Gulfstream GIV

Helidosa Aviation Group

The aircraft departed La Isabela-Dr. Joaquín Balaguer Airport on a charter flight to Orlando, carrying six passengers and three crew members. Shortly after takeoff, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to Santo Domingo-Las Américas Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the aircraft went out of control and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed, among them the Portorican music artist José Angel Hernández aka Flow La Movie. According to a preliminary report, the crew encountered technical problems with the spoilers and maintenance was performed to change the ground spoiler actuators. After maintenance, the crew completed a ground check and while all spoilers properly deployed on both wings, only the spoilers on the left wing retracted as the spoilers on the right wing remained deployed. The crew failed to notice this asymetry. Immediately after takeoff, the crew reported controllability problems and elected to return but finally decided to divert to Las Américas Airport. The aircraft eventually went out of control and crashed 16 minutes after takeoff.

SN 1124 LLC

On August 21, 2021, about 1340 eastern daylight time, a Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV airplane, N277GM, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The four crew members and 10 passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that after a routine taxi to the runway he initiated the takeoff on runway 9. As the takeoff roll progressed, he recalled that the normal callouts were made, and nothing was abnormal until the airplane reached about 100 to 110 knots, at which point he felt a “terrible shimmy” that “progressively got worse and worse.” He initiated an immediate aborted takeoff with braking and thrust reversers and it seemed that the airplane was slowing; however, the airplane veered off the runway and the right main landing gear struck a concrete slab holding approach lighting equipment. The airplane came to a stop shortly after impacting the concrete slab. The second-in-command pilot reported that the taxi and initial takeoff roll were normal. As the airplane passed through 80 knots, he recalled feeling a “slight shimmy” and “a little rattle” between the rudder pedals, which “intensified dramatically.” The PIC then aborted the takeoff by reducing the power to idle, applying thrust reversers, and applying brakes. During the abort procedure, the nose dropped, and it became apparent that “the nose gear collapsed.” The airplane continued to maintain the runway centerline for a short period of time but then veered to the right, off the runway and came to a stop. He then opened the main cabin door, and the passengers immediately exited. A third non-type rated observer pilot seated in the jumpseat reported a similar account of the accident sequence. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector responded to the accident site the day of the accident. The airplane came to rest in a sandy grass area about 200 ft to the right of the runway 9 centerline. The left main landing gear did not collapse; however, the right main landing gear was displaced upward and punctured the inboard aft section of the right wing which resulted in substantial damage. Examination of the runway and surrounding grass areas found several items of debris. Moving east in the direction of the takeoff roll, the first component located on the runway was the nose landing gear (NLG) pip pin that is normally seated in the NLG torque link. It was found about 2,215 ft from the main wreckage. Continuing down the runway, about 1,315 ft from the main wreckage, the bulk of the NLG shock strut assembly, trunnion and truss, both tires, and lower scissor link were located intact and impact damaged. The safety pin, that normally is installed through the NLG pip pin was found intact with the separated NLG still attached to its lanyard cord. The NLG upper scissor link was located in the grass a few hundred feet from the runway centerline. Figure 1 shows a still image captured by the FXE Airport Authority drone shortly after the accident. Additional photographs have been added to the drone image to show the location of swivel tire marks and where components were located on the runway as noted with the red circles.

CentralAv

Crashed in unknown circumstances, killing the pilot, sole on board.

SK Travel

The aircraft crashed after it overran the end of runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts. The airplane rolled through the paved overrun area and across a grassy area, collided with approach lights and a localizer antenna, passed through the airport’s perimeter fence, and came to a stop in a ravine. The two pilots, a flight attendant, and four passengers died. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The corporate flight, which was destined for Atlantic City International Airport, Atlantic City, New Jersey, was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. During the engine start process, the flight crew neglected to disengage the airplane’s gust lock system, which locks the elevator, ailerons, and rudder while the airplane is parked to protect them against wind gust loads. Further, before initiating takeoff, the pilots neglected to perform a flight control check that would have alerted them of the locked flight controls. A review of data from the airplane’s quick access recorder revealed that the pilots had neglected to perform complete flight control checks before 98% of their previous 175 takeoffs in the airplane, indicating that this oversight was habitual and not an anomaly. A mechanical interlock between the gust lock handle and the throttle levers restricts the movement of the throttle levers when the gust lock handle is in the ON position. According to Gulfstream, the interlock mechanism was intended to limit throttle lever movement to a throttle lever angle (TLA) of no greater than 6° during operation with the gust lock on. However, postaccident testing on nine in-service G-IV airplanes found that, with the gust lock handle in the ON position, the forward throttle lever movement that could be achieved on the G-IV was 3 to 4 times greater than the intended TLA of 6°. During takeoff, the pilot-in-command (PIC) manually advanced the throttle levers, but the engine pressure ratio (EPR) did not reach the expected level due to the throttles contacting the gust lock/throttle lever interlock. The PIC did not immediately reject the takeoff; instead, he engaged the autothrottle, and the throttle levers moved slightly forward, which allowed the engines to attain an EPR value that approached (but never reached) the target setting. As the takeoff roll continued, the second-in-command made the standard takeoff speed callouts as the airplane successively reached 80 knots, the takeoff safety speed, and the rotation speed. When the PIC attempted to rotate the airplane, he discovered that he could not move the control yoke and began calling out “(steer) lock is on.” At this point, the PIC clearly understood that the controls were locked but still did not immediately initiate a rejected takeoff. If the flight crew had initiated a rejected takeoff at the time of the PIC’s first “lock is on” comment or at any time up until about 11 seconds after this comment, the airplane could have been stopped on the paved surface. However, the flight crew delayed applying brakes for about 10 seconds and further delayed reducing power by 4 seconds; therefore, the rejected takeoff was not initiated until the accident was unavoidable. Among the victims was Lewis Katz, co-owner of the 'Philadelphia Inquirer'.

Universal Jet Aviation

The crew, consisting of a Captain and a co-pilot, took off at around 6 h 00 for a flight between Athens and Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (Turkey). A cabin aid was also on board the aeroplane. The crew then made the journey between Istanbul and Nice (06) with three passengers. After dropping them off in Nice, the aeroplane took off at 12 h 56 for a flight to Le Castellet aerodrome in order to park the airplane for several days, the parking area at Nice being full. The Captain, in the left seat, was Pilot Monitoring (PM). The copilot, in the right seat, was Pilot Flying (PF). Flights were operated according to US regulation 14 CFR Part 135 (special rules applicable for the operation of flights on demand). The flight leg was short and the cruise, carried out at FL160, lasted about 5 minutes. At the destination, the crew was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 13. The autopilot and the auto-throttle were disengaged, the gear was down and the flaps in the landing position. The GND SPOILER UNARM message, indicating nonarming of the ground spoilers, was displayed on the EICAS and the associated single chime aural warning was triggered. This message remained displayed on the EICAS until the end of the flight since the crew forgot to arm the ground spoilers during the approach. At a height of 25 ft, while the aircraft was flying over the runway threshold slightly below the theoretical descent path, a SINK RATE warning was triggered. The PF corrected the flight path and the touchdown of the main landing gear took place 15 metres after the touchdown zone - that’s to say 365 metres from the threshold - and slightly left of the centre line of runway 13(3). The ground spoilers, not armed, did not automatically deploy. The crew braked and actuated the deployment of the thrust reversers, which did not deploy completely(4). The hydraulic pressure available at brake level slightly increased. The deceleration of the aeroplane was slow. Four seconds after touchdown, a MASTER WARNING was triggered. A second MASTER WARNING(5) was generated five seconds later. The nose landing gear touched down for the first time 785 metres beyond the threshold before the aeroplane’s pitch attitude increased again, causing a loss of contact of the nose gear with the ground. The aircraft crossed the runway centre line to the right, the crew correcting this by a slight input on the rudder pedals to the left. They applied a strong nose-down input and the nose gear touched down on the runway a second time, 1,050 metres beyond the threshold. The speed brakes were then manually actuated by the crew with an input on the speed brake control, which then deployed the panels. Maximum thrust from the thrust reversers was reached one second later(6). The aircraft at this time was 655 metres from the runway end and its path began to curve to the left. In response to this deviation, the crew made a sharp input on the right rudder pedal, to the stop, and an input on the right brake, but failed to correct the trajectory. The aeroplane, skidding to the right(7), ran off the runway to the left 385 metres from the runway end at a ground speed of approximately 95 knots. It struck a runway edge light, the PAPI of runway 31, a metal fence then trees and caught fire instantly. An aerodrome firefighter responded quickly onsite but did not succeed in bringing the fire under control. The occupants were unable to evacuate the aircraft.

Stanford Aviation

The aircraft was performing a flight from Kinshasa to Bukavu with an intermediate stop in Goma on behalf of the DRC Government. After touchdown at Bukavu-Kavumu Airport, the aircraft failed to stop within the remaining distance. It veered off runway to the left, went down 20 metres high embankment before coming to rest, broken in two. There was no fire. Both pilots, a passenger and two people on the ground were killed. All others occupants were seriously injured. Fifteen days later, on 27FEB2012, a second passenger died from his injuries. The Governor of Katanga Katumba Mwanke was killed as well as the Deputy of Lukunga District Oscar Gema di Mageko who died on 27FEB2012. The survivors were the Finance Minister Matata Ponyo, the Governor of Sud-Kivu Marcelin Cishambo and the Ambassador of the President Antoine Ghonda.

Prime Aviation

While taxiing at Papeete-Faaa Airport, the aircraft went out of control and collided with various ground handling equipment such as a catering truck, a belt loader and cargo containers. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Gama Aviation

The flight was cleared for the ILS Runway 19 approach, circle-to-land on Runway 24; a 6,013-foot-long, 150-foot wide, asphalt runway. The auto throttle and autopilot were disengaged during the approach, about 800 feet agl. However, the auto throttle reengaged just prior to touchdown, about 35 feet agl. The flightcrew did not recall reengaging the auto throttle, and were not aware of the autothrottle reengagement. According to the auto throttle computers, the reengagement was commanded through one of the Engage/Disengage paddle switches located on each power lever. The target airspeed set for the auto throttle system was 138 knots. After touchdown, as the airplane decelerated below 138 knots, the auto throttle system gradually increased the power levers in an attempt to maintain the target airspeed. Without the power levers in the idle position, the ground spoilers and thrust reversers would not deploy. While the flightcrew was pulling up on the thrust reverser levers, they may not have initially provided enough aft force on the power levers (15 to 32 lbs.) to override and disconnect the auto throttle system. The flight data recorder indicated that the autothrottle system disengaged 16 seconds after the weight-on-wheels switches were activated in ground mode. As the airplane neared the end of the runway, the pilot engaged the emergency brake, and the airplane departed the right side of the runway. The autothrottle Engage/Disengage paddle switches were not equipped with switch guards. Although the autothrottle system provided an audible tone when disengaged, it did not provide a tone when engaged. The reported wind about the time of the accident was from 290 degrees at 16 knots, gusting to 25 knots, with a peak wind from 300 degrees at 32 knots.

Alberto Culver

The flightcrew of a Gulfstream G-IV began taking off on Runway 34 with a crosswind from 280° at 24 knots. About 1,340 feet after the takeoff roll began, the airplane veered left 5.14° to a heading of 335°. It departed the runway, and tire marks indicated no braking action was applied. One of the pilots said, "Reverse," then one said, "No, no, no, go, go, go, go, go." The airplane traversed a shallow ditch that paralleled the runway, which resulted in separation of both main landing gear, the left and right flaps, and a piece of left aileron control cable from the airplane. The airplane became airborne after it encountered a small berm at the departure end of the runway. Reportedly, the left wing fuel tank exploded. The main wreckage was located about 6,650 feet from the start of the takeoff roll. Examination of the airplane indicated no preexisting anomalies of the engines, flight controls, or aircraft systems. The Nose Wheel Steering Select Control Switch was found in the "Handwheel Only" position, and not in the "Normal" position. The pilot-in-command (PIC) routinely flew with the switch in the "Normal" position. The PIC and copilot (pilot-not-flying) comprised a mix crew in accordance with an Interchange Agreement between two companies which operated G-IV's. The companies' operation manuals and the Interchange Agreement did not address mixed crews, procedural differences, or aircraft difference training.