Airbus A310

Serve Air

The crew completed the approach and landing on runway 17 in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. After touchdown on a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 17 is 2,000 metres long). It overran and collided with several houses before coming to rest 300 metres further. All five crew members evacuated safely while eight people on the ground were killed.

Yemenia Yemen Airways

Following an uneventful flight from Sana'a, the crew started a night approach to Moroni-Prince Saïd Ibrahim Airport runway 02. Weather conditions were considered as good with a 10 km visibility, an OAT of 24° C. and a wind from 180° gusting to 25 knots for runway 20. For unknown reasons, the crew initiated a go-around procedure when the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 6 km from the airport. A young girl aged 12 was found alive few hours later while 152 other occupants were killed. Both CVR and DFDR were found almost two months later at a depth of 1,200 metres. The final report was published in June 2013.

Sudan Airways

The Airbus 310 serial number 548 owned by Sudan Airways Was entered in Sudan Civil Register on 15/09/2007 , designated registration marks ST-ATN in accordance to registration certificate No. 0493 dated 15/09/2007 and issued with Certificate of airworthiness No AWP/COA/0203/2007 dated 19/09/2007. On the morning of 10th June at 8:30 hrs (local time 05:30 UTC) after arriving from Cairo with a deactivated no 1 engine reverse as being a carry forward defect and being labeled according to MEL, the captain accepted the aircraft to carry out its scheduled flight to Amman via Damascus. The trip en-route to Amman was uneventful. Same day in the afternoon, the Airbus A310, ST-ATN, was en-route flying from Damascus (Syria) to Khartoum (Sudan) with 203 passengers and 11 crew members on board. The Airbus approached Khartoum in the afternoon and due to bad weather conditions, the captain decided to divert to Port Sudan. The aircraft landed Port Sudan Airport normally and was refuelled with 20 tons of Jet A1. As mentioned by the Captain that he was in contact with Khartoum enquiring about the weather. After staying on ground at Port Sudan for about 1:15 hour, and being informed that the weather was getting better, the Captain decided to return back to Khartoum. A310, ST-ATN, took off to Khartoum where the captain initiated a night approach for the runway 36 as pilot flying. He got the clearance to land after the controller provided him with wind information (320° / 7 Kt) and runway condition (wet). The left engine thrust reverser was unserviceable and inhibited as per Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures. The aircraft landed smoothly about 17:26 UTC. R/W 36 landing and within 900 meters range from the threshold of R/W 36 as stated by the flying pilot. The captain reported that he experienced some difficulties in maintaining the aircraft on the centre line just after setting both thrust levers in the reverse position. Then he did not succeed in slowing down the aircraft nor could stop it before the end of the runway. The aircraft longitudinally overran the runway and came to a stop 215 meters after the runway end. Then it caught fire on its right side. The right hand slides could not be deployed, the crew and the passengers evacuated the aircraft from the left front slide, twenty nine passengers and one cabin crew were fatally injured.

Biman Bangladesh Airlines

During the takeoff roll from Dubai Intl Airport runway 12L, after V1 speed, the crew heard a loud bang then noticed severe vibrations when the nose gear collapsed. The captain abandoned the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. The aircraft slid on its nose for few hundred metres and came to rest just before the end of the runway, slightly to the left of the centerline. All 250 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

S7 Airlines

On July 8, 2006 an <U+0410>310 airplane with state registration number F-OGYP (France), leased by <U+041E><U+0410><U+041E> Aviakompania Sibir, and with a flight crew consisting of the Captain and the co-pilot, was flying scheduled passenger flight <U+0421>7 778 from Domodedovo to Irkutsk. Apart from the two cockpit personnel, there were 6 flight attendants and 195 passengers on board (of these, 2 worked for the company), which included 181 nationals of Russia, 3 of Germany, 3 of the PRC, 2 of Poland, 3 of Belarus, 2 of Moldova and 1 of Azerbaijan. The airplane's payload according to the flight manifest was 19,800 kg (which included about 80 kg of hazardous freight - perfume), its take-off weight 140414 kg (maximum permissible – 150,000 kg), and center-of-gravity position 25.5% (the range of permissible center-of-gravity positions for take-off is 18% - 32%). Upon completion of the pre-flight preparation, the crew took off from Domodedovo airport at 17:17 (17:15 – as per schedule) and after climbing set a course for its destination airport of Irkutsk (alternate airport Bratsk). The flight proceeded without incident and at 22:17 the crew initiated descent for an approach and landing at Irkutsk airport. At 22:43:40 the airplane landed without misalignment on runway 30 at Irkutsk airport. Before the flight, in accordance with Sibir’s MEL, the maintenance personnel deactivated the thrust reverser on the airplane's left engine after hearing the crew's observation about this thrust reverser's malfunction during a previous flight. After touchdown all spoiler sections prepared ("armed") by the crew for utilization were deployed and the autobrake in Low mode, previously selected by the crew, was activated. The pilot moved the right engine (no. 2) thrust reverser forward. However, simultaneously with the subsequent reduction of the reverse mode of engine no. 2, engine no. 1 started to speed up (forward thrust), which led to an increase in airplane speed and the onset of torque that pulled the airplane to the right. The crew failed to perceive the cause of what was happening. In spite of intense wheel-braking efforts, the airplane used up the entire length of the runway and overshot its end at a speed of about 180 kph. The airplane then continued to travel on wet soil. At a distance of about 300 m from the departure threshold of the runway, the airplane collided with a concrete barrier of the aerodrome and then with some garages located directly behind the barrier, after which the airplane, now seriously damaged, stopped. As a result of the destruction of the fuel tanks the fuel ignited and fire penetrated the airplane's interior. As a result of the accident, 125 individuals died, including the two pilots and three of the flight attendants. The airplane was practically completely destroyed by the fire.

Hapag-Lloyd

After takeoff from Chania-Souda Airport, the crew reported technical problems with the right main gear that could not be raised properly in its wheel well. The captain decided to continue to Munich in a gear down configuration but the fuel consumption increased. En route, the crew realized he could not make it to Munich so diverted to Vienna-Schwechat Airport. At a distance of about 12 NM from the airport, at an altitude of 4,000 feet, both engines failed due to fuel exhaustion. One of the engine could be restarted for a short period of time but on short final, the aircraft stalled and struck the ground (a grassy area) about 500 metres short of runway 34. The left main gear broke off, the aircraft slid for some 600 metres then veered to the left and came to rest on its left wing. All 151 occupants were rescued, among them 26 passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Kenya Airways

On Sunday 30 January 2000, the Kenya Airways Airbus 310-304, registered 5Y-BEN, was undertaking the scheduled international flight KQ 431 transporting passengers from Abidjan to Nairobi, via Lagos. On board there were 10 crewmembers and 169 passengers. On the same day, in the afternoon, 5Y-BEN had flown in from Nairobi and landed at Félix Houphouët-Boigny International Airport in Abidjan at 15 h 15. The unfavorable meteorological at Lagos had obliged the pilot, after a thirty minutes hold at Lagos, to divert to Abidjan. The relief crew, which had arrived two days previously on flight KQ 430 on Friday 28 January 2000, at 15 h 44, took over on board 5Y-BEN, to undertake flight KQ 431 from Abidjan to Nairobi, via Lagos. Departure was scheduled for 21 h 00, in accordance with the initial program. The copilot was pilot flying, the Captain was pilot not flying. At 20 h 55 min 22 s, the crew established contact with Abidjan Airport control tower and asked for start-up clearance. This was granted. At 20 h 56 min 09 s, the Captain ordered the checklist to be performed and announced the type of take-off by saying "Flex sixty" at 20 h 56 min 19 s. At 21 h 00 min 18 s, three minutes and nineteen seconds after the start-up of the first engine (engine n° 2), the Captain announced over the interphone that linked him with the ground mechanic “we have two normal start-ups”. At 21 h 01 min 07 s, the crew of 5Y-BEN asked for clearance to taxi. The tower controller put them on standby. A few seconds later, he cleared them to taxi. At 21 h 02 min 33 s, the Captain ordered the Copilot to set the flaps at 15°. Later, at 21 h 04 min 50 s , the copilot announced "trim: 0.9 nose up, Slats/flaps 15/15". The airplane began to taxi at 21 h 07 min 35 s, the tower controller informed the crew of the latest wind, cleared them to take off and asked the crew the call back when they reached flight level 40. At 21 h 07 min 45 s, the copilot read back the clearance. This was the last communication between the crew and the control tower. At 21 h 08 min 08 s, the copilot announced "Take-off checklist completed … cleared for take-off". At 21 h 08 min 18 s, the Captain applied take-off power and announced "thrust, SRS, and runway" then, nine seconds later “100 knots”. At 21 h 08 min 50 s, the Captain announced "V1 and Rotate(4)", then two seconds later "Positive". The airplane took off. At 21 h 08 min 57 s, the copilot announced "Positive rate of climb, gear up". Less than two seconds later the stall warning sounded. At 21 h 09 min 07 s, the automatic call out (AC) announced 300 feet. At 21 h 09 min 14 s, the copilot asked "what’s the problem?". From 21 h 09 min 16 s, the AC announced successively 200, 100, 50, 30, 20 and 10 feet. Meanwhile, at 21 h 09 min 18 s, the copilot ordered the aural warning to be cut. Two seconds later, the GPWS sounded the “Whoop...” alarm followed, a half a second later, by the AC announcement of 50 feet. At 21 h 09 min 22 s, an aural master warning started, immediately followed by an order from the Captain to climb: "Go up!", though this was preceded six tenths of a second by the AC announcement of 10 feet. At 21 h 09 min 23.9 s, end of the master warning, followed immediately within a tenth of a second by the noise of the impact. The time of the accident is presumed to be 21 h 09 min 24 s.

Thai Airways International

Thai Airways International flight 261, an Airbus A310, left Bangkok-Don Mueang International Airport, Thailand at 17:54 hours local time for a domestic flight to Surat Thani. At 18:26 hours, the copilot first established contact with the Surat Thani approach controller while the aircraft was 70 nautical miles away from Surat Thani Airport. The controller radioed that the crew could expect a VOR/DME instrument approach to runway 22. At that time surface wind was calm with a visibility of 1500 meters, light rain and a cloud base of 1800 feet. At 18:39 hours the copilot contacted Surat Thani aerodrome controller and reported over the Intermediate Fix (IF). The controller informed him that the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) on the right side of runway 22 were unserviceable while the left lights were in use. At 18:41 hours, the copilot reported passing final approach fix (FAF). The controller informed the pilot that the aircraft was not in sight but it was cleared to land on runway 22. The surface wind was blowing from 310 degrees at a velocity of 5 knots so the pilots should be careful or the slippery runway. At 18:42 hours, the copilot reported that the runway was in sight and later on the controller also had the aircraft in sight. The pilot decided to go-around. The controller asked the pilot about the distance where the runway could be seen. The copilot reported that it could be seen at 3 nautical miles and requested for the second approach. The controller requested to report over FAF . When the copilot reported that the flight was over the FAF again, the controller cleared the flight to land although he again could not see the runway. When the flight crew failed to observe the runway lights, the captain decided to go around again. Again the controller instructed the flight to report over the FAF and reported that visibility had decreased to 1,000 meters in light rain. At 19:05, after reporting over the FAF, the flight was cleared to land on runway 22. The flight maintained the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) but the crew were unable to see the runway. The autopilot was disconnected and a little later the captain decided to go around. The pitch attitude increased continuously. The pitch attitude reached approximately 40°, when the pilot applied the elevator decreasing the pitch attitude to 32-33°. When he discontinued applying elevator the pitch increased to 47-48°. Consequently the speed decreased to 100 knots. The captain was not aware of the attitude due to stress and the expectation that the go around was flown exactly like the first two go-arounds. The airplane lost altitude until it impacted terrain to the left of the runway. 45 people survived and 101 others were killed, including 11 crew members.

TAROM - Transporturile Aeriene Române

Tarom flight 371 was a scheduled passenger service from Bucharest Otopeni Airport (OTP) in Romania to Brussel Airport (BRU), Belgium. On board were 49 passengers and eleven crew members. The first officer was pilot flying, the captain was pilot monitoring. Following de-icing, the Airbus A310 taxied to runway 08R for departure. The flight was cleared via the Strejnic 'STJ' VOR/DME beacon and an initial climb to flight level 260. Takeoff was initiated at 09:04 hours local time. When airborne, the captain announced positive climb and co-pilot requested to retract the landing gear. At 09:07:20 the captain called the Otopeni Approach controller and received a clearance to turn left and proceed direct to STJ. The co-pilot asked the captain to select direct STJ on FMS. The captain confirmed a direct STJ selection and requested the co-pilot to move the control wheel slightly. At an altitude of 1700 feet and speed a 187 knots, with flaps 15/slats 15 and pitch angle of 17.6 degrees, the aircraft was turning left, with a bank angle of 12 degrees, flying towards STJ. At 09:07:36, when the aircraft crossed 2000 feet at 188 knots, an engine thrust asymmetry started developing with continuous decrease of the left engine thrust, approximately 1 degree TRA (throttle resolver angle)/second. At 09:07:53, when the aircraft was crossing 3300 feet altitude at 195 kts turning with a decreasing bank angle of 20 degrees, the first officer called "250 in sight" and asked the captain to retract the flaps. This was carried out. At that moment, the engine thrust asymmetry reached 14.5 TRA degrees and 0.19 for EPRs. The first officer then requested slats retraction, but this action which was not carried out by the captain. At this moment the aircraft was passing through 013 degrees magnetic heading, at 3800 feet altitude and a decreasing speed of 185 kts. The aircraft pitch angle was 16,5 degrees, decreasing, and the left bank angle was 18 degrees, also decreasing. At that time the thrust asymmetry reached was 28 TRA degrees and 0.27 for EPRs. At 09:08:02, the first officer asked the captain: "Are you all right?" The aircraft was passing through 330 degrees magnetic heading, 4200 ft altitude, a decreasing speed of 181 kts, and an increasing 17 degrees left bank angle. At 09:08:08, a noise like an uttering of pain or a metallic noise was heard. The aircraft was crossing 4460 ft altitude, 179 kts speed and an increasing bank angle of 22 degrees. At that time the engines thrust asymmetry reached 0.36 for EPRs. The bank angle continued to increase to 28 degrees and the engine thrust asymmetry reached 0.41 for EPRs. At 09:08:15, the first officer, with a stressed and agitated voice, requested engagement of autopilot no. 1. The aircraft was crossing 4620-ft altitude, continuing its turn at an increasing bank angle of 43 degrees and a steadily decreasing pitch angle of 3.5 degrees. One of the pilots attempted to engage autopilot no. 1 The aircraft started a descent with 45 degrees bank angle and the engine thrust asymmetry had reached the maximum value of 0.42 for EPRs, followed by a continuous thrust reduction of engine n°2. One second later, there was recorded autopilot disengagement followed by the aural warning a level 3 "cavalry charge" lasting several moments. From that moment on, the aircraft started diving, the speed increased and the aircraft performed a complete rotation around its roll axis. At 09:08.28, first officer cried out "THAT ONE HAS FAILED!" without any other comments. The aircraft was descending through 3600 ft at 258 kts speed and an increasing nose down pitch angle at 61.5 degrees. The aircraft continued until it impacted the ground at a nose down attitude of approximately 50 degrees pitch angle with both engines at idle power. The airplane was destroyed and all 60 occupants were sustained fatal injuries.

Thai Airways International

Thai Airways Flight 311 was conducting the Sierra (VOR/DME) approach to runway 02 at Tribhuvan International Airport, in instrument weather conditions. A flap fault occurred while the flight was on the approach; this caused the crew to ask for clearance back to Calcutta, a decision that was in keeping with both Company and performance requirements, which necessitate the use of full flaps for the steep final approach. Shortly (21 seconds) after making this request, at a distance of approximately 12 nm from the Kathmandu VOR, the flap fault was rectified by retracting and then reselecting the flaps. The crew determined that it was not possible to continue the straight-in approach, due to the steep descent angles required and the position of the aircraft. The crew stated to the control tower that they wished to start their approach again and requested a left turn back to the Romeo fix, which is 41 nm south south-west (202 radial) of the Kathmandu VOR. The Controller, in the non-radar environment, responded by clearing the flight to make the Sierra approach, which starts at the 202 radial and 16 nautical miles from the VOR. The crew response to the clearance was to report that, at the moment, they couldn't land and to ask again for left turn back to Romeo to start their approach again. After further dialogue with the controller, which included requests for a left turn, the crew unilaterally initiated a right turn from the aircraft's 025° heading and commenced a climb from an altitude of 10,500 feet to FL180, when the flight was about 7 nm south of the Kathmandu VOR. The crew reported to the tower controller that the flight was climbing and the controller replied by instructing the crew to report at 16 nm for the Sierra approach. During the turn, there was more discussion between the tower controller and the flight, where it was established that the aircraft was to maintain an altitude of FL115 and was to 'proceed to Romeo' and contact the Area Control Center (ACC) controller. The flight, commencing a descent while in the turn, completed a 360° turn, momentarily rolling out on headings of 045° and 340°, and again proceeded toward the north on a heading of 025° magnetic. When the flight was about 5 nm south-west of the Kathmandu VOR, the crew contacted the ACC and stated that the aircraft was 'heading 025' and they wished to proceed to Romeo to start their approach again; adding they had 'technical problems concerned with the flight.' It was again established that the flight was to proceed to Romeo and the crew agreed to 'report over Romeo.' It was determined from the cockpit voice recorder that the crew was in the process of inserting 'Romeo' and other related navigational information in the Flight Management System, but were experiencing difficulties. The flight continued towards the north on a heading of 025° and then, at about 16 nm north, the heading was altered to the left to 005°. Slightly over one minute later, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded the warning 'terrain, terrain' followed by 'whoop whoop pull-up'; the aural warning continued until impact approximately 16 seconds later. Engine thrust was increasing and 'Level Change' had been announced on the cockpit, just before the impact occurred at the 11,500-foot level of a 16,000-foot peak; the accident site was located on the 015 radial (north-north east) at 23.3 nm from the Kathmandu VOR. The aircraft was destroyed and all 113 occupants were killed.