Pilatus PC-12

Haynie Enterprises

Timeless USA

EDP Management Group

After its departure from Hyde County Airport, North Carolina, the single engine airplane followed an erratic track according to ATC. While cruising along the shore, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 30 km northeast of Beaufort-Michael J. Smith Field Airport, few km east of the Drum Inlet. The wreckage was found at a depth of about 55 feet. Two bodies and other remains were later found.

Private Romanian

The single engine aircraft departed Milan-Linate Airport runway 36 at 1304LT, bound to Olbia with 8 people on board. During initial climb, the pilot completed two successive turns to the right then continued to the south. At an altitude of 5,300 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on an industrial building under renovation and located about 1,8 km southwest of the runway 36 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 8 occupants were killed, among them the Romania businessman Dan Petrescu. The building suffered severe damages as well as few vehicles in the street. There were no injuries on the ground.

Private American

On November 6, 2020, about 1600 Pacific standard time, a Pilatus PC-12, N400PW, was substantially damaged when it was ditched in the Pacific Ocean about 1000 miles east of Hilo, Hawaii. The two pilots sustained no injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 ferry flight. According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the ferry company owner, he and another pilot were ferrying a new airplane from California to Australia. The first transoceanic leg was planned for 10 hours from Santa Maria Airport (KSMX), Santa Maria, California to Hilo Airport (PHTO), Hilo, Hawaii. The manufacturer had an auxiliary ferry fuel line and check valve installed in the left wing before delivery. About 1 month before the trip, the pilot hired a ferry company to install an internal temporary ferry fuel system for the trip. The crew attempted the first transoceanic flight on November 2, but the ferry fuel system did not transfer properly, so the crew diverted to Merced Airport (KMCE), Merced, California. The system was modified with the addition of two 30 psi fuel transfer pumps that could overcome the ferry system check valve. The final system consisted of 2 aluminum tanks, 2 transfer pumps, transfer and tank valves, and associated fuel lines and fittings. The ferry fuel supply line was connected to the factory installed ferry fuel line fitting at the left wing bulkhead, which then fed directly to the main fuel line through a check valve and directly to the turbine engine. The installed system was ground and flight checked before the trip. According to Federal Aviation Administration automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) data, the airplane departed KSMX about 1000. The pilots each stated that the ferry fuel system worked as designed during the flight and they utilized the operating procedures that were supplied by the installer. About 5 hours after takeoff, approaching ETNIC intersection, the PIC climbed the airplane to flight level 280. At that time, the rear ferry fuel tank was almost empty, and the forward tank was about 1/2 full. The crew was concerned about introducing air into the engine as they emptied the rear ferry tank, so the PIC placed the ignition switch to ON. According to the copilot (CP), she went to the cabin to monitor the transparent fuel line from the transfer pumps to ensure positive fuel flow while she transferred the last of the available rear tank fuel to the main fuel line. When she determined that all of the usable fuel was transferred, and fuel still remained in the pressurized fuel line, she turned the transfer pumps to off and before she could access the transfer and tank valves, the engine surged and flamed out. The PIC stated that the crew alerting system (CAS) fuel low pressure light illuminated about 5 to 15 seconds after the transfer pumps were turned off, and then the engine lost power and the propeller auto feathered. The PIC immediately placed the fuel boost pumps from AUTO to ON. The CP went back to her crew seat and they commenced the pilot operating handbook’s emergency checklist procedures for emergency descent and then loss of engine power in flight. According to both crew members, they attempted an engine air start. The propeller unfeathered and the engine started; however, it did not reach flight idle and movement of the power control lever did not affect the engine. The crew secured the engine and attempted another air start. The engine did not restart and grinding sounds and a loud bang were heard. The propeller never unfeathered and multiple CAS warning lights illuminated, including the EPECS FAIL light (Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System). The crew performed the procedures for a restart with EPECS FAIL light and multiple other starts that were unsuccessful. There were no flames nor smoke from either exhaust pipe during the air start attempts. About 8,000 ft mean sea level, the crew committed to ditching in the ocean. About 1600, after preparing the survival gear, donning life vests, and making mayday calls on VHF 121.5, the PIC performed a full flaps gear up landing at an angle to the sea swells and into the wind. He estimated that the swells were 5 to 10 ft high with crests 20 feet apart. During the landing, the pilot held back elevator pressure for as long as possible and the airplane landed upright. The crew evacuated through the right over wing exit and boarded the 6 man covered life raft. A photograph of the airplane revealed that the bottom of the rudder was substantially damaged. The airplane remained afloat after landing. The crew utilized a satellite phone to communicate with Oakland Center. The USCG coordinated a rescue mission. About 4 hours later, a C-130 arrived on scene and coordinated with a nearby oil tanker, the M/V Ariel, for rescue of the crew. According to the pilots, during the night, many rescue attempts were made by the M/V Ariel; however, the ship was too fast for them to grab lines and the seas were too rough. After a night of high seas, the M/V Ariel attempted rescue again; however, they were unsuccessful. That afternoon, a container ship in the area, the M/V Horizon Reliance, successfully maneuvered slowly to the raft, then the ship’s crew shot rope cannons that propelled lines to the raft, and they were able to assist the survivors onboard. The pilots had been in the raft for about 22 hours. The airplane was a new 2020 production PC-12 47E with a newly designed Pratt and Whitney PT6E-67XP engine which featured an Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System. The airplane is presumed to be lost at sea. The investigation is ongoing.

Boutique Air

On April 23, 2020, about 1600 central daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12 airplane, N477SS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Mesquite, Texas. The pilot received serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91 cross-country flight. Preliminary reports indicate the pilot reported to air traffic control that he was losing engine power. The pilot then said he was going to divert to Rockwall (airport) and accepted vectors to the airport. The pilot then reported the loss of engine power had stabilized, so he wanted to return to DFW (Dallas-Fort Worth International airport). A few moments later the pilot reported that he was losing engine power and he needed to go back to Rockwall. The controller reported that the Mesquite airport (HQZ) was at the pilot's 11 o'clock position and about 3 miles and gave a heading. The pilot reported that he was going to perform a 360° turn to set-up for a left base for the Mesquite Airport. The airplane impacted terrain in a muddy field, short of the airport. The airplane's wings separated in the accident and a post-crash fire developed near the wings.

Conrad %26 Bischoff

The single engine airplane departed Chamberlain Airport in marginal weather conditions. Few minutes later, while flying in snow falls, the airplane went out of control and crashed in a cornfield located about 30 miles west-southwest of Chamberlain. Three passengers aged 17, 27 and 28 were injured and evacuated to hospitals in Chamberlain, Mitchell and Sioux Falls while nine other occupants were killed. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules plan with the Federal Aviation Administration and received a clearance to fly direct from Chamberlain, a non-towered airport, to Idaho Falls, Idaho, with a planned departure time of 12:20 p.m. CST. The plane departed Chamberlain at 12:26 p.m. CST. When the pilot did not activate the flight plan after departure, the FAA issued an alert for a missing airplane. At 12:35 p.m. CST, an AWOS-3 automated weather observation station at the Chamberlain airport recorded weather as follows: winds from 020 degrees (north/northeast) at 6 knots (7 mph), ½ mile visibility with moderate snow and icing, low-level windshear, and clear air turbulence conditions with overcast skies. The base of the cloud layer was recorded at 500 feet above the ground. The airplane departed on runway 31 and crashed in a field about 1 mile north of the airport. The Pilatus PC-12 airplane is not required to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder. Investigators will be looking for any avionics or engine monitoring equipment with non-volatile memory that could yield information relevant to the investigation. The airplane was equipped with an automated dependent surveillance broadcast system (ADS-B), which records parameters that will help investigators determine the performance of the airplane by evaluating the flight track, altitude and speed from takeoff to the end of the flight.

Wheaton Brasil Vidros

En route from Angra dos Reis to Campo de Marte, the crew reported engine problems and elected to divert to the Ubatuba Airport (runway 09/27 is 900 meters long). It is believed the crew was unable to make it and eventually decided to make an emergency landing. The airplane struck several trees, lost its both wings and empennage and crashed in a wooded area located near the district of Estufa II, south of the airport. All 10 occupants were quickly rescued and the aircraft was destroyed. It is reported that the crew encountered technical problems with the engine/propeller.

Rico Aviation

The pilot and two medical crew members departed on an air ambulance flight in night instrument meteorological conditions to pick up a patient. After departure, the local air traffic controller observed the airplane's primary radar target with an incorrect transponder code in a right turn and climbing through 4,400 ft mean sea level (msl), which was 800 ft above ground level (agl). The controller instructed the pilot to reset the transponder to the correct code, and the airplane leveled off between 4,400 ft and 4,600 ft msl for about 30 seconds. The controller then confirmed that the airplane was being tracked on radar with the correct transponder code; the airplane resumed its climb at a rate of about 6,000 ft per minute (fpm) to 6,000 ft msl. The pilot changed frequencies as instructed, then contacted departure control and reported "with you at 6,000 [ft msl]" and the departure controller radar-identified the airplane. About 1 minute later, the departure controller advised the pilot that he was no longer receiving the airplane's transponder; the pilot did not respond, and there were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot. Radar data showed the airplane descending rapidly at a rate that reached 17,000 fpm. Surveillance video from a nearby truck stop recorded lights from the airplane descending at an angle of about 45° followed by an explosion. The airplane impacted a pasture about 1.5 nautical miles south of the airport, and a post impact fire ensued. All major components of the airplane were located within the debris field. Ground scars at the accident site and damage to the airplane indicated that the airplane was in a steep, nose-low and wings-level attitude at the time of impact. The airplane's steep descent and its impact attitude are consistent with a loss of control. An airplane performance study based on radar data and simulations determined that, during the climb to 6,000 ft and about 37 seconds before impact, the airplane achieved a peak pitch angle of about 23°, after which the pitch angle decreased steadily to an estimated -42° at impact. As the pitch angle decreased, the roll angle increased steadily to the left, reaching an estimated -76° at impact. The performance study revealed that the airplane could fly the accident flight trajectory without experiencing an aerodynamic stall. The apparent pitch and roll angles, which represent the attitude a pilot would "feel" the airplane to be in based on his vestibular and kinesthetic perception of the components of the load factor vector in his own body coordinate system, were calculated. The apparent pitch angle ranged from 0° to 15° as the real pitch angle steadily decreased to -42°, and the apparent roll angle ranged from 0° to -4° as the real roll angle increased to -78°. This suggests that even when the airplane was in a steeply banked descent, conditions were present that could have produced a somatogravic illusion of level flight and resulted in spatial disorientation of the pilot. Analysis of the performance study and the airplane's flight track revealed that the pilot executed several non-standard actions during the departure to include: excessive pitch and roll angles, rapid climb, unexpected level-offs, and non-standard ATC communications. In addition to the non-standard actions, the pilot's limited recent flight experience in night IFR conditions, and moderate turbulence would have been conducive to the onset of spatial disorientation. The pilot's failure to set the correct transponder code before departure, his non-standard departure maneuvering, and his apparent confusion regarding his altitude indicate a mental state not at peak acuity, further increasing the chances of spatial disorientation. A post accident examination of the flight control system did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The engine exhibited rotational signatures indicative of engine operation during impact, and an examination did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation. The damage to the propeller hub and blades indicated that the propeller was operating under high power in the normal range of operation at time of impact. Review of recorded data recovered from airplane's attitude and heading reference unit did not reveal any faults with the airplane's attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) during the accident flight, and there were no maintenance logbook entries indicating any previous electronic attitude director indicator (EADI) or AHRS malfunctions. Therefore, it is unlikely that erroneous attitude information was displayed on the EADI that could have misled the pilot concerning the actual attitude of the airplane. A light bulb filament analysis of the airplane's central advisory display unit (CADU) revealed that the "autopilot disengage" caution indicator was likely illuminated at impact, and the "autopilot trim" warning indicator was likely not illuminated. A filament analysis of the autopilot mode controller revealed that the "autopilot," "yaw damper," and "altitude hold" indicators were likely not illuminated at impact. The status of the "trim" warning indicator on the autopilot mode controller could not be determined because the filaments of the indicator's bulbs were missing. However, since the CADU's "autopilot trim" warning indicator was likely not illuminated, the mode controller's "trim" warning indicator was also likely not illuminated at impact. Exemplar airplane testing revealed that the "autopilot disengage" caution indicator would only illuminate if the autopilot had been engaged and then disconnected. It would not illuminate if the autopilot was off without being previously engaged nor would it illuminate if the pilot attempted and failed to engage the autopilot by pressing the "autopilot" push button on the mode controller. Since the "autopilot disengage" caution indicator would remain illuminated for 30 seconds after the autopilot was disengaged and was likely illuminated at impact, it is likely that the autopilot had been engaged at some point during the flight and disengaged within 30 seconds of the impact; the pilot was reporting to ATC at 6,000 ft about 30 seconds before impact and then the rapid descent began. The airplane was not equipped with a recording device that would have recorded the operational status of the autopilot, and the investigation could not determine the precise times at which autopilot engagement and disengagement occurred. However, these times can be estimated as follows: - The pilot likely engaged the autopilot after the airplane climbed through 1,000 ft agl about 46 seconds after takeoff, because this was the recommended minimum autopilot engagement altitude that he was taught. - According to the airplane performance study, the airplane's acceleration exceeded the autopilot's limit load factor of +1.6 g about 9 seconds before impact. If it was engaged at this time, the autopilot would have automatically disengaged. - The roll angle data from the performance study were consistent with engagement of the autopilot between two points: 1) about 31 seconds before impact, during climb, when the bank angle, which had stabilized for a few seconds, started to increase again and 2) about 9 seconds before impact, during descent, at which time the autopilot would have automatically disengaged. Since the autopilot would have reduced the bank angle as soon as it was engaged and there is no evidence of the bank angle reducing significantly between these two points, it is likely that the autopilot was engaged closer to the latter point than the former. Engagement of the autopilot shortly before the latter point would have left little time for the autopilot to reduce the bank angle before it would have disengaged automatically due to exceedance of the normal load factor limit. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot engaged the autopilot a few seconds before it automatically disconnected about 9 seconds before impact. The operator reported that the airplane had experienced repeated, unexpected, in-flight autopilot disconnects, and, two days before the accident, the chief pilot recorded a video of the autopilot disconnecting during a flight. Exemplar airplane testing and maintenance information revealed that, during the flight in which the video was recorded, the autopilot's pitch trim adapter likely experienced a momentary loss of power for undetermined reasons, which resulted in the sequence of events observed in the video. It is possible that the autopilot disconnected during the accident flight due to the pitch trim adapter experiencing a loss of power, which would have to have occurred between 30 and 9 seconds before impact. A post accident weather analysis revealed that the airplane was operating in an environment requiring instruments to navigate, but it could not be determined if the airplane was in cloud when the loss of control occurred. The sustained surface wind was from the north at 21 knots with gusts up to 28 knots, and moderate turbulence existed. The presence of the moderate turbulence could have contributed to the controllability of the airplane and the pilot's inability to recognize the airplane's attitude and the autopilot's operational status.

United States Air Force - USAF

On 14 Mar 17, at 1835 local time (L), a U-28A, tail number 0724, crashed one-quarter mile south of Clovis Municipal Airport (KCVN), New Mexico (NM). This aircraft was operated by the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crewmembers died upon impact. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) departed Cannon AFB at 1512L for tactical training over Lubbock, Texas, followed by pilot proficiency training at KCVN. The Mishap Crew (MC) entered Lubbock airspace at 1545L, completed their tactical training, and departed Lubbock airspace at 1735L enroute to KCVN. The MC entered the KCVN traffic pattern at 1806L, where they conducted multiple approaches and landings prior to executing the mishap maneuver, a practice turnback Emergency Landing Pattern (ELP). The MC entered the practice turnback ELP with 0° flaps led to increased aircraft nose-down attitudes and higher descent rates required to maintain a safe angle of attack versus a comparative 15° flap approach. In addition, 0° flap stall speeds are higher than 15° flap stall speeds – 15 to 25 knots higher for the range of bank angles flown by the MC during the practice turnback ELP. The MC was also late to achieve the bank angle required to enable the MA to align with the extended centerline for the runway resulting in an overshoot condition. The MC attempted to arrest their excessive nose-down attitude, descent rate, and shallow bank angle by pulling back on the aircraft yoke and increasing bank angle. The g-load from the MC pull back, coupled with the MA's increased bank angle, slowed the MA airspeed below 0° flap stall speed and it departed controlled flight. Subsequent power increase and flight control inputs would not have enabled the aircraft to recover from the stall within remaining altitude. After entering the stall, the MC increased power; however, it was not enough to overcome the MA descent rate. At no point during the practice turnback ELP did the MA performance reflect a MC intent to abort the maneuver. The MA impacted the ground with a 13° nose-high, 7° left-wing low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed. Crew: Cpt Andrew Becker, pilot, 1st Lt Frederick Dellecker, copilot, Cpt Kenneth Dalga, combat systems officer.

Tomcat Air

Pilot advised that upon making his approach to land at Cat Cay (MYCC), on short final he experienced an unexpected accelerated sink rate. To compensate for the sink rate he increased the pitch of the aircraft. While going over the threshold, a slight impact was felt as the landing gear came into contact with the seawall. He flew the aircraft until it came to a stop about 600 feet down the runway. No injuries were sustained, aircraft received substantial damage.

Air Charter Services

The single engine aircraft departed New Delhi at 0842LT on an ambulance flight to Bangkok with two pilots and three doctors on board. A refueling stop was completed at Calcutta Airport. At 1903LT, en route to Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport, the crew contacted ATC and requested permission to divert to Kamphaeng Saen Airport due to an emergency. The permission was granted and the crew initiated the descent when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens at 1916LT. The burned wreckage was found an hour and 30 minutes later, at 2048LT, in a wooded area located few km from runway 22L threshold. All five occupants were injured while the aircraft was destroyed. Few hours later, the copilot died from his injuries.

PlaneSense

The aircraft collided with a ditch during a precautionary landing after takeoff from Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (SAV), Savannah, Georgia. The pilot and copilot sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Upper Deck Holdings, Inc. and was being operated by PlaneSense, Inc,. as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight to Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The pilot in the left seat was the pilot monitoring and the copilot in the right seat was the pilot flying. The crew had the full length of the runway 1 available (7,002 ft) for takeoff. The pilots reported that the acceleration and takeoff was normal and after establishing a positive rate of climb, the crew received an auditory annunciation and a red crew alerting system (CAS) torque warning. The engine torque indicated 5.3 pounds per square inch (psi); the nominal torque value for the conditions that day was reported by the crew to be 43.3 psi. With about 2,700 ft of runway remaining while at an altitude of 200 ft msl, the copilot elected to land immediately; the copilot pushed the nose down and executed a 90° left descending turn and subsequently landed in the grass. Although he applied "hard" braking in an attempt to stop, the airplane impacted a drainage ditch, resulting in substantial impact damage and a postimpact fire. The pilot reported that, after takeoff, he observed a low torque CAS message and the copilot told him to "declare an emergency and run the checklist." The pilot confirmed that the landing gear were extended and the copilot turned the airplane to the left toward open ground between the runways and the terminal. About 60 seconds elapsed from the start of the takeoff roll until the accident. The airport was equipped with security cameras that captured the airplane from its initial climb through the landing and collision. One camera, pointed toward the west-southwest, recorded the airplane's left descending turn and its landing in the grass, followed by impact and smoke. A second camera, mounted on the control tower, pointed toward the southeast and showed the airplane during the initial climb before it leveled off and entered a descending left turn; it also showed the airplane land and roll through the grass before colliding with the ditch.

Servicios Aéreos Corporativos

Following an uneventful flight, the pilot initiated a VFR approach to Ciudad Acuña-El Bonito Airport runway 28 in good weather conditions with 9 km visibility and an OAT of +30° C. On short final, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft impacted ground five metres short of runway. The aircraft bounced, rolled for few dozen metres then veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a wooded area. All six occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

LabCorp - Laboratory Corporation of America

The pilot departed in night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions on a medical specimen transport flight. During the climb, an air traffic controller told the pilot that the transponder code he had selected (2501) was incorrect and instructed him to reset the transponder to a different code (2531). Shortly thereafter, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 3,300 ft and then entered a descending right turn. The airplane’s enhanced ground proximity warning system recorded a descent rate of 11,245 ft per minute, which triggered two “sink rate, pull up” warnings. The airplane subsequently climbed from an altitude of about 1,400 ft to about 2,000 ft before it entered another turning descent and impacted the ground about 5 miles northeast of the departure airport. The airplane was fragmented and strewn along a debris path that measured about 800-ft long and 300-ft wide. Postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded the pilot from controlling the airplane. The engine did not display any evidence of preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. An open resistor was found in the flight computer that controlled the autopilot. It could not be determined if the open resistor condition existed during the flight or occurred during the impact. If the resistor was in an open condition at the time of autopilot engagement, the autopilot would appear to engage with a mode annunciation indicating engagement, but the pitch and roll servos would not engage. The before taxiing checklist included checks of the autopilot system to verify autopilot function before takeoff. It could not be determined if the pilot performed the autopilot check before the accident flight or if the autopilot was engaged at the time of the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Dark night IFR conditions prevailed, and the track of the airplane suggests a loss of attitude awareness. Although the pilot was experienced in night instrument conditions, it is possible that an attempt to reset the transponder served as an operational distraction that contributed to a breakdown in his instrument scan. Similarly, if the autopilot’s resistor was in an open condition and the autopilot had been engaged, the pilot’s failure to detect an autopilot malfunction in a timely manner could have contributed to spatial disorientation and the resultant loss of control.

Air Sarina

The pilot took off from Anvers (Belgium) at around 14 h 40 bound for Saanen (Switzerland) where he was supposed to drop off his three passengers. The flight was performed in IFR then VFR, at a cruise altitude of 26,000 ft. After about 1 h 15 min of flight, still under IFR, the Geneva controller cleared the pilot to descend towards FL 210 and to fly towards Saanen with a view to an approach. A short time later, the radar data showed that the aeroplane deviated from the planned trajectory. Following a question from the controller, the pilot said he had an autopilot problem. The controller then asked the pilot to follow heading 165°, which the pilot read back, then asked him ‘‘are you okay, okay for the safety, it’s good for you? ‘‘. The pilot answered that he had a ‘‘big problem’’. The radar data show tight turns on descent. During these manœuvres, in reply to a request from the controller, the pilot said that he was in ‘‘total IMC’’. During this communication, the aeroplane‘s overspeed warning could be heard. The aeroplane was then descending at 15,500 ft/min. About ten seconds later, it was climbing at 15,500 ft/min. The right wing broke off about twenty seconds later. The indicated airspeed was then 274 kt and the altitude was 12,750 ft. The wreckage was found in woods in the commune of Solemont (25). A piece of the right wing was found about 2.5 km from the main wreckage. Some debris, all from the right wing, was found on a south-west/north-east axis. The aeroplane part that was furthest away was found 10 km from the main site. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all four occupants were killed.

Roadside Ventures

The airplane, registered to and operated by Roadside Ventures, LLC, departed controlled flight followed by subsequent inflight breakup near Lake Wales, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the altitude and location of the departure from controlled flight and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from St Lucie County International Airport (FPR), Fort Pierce, Florida, to Freeman Field Airport (3JC), Junction City, Kansas. The airplane was substantially damaged and the private pilot and five passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated from FPR about 1205. After departure while proceeding in a west-northwesterly direction and climbing, air traffic control communications were transferred to Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (Miami ARTCC). The pilot remained in contact with various sectors of that facility from 1206:41, to the last communication at 1233:16. About 6 minutes after takeoff the pilot was advised by the Miami ARTCC Stoop Sector radar controller of an area of moderate to heavy precipitation twelve to two o'clock 15 miles ahead of the airplane's position; the returns were reported to be 30 miles in diameter. The pilot asked the controller if he needed to circumnavigate the weather, to which the controller replied that deviations north of course were approved and when able to proceed direct LAL, which he acknowledged. A trainee controller and a controller providing oversight discussed off frequency that deviation to the south would be better. The controller then questioned the pilot about his route, to which he replied, and the controller then advised the pilot that deviations south of course were approved, which he acknowledged. The flight continued in generally a west-northwesterly direction, or about 290 degrees, and at 1230:11, while at flight level (FL) 235, the controller cleared the flight to FL260, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1232:26, the aircraft's central advisory and warning system (CAWS) recorded that the pusher system went into "ice mode" indicating the pilot had selected the propeller heat on and inertial separator open. At that time the aircraft's engine information system (EIS) recorded the airplane at 24,668 feet pressure altitude, 110 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and an outside air temperature of minus 11 degrees Celsius. At 1232:36, the Miami ARTCC Avon Sector radar controller advised the pilot of a large area of precipitation northwest of Lakeland, with moderate, heavy and extreme echoes in the northwest, and asked him to look at it and to advise what direction he needed to deviate, then suggested deviation right of course until north of the adverse weather. The pilot responded that he agreed, and the controller asked the pilot what heading from his position would keep the airplane clear, to which he responded at 1233:04 with, 320 degrees. At 1233:08, the Miami ARTCC Avon Sector radar controller cleared the pilot to fly heading 320 degrees or to deviate right of course when necessary, and when able proceed direct to Seminole, which he acknowledged at 1233:16. There was no further recorded communication from the pilot with the Miami ARTCC. Radar data showed that between 1233:08, and 1233:26, the airplane flew on a heading of approximately 290 degrees, and climbed from FL250 to FL251, while the EIS recorded for the same time the airplane was at either 109 or 110 KIAS and the outside air temperature was minus 12 degrees Celsius. The radar data indicated that between 1233:26 and 1233:31, the airplane climbed to FL252 (highest recorded altitude from secondary radar returns). At 1233:30, while at slightly less than 25 degrees of right bank based on the NTSB Radar Performance Study based on the radar returns, 109 KIAS, 25,188 feet and total air temperature of minus 12 degrees Celsius based on the data downloaded from the CAWS, autopilot disengagement occurred. This was recorded on the CAWS 3 seconds later. The NTSB Performance Study also indicates that based on radar returns between 1233:30, and 1233:40, the bank angle increased from less than approximately 25 degrees to 50 degrees, while the radar data for the approximate same time period indicates the airplane descended to FL249. The NTSB Performance Study indicates that based on radar returns between 1233:40 and 1234:00, the bank angle increased from 50 degrees to approximately 100 degrees, while the radar data indicates that for the approximate same time frames, the airplane descended from FL249 to FL226. The right descending turn continued and between 1233:59, and 1234:12, the airplane descended from 22,600 to 16,700, and a change to a southerly heading was noted. The NTSB Performance Study indicates that the maximum positive load factor of 4.6 occurred at 1234:08, while the NTSB Electronic Device Factual Report indicates that the maximum recorded airspeed value of 338 knots recorded by the EIS occurred at 1234:14. The next recoded airspeed value 1 second later was noted to be zero. Simultaneous to the zero airspeed a near level altitude of 15,292 feet was noted. Between 1234:22, and 1234:40, the radar data indicated a change in direction to a northeast occurred and the airplane descended from 13,300 to 9,900 feet. The airplane continued generally in a northeasterly direction and between 1234:40 and 1235:40 (last secondary radar return), the airplane descended from 9,900 to 800 feet. The last secondary radar return was located at 27 degrees 49.35 minutes North latitude and 081 degrees 28.6332 minutes West longitude. Plots of the radar targets of the accident site including the final radar targets are depicted in the NTSB Radar Study which is contained in the NTSB public docket. At 1235:27, the controller asked the pilot to report his altitude but there was no reply. The controller enlisted the aid of the flight crew of another airplane to attempt to establish contact with the pilot on the current frequency and also 121.5 MHz. The flight crew attempted on both frequencies but there was no reply. At 1236:30, the pilot of a nearby airplane advised the controller that he was picking up an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal. The pilot of that airplane advised the controller at 1237:19, that, "right before we heard that ELT we heard a mayday mayday." The controller inquired whether the pilot had heard the mayday on the current frequency or 121.5 MHz, to which he replied that he was not sure because he was monitoring both frequencies. The controller inquired with the flight crews of other airplanes if they heard the mayday call on the frequency and the response was negative, though they did report hearing the ELT on 121.5 MHz. The controller verified with the flight crew's that were monitoring 121.5 MHz whether they heard the mayday call on that frequency and they advised they did not. A witness who was located about 1.5 nautical miles south-southwest from the crash site reported that on the date and time of the accident, he was inside his house and first heard a sound he attributed to a propeller feathering or later described as flutter of a flight control surface. The sound lasted 3 to 4 cycles of a whooshing high to low sound, followed by a sound he described as an energy release. He was clear the sound he heard was not an explosion, but more like mechanical fracture of parts. He ran outside, and first saw the airplane below the clouds (ceiling was estimated to be 10,000 feet). He noted by silhouette that parts of the airplane were missing, but he did not see any parts separate from the airplane during the time he saw it. At that time it was not raining at his location. He went inside his house, and got a digital camera, then ran back outside to his pool deck, and videotaped the descent. He reported the airplane was in a spin but could not recall the direction. The engine sound was consistent the whole time; there was no revving; he reported there was no forward movement. He called 911 and reported the accident. Another witness who was located about .4 nautical mile east-southeast of from the crash site reported hearing a boom sound that he attributed to a lawn mower which he thought odd because it had just been raining, though it was not raining at the time of the accident. He saw black smoke trailing the airplane which was spinning in what he described as a clockwise direction and flat. He ran to the side of their house, and noted the airplane was still spinning; the smoke he observed continued until he lost sight. His brother came by their back door, heard a thud, and both ran direct to the location of where they thought the airplane had crashed. When they arrived at the wreckage, they saw fire in front of the airplane which one individual attempted to extinguish by throwing sand on it, but he was unable. The other individual reported the left forward door was hard to open, but he pushed it up and then was able to open it. Both attempted to render assistance, and one individual called 911 to report the accident. One individual then guided local first responders to the accident site. The airplane crashed in an open field during daylight conditions. The location of the main wreckage was determined to be within approximately 100 feet from the last secondary radar return. Law Enforcement personnel responded to the site and accounted for five occupants. A search for the sixth occupant was immediately initiated by numerous personnel from several state agencies; he was located the following day about 1420. During that search, parts from the airplane located away from the main wreckage were documented and secured in-situ.

United States Air Force - USAF

On 18 February 2012, at approximately 1918 local time (L), a United States Air Force U-28A aircraft, tail number 07-0736, crashed five nautical miles (NM) southwest of Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti. This aircraft was assigned to the 34th Special Operations Squadron, 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL, and deployed to the 34th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. The aircraft was destroyed and all four aircrew members died instantly upon impact. The mishap aircraft (MA) departed Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti at 1357L, to accomplish a combat mission in support of a Combined Joint Task Force. The MA proceeded to the area of responsibility (AOR), completed its mission in the AOR and returned back to Djiboutian airspace at 1852L arriving overhead the airfield at 1910L to begin a systems check. The MA proceeded south of the airfield at 10,000 feet (ft) Mean Sea Level (MSL) for 10 NM then turned to the North towards the airfield, accomplished a systems check and requested entry into the pattern at Ambouli International Airport. This request was denied due to other traffic, and the MA was directed to proceed to the west and descend by Air Traffic Control (ATC). The MA began a left descending turn to the west and was directed by ATC to report final. The mishap crew (MC) reported they were passing through 4,000 ft MSL and would report when established on final approach. The MA, continuing to descend, initiated a right turn then reversed the turn entering a left turn while continually and smoothly increasing bank angle until reaching 55 degrees prior to impact. Additionally, the MA continued to steadily increase the descent rate until reaching 11,752 ft per minute prior to impact. The MC received aural “Sink Rate” and “Pull Up” alerts with no apparent corrective action taken. The MA impacted the ground at approximately 1918L, 5 NM southwest of Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti.

Air Charter Services

M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd. offered their aircraft VT-ACF for operating medical evacuation flight to pick one critically ill patient from Patna on 25/05/2011. The Aircraft took off from Delhi to Patna with two crew members, two doctors and one male nurse. The Flight to Patna was uneventful. The Air Ambulance along with patient and one attendant took off from Patna at 20:31:58 IST, the aircraft during arrival to land at Delhi crashed near Faridabad on a Radial of 145 degree and distance of 15.2 nm at 22:42:32 IST. Aircraft reached Patna at 18:31 IST. Flight Plan for the flight from Patna to Delhi was filed with the ATC at Patna via W45-LLK-R594 at FL260, planned ETD being 22:00 hours IST and EET of 2hours for a planned ETA at VIDP being 24:00 hours IST. The crew took self-briefing of the weather and same “Self Briefing” was recorded on the flight plan submitted at ATC Patna. The passenger manifest submitted at Patna indicated a total of 2 crew and 5 passengers inclusive of the patient. Weather at Patna at the time of departure was 3000m visibility with Haze. Total fuel on board for departure at Delhi was 1516 lts. The preflight/transit inspection of the aircraft at Patna was carried out by the crew as per laid down guidelines. The crew requested for startup at 20:21 IST from Patna ATC and reported airborne at 20:33:43 IST. The aircraft climbed and maintained FL 260 for cruise. On handover from Varanasi Area Control (Radar), the aircraft came in contact with Delhi Area Control (East) Radar at 21:53:40 IST at 120.9 MHz. At 21:53:40 IST aircraft was identified on Radar by squawking code 3313. At 22:02:05 IST the crew requested for left deviation of 10° due to weather, the same was approved by the RSR controller. At 22:05:04 IST the crew informed that they have a critical patient on board and requested for priority landing and ambulance on arrival. The same was approved by the RSR controller. The aircraft was handed over to Approach Control on 126.35 MHz at 22:28:03 IST. At 22:28:18 IST VT-ACF contacted TAR (Terminal Approach Radar) on 126.35 MHz and it was maintaining FL160. At 22:32:22 IST, VT-ACF was asked to continue heading to DPN (VOR) and was cleared to descend to FL110. At 22:36:34 IST, the TAR controller informed VT-ACF about weather on HDG 330°, the crew replied in “Affirmative” and requested for left heading. At 22:38:12 IST, TAR controller gave aircraft left heading 285° which was copied by the aircraft. The aircraft started turning left, passing heading 289, it climbed from FL125 to FL141. At 22:40:32 IST the TAR controller gave 3 calls to VT-ACF. At 22:40:43 IST aircraft transmitted a feeble call “Into bad weather”, at that instance the aircraft had climbed FL 146.Thereafter the aircraft was seen turning right in a very tight turn at a low radar ground speed and loosing height rapidly from FL146 to FL 016. Again at 22:41:32 IST TAR controller gave call to VT-ACF, aircraft transmitted a feeble call “Into bad weather. Thereafter the controller gave repeated calls on both 126.35 MHz and also 121.5 MHz, before the blip on radar became static on a radial of 145 degree at 15.2 nm from DPN VOR at 22:42:32 IST. All attempts to raise contact with the aircraft failed. The TAR controller then informed the duty WSO and also the ATC Tower. At 22:50:00 IST, the tower informed the WSO that they have got a call from the City Fire Brigade confirming that an aircraft has crashed near Faridabad in a congested residential area known as Parvatia Colony. After the accident, local residents of the area and police tried to put off the fire and extricate the bodies from the wreckage of the aircraft.

Majuba Aviation

The aircraft, which was operated under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs), departed from Queenstown Aerodrome (FAQT) at 1329Z on an instrument flight plan for Plettenberg Bay Aerodrome (FAPG). On board the aircraft were two (2) crew members and seven (7) passengers. The estimated time of arrival for the aircraft to land at FAPG was 1430Z, however the aircraft never arrived at its intended destination, nor did the crew cancel their search and rescue as per flight plan/air navigation requirements. At ±1600Z an official search for the missing aircraft commenced. The search was coordinated by the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC). The first phase of the search, which was land based, was conducted in the Robberg Nature Reserve area. Progress was slow due to poor visibility associated with dense mist and night time. A sea search was not possible following activation of the official search during the late afternoon and night time, but vessels from the National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) were able to launch at first light the next morning. Floating debris (light weight material) was picked up from the sea and along the western shoreline of the Robberg Nature Reserve where foot patrols were conducted. On 11 February 2011 the South African Navy joined the search for the missing wreckage by utilizing side scan sonar equipment to scan the sea bed for the wreckage. All the occupants on board the aircraft were fatally injured in the accident.

E. S. Management

The aircraft took off from Budel-Kempen Airport runway 21 at 0822LT. After liftoff, pilot was instructed to make a left turn and was cleared to climb to 2,000 feet. While flying in clouds, the autopilot was disengaged. The aircraft rolled to the right then entered a steep descent and crashed in an open field located in Weert, east of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed, among them Paul Evers, Director of Alko International.

Nicholas Elliott %26 Jordan

While in instrument meteorological conditions flying 800 feet above the airplane’s service ceiling (30,000 feet), with no icing conditions reported, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he, “...lost [his] panel.” With the autopilot most likely engaged, the airplane began a right roll about 36 seconds later. The airplane continued in a right roll that increased to 105 degrees, then rolled back to about 70 degrees, before the airplane entered a right descending turn. The airplane continued its descending turn until being lost from radar in the vicinity of the accident site. The airplane impacted in a nose-down attitude in an open field and was significantly fragmented. Postaccident inspection of the flight control system, engine, and propeller revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The flaps and landing gear were retracted and all trim settings were within the normal operating range. Additionally, the airplane was within weight and balance limitations for the flight. The cause of the pilot-reported panel failure could not be determined; however, the possibility of a total electrical failure was eliminated since the pilot maintained radio contact with the air traffic controller. Although the source of the instrumentation failure could not be determined, proper pilot corrective actions, identified in the pilot operating handbook, following the failure most likely would have restored flight information to the pilot’s electronic flight display. Additionally, a standby attitude gyro, compass, and the co-pilot’s electronic flight display units would be available for attitude reference information assuming they were operational.

Eagle Cap Leasing

On March 22, 2009, about 1432 mountain daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12/45, N128CM, was diverting to Bert Mooney Airport (BTM), Butte, Montana, when it crashed about 2,100 feet west of runway 33 at BTM. The pilot and the 13 airplane passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces and a post crash fire. The airplane was owned by Eagle Cap Leasing of Enterprise, Oregon, and was operating as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed Oroville Municipal Airport, Oroville, California, on an instrument flight rules flight plan with a destination of Gallatin Field, Bozeman, Montana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Rooney Consulting %26 Aviation

The pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan with a planned departure time of 0700 in order to arrive at his intended destination in time for a planned engagement. He and his passenger arrived at the airport approximately 0800 and requested that the airplane be fueled. The airplane was pulled from its heated hangar into heavy snowfall and fueled at 0917. As the airplane sat outside in the heavy snowfall, a measurable amount of wet slushy snow accumulated on the airplane. The Fixed Base Operator manager suggested to the pilot that the airplane be deiced, but he declined. The airplane was then pulled out to the taxiway in an effort to prevent it from becoming stuck in the snow. At 0939, approximately 22 minutes after the airplane was pulled out if its hangar, the pilot departed with a visibility of 3/4 of a mile in snow and with a 4-knot direct tailwind. The pilot then made a right turn and announced that he was heading to his first waypoint. The airplane continued into an ever tightening right turn until it impacted the ground while in an inverted position about one mile north-northwest of the runway. An examination of the airplane’s wreckage revealed no anomalies with either the engine or airframe that would have contributed to the loss of control. The airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual contained the following limitation: "The aircraft must be clear of all deposits of snow, ice and frost adhering to the lifting surfaces immediately prior to takeoff."

Gardner Leasing

The pilot was approaching his home airport under dark night conditions. He reported that he was five miles from the airport and adjusted the airport lighting several times. He made no further radio calls, though his normal practice was to report his position several times as he proceeded in the landing pattern. The airplane approached the airport from the southeast in a descent, continued past the airport, and adjusted its course slightly to the left. One witness reported observing the airplane enter a left turn, then pitch down, and descend at a steep angle. The airplane impacted terrain in a steep left bank and cart wheeled. An examination of the airframe, airplane systems, and engine revealed no pre-impact anomalies. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The pilot had flown eight hours and 30 minutes on the day of the accident, crossing two time zones, and had been awake for no less than 17 hours when the accident occurred. The accident occurred at a time of day after midnight in the pilot's departure time zone. Post-accident toxicology testing revealed doxylamine and amphetamine in the pilot's tissues. The pilot had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) almost five years prior to the accident and had taken prescription amphetamines for the disorder since that diagnosis. The FAA does not medically certify pilots who require medication for the control of ADHD. At the time of the accident, the pilot's blood level of amphetamines may have been falling, and he may have been increasingly fatigued and distracted. The use of doxylamine (an over-the-counter antihistamine, often used as a sleep aid) could suggest that the pilot was having difficulty sleeping.

JMH Capital

The private pilot receiving instruction and his flight instructor departed on runway 06 with a headwind of 17 knots gusting to 23 knots. Witnesses said that the pilot had transmitted on Common Traffic Advisor Frequency the intention of practicing a loss of engine power after takeoff, and turning 180 degrees to return to the airport. Another witness said that the airplane pitched up 30 degrees while simultaneously banking hard to the right in an uncoordinated manner. He said that as the airplane rolled to the right, the nose of the airplane yawed down to nearly 45 degrees below the horizon. Subsequently, the airplane's wings rolled level, but the aircraft was still pitched nose down. He said the airplane appeared to be recovering from its dive. A witness said that the airplane appeared to be in a landing flare when he observed dirt and grass flying up behind the aircraft. He said the airplane's right wing tip and engine impacted terrain, and a fire ensued that consumed the airplane. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane's right wingtip hit a 10 inch in diameter rock and immediately impacted a wire fence 10 inches above the ground. Approximately 120 feet of triple wire fence continued with the airplane to the point of rest. No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies which might have affected the airplane's performance were identified. The weight and balance was computed for the accident airplane at the time of the accident and the center of gravity was determined to be approximately one inch forward of the forward limit.

J2W Aviation

The accident airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to land, when witnesses reported seeing it spinning in a nose down, near vertical attitude before it collided with the ground. The accident site was about 3 miles from the approach end of the intended runway. A review of radar data disclosed that the private pilot had difficulty maintaining altitude and airspeed while on final approach, with significant excursions above and below the glidepath, as well as large variations in airspeed. Interviews with other pilots in the area just prior to and after the accident revealed that icing conditions existed in clouds near the airport, although first responders to the accident site indicated that there was no ice on the airplane. Post accident inspection of the airplane, its engine and flight navigation systems, discovered no evidence of preimpact anomalies. An analysis of the airplane's navigation system's light bulbs, suggests that the pilot had selected the GPS mode for the initial approach, but had not switched to the proper instrument approach mode to allow the autopilot to lock onto the ILS.

Pilatus Partners

The turbo-prop airplane departed controlled flight after initiating an ATC directed turn during cruise climb. The airplane subsequently entered a rapidly descending spiral turn, impacting the terrain and exploding. A witness reported hearing an "unusually loud" engine sound prior to seeing the airplane in a nose-low descent. The witness stated the airplane was "heading straight down, and did between a quarter and half of turn, but was not spinning wildly." The witness reported the airplane disappeared behind a nearby ridgeline and was followed by a "loud sound, and an immediate large cloud of black smoke." Aircraft radar track data showed the airplane heading to the northeast, while climbing to a maximum altitude of 13,800 feet msl. The airplane then entered an increasingly tighter, right descending turn. The calculated descent rate was 7,000 feet/min. Instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed at altitude and marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions prevailed at the accident site. The instrument-rated pilot received a weather briefing prior to departure. During the briefing the pilot was told of building thunderstorm activity near the departure airport and along the route of flight. The pilot told the briefer he was going to depart shortly to keep ahead of the approaching weather. A witness at the departure airport reported that the passenger was concerned about flying in "bad weather" and the pilot told the passenger that the weather was only going to get worse and that they "needed to go to get ahead of it." A two-dimensional reconstruction determined that all primary airframe structural components, flight control surfaces, powerplant components, and propeller blades were present. Flight control continuity could not be established due to the extensive damage to all components. Inspection of the recovered flight control components did not exhibit any evidence of pre-impact malfunction. The standby attitude indicator gyro and its case showed evidence of rotational damage, consistent with the gyro rotating at the time of impact. Both solid-state Attitude & Heading Reference System (AHRS) units were destroyed during the accident, and as a result no information was available.

Access Air

On July 8, 2001, approximately 1345 local time (0245UTC), a Pilatus PC-12/45, N660NR, registered to a US private owner, operated by Jeflyn Aviation, Inc. doing business as Access Air, and being flown by a US certificated airline transport rated pilot, was presumed destroyed following a ditching in the Sea of Okhotsk, Western Pacific Ocean. The pilot sustained minor injuries and the three remaining Japanese passengers were uninjured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an IFR flight plan had been filed and activated. The flight, which was returning to the United States following a round-the-world trip, was being operated under 14CFR91 as a business trip. The aircraft had originated from Hakodate, Japan, departing 0910 hours local time and was destined for Magadan, Russia. The pilot reported in a telephonic interview that the aircraft was established in cruise at 8,100 meters altitude when he felt a vibration followed by a rapid increase in the engine's Turbine Temperature Indication (TTI). He reported that the TTI reached 1144 degrees during which there was a compressor stall. He shut the engine down, feathered the propeller, and initiated a power off emergency descent. During the emergency descent the pilot radioed a mayday on 121.5 MHz, set his transponder to code 7700, and manually activated the emergency locator beacon. The aircraft descended through multiple cloud layers during which the pilot and passengers prepared for the ditching. The pilot reported that upon breaking through the bottom of the last overcast layer, at 100 feet above the water, he encountered swells of approximately 8-12 feet height. He ditched the aircraft on the crest of a swell and the aircraft came to a stop floating in an upright, level attitude. All four occupants exited the aircraft through the main cabin door into a life raft. Over a period of several hours the occupants lost sight of the floating aircraft and after about 15 hours they were picked up by a Russian container ship and airlifted to Sakhalin Island.

Adolf Henschel

After takeoff from runway 28 at Brno-Turany Airport, the pilot reported on the tower frequency that she needs to land. She received instruction to continue a southern (left-hand) circuit and to report final for runway 28. At this time the first contact was made with the aeroplane by secondary radar at a height of about 520 feet AAL and 560 metres north from runway 28. The pilot did not confirm the instruction, did not turn for the southern (left-hand) circuit, but continued to turn for the northern (right-hand) one. Since she did not confirm repeated approval for the left-hand circuit and continued the right-hand one, she received information from tower that it is possible to continue the northern circuit, clearance to land to runway 28 ans was offered assistance after landing. Without any confirmation. At this time the height was approximately 930 feet AAL and position 2,8 km north from the aerodrome. The aeroplane started gradually to descend and to turn as the pilot probably intended to accomplish approach for runway 28. However it did not happen and the aeroplane hit the ground at 0615,28 approximately 600 metres north from the runway 28 threshold. The aeroplane was flying very low in the last phase of flight according to statements of witnesses. The last height recorded by the secondary radar was approximately 120 feet AAL 13 seconds prior to the impact onto ground. Witnesses described the attitude of the aeroplane prior to strike to ground as very unusual. Both occupants were killed.

V. Kelner Airways

The aircraft, a Pilatus PC-12, serial number 151, was on a scheduled domestic flight from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Goose Bay, Labrador, with the pilot, a company observer, and eight passengers on board. Twenty-three minutes into the flight, the aircraft turned back towards St. John's because of a low oil pressure indication. Eight minutes later, the engine(Pratt & Whitney PT6A-67B) had to be shut down because of a severe vibration. The pilot then turned towards Clarenville Airport, but was unable to reach the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed during the forced landing in a bog one and a half miles from the Clarenville Airport. The pilot, the company observer, and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The Board determined that the pilot did not follow the prescribed emergency procedure for low oil pressure, and the engine failed before he could land safely. The pilot's decision making was influenced by his belief that the low oil pressure indications were not valid. The engine failed as a result of an interruption of oil flow to the first-stage planet gear assembly; the cause of the oil flow interruption could not be determined.

Heading South

The single engine aircraft was returning to Nairobi with one pilot and eight passengers who were returning to the capital city following a three-day safari and cinema trip. While descending to Nairobi-Wilson Airport, the pilot encountered poor visibility due to mist and failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the Ngong Hills, about 20 km southwest of Wilson Airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all nine occupants were killed.