Thai Airways International

Airbus A350-941

Thai Airways flight TG925, an Airbus A350-941, was en route between Munich (MUC) and Bangkok (BKK) when the aircraft experienced turbulence. Four occupants suffered serious injuries, one suffered minor injuries.

Airbus A330

Following an uneventful night schedule service from Guangzhou, the crew was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 19L at Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport. Following a smooth landing, the crew started the braking procedure when, after a course of about 1,000 metres, the aircraft deviated to the right then veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed, the aircraft sank in earth and came to rest with both engines in flames. All 302 occupants were rescued, among them 14 passengers were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 737-400

While parked at gate 62 at Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport, the aircraft suffered an explosion and caught fire. On board were eight crew members awaiting 148 passengers to embark, among them Thaksin Shinawatra, Thai Prime Minister. Seven crew members were able to evacuate the cabin while the eighth crew member died. The aircraft was completely destroyed by fire. It was reported that the first explosion occurred in the center fuel tank, about 27 minutes prior to the expected takeoff time, followed by a second explosion in the right wing tank 18 minutes later.

Airbus A310

Thai Airways International flight 261, an Airbus A310, left Bangkok-Don Mueang International Airport, Thailand at 17:54 hours local time for a domestic flight to Surat Thani. At 18:26 hours, the copilot first established contact with the Surat Thani approach controller while the aircraft was 70 nautical miles away from Surat Thani Airport. The controller radioed that the crew could expect a VOR/DME instrument approach to runway 22. At that time surface wind was calm with a visibility of 1500 meters, light rain and a cloud base of 1800 feet. At 18:39 hours the copilot contacted Surat Thani aerodrome controller and reported over the Intermediate Fix (IF). The controller informed him that the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) on the right side of runway 22 were unserviceable while the left lights were in use. At 18:41 hours, the copilot reported passing final approach fix (FAF). The controller informed the pilot that the aircraft was not in sight but it was cleared to land on runway 22. The surface wind was blowing from 310 degrees at a velocity of 5 knots so the pilots should be careful or the slippery runway. At 18:42 hours, the copilot reported that the runway was in sight and later on the controller also had the aircraft in sight. The pilot decided to go-around. The controller asked the pilot about the distance where the runway could be seen. The copilot reported that it could be seen at 3 nautical miles and requested for the second approach. The controller requested to report over FAF . When the copilot reported that the flight was over the FAF again, the controller cleared the flight to land although he again could not see the runway. When the flight crew failed to observe the runway lights, the captain decided to go around again. Again the controller instructed the flight to report over the FAF and reported that visibility had decreased to 1,000 meters in light rain. At 19:05, after reporting over the FAF, the flight was cleared to land on runway 22. The flight maintained the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) but the crew were unable to see the runway. The autopilot was disconnected and a little later the captain decided to go around. The pitch attitude increased continuously. The pitch attitude reached approximately 40°, when the pilot applied the elevator decreasing the pitch attitude to 32-33°. When he discontinued applying elevator the pitch increased to 47-48°. Consequently the speed decreased to 100 knots. The captain was not aware of the attitude due to stress and the expectation that the go around was flown exactly like the first two go-arounds. The airplane lost altitude until it impacted terrain to the left of the runway. 45 people survived and 101 others were killed, including 11 crew members.

Airbus A310

Thai Airways Flight 311 was conducting the Sierra (VOR/DME) approach to runway 02 at Tribhuvan International Airport, in instrument weather conditions. A flap fault occurred while the flight was on the approach; this caused the crew to ask for clearance back to Calcutta, a decision that was in keeping with both Company and performance requirements, which necessitate the use of full flaps for the steep final approach. Shortly (21 seconds) after making this request, at a distance of approximately 12 nm from the Kathmandu VOR, the flap fault was rectified by retracting and then reselecting the flaps. The crew determined that it was not possible to continue the straight-in approach, due to the steep descent angles required and the position of the aircraft. The crew stated to the control tower that they wished to start their approach again and requested a left turn back to the Romeo fix, which is 41 nm south south-west (202 radial) of the Kathmandu VOR. The Controller, in the non-radar environment, responded by clearing the flight to make the Sierra approach, which starts at the 202 radial and 16 nautical miles from the VOR. The crew response to the clearance was to report that, at the moment, they couldn't land and to ask again for left turn back to Romeo to start their approach again. After further dialogue with the controller, which included requests for a left turn, the crew unilaterally initiated a right turn from the aircraft's 025° heading and commenced a climb from an altitude of 10,500 feet to FL180, when the flight was about 7 nm south of the Kathmandu VOR. The crew reported to the tower controller that the flight was climbing and the controller replied by instructing the crew to report at 16 nm for the Sierra approach. During the turn, there was more discussion between the tower controller and the flight, where it was established that the aircraft was to maintain an altitude of FL115 and was to 'proceed to Romeo' and contact the Area Control Center (ACC) controller. The flight, commencing a descent while in the turn, completed a 360° turn, momentarily rolling out on headings of 045° and 340°, and again proceeded toward the north on a heading of 025° magnetic. When the flight was about 5 nm south-west of the Kathmandu VOR, the crew contacted the ACC and stated that the aircraft was 'heading 025' and they wished to proceed to Romeo to start their approach again; adding they had 'technical problems concerned with the flight.' It was again established that the flight was to proceed to Romeo and the crew agreed to 'report over Romeo.' It was determined from the cockpit voice recorder that the crew was in the process of inserting 'Romeo' and other related navigational information in the Flight Management System, but were experiencing difficulties. The flight continued towards the north on a heading of 025° and then, at about 16 nm north, the heading was altered to the left to 005°. Slightly over one minute later, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded the warning 'terrain, terrain' followed by 'whoop whoop pull-up'; the aural warning continued until impact approximately 16 seconds later. Engine thrust was increasing and 'Level Change' had been announced on the cockpit, just before the impact occurred at the 11,500-foot level of a 16,000-foot peak; the accident site was located on the 015 radial (north-north east) at 23.3 nm from the Kathmandu VOR. The aircraft was destroyed and all 113 occupants were killed.

Avro 748

After landing, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 737-200

Thai Airways Flight 365 was approaching Phuket VOR/DME on radial 119 after a flight from Hat Yai. At the same time Dragon Air Flight 203 (a Boeing 737 registered VR-HYL, carrying 62 occupants) also approached Phuket VOR/DME on radial 090. At 08:34 UTC Dragonair 203 reported at 2500 feet with Thai 365 in sight in front of them. The Thai Boeing was flying at 3000 feet at the time, and was 13 miles from Phuket VOR/DME. Dragonair 203, first priority in approach sequence, then turned right at 12 DME and was going to turn inbound for finals for runway 27. The Thai crew surmised that the other crew were making a false position report to gain landing priority and reported hurriedly that they were at 8 DME inbound and requested visual approach, though they hadn't reached 8 DME yet. This forced Phuket Approach to give Thai 365 landing priority at 08:35. The Dragonair crew (flying IFR) immediately warned that the Thai plane couldn't descend through their flight level. Concentrating on the conflicting traffic the speed decayed to 163 knots until the stick shaker activated. The Thai crew then applied power and raised the landing gear, but the aircraft entered a stall crashed into the sea, disintegrating on impact. All 83 occupants were killed.

Avro 748

Following an uneventful flight from Chiang Mai, the crew initiated the approach to Chiang Rai Airport in good weather conditions. The copilot was the pilot-in-command when the aircraft completed a gear up landing. It slid on runway for about 1,075 meters before coming to rest on the runway. All 43 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 737-200

Following an uneventful flight from Bangkok, the crew started the descent to Phuket Airport by night and good weather conditions. Four minutes after being cleared to descend to 3,000 feet, the pilot reported that he was unable to receive the DME signal. ATC asked the crew if he wanted to conduct a VOR approach to runway 09 but the captain preferred to attempt a visual approach to runway 27. On final, the aircraft struck a hill (800 feet high) and crashed about 18 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all 11 occupants were killed.

Avro 748

After touchdown at Chiang Rai Airport, the airplane encountered difficulties and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a ditch. All 21 occupants were evacuated, some of them were injured.

Avro 748

On 27 April 1980, HS-748 Series 11, HS-THB was on a scheduled domestic passenger flight. The flight operated the route Bangkok - Khon Kaen - Udon - Nakhon Phanom - Udon - Khon Kaen - Bangkok. The departure flight was flight number TG221 which departed Bangkok International Airport at 0101 h, arrived Khon Kaen Airport at 0210 h, departed Khon Kaen Airport at 0233 h, arrived Udon Airport at 0251 h, departed Udon Airport at 0309 h, arrived Nakhon Phanom Airport at 0349 h. The return flight, flight number TG231, departed Nakhon Phanom Airport at 0408 h, arrived Udon Airport at 0448 h, departed Udon Airport at 0507 h, arrived Khon Kaen Airport at 0532 h, departed Khon Kaen Airport at 0550 h, ETA Bangkok International Airport at 0656 h. At 0559 h, after take-off from Khon Kaen Airport, the pilot reported to Bangkok Area Control Centre that he was climbing to 6 000 ft, ETA Korat at 0626 h, ETA Bangkok International Airport at 0656 h and requested ATC clearance to Bangkok International Airport via W6 - KT - W1 - BKK. Bangkok Area Control Centre cleared HS-THB to Bangkok International Airport via this route, to maintain FL 120 and asked the pilot to report when the aircraft reached FL 120. - At 0614 h the pilot reported that HS-THB reached FL 120. - At 0626 h the pilot reported that the aircraft was over KT. - AT 0627 h Bangkok Area Control Centre informed the pilot that HS-THB was in radar contact, 5 miles northwest of KT. - At 0642 h Bangkok Area Control Centre cleared HS-THB to descend to 8 000 ft and informed the pilot that the altimeter setting was 1 008 mb. This was acknowledged by the pilot. - At 0644 h, Bangkok Area Control Centre advised the pilot to contact Bangkok Approach Control on 119.1 MHz. - At 0644 h, the pilot contacted Bangkok Approach Control and reported that he was maintaining 8 000 ft. Bangkok Approach Control advised the pilot to descend to 6 000 ft and informed him that the altimeter setting was 1 008 mb. This was acknowledged by the pilot. - At 0648 h Bangkok Approach Control advised HS-THB to descend to 6 000 ft. - At 0651 h Bangkok Approach Control advised HS-THB to descend to 1 500 ft. - At 0653 h the pilot reported that HS-THB had reached 1 500 ft. - At 0654 h Bangkok Approach Control informed the pilot that HS-THB was 7 miles from the Outer Marker and cleared the aircraft to make an ILS approach to runway 21R. This was acknowledged by the pilot. - At 0656 h Bangkok Approach Control advised the pilot to contact Bangkok Tower on 118.1 MHz but no answer from the pilot was received. Bangkok Approach Control tried to contact HS-THB until 0709 h but no answer was received. HS-THB operated in good weather conditions on both the outbound and return flights until, descending to runway 21R nearly at the airport, it encountered an area of rain. Later, HS-THB lost altitude rapidly. Many things in the passenger cabin fell to the cabin floor. It was raining with hail. Looking through the windows, some passengers saw grey clouds. Then the aircraft could maintain altitude. Thirty seconds later it again lost altitude, more severely than the first time. Finally it crashed into a paddy field and skidded forward about 510 feet. Fire occurred in both wings for a while. The accident site was 8 NM northeast of Bangkok International Airport.

Douglas DC-8

After touchdown at Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport, the four engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and one engine before coming to rest in a dump. Onee people on the ground was killed and four passengers were injured. The aircraft was written off.

Douglas DC-3

On final approach, the airplane was too low and crashed in unclear circumstances short of runway. All 21 occupants were able to evacuate the cabin and none of them was injured. Nevertheless, the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

Sud-Aviation SE-210 Caravelle

The approach to Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport was completed by the copilot in poor weather conditions (low visibility and heavy rain falls due to tropical storm) when the ILS equipment failed. It was decided to continue the approach and at an altitude of 700 feet, the pilot-in-command was able to locate the runway lights. At this time, the aircraft was slightly too high on the glide and too far to the left. Once the altitude of 300 feet was reached on descent, the IAS was 127 knots, about five knots above the planned speed. Thus, the copilot decided to reduce the speed to 122 knots when the airplane suddenly lost height. The captain elected to regain control but it was too late. With a relative high sink rate, the airplane landed very hard, causing both main landing gear to puncture the wings. The aircraft came to rest after a course of several hundred yards. While all 75 occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Douglas DC-3

On approach to runway 36, the pilot-in-command was hampered by insufficient visibility due to fog and decided to abandon the landing and to make a low pass over the airport. Few minutes later, he was cleared to make an approach to runway 18 and decided to refer to three roads but referred to the wrong road. On final, the airplane was unstable and banked left, causing the left engine to struck the ground. The airplane crashed 200 meters short of runway threshold and came to rest. Four passengers were killed.

Sud-Aviation SE-210 Caravelle

Thai Airways International Flight 601, a scheduled passenger service from Taipei International Airport, Formosa, to Hong Kong International Airport, departed from Taipei at 0540 hours with an estimated enroute time of 1 hour 27 minutes, and an endurance of 4 hours 19 minutes. The flight was made at flight level 260 and was entirely normal except that, because of turbulence expected from a severe tropical storm, the passenger seat belts were on for the majority of the flight. No turbulence of any importance was in fact experienced. At 0638 hours, when approximately 170 miles from Hong Kong, Flight 601 made contact with Hong Kong airways control and received clearance to descend to flight level 70. At 0658 hours they contacted Hong Kong approach control, which later cleared them to descend to 2 500 feet using an altimeter setting (QNH) of 999 mb, and informed them that there was a heavy rain shower at Hong Kong and that the visibility was very reduced to 2 km. The co-pilot flew the aircraft manually from the right-hand seat, whilst the Captain monitored the approach from the left hand seat and handled the R/T communications, the third pilot, who was acting as the system operator, also monitored the flight instruments. Rhe approach controller provided radar guidance to position the aircraft for an ILS approach to runway 31 and when it was at about 8 miles from touchdown, cleared the pilots to contact the precision controller. This controller cleared them to continue their ILS approach, informed them that there was heavy rain at the field and told them the overshoot procedure to be adopted should this become necessary. The aircraft remained well within the approach safety funnel 2° either side of the localiser centerline and 1/2° above or below the glide slope, until 3 miles from touchdown, the PAR controller having provided information on weather, overshoot instructions and distance from touchdown as shown on the R/T transcript at Appendix C. In his 3 miles distance advisory, the PAR controller informed the pilot that he was just a little to the right; this appeared to be corrected and the aircraft returned to the centre line. At about 2 3/4 miles, the aircraft descended momentarily below the glide slope safety funnel but returned quickly towards the glide slope before the PAR controller had made any advisory comment. At 1 1/2 mile the aircraft was again a little right of centre line and at this time also interference from the heavy rain began to obscure PAR reception, firstly in elevation and, shortly after one mile, also in azimuth. Correlation of the flight recorder readout and the R/T transcript indicates that-approximately 2 seconds after receiving the 1 1/2 mile advisory that he was a little to the right, the co-pilot made a left turn of 14°. Eight seconds later, the PAR controller advised him that he was coming back to the centre line and almost immediately he began a right turn of similar dimensions. Five seconds after this, the PAR controller save the 1 mile advisory and the information that the aircraft was going left of centre after which the aircraft increased its rate of turn to the right. On hearing the 1 mile advisory, the captain reinforced it by telling the co-pilot to move to the right and a moment or two later, when looking across the cockpit, saw the sea about 100 ft below through the copilot's side window. He immediately attempted to make a pull-up, but the aircraft struck the surface, bounced slightly, and settled on the water about 3 925 ft before the ILS reference point of runway 31 and about 100 ft left of the ILS centre line. According to the survivors the impact was not unduly greater than that of a heavy landing but the starboard wing and undercarriage broke away, the latter ripping open the underside of the fuselage; in addition, the rear end of the fuselage broke open. As a result of this damage the aircraft sank very rapidly and 14 of the passengers did not escape from the fuselage and were drowned, 6 were dead on arrival at hospital, 4 were missing and later found drowned. The remaining passengers and the crew were rescued by nearby surface vessels and a helicopter.