectors mentioned above. The flight was under Command of an ATPL holder with another ATPL holder as First Officer (FO) and 04 Cabin Crew members. The Commander was CAT III qualified and the FO was CAT I qualified. The FWz plan was prepared for VT-ESL, but later on the aircraft was changed to VT-ESH. As per the pilot in command as both the aircraft have bogie gear type of landing gear and the performance factor is also same for these aircraft, he had accepted the FWz plan of VT-ESL. As per the manager flight dispatch on duty, only first leg i.e. Delhi Guwahati was dispatched. Required fuel figures were informed to the engineering & commercial departments. Pilots were briefed with folders which in addition to flight plans contained current NOTAMs and meteorological information. The relevant information in these documents was highlighted for briefing to the flight crew. For the remaining sectors which were self briefing sectors flight plan and NOTAMs were given to the flight crew. As per the pre flight briefing register, both the crew members have visited the flight dispatch section for briefing and at around 10:40 hrs. IST have signed the dispatch register. The sectors Delhi – Guwahati – Imphal – Guwahati were as per schedule and were uneventful. As per the flight sector report, the transit time at Guwahati prior to Guwahati-Delhi sector was 50 minutes. The aircraft landed at Guwahati from Imphal at 11:15 hrs. UTC and 12.7 tons of fuel was uplifted. The filed alternates for the sector were Lucknow and Jaipur in that order. METARs of Delhi, Lucknow and Jaipur were provided at Guwahati. There was no specific briefing. Flight crew has taken the weather updates of destination and alternates before departure from Guwahati. Lucknow visibility at that time was 2000 meters with temperature and dew point of 18°C & 13°C respectively. The weather at Delhi (11:05 UTC) was RVR as 500 meters for runway 29, general visibility of 150 meters, with both temperature and dew point of 12°C. A speci was issued at 1130 UTC for Jaipur with winds 04 kts. visibility 3000m and haze. There was no significant clouding (NSC), temperature (T) 18°C & dew point (Dp) 13°C, QNH 1013. Pre flight walk around inspection was carried out by the crew at Guwahati and the aircraft was released by an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer which was accepted by the Pilot-in-command. There was no snag or technical problem with the aircraft. There was no component or system released under Minimum Equipment List (MEL). For its last leg, the aircraft departed Guwahati for Delhi at 1205 UTC with 173 passengers on board. The fuel requirement from Guwahati to Delhi with 179 persons on board was 12.2 tonnes. As per the commander of flight, additional 500 kgs of fuel was taken (total on board was 12.7 tonnes) considering the time of arrival in Delhi was that of traffic congestion and because of weather in Delhi. As per the Operational Flight Plan (OFP), there was 10 minutes of arrival delay at the destination. The aircraft was flown on managed speeds. Initially the flight was cleared by ATC for a lower level and was later on cleared to fly at cruising level of 340. The fuel was checked visually on the Flight Management System (FMS) and Fuel Page which was further cross checked with the OFP planned figures by the crew on way points but was not recorded on the Operational Flight Plan. As per the crew, the fuel consumed was marginally higher than planned. The time taken to reach the way points was also noted, which was almost the same as planned figures were. Enroute, there was no briefing about traffic congestion over Delhi by any of the ground stations of AAI. The crew, on reaching overhead Lucknow, has taken Lucknow weather and when the aircraft was in range of ATIS Delhi, Delhi ATIS weather was also copied. The aircraft was not equipped with Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) but was provided with HF/VHF system. As per the flight crew no flight following was provided either by flight dispatch or the IOCC of Air India. Weather updates were not seeked by the crew from the flight dispatch nor were any updates provided by Flight dispatch to the aircraft during the flight except when crew had asked Delhi dispatch about Jaipur visibility before finally making the decision to divert to Jaipur. Flight crew did not seek any update of Delhi or Jaipur weather till the time the aircraft came in contact with Delhi ATC. While in contact with Delhi ATC, the flight was advised to join hold as Delhi visibility Runway 28 RVR had dropped to the lower end of CAT I operations at this point runway 29 was below minima. AI 890 was number 12 in sequence and continued to remain in the holding pattern for the next 20-25 minutes. During this period there was no attempt on the part of flight crew to seek Lucknow weather. Air India Flight dispatch has also not given any advice to the flight about Jaipur or Lucknow weather. The weather (visibility / RVR) reported on Runway 29 was below CAT I conditions so runway was not available for this flight at that moment as the First Officer was only Cat I qualified. As per commander of the flight, they did 03 holds each of 1.5 minutes leg and flew headings 360° and 180° before intercepting the localizer Runway 28 at 35 miles. RVR runway 28 also dropped below Cat. I minimas, therefore the crew discontinued approach and climbed to 8000 feet on runway heading before going on heading 180. As per the Commander, though the 1st planned diversion alternate was Lucknow which had visibility of 2000 m i.e. above minima, but change of diversion to Jaipur was made as after missed approach they were closer to Jaipur and they had inquired about the visibility from Dispatch for Jaipur, which was provided as 2000 m. At this stage the crew did not check complete weather of Jaipur. Minimum diversion fuel to Jaipur was 2.9 tonnes as per FWz CFP. AI-890 commenced diversion to Jaipur with <U+2015>Fuel on Board<U+2016> of 3.1 tonnes. As per the Station Manager of Air India at Jaipur Airport, he received a call from their Executive Director, Northern Region at around 2040 hrs. IST on 05.01.2014 that due to Delhi weather, AI 890 had diverted to Jaipur. He then conveyed the same to the airport office and the concerned engineer. The aircraft came in contact with Jaipur for the first time when it was at 68 DME from Jaipur. At that time the crew came to know of the complete weather of Jaipur from ATIS as visibility of 900 m, Dew Point as 13°C, temperature as 13°C, and RVR of 1000m. At 60 miles and passing flight level 138, the crew intimated Jaipur that the aircraft is descending for flight level 100 as cleared by Delhi control, which was acknowledged by Jaipur ATC. The aircraft again informed Jaipur ATC its position at 55 miles, 50 miles and 42 miles from Jaipur which were also acknowledged by Jaipur ATC. During these contacts, weather of Jaipur was neither asked by the crew nor provided by the ATC. When the aircraft was at flight level 83, the crew asked ATC Jaipur to confirm that they can carry out ILS approach for runway 27 via 10 DME arc. While confirming the requested approach, Jaipur ATC has informed all the stations about the weather at that moment as visibility 400 m and RVR 1000 m. When the aircraft was at 30 miles from Jaipur, Jaipur ATC passed weather as visibility 400 m, RVR 1000 m and trend visibility becoming 350 m. The crew was asked to come overhead by Jaipur ATC. At 28 DME from Jaipur, the aircraft was maintaining 6000 feet and on request was cleared by Jaipur ATC to descend to 5000 feet. When the aircraft was at 25 DME, from Jaipur, ATC advised that the weather was deteriorating rapidly and visibility was 400 meters. The crew however intimated the ATC that they were committed to land at Jaipur due fuel. As per the crew the fuel on board at that point of time was 2.6 tonnes (approx.) and approach was commenced for Jaipur with a visibility of 500 m with trend reducing. The aircraft was no. 2 in approach at Jaipur and was cleared for VORDME arc ILS approach runway 27 at 25 nm. Crew had, as per them, checked Ahmedabad distance as 291 nm, with a fuel calculation of 2.7 tonnes and as sufficient fuel was not available for Ahmedabad so did not consider diverting to Ahmedabad at that moment. Crew has also stated that Udaipur watch hours were not available with them, Jodhpur is an Air Force field with restrictions and Delhi was packed so they continued approach to Jaipur knowing that visibility / RVR was rapidly deteriorating. Due to reducing visibility, Jaipur ATC asked all the aircraft inbound for Jaipur to come over head and join JJP hold. The crew of the subject flight asked for the weather which was provided as visibility 400 m & RVR 1000 m though RVR deteriorating to 550 m. The flight from the <U+2015>Arrival Route<U+2016> flew the VORDME arc for ILS runway 27. The ATC had transmitted the RVR as 200 m and visibility as 50 m with trend reducing. Another scheduled flight ahead of AI-890 carried out a missed approach and diverted to Ahmedabad. When the aircraft was above MDA (1480 feet AGL), ATC reported RVR 50 m and cleared the aircraft to land subject to minima. Both the flight crew maintained that they had seen the runway lights. ILS approach was performed with dual AP until 200ft RALT. After descending below MDA on auto pilot, the commander disconnected the auto pilot. Captain performed the final approach manually. The aircraft deviated to the left of the runway centre line and touched down on soft ground (in kutcha) on the LH side of the runway. During touchdown and landing roll, the visibility was zero and crew were unable to see any of the reference cues. The crew had heard rumbling sound during landing roll. As per the commander, he did the manual landing as he was not sure if he could do auto-land on a ground facility which is CAT I certified airfield in actual zero visibility. The aircraft continued to roll/ skid on the unpaved surface and during this period the left wing impacted trees causing damage to the left wing. Thereafter aircraft turned right and entered the runway finally coming to a halt on the LH side of runway. There was no fire. ATC Jaipur informed the Airport Manager of the Airline at Jaipur that their flight AI-890 had blocked the runway and also requested them to send equipments / manpower to attend the aircraft and get the aircraft removed. The Station AME of the airline alongwith the Asst Officer (Comm.), who was at the tarmac were instructed by the Station Manager to move to the aircraft. As per the AME, the visibility was almost nil and they could not move without the help of =Follow Me‘ Jeep. The ATC was informed to arrange the jeep to escort the personnel upto the aircraft. The AME after reaching the aircraft observed that the no. 1 main wheel of the aircraft had decapped/ damaged and the port side wing was damaged. The fuel remaining on board was 2400 kgs. The disembarkation of passengers was carried out on the runway itself and passengers were sent to the terminal building. Since the aircraft was not in a position to be either taxied or towed to the parking bay, the baggage of passengers was offloaded at the runway itself and sent to the terminal. One passenger suffered minor bruise on the knuckle of his right hand middle finger. He was attended to by the cabin crew in the aircraft and also by the doctor at the airport. Medical check-up of all the crew members including breathanalyser (BA) test was done by the medical officer, M.I. room Jaipur airport. The BA test was negative for all the crew members with a reading of 00.00. Since the aircraft was obstructing the runway, the airport was shut down for any further flight operations till the runway could be cleared. A NOTAM was issued to this effect. The aircraft was towed the next day to parking bay no.5 at terminal-1 by 1200 hrs and was later repositioned on a non-operational remote bay.

Tunis Air

Following an uneventful flight from Casablanca-Mohamed V Airport, the crew started the approach to Tunis-Carthage International Airport Runway 19 and encountered marginal weather conditions. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for a distance of 1,600 metres then deviated to the right. The aircraft veered off runway, rolled in a grassy area for 114 metres when the nose gear impacted the concrete perpendicularly runway 11/29. On impact, the nose gear was torn off and the aircraft rolled for another 130 metres before coming to rest. All 83 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, strong crosswinds and heavy rain falls passed over the airport.

USAir - US Airways

Aircraft experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from La Guardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crew members evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged.

XL Airways

Flight GXL888T from Perpignan-Rivesaltes aerodrome was undertaken in the context of the end of a leasing agreement, before the return of D-AXLA to its owner. The program of planned checks could not be performed in general air traffic, so the flight was shortened. In level flight at FL320, angle of attack sensors 1 and 2 stopped moving and their positions did not change until the end of the flight. After about an hour of flight, the airplane returned to the departure aerodrome airspace and the crew was cleared to carry out an ILS procedure to runway 33, followed by a go around and a departure towards Frankfurt/Main (Germany). Shortly before overflying the initial approach fix, the crew carried out the check on the angle of attack protections in normal law. They lost control of the airplane, which crashed into the sea.

TACA International Airlines - Transportes Aéreos Centro Americanos

A TACA Airlines Airbus A320, flight TA390, with Irish Registry EI-TAF, with 135 passengers and crew on board, overran at the end of the runway during landing at Tegucigalpa caused the deaths of three people on board and two on the ground. The government of Honduras delegated the conduct of investigation to the Salvadoran Civil Aviation Authorities, as provided for in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. In accordance with international agreements, France sent two investigators from the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses), accompanied by five technical advisors from Airbus; United States sent two investigators from the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), accompanied by one advisor from FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) and one technical Advisor from IAE (International Aero Engine); and Ireland sent one investigator. Both flight recorders (CVR and DFDR) were recovered and taken to the NTSB in order to perform the read out. The following data result from the analysis done by the BEA and Airbus of the accident recorders, which have been processed within the NTSB facilities under the leadership of the in-charge Authorities. It is confirmed that the aircraft was dispatched without any deferred MEL item. Prior to landing, the wind information given by the ATC to the crew was 190°/10kt and ATC also confirmed that the runway was wet. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF). Landing configuration was established with Slats/Flaps fully extended, gear down, ground spoilers armed, autobrake selected to MED. The aircraft landing weight was 63.5t (max landing weight 64.5t), Vapp 137kt. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 02 and landed with Autopilot and Flight Directors OFF, and autothrust engaged in managed speed mode. At time of touch down, IAS was 139kt and Ground Speed (GS) was 159kt (estimated tailwind was 12kt from DFDR data analysis). The aircraft landed on runway 02 (Runway 02 is 3297 feet high and has a displaced threshold of 213m). The Landing Distance Available (LDA) for runway 02 is of 1649m. The touch down occurred at approximately 400m from the runway 02 displaced threshold. Immediately after touchdown, the crew selected MAX REV, and both engine reversers and the Ground Spoilers (G/S) deployed normally. The nosewheel touch down occurred 7s after the Main Landing Gear (MLG) following PF inputs. The crew applied manual braking 4s after MLG touch down and commanded maximum pedal braking in 10s (14s after MLG touch down). At 70 knots Indicated Airspeed Speed (IAS), upon Pilot Non Flying (PNF) call-out, the PF selected IDLE REV. The remaining distance to the runway end was approximately 190m. The aircraft overran the runway at 54kt and dropped down the 20 m embankment sustaining severe damage on impact with the ground. The landing performance analysis confirms that the landing performances are consistent with runway condition and crew actions.

Philippine Airlines - PAL

Following an uneventful flight from Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport, the crew started the approach to Butuan Airport in good weather conditions. After landing on runway 12/30 which is 1,965 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down an embankment and came to rest in a coconut grove. The cockpit was partially destroyed and both pilots were seriously injured while 32 passengers escaped with minor injuries. 120 other occupants were unhurt and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

TAM Brasil - Taxi Aéreo Marilia - Transportes Aéreos Regionais

On 17 July 2007, at 17:19 local time (20:19 UTC), the Airbus aircraft, model A320, registration PR-MBK, operating as flight JJ3054, departed from Porto Alegre (SBPA) destined to Congonhas Airport (SBSP) in São Paulo city, São Paulo State. There were a total of 187 souls on board the aircraft, being six active crew members and 181 passengers, including 2 infants and 5 extra crew members (not on duty). The weather prevailing along the route and at the destination was adverse, and the crew had to make a few deviations. Up to the moment of the landing, the flight occurred within the expected routine. The aircraft was operating with the number 2 engine reverser de-activated, in accordance with the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). According to information provided to the TWR by crews that had landed earlier, the active runway at Congonhas (35L) was wet and slippery. During the landing, at 18:54 local time (21:54 UTC), the crew noticed that the ground spoilers had not deflected, and the aircraft, which was not slowing down as expected, veered to the left, overran the left edge of the runway near the departure end, crossed over the Washington Luís Avenue, and collided with a building in which the cargo express service of the very operator (TAM Express) functioned, and with a fuel service station. All the persons on board perished. The accident also caused 12 fatalities on the ground among the people that were in the TAM Express building. The aircraft was completely destroyed as a result of the impact and of the raging fire, which lasted for several hours. The accident caused severe damage to the convenience shop area of the service station and to some vehicles that were parked there. The TAM Express building sustained structural damages that determined its demolition. The aircraft was completely destroyed.

Armavia

On 2 May 2006 the Armavia A320, registered EK-32009, was undertaking passenger flight RNV 967 from Zvartnots (Yerevan, Armenia) to Adler (Sochi, Russia). Preliminary preparation of the crew was conducted on 23-24 May 2006 under the guidance of the airline’s Flight Director, in accordance with the requirements of ROLRGA RA-2000, Section 7.2.1. Pre-flight briefing of the crew was conducted on the day of departure, under the guidance of the Captain, in accordance with the requirements of ROLRGA RA-2000, Section 8.2.1 On 2 May 2006 at 19.30 the crew passed the pre-flight medical examination. The crew’s pre-flight rest period exceeded 24 hours. In accordance with ROLRGA RA-2000 and Work-Rest Norms for civil aircraft crews from the Republic of Armenia, each crew member is individually responsible for adherence to the pre-flight rest regime. It should be noted that it was difficult for the crew to take adequate rest during the day before the night flight, due to impairment of bio-rhythms. That is most likely why, in their cockpit conversations the crew members mentioned that they had not got enough sleep. In order to make their decision for departure, the crew obtained the observed weather data and the weather forecast for the takeoff, landing and alternate aerodromes that met the requirements for IFR flights. According to the documents submitted, the airplane takeoff weight and the centre of gravity were 62,712 kg and 29.9% mean aerodynamic chord, i.e. within the A320 FCOM limitations. There were 113 occupants on board: 105 passengers (including 5 children and 1 baby), 2 pilots, 5 flight attendants and 1 engineer. The airplane took off from Zvartnots airport at 20:47. Takeoff, climb and cruise were uneventful. The first communication between the Sochi approach controller and the crew took place at 21:10:20. At that moment the airplane was beyond the coverage area of Sochi aerodrome radar. Up until 21:17 the approach controller and the crew discussed the observed and forecast weather, and as a result the crew decided to return to Yerevan. At 21:26:37, after the decision had already been made, the crew asked the controller about the latest observed weather. At 21:30:49 the controller informed the crew that visibility was 3,600 m and the cloud ceiling 170 m. At 21.31.14 the crew decided to continue the flight to Sochi airport. The next communication with the approach controller was at 22:00:45. At that moment the airplane was descending to an altitude of 3,600 m heading to GUKIN point and was being tracked by the Sochi radar. The approach controller cleared the airplane for descent to 1,800 m and reported the observed weather at Sochi, as at 22:00, for runway 06, which was above the aerodrome minimum. Then the crew was handed over to the holding and tower controllers, and was cleared for descent to 600 m, as per aerodrome pressure QNH 1016 hPa, before entering the turn to final. While performing the turn to final, the runway extended centreline was overshot. Having eliminated the deviation, the airplane started descending along the glide slope, following the approach pattern. At 22:10:45 the crew reported extension of the landing gear and their readiness for landing. In response they were advised of the distance of 10 km and weather 4000 x 190, and were cleared for landing. However, about 30 seconds later, the controller advised the crew of the observed cloud ceiling at 100 m and instructed them to stop their descent and carry out a right turn and climb up to 600 m and also to get in touch with the holding controller. The last communication with the crew was at 22:12:35. After that the crew did not respond to any of the controller’s calls. At 22:13:03 the airplane struck the water, was destroyed and sank.

America West Airlines

After an asymmetrical deployment of the thrust reversers during landing rollout deceleration, the captain failed to maintain directional control of the airplane and it veered off the runway, collapsing the nose gear and damaging the forward fuselage. Several days before the flight the #1 thrust reverser had been rendered inoperative and mechanically locked in the stowed position by maintenance personnel. In accordance with approved minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures, the airplane was allowed to continue in service with a conspicuous placard noting the inoperative status of the #1 reverser placed next to the engine's thrust lever. When this crew picked up the airplane at the departure airport, the inbound crew briefed the captain on the status of the #1 thrust reverser. The captain was the flying pilot for this leg of the flight and the airplane touched down on the centerline of the runway about 1,200 feet beyond its threshold. The captain moved both thrust levers into the reverse position and the airplane began yawing right. In an effort at maintaining directional control, the captain then moved the #1 thrust lever out of reverse and inadvertently moved it to the Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust lever in the full reverse position. The thrust asymmetry created by the left engine at TOGA power with the right engine in full reverse greatly increased the right yaw forces, and they were not adequately compensated for by the crew's application of rudder and brake inputs. Upon veering off the side of the runway onto the dirt infield, the nose gear strut collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose down pitch attitude, about 7,650 feet from the threshold. There was no fire. Company procedures required the flying pilot (the captain) to give an approach and landing briefing to the non flying pilot (first officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the thrust reverser's MEL'd status, nor was he specifically required to do so by the company operations manual. Also, the first officer did not remind the captain of its status, nor was there a specific requirement to do so. The operations manual did state that the approach briefing should include, among other things, "the landing flap setting...target airspeed...autobrake level (if desired) consistent with runway length, desired stopping distance, and any special problems." The airline's crew resource management procedures tasked the non flying pilot to be supportive of the flying pilot and backup his performance if pertinent items were omitted from the approach briefing. The maintenance, repair history, and functionality of various components associated with the airplane's directional control systems were evaluated, including the brake system, the nose landing gear strut and wheels, the brakes, the antiskid system, the thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these components.

Iberia - Lineas Aéreas de Espana

The aircraft was on its final approach to runway 30 of Bilbao Airport. The aircraft, operated by Iberia, was employed on flight IB1456, a scheduled domestic flight from Barcelona to Bilbao, with 136 passengers and 7 crew members on board. The expected flight time was 53 minutes. The current conditions in Bilbao were night VMC, with a 10 knots and southwest (SW) wind and gusts of up to 25 knots. Visibility was more than 10 km and there were scattered clouds above 5,600 feet. The sun had set four hours earlier and all electronic and visual aids in the airport were fully operational. There was no rain and the flight was conducted unter IFR rules. Since the takeoff from Barcelona at 2201LT, the flight had been uneventful. The pilot flying was seated on the right hand side, and he was in line flying under supervision. The captain seated on the left hand side was supervising the flight. A third flight crew member, seated in the jumpseat, was the first officer who had given his seat to the pilot under supervision on the right hand seat. On course to Bilbao, the aircraft flew over Pamplona at FL150, where they were informed of possible light turbulence. A about 25 NM from their destination and at 7,500 feet altitude, they crossed a small cumulus with strong turbulence. Descending through 6,000 feet and established on the Bilbao localizer they found winds of 55 knots. The ATC tower (TWR) of Bilbao cleared them to land on runway 30, and informed the decision height, 247 feet, under VMC conditions and continued the approach to land. One minute prior to touchdown, the tower informed of wind conditions of 240° 8 knots. The aircraft conditions during the approach were: weight, 62,380 kilos; centre of gravity, 28,66% MAC, full flaps. The reference speed (Vref) was 132 knots and the approach speed (Vapp), 142 knots. Autopilot was disconnected by the crew at 400 feet to continue the approach manually. In the last few seconds prior to touchdown, the vertical descent speed was very high, around 1,200 feet per minute (6 metres per second) and the 'sink rate' warning of the GPWS sounded twice. The aircraft did not react to the pitch-up order input applied by both pilots on the side-sticks, due to the design software logic that operates at these specific moments, and did not flare. Announcements of 'dual-input' warning were heard at the time. Then the captain, in view of the 'sink rate' warnings, selected TOGA power setting to go around and abort the landing. The pilot's actions on the flight controls could not avoid a hard touchdown of the aircraft in a slight nose down attitude, and the captain decided to continue the landing and to stop the aircraft. The aircraft slowed-down along 1,100 metres of the runway within the paved surface. It finally came to a stop with its horizontal axis at an angle of 60° to the right of the runway centerline. During the landing roll the nose landing gear collapsed, the four tires of the main gear burst and the engine nacelles, on which the aircraft was leaning after the collapse, dragged along the pavement. Once the aircraft came to a halt, the captain ordered its evacuation, which was carried out using all the exit doors and their slides. During the evacuation a cabin crew member and 24 passengers were injured. All injuries were considered minor except for one, a female passenger whose injuries were considered serious. Seven injured people were taken to hospital.

Gulf Air

On 23 August 2000, at about 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF072, an Airbus A320-212, a Sultanate of Oman registered aircraft A4O-EK, crashed at sea at about 3 miles north-east of Bahrain International Airport. GF072 departed from Cairo International Airport, Egypt, with two pilots, six cabin crew and 135 passengers on board for Bahrain International Airport, Muharraq, Kingdom of Bahrain. GF072 was operating a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the provisions of the Sultanate of Oman Civil Aviation Regulations Part 121 and was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. GF072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. At about one nautical mile from the touch down and at an altitude of about 600 feet, the flight crew requested for a left hand orbit, which was approved by the air traffic control (ATC). Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centreline on a south-westerly heading, the captain decided to go-around. Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered the radar vectors, which the flight crew accepted. GF072 initiated a go-around, applied take-off/go-around thrust, and crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow climb to about 1000 feet. As the aircraft rapidly accelerated, the master warning sounded for flap over-speed. A perceptual study, carried out as part of the investigation, indicated that during the go-around the flight crew probably experienced a form of spatial disorientation, which could have caused the captain to falsely perceive that the aircraft was ‘pitching up’. He responded by making a ‘nose-down’ input, and, as a result, the aircraft commenced to descend. The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) voice alarm sounded: “whoop, whoop pull-up …”. The GPWS warning was repeated every second for nine seconds, until the aircraft impacted the shallow sea. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces, and all 143 persons on board were killed.

Philippine Airlines - PAL

Flight PR137 was a regular scheduled passenger flight and departed Manila for Bacolod at 18:40. The airplane departed with the thrust reverser of engine n°1 inoperative. At 19:20, PR137 called Bacolod Approach Control and reported passing FL260 and 55 DME to Bacolod . The crew then requested landing instructions and was instructed to descend to FL90 after passing Iloilo and descend to 3,000 feet for a VOR runway 04 approach. Wind was 030° at 08 kts, altimeter 1014 mbs, transition level at FL60 and temperature at 28°C. At 19:28, the flight requested to intercept the final approach to runway 04 and Approach Control replied "PR 137 visual approach on final". At 19:37, Bacolod Tower cleared the flight to land at runway 04 and the clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. The approach was flown with the Autothrust system was engaged in SPEED mode. The thrust lever of engine no.1 was left in Climb detent. Upon touchdown the first officer called out "no spoilers, no reverse, no decel". Engine no.2 was set to full reverse thrust after touchdown, but the engine no .1 thrust lever was not retarded to idle and remained in the climb power position. Consequently, the spoilers did not deploy. Because one engine was set to reverse, the autothrust system automatically disengaged. With the autothrust disengaged, no. 1 engine thrust increased to climb thrust. Due to the asymmetrical thrust condition, the A320 ran off the right side of the runway. At this speed, rudder and nosewheel steering are ineffective. Engine no.2 was moved out of reverse up to more than 70 percent N1 and the airplane swerved back onto the runway. The A320 continued past the runway end. The aircraft hit the airport perimeter fence and then jumped over a small river. It continued to slice through a hallow block fence where it went through several clusters of shanties and trees. No fire ensued after the crash.

Gulf Air

During the takeoff roll on runway 31 at Abu Dhabi Airport, just before V1, the aircraft started to vibrate and longitudinal control was lost. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiate an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to a halt few dozen metres further. On impact, the cockpit and both engines were almost destroyed and the left wing broke in two.

Lufthansa

Following an uneventful flight from Frankfurt, the crew started the descent to Warsaw-Okecie Airport in poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, wind shear, rain falls and CB's. After being cleared to land on runway 11, the wind component changed during the last seconds. The right main gear touched down 770 metres past the runway threshold (aircraft's speed was 170 knots). The left main gear touched down 9 seconds later, 1,525 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the thrust reversers and spoilers but the remaining distance was insufficient. At a speed of 72 knots, the aircraft overran, went down an embankment, lost its left engine and came to rest 90 metres further, bursting into flames. A female passenger and the captain were killed while all other occupants were rescued, among them 51 were seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Air Inter

On 20 January 1992, an Airbus A320 registered F-GGED and operated by the company Air Inter, made the scheduled connection by night between Lyon-Satolas and Strasbourg-Entzheim using the call sign ITF 148 DA. The aircraft took off from Lyon at approx. 17.20 hours with 90 passengers, 2 flight crew members and 4 cabin crew members on board. No problems were reported by the crew during the course of the flight. The runway in operation at Strasbourg-Entzheim was 05. After listening to the ATIS announcements, the crew planned to carry out an ILS approach procedure for runway 23, followed by visual manoeuvres for a landing on runway 05. Before transferring the aircraft to Strasbourg Approach Control, the Centre Régional de la Navigation Aérienne (CRNA) Est (Eastern Regional Air Navigation Centre) in Reims cleared it to descend to Flight Level 70 near the ANDLO way point. At 18.09 hours contact was established with Strasbourg Approach Control. While the aircraft was crossing Flight Level 150 in descent its distance to STR VOR was around 22 nautical miles. Strasbourg Control cleared it to continue its descent to an altitude of 5,000 feet QNH, then, after announcing that it had passed ANDLO, cleared it to a VOR-DME approach to runway 05. However, the altitude and speed of the aircraft were such that the direct approach procedure could no longer be carried out and the crew informed Control of their intention to carry out an ILS Rwy 23 approach procedure followed by visual manoeuvres for runway 05. Control warned them that this choice would mean a delay, as three aircraft were in the process of taking off from runway 05, using an IFR flight plan. The crew then modified their strategy and advised Control that they would carry out a complete VOR-DME procedure for runway 05. Control then suggested radar guidance to bring them back to ANDLO, thus curtailing the approach procedure. The aircraft was a few seconds away from STR VOR. The crew accepted and carried out the manoeuvres prescribed by the controller: left turn towards heading 230 for an outbound track parallel to the approach axis, then a reciprocal turn towards the ANDLO point. At 18.19 hours the Controller informed the crew that the aircraft was abeam the ANDLO way point and cleared them to final approach. The aircraft then commenced its descent, approximately at the distance allowed for the approach procedure, i.e. 11 nautical miles from STR VOR. Thirty seconds later the Controller requested the crew to call back passing STR. The crew acknowledged. This was the last contact with the aircraft. The wreckage was discovered at 22.35 hours, on a slope of Mont "La Bloss" at a topographical level close to 800 metres (2,620 feet), at a distance approximately 0.8 nautical miles (1,500 m) to the left of the approach path and 10.5 nautical miles (19.5 km) from the runway threshold. Five crew members and 82 passengers were killed while 9 other occupants, including one crew members, were rescued.

Indian Airlines

Indian Airlines Flight 605 took off from Mumbai, India, at 11:58 for a domestic flight to Bangalore. At 12:25 Bangalore approach was contacted and prevailing weather was passed on to the crew (wind variable 5 knots, visibility 10 km, clouds 2 octa 2,000 feet, temperature 27° C, QNH 1018). At 12:44 the aircraft was cleared to descend to FL110. Reaching FL110, vectors were given for a visual runway 09 approach. On final approach, the aircraft descended well below the normal approach profile and kept descending until it struck the boundaries of the Karnataka Golf Club (2,300 feet short of the runway and 200 feet right of the extended centerline. The aircraft rolled for 80 feet and lifted off again for about 230 feet and came down again on the 17th green of the golf course. The landing gear wheels dug into the ground and the aircraft impacted a 12 feet high embankment, causing the gears and engines to be sheared off. The aircraft continued over the embankment and came to rest in a grassy, marshy and rocky area.

Air France

A newly delivered Airbus A320, F-GFKC, was destroyed when it impacted trees during a low pass over the runway at Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport, France. A fire broke out, killing three occupants. The Mulhouse Flying Club had requested Air France to perform a fly by at their air show at Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport on June 26, 1988. Air France prepared a low speed pass with the gear down at 100 feet and the another pass at high speed in clean configuration. While Air France had performed more than twenty low passes since 1987, the altitude of 100 feet was not allowed according to regulations. French air safety regulations imposed a minimum VFR overflight height of 170 feet. The fly by was to be performed using an Airbus A320, an aircraft model that was introduced by launching customer Air France in March 1988. F-GFKC was the third A320 in the fleet and had been delivered on June 23. The flight crew scheduled to perform the demonstration flight were two captains: the head of A320 training subdivision (Pilot Flying) and a captain participating in the placing into service of the A320(Pilot Monitoring). On board the flight were four cabin crew members and 130 passengers. The aircraft took off from nearby Basel-Mulhouse Airport at 14:41 and climbed to 1000 feet agl. The crew started the descent three minutes later and Habsheim was in sight at 450 feet agl. The Pilot Monitoring informed the Pilot Flying that the aircraft was reaching 100 feet at 14:45:14. The descent continued to 50 feet 8 seconds later and further to 30-35 feet. Go-around power was added at 14:45:35. The A320 continued and touched trees approximately 60 meters from the end of runway 34R at 14:45:40 with a 14 degree pitch attitude and engines at 83% N1. The plane sank slowly into the forest and a fire broke out.