Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante

Sales Serviços Aéreos

The airplane departed Jundiaí on a cargo flight to Eldorado do Sul, carrying two pilots and a load of automotive parts. On final approach, the airplane crash landed in a rice paddy field and came to rest with its left wing detached. Both pilots were slightly injured.

Táxi Aéreo Ribeiro

Shortly after takeoff from Foz do Iguaçu-Cataratas Airport, while climbing, the crew reported technical problems and elected to return. The crew realized he could not make it so he attempted an emergency landing in a corn field. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Among the four occupants, one passenger was slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Batair Cargo

The crew was performing a cargo flight from Lanseria to Lubumbashi with an intermediate stop at Francistown Airport to refuel, and the aircraft was carrying a load of ion exchange resins for water purification. During an early morning approach, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions, abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. During a second approach from the opposite direction, the crew informed ATC he established a visual contact with the runway when the aircraft crashed in a bushy area located some 4,6 km short of runway.

Taxi Aéreo Weiss

The twin engine aircraft departed Sorocaba on a cargo flight to Cascavel, carrying two pilots and a load consisting of pharmaceutical materials. On final approach in low visibility due to bad weather conditions and night, the aircraft descended below the glide and impacted the ground 700 metres short of runway 33. On impact, it lost its undercarriage then slid for 150 metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Visibility at the time of the accident was 1,200 metres with mist, local patches of fog and ceiling at 100 feet. Cascavel Airport was equipped with an NDB only.

Piquiatuba Taxi Aéreo

Following an uneventful flight from Belém, the crew started the descent to Senador José Porfirio-Wilma Rebelo Airport in marginal weather conditions. On approach, the crew noticed an elevation of the left engine turbine temperature. The captain reduced the power on both engines and elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field located 4 km short of runway. The captain and a passenger were killed. All eight other occupants were killed, three seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.

Manaus Aerotáxi

The twin engine aircraft departed Coari Airport at 1240LT on a charter flight to Manaus-Eduardo Gomes Airport, carrying 26 passengers and two pilots. About 30 minutes into the flight, while cruising at FL115, the crew informed ATC that the left engine failed and elected to divert to the unused Manacapuru Airfield. While approaching runway 08, the aircraft rolled to the left to an angle of 30° then crashed in the Rio Manacapuru. 24 people were killed while 4 passengers were slightly injured.

Rico Linhas Aéreas - Rondonia Importaçao e Comercio

The twin engine aircraft departed Manaus-Eduardo Gomes Airport on a flight to Carauari, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. About 50 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 8,500 feet, the right engine failed. The crew elected several times to restart it but without success. After the crew informed ATC about his situation, he was cleared to divert to Coari Airport located about 37 km from his position. Because the aircraft was overloaded and one engine was inoperative, the crew was approaching Coari Airport runway 28 with a speed higher than the reference speed. The aircraft landed too far down the runway, about 700 metres past the runway 28 threshold (runway 28 is 1,600 metres long). After touchdown, directional control was lost. The airplane veered off runway to the left and while contacting a drainage ditch, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft came to rest 20 metres further. All 17 occupants were evacuated, among them nine were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Airlink Papua New Guinea

The aircraft was refueled with 640 litres (L) of Jet-A1 (AVTUR) in preparation for an early morning departure to Hoskins, New Britain, on 30 March. On 30 March, the crew lodged a flight plan, which stated that the total fuel on board was 2,100 pounds (lbs) (1,208 L). The first sector of the planned route was from Port Moresby to Hoskins. The pilot-in-command (PIC) obtained an area forecast for the flight, which indicated that there were areas of rain and scattered cloud from 1500-5000 feet (ft), with deteriorating conditions forecast for the period between 0400-0800 hours (hrs); for their arrival at Hoskins. The forecast required 30 minutes holding fuel in addition to the flight and statutory fuel requirements. These conditions were normal for their destination at this time of the year.The aircraft departed Port Moresby at 0402, as flight number ND304 for Hoskins. It initially climbed to the planned Flight Level (FL) 140 (14,000 ft), which was 300 ft above the lowest safe altitude (LSA) on the initial RNC track between Port Moresby and Girua, an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) reporting point on the north coast of the PNG mainland. The LSA for the sector between Girua and the en-route reporting point Maran was 3,300 ft, and the PIC had planned to cruise at 9,000 ft. The sector between Maran and Hoskins was planned at 9,000 ft, with a LSA of 8,300 ft. The purpose of the flight was to transport newspapers and general freight to Hoskins and Rabaul. Flight Information Area (FIA) communications with Nadzab Flight Service used High Frequency (HF) radio, and a Very High Frequency (127.1 MHz) repeater transceiver located near the township of Popondetta. This service was usually monitored by Nadzab Flight Service during their normal hours of operation, for aircraft operating on the Girua to Hoskins track. One of the functions of the Nadzab Flight Service Unit was to record all transmissions received via the Girua repeater site. The crew made a position report, intercepted by Port Moresby Flight Service, advising that they were overhead Maran at 0506, cruising at FL 110 (11,000 ft), and gave an estimated time of arrival (ETA) Hoskins at 0540. That was 2,000 ft higher than the planned level. The position report was received by Port Moresby Flight Service, because Nadzab Flight Service had not commenced operations. It subsequently commenced operations for the day at 0540. Because Nadzab was responsible for the airspace in which ALU was operating, Port Moresby Flight Service advised Nadzab of ALU’s position report, once Nadzab opened. The Maran position report was the last recorded radio contact with the aircraft. No transmission declaring the intention to descend below FL110 was heard from the crew of ALU. No MAYDAY transmission was reported by ATS or other aircrew. When the crew of ALU failed to report their arrival at Hoskins, a search was commenced of the Hoskins aerodrome. At 0650 a DISTRESFA Search and Rescue Phase (SAR) was declared indicating the degree of apprehension held for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. Later that morning verbal reports were received from a coastal logging company in an area east of Kandrian, that an aircraft had crashed. The wreckage of ALU was found 27 km east of Kandrian, at an elevation of 780 ft above sea level. Both crew members had not survived the impact. The wreckage was located at position 06° 11' 39.8'' S, 149° 52' 58.9'' E, and was dispersed along a 500 m wreckage trail after colliding with numerous trees and impacting the terrain. The investigation estimated the time of the accident to be about 0523.

AirNow

The airport's instrument approach procedures included a very high frequency, omnidirectional range (VOR) approach, and a global positioning system (GPS) approach that was not an overlay. The VOR approach procedure included an inbound course to the VOR, and after passage, a descent along the same course to a missed approach point. The missed approach point was defined as 6 nautical miles beyond the VOR, as well as by timing. The pilot twice attempted the VOR approach in instrument meteorological conditions. He flew the first approach to the missed approach point, initiated a missed approach, contacted the controller, and requested a second VOR approach. He then received vectors to rejoin the approach course inbound to the VOR. The airplane subsequently passed over the VOR, on course, about 100 feet above the minimum altitude. However, instead of descending as described in the procedure, the airplane maintained that altitude until reaching the airport, then began a descent. The airplane continued to travel outbound along the same approach course until it impacted rising terrain about 6.5 miles beyond the airport. There was no dedicated distance measuring equipment (DME) onboard the airplane. Instead, distance was determined by the use of an instrument flight rules (IFR)-approved GPS unit. Due to the non-storage capability of the unit, historical waypoint selection could not be determined. The pilot could have selected the airport as a "direct to" waypoint, or, if he had entered flight plan waypoints, the unit would have sequenced from the VOR to the airport during the first approach. In either case, unless the pilot reprogrammed the unit, the last waypoint entered would have remained at the airport, rather than the VOR. The pilot then most likely mistook the airport position for the VOR position, and displaced the beginning of the descent by 6 nautical miles. Also noted, was that once the airplane passed over the VOR en route to the airport, the HSI would have indicated a change of "to" to "from". There were no medical anomalies noted with the pilot and no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane.

AirNow

The pilot had flown the airplane the day before the accident and after landing on the morning of the accident; she ordered fuel for the airplane. While exiting the airplane another pilot informed her that he had heard a "popping noise" coming from one of the engines. The pilot of the accident airplane elected to taxi to a run up area to conduct an engine run up. The fuel truck arrived at the run up area and the pilot elected not to refuel the airplane at that time and continued the run up. No anomalies were noted during the run up and the airplane was taxied back to the ramp and parked. The pilot arrived back at the airport later on the day of the accident and did not re-order fuel for the airplane nor did she recall checking the fuel tanks during the preflight inspection of the airplane. The pilot departed and was in cruise flight when she noticed the fuel light on the annunciator panel flickering. The pilot checked the fuel gauges and observed less than 100 pounds of fuel per-side indicated. The pilot declared low fuel with Columbia Approach Control controllers and requested to divert to the nearest airport, Orangeburg Municipal. The controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach to the airport and as she turned the airplane for final, the left engine lost power followed by the right engine. The pilot made a forced landing into the trees about 1/4 mile from the approach end of runway 36. The pilot exited the airplane and telephoned 911 emergency operators on her cell phone. The pilot stated she did not experience any mechanical problems with the airplane before the accident. Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and no fuel was present in the fuel tanks.

AirNow

According to the pilot, the airplane took off with a flaps setting of 25 percent, per the operator’s procedures at the time. He stated that, immediately after raising the landing gear after takeoff, he heard an explosion and saw that all gauges for the left engine, a Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) PT6A-34, pointed to zero, indicating a loss of power to the left engine. He also noted that the left propeller had completely stopped so he added full power to the right engine, left the flaps at 25 percent, and left the landing gear up. He further stated that, although he “stood on the right rudder,” he could not stop the airplane’s left turning descent. The pilot later noted that, after the left engine lost power, he “couldn’t hold V speeds” and “the stall warning horn was going off the whole time.” Post accident examination of the accident airplane’s left engine revealed that that it had failed and that the propeller had been feathered. Examination of the trim positions revealed that the rudder was at neutral trim and the aileron was at full left trim. Although these trim positions could have been altered when the wings separated from the fuselage during ground impact, the pilot’s comment that he “stood on the rudder” suggests that he either had not trimmed the airplane after the engine failure or had applied trim opposite the desired direction. The activation of the stall warning horn and the pilot’s statement that he “couldn’t hold V speeds” indicate that he also did not lower the nose sufficiently to maintain best single-engine rate of climb or best single-engine angle of climb airspeed. In addition, a performance calculation conducted during the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation revealed that the airplane, with flaps set at 25 degrees, would have been able to climb at more than 400 feet per minute if the pilot had maintained best single-engine rate of climb airspeed and if the airplane had been properly trimmed. Post accident examination of the accident airplane’s left engine revealed fatigue fracturing of the first-stage sun gear.[1] According to the airplane’s maintenance records, during an October 1998 engine overhaul, the first-stage planet gear assembly was replaced due to “frosted and pitted gear teeth.” The planet gear assembly’s mating sun gear was also examined during overhaul but was found to be serviceable and was reinstalled with the new planet gear assembly, which was an accepted practice at the time. However, since then, the engine manufacturer determined that if either the sun gear or planet gear assembly needed to be replaced with a zero-time component, the corresponding mating gear/assembly must also be replaced with a zero-time component; otherwise, the different wear patterns on the gears could potentially cause “distress” to one or both of the components. Review of maintenance records showed that the engines were maintained, in part, under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved “on-condition” maintenance program;[2] Business Air’s maintenance program was approved in May 1995. In April 2002, P&WC, the engine manufacturer, issued Service Bulletin (SB) 1403 Revision 7, which no longer mentioned on-condition maintenance programs and required, for the first time for other time between overhaul extension options, the replacement of a number of PT6A-34, -35, and -36 life-limited engine components, including the first-stage sun gear at 12,000 hours total time since new. The first-stage sun gear on the accident airplane failed at 22,064.8 hours. In November 2005 (when the Manchester accident occurred), Business Air was operating under an engine on-condition maintenance program that did not incorporate the up-to-date PT6A 34, -35, and -36 reliability standards for the life-limited parts listed in SB 1403R7 because the SB did not address previously approved on-condition maintenance programs. Three months later, in an e-mail message to Business Air, P&WC stated that it would continue to “endorse” Business Air’s engine on-condition maintenance program. Although SB 1403R7 improves PT6A-34, -35, and -36 engine reliability standards, allowing grandfathered on condition maintenance programs for these engines is less restrictive and does not offer the same level of reliability. The National Transportation Safety Board’s review of maintenance records further revealed numerous deficiencies in Business Air’s on-condition engine maintenance program that appear to have gone undetected by the Portland, Maine, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), which is in charge of monitoring Business Air’s operations. For example, one infraction was that Business Air did not specify which parts were included in its on-condition maintenance program and which would have been removed by other means, such as hard-time scheduling.[3] Also, the operator used engine condition trend monitoring as part of determining engine health; however, review of records revealed missing data, inaccurate data input, a lack of regular trend analyses, and a failure to update trends or reestablish baselines when certain maintenance was performed. Another example showed that, although Business Air had an engine-oil analysis program in place, the time it took to send samples for testing and receive results was lengthy. According to maintenance records, the operator took an oil sample from the accident engine more than 2 weeks before the accident and sent it for testing. The oil sample, which revealed increased iron levels, would have provided valuable information about the engine’s health. However, the results, which indicated a decline in engine health, were not received until days after the accident. If the FAA had been properly monitoring Business Air’s maintenance program, it may have been aware of the operator’s inadequate maintenance practices that allowed, among other things, an engine with a sun gear well beyond what the manufacturer considered to be a reliable operating timeframe to continue operation. It also took more than 2 1/2 years after the accident for the FAA to finally present a consent order[4] to the operator, in which both parties not only acknowledged the operator’s ongoing maintenance inadequacies but also the required corrective actions. [1] A sun gear is the center gear around which an engine’s planet gear assembly revolves; together, the sun gear and planet gear assembly provide a means of reducing the engine’s rpm to the propeller’s rpm. [2] According to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-17A, “Maintenance Control by Reliability Methods,” under on-condition maintenance programs, components are required to be periodically inspected or checked against some appropriate physical standard to determine whether they can continue in service. [3] According to FAA AC 120-17A, “Maintenance Control by Reliability Methods,” under hard time maintenance programs, components are required to be periodically overhauled or be removed from service. [4] A consent order is a voluntary agreement worked out between two or more parties to a dispute. It generally has the same effect as a court order and can be enforced by the court if anyone does not comply with the orders. [4] A consent order is a voluntary agreement worked out between two or more parties to a dispute. It generally has the same effect as a court order and can be enforced by the court if anyone does not comply with the orders.

AirNow

En route to the company's home airport, the twin-engine airplane either experienced a loss of power to the right engine, or the pilot decided to shut the engine down. Although the home airport had night visual meteorological conditions, and there was no evidence of any malfunction with the remaining engine, the pilot opted to fly a night precision instrument approach to an airport 45 nautical miles closer, with a 1-mile visibility and a 100-foot ceiling. Unknown to the pilot, there was also fog at the airport. The pilot did not advise or seek assistance from air traffic control or the company. When the airplane broke out of the clouds, it was not stable. Approaching the runway, at full flaps and exceeding the 25 percent maximum for a go-around, the pilot added full power to the left engine. The high power setting, slow airspeed, and full flaps combination resulted in a minimum control speed (Vmc) roll. No determination could be made as to why the right engine was inoperative, and there were no mechanical or fuel-related anomalies found that would have precluded normal operation.

NHR Táxi Aéreo

When the crew departed São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport, weather conditions at destination were considered as good. These conditions deteriorated en route and when the crew started the approach to Uberaba Airport by night, the visibility was below IFR minimums. Nevertheless, the crew attempted to land, continued the approach, descended below the MDA by 240 feet when the aircraft struck two houses and crashed in the district of Conjunto Pontal, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 800 metres short of runway 17 threshold. Both pilots as well as one people in a house were killed.

Naturelink Charter

During the takeoff roll, the left engine failed. Control was lost and the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Inter Tropic Airlines

The aircraft was performing a flight from Freetown-Lungi Airport to Freetown-Hastings located southeast of the capital city. During the night, rebels sabotaged the runway with concrete and steel projectiles. After landing, the right main gear struck several obstructions and was torn off. The aircraft came to rest and was damaged beyond repair while all 16 occupants escaped uninjured. The exact date of the mishap remains unknown, somewhere in 2002.

Aerotaxi

On final approach to Havana-José Marti-Rancho Boyeros Airport by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. In limited visibility, the aircraft descended too low when it impacted the ground and crashed in a wasteland located less than one km from the runway threshold. All 10 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Airtex Aviation

The Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante, VH-OZG, departed from Sydney Kingsford Smith international airport at 0855 on 25 June 2001, on a single-pilot instrument flight rules (IFR) charter flight to Griffith. The nine occupants on board the aircraft included the pilot and eight passengers. At about 0945, while maintaining an altitude of 10,000 ft, the master caution light illuminated. At the same time, the multiple alarm panel ‘GENERATOR 2’ (right generator) warning light also illuminated, indicating that the generator was no longer supplying power to the main electrical bus bar. After resetting the generator and monitoring its output, the pilot was satisfied that it was operating normally. A short time later, the master warning light illuminated again. A number of circuit breakers tripped, accompanied by multiple master alarm panel warnings. The red ‘FIRE’ warning light on the right engine fire extinguisher ‘T’ handle also illuminated, accompanied by the aural fire alarm warning. The pilot reported that after silencing the aural fire alarm, he carried out the engine fire emergency checklist actions. However, he was unable to select the fuel cut-off position with the right fuel condition lever, despite overriding the locking mechanism using his left thumb while attempting to operate the lever with his right hand. He also reported that the propeller lever did not remain in the feathered detent, but moved forward, as if spring-loaded, to an intermediate position. After unsuccessfully attempting to select fuel cut-off with the right fuel condition lever, or feather the right propeller with the propeller lever, the pilot pulled the right ‘T’ handle to discharge the fire bottle. The amber discharge light illuminated and a short time later the fire alarm sounded again. Passengers reported seeing lights illuminated on the multiple alarm panel and heard the sound of a continuous fire alarm in the cockpit. At 0956, the pilot notified air traffic services (ATS) that there was a ‘problem’ with the aircraft, but did not specify the nature of that problem. Almost immediately the pilot transmitted a PAN radio call and advised ATS that there was a fire on board the aircraft. The nearest aerodromes for an emergency landing were not available due to fog, and the pilot decided to divert to Young, which was about 35 NM to the south east of the aircraft’s position at that time. The pilot advised ATS that the fire was extinguished, and that he was diverting the aircraft to Young. Two minutes later, the pilot repeated his advice to ATS stating that a fire in the right engine had been extinguished, and requested emergency services for the aircraft’s arrival at Young. The pilot informed one of the passengers that there was an engine fire warning, and that they would be landing at Young. The passengers subsequently reported seeing flames in the right engine nacelle and white smoke streaming from under the wing. Smoke had also started to enter the cabin in the vicinity of the wing root. The pilot subsequently reported that he had selected the master switch on the air conditioning control panel to the ‘vent’ position, and that he had opened the left direct vision window in an attempt to eliminate smoke from the cabin. When that did not appear to have any effect he closed the direct vision window. The pilot of another aircraft reported to ATS that Young was clear, but there were fog patches to the north. On arrival at Young, however, the pilot of the Bandeirante was unable to land the aircraft because of fog, and advised ATS that he was proceeding to Cootamundra, 27 NM to the south southwest of Young. The crew of an overflying airliner informed ATS that Cootamundra was clear of fog. ATS confirmed that advice by telephoning an aircraft operator at Cootamundra aerodrome. At 1017 thick smoke entered the cabin and the pilot transmitted a MAYDAY. He reported that the aircraft was 9 NM from Cootamundra, and ATS informed him that the aerodrome was clear of fog. The pilot advised that he was flying in visual conditions and that there was a serious fire on board. No further radio transmissions were heard from the aircraft. At 1021, approximately 25 minutes after first reporting a fire, the pilot made an approach to land on runway 16 at Cootamundra. He reported that when he selected the landing gear down on late final there was no indication that the gear had extended. The pilot reported that he did not have sufficient time to extend the gear manually using the emergency procedure because he was anxious to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible. Unaware that the right main landing gear had extended the pilot advised the passengers to prepare for a ‘belly’ landing. He lowered full flap, selected the propeller levers to the feathered position and the condition levers to fuel cut-off. The aircraft landed with only the right main landing gear extended. The right main wheel touched down about 260 m beyond the runway threshold, about one metre from the right edge of the runway. During the landing roll the aircraft settled on the nose and the left engine nacelle and skidded for approximately 450 m before veering left off the bitumen. The soft grass surface swung the aircraft sharply left, and it came to a stop on the grass flight strip east of the runway, almost on a reciprocal heading. The pilot and passengers were uninjured, and vacated the aircraft through the cabin door and left overwing emergency exit. Personnel from a maintenance organisation at the aerodrome extinguished the fire in the right engine nacelle using portable fire extinguishers.

Gabonese Air Force - Forces Aériennes Gabonaises

Crashed in unknown circumstances somewhere in Gabon while performing a flight from Libreville to Tchibanga. No trace of the aircraft nor the three occupants was found.

Skypower Express Airways

On the day of the accident, the aircraft was engaged in a charter operation for the Central Bank of Nigeria. The first segment of the flight (Lagos - Abuja) was flown by the Commander. The aircraft departed Lagos about 0630 hours UTC and initially at cruise, the crew had a momentary problem setting power on the starboard engine after which the flight continued normally to Abuja. The aircraft which departed Abuja for Jos at 0900 hours UTC had 6 souls on board, 5 hours endurance with the first officer at the controls. At FL 90 and about 30NM from Abuja, the crew again had problems with the cruise power setting on the starboard engine. The torque remained at 1400. The crew retarded the right power lever to the minimum with the aim of achieving a cruise setting of 1300 but the gear warning came on. The Commander at this stage took over the controls from the first officer. At 0923 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Kaduna Tower that it would be diverting to Kaduna as against its scheduled destination giving its flight level as 90 at a distance of 61 miles and estimating TMA at 24 miles, 'KC' at 41 miles, 6 souls on board and 5 hours endurance at departure. The tower then gave the aircraft an inbound clearance to 'KC' locator maintaining FL 90 and to expect no delay for a locator approach runway 05. Weather report at 0900 hours UTC was also passed to the aircraft as wind 090/05 knots, QNH 1014 and temperature 30°c. At 0928 hours UTC the airplane at about 42 miles, speed between 150-160 kts, requested descent and was cleared to 4,500H, QNH 1014. At about 0935 hours UTC, the pilots contacted tower that they would make a single engine approach because they were having problems controlling power on the starboard engine and it would be shut down. The tower in response, asked whether they would need fire coverage on landing to which the pilots affirmed. The commander then reviewed the single engine approach with the first officer estimating 4,500 ft at 8NM. Approaching 4,500 ft at 11 NM, the crew initiated right engine shut down after which the speed was decayed from 150 to 140 kts. At 0946 hours UTC, the pilot reported 6nm final and field in sight while the tower requested hire to report 4 miles final. Shortly, the controller reported having the aircraft in sight and subsequently cleared it to land on runway 05 giving wind as north easterly 06 knots. Descending at 500ft/min, the commander requested for 25% of flap when the first officer selected full flap. Shortly, the speed started decaying and bleeding faster. When the aircraft was at 2,700 ft high, the speed had already decayed to between 100 - 110 kts. The crew applied full power on the port engine to arrest the speed decay but to no avail . The pilot was trying to correct the descent rate, speed decay and the asymmetry when the stall warning came on. At this juncture, all effort by the controller to establish further contact with the airplane proved abortive. Suddenly, the controller observed a gust of dust in the atmosphere which gave him an indication that the aircraft had crashed. The aircraft crashed into the new VOR/DME site being constructed about 1175m from the threshold of runway 05. Time of accident was 0947 hours UTC.

Sabin Air

Shortly after takeoff from Maputo Airport in excellent weather conditions, the aircraft lost height and crashed onto several houses located in the 25th June district near the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 18 occupants were rescued. Unfortunately, a woman in a house was killed. All passengers were students going back home.

Government of the State of Amazonas

En route from Tefé to Eirunépé, weather conditions deteriorated and the crew decided to divert to the non controlled Envira Airport. Following a visual approach in heavy rain falls, the aircraft landed 500 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft encountered aquaplaning conditions and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest 100 metres further in a ravine. The captain was seriously injured, the copilot suffered minor injuries and all 16 passengers escaped uninjured.

Skypower Express Airways

On final approach to Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport runway 22, the crew declared an emergency and reported smoke in the cockpit and cabin. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed 120 metres short of runway. A passenger and one people on the ground were killed while 12 other occupants were injured.

Norte Jet Taxi Aéreo

The twin engine aircraft departed Belém-Val de Cans Airport on a cargo flight to Monte Dourado with two pilots on board and a load of 1,636 kilos of limestone grit divided into 36 bags of 45.45 kilos each. After a flight of 1 hour and 18 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend by night to Monte Dourado Airport. On final approach, the crew was able to send a brief message saying the aircraft was crashing. The aircraft was destroyed on impact and both pilots were killed.

Air Fiji

The twin engine aircraft departed Suva-Nausori Airport at 0525LT on a regular schedule service (flight PC121) to Nadi, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. The crew continued to climb via route 28 Golf in relative good weather conditions. At 0532LT, the pilot reported 5,500 feet 22,4 km from the airport. One minute later, he reported at 6,000 feet when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens, eight minutes after takeoff. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 540 metres in a wooded an mountainous area located in the Mataicicia Mountain Range, 35,2 km west of Nausori Airport, south of the village of Nasirotu. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all 17 occupants were killed, among them nine Fidjians, five Australians, one New Zealander, one Chinese and one Japanese.

Airlink Papua New Guinea

The twin engine aircraft departed Lae-Nadzab Airport at 0820LT on a flight to Goroka, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. While descending in marginal weather conditions at an altitude of 8,500 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 20 km east-southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all 17 occupants were killed, among them two Dutch citizens.

Selva Táxi Aéreo

The EMB-110 Bandeirante operated on a domestic flight from Manaus to Tefé, Brazil. Although the airplane was certificated for a maximum of 19 passengers, there were 25 passengers on board. Also, for financial reasons the crew decided to take more fuel than necessary for this flight. This resulted in the airplane departing with an excess of weight of 852 kg. About 20 minutes into the flight the oil pressure of the no. 2 engine dropped. The crew reduced engine power to 72% and continued to Tefé. When the flight was 185 km from Manaus at FL85 the oil pressure dropped to 40psi and the TGT increased. The copilot shut down the engine and the captain turned the airplane around, back to Manaus. At 13:15 the crew contacted Manaus ACC reporting that they were returning on one engine. The overloaded airplane flying on one engine, began to lose height. During the descent the speed was kept around 105 kts which occasionally caused activated stick shaker. To lose weight, the left overwing exit was opened and luggage of the passengers was jettisoned. The airplane did not make it to Manaus and an emergency landing on the Manacapuru River was made. The Bandeirante landed hard on the water, causing an opening in the fuselage. It sank quickly.

Airlink Papua New Guinea

After takeoff from Hoskins Airport, the stewardess informed the pilots about an explosion in the rear of the cabin. The crew returned to the airport for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft deviated to the left, veered off runway and came to rest in a ravine. All 13 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sowind Air

The Sowind Air Ltd. Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante aircraft departed the operator's base at St. Andrews, Manitoba, with a crew of 2 and 15 passengers, on a 40-minute, scheduled flight to Little Grand Rapids, Manitoba. The aircraft arrived at Little Grand Rapids, and the crew flew an instrument approach to the airport and executed a missed approach because the required visual reference was not established. A second instrument approach was attempted. Ground-based witnesses observed the aircraft very low over the lake to the south of the airport and to the east of the normal approach path. Passengers in the aircraft also reported being very low over the lake and to the east of the normal approach path. The passengers described an increase in engine power followed by a rapid series of steep banking manoeuvres after the aircraft crossed the shoreline to the southeast of the airport. During the manoeuvres, the aircraft descended into the trees and crashed approximately 400 feet south and 1 600 feet east of the approach to runway 36 at Little Grand Rapids. The captain and three passengers were fatally injured, and the first officer and the remaining 12 passengers were seriously injured.

Skypower Express Airways

While approaching Yola Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. The captain decided to abandon the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. The crew followed a holding pattern for about an hour before starting a second attempt to land. On final approach, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck tree tops and a powerline before crashing 700 metres short of runway 17. All three crew members and two passengers were killed. The remaining 11 passengers were injured.

Transportes Aéreos Profesionales Guatemalteca

The approach to Flores-Santa Elena was completed in poor weather conditions. While descending at an altitude of 900 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 8 km from the runway threshold. All 14 occupants were killed, 13 citizen from Guatemala and one Mexican.

Helisul Taxi Aéreo

The crew departed Porto Alegre on a night cargo flight to Joinville. The JNV NDB beacon and the next PP NDB were selected by the crew to start the descent to Joinville Airport, with a minimum safe altitude fixed at 770 feet. After the aircraft passed over JNV beacon, the ADF system was unable to find the PP NDB as it was inoperative so the aircraft initiated a turn heading 051° towards the PP beacon located near São Paulo-Congonhas Airport. The crew did not notice the change of heading and continued the descent when few minutes later, the aircraft struck a hill and crashed. Both pilots were killed.

Aires Colombia - Aerovias de Integracion Regional

The twin engine aircraft departed Neiva-Benito Salas Airport at 0922LT on a regular schedule flight to Cali, carrying six passengers and two pilots. After departure, the crew was cleared to climb under VFR to the altitude of 14,500 feet. The last radio communication was recorded at 0940LT and three minutes later, while cruising in clouds at the altitude of 14,271 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Nevado del Huila (5,750 metres high). SAR operations were initiated but the wreckage was found 10 days later only, at an altitude of 4,350 metres. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

Knight Air

On the morning of 24 May 1995 the aircraft had returned to its base at Leeds/Bradford from Aberdeen, U.K. on a scheduled passenger flight landing at 09:44 local time. The crew, which was not the one later involved in the accident, stated that all of the aircraft's systems and equipment had been serviceable during the flight. Some routine maintenance was performed on the aircraft which was later prepared for a scheduled passenger flight, NE816, to Aberdeen. It was positioned at the passenger terminal where it was taken over by the crew which was to operate the service, comprising the commander, who occupied the left hand seat, the first officer and a flight attendant. Nine passengers were boarded. The weather at Leeds/Bradford Airport was poor with Runway Visual Range (RVR) reported as 1,100 metres; scattered cloud at 400 feet above the aerodrome elevation of 682 feet and a light south-easterly wind. It was raining and the airfield had recently been affected by a thunderstorm. The freezing level was at 8,000 feet and warnings of strong winds and thunderstorms were in force for the Leeds/Bradford area. The crew called ATC for permission to start the engines at 17:41 hrs. Having backtracked the runway to line up, the aircraft took-off from runway 14 at 17:47 hrs and the crew was instructed by ATC to maintain the runway heading (143°M). The aircraft began to turn to the left shortly after becoming airborne. One minute and fifty seconds after the start of the take-off roll and as the aircraft was turning through a heading of 050° and climbing through 1,740 feet amsl, the first officer transmitted to Leeds/Bradford aerodrome control: "Knightway 816 we've got a problem with the artificial horizon sir and we'd like to come back." The aerodrome controller passed instructions for a radar heading of 360° and cleared the aircraft to 3,000 feet QNH. These instructions were read back correctly but the aircraft continued its left turn onto 300° before rolling into a right hand turn with about 30° of bank. About 20 seconds before this turn reversal, the aircraft had been instructed to call the Leeds/Bradford approach controller. The aircraft was now climbing through an altitude of 2,800 feet in a steep turn to the right and the approach controller transmitted: "I see you carrying out an orbit just tell me what i can do to help". The first officer replied: "Are we going straight at the moment sir" The controller informed him that the aircraft was at that time in a right hand turn but after observing further radar returns he said that it was then going straight on a south-easterly heading. The first officer's response to this transmission was: "Radar vectors slowly back to one four then sir please". The controller then ordered a right turn onto a heading of 340°. This instruction was correctly acknowledged by the first officer but the aircraft began a left hand turn with an initial angle of bank between 30° and 40°. This turn continued onto a heading of 360° when the first officer again asked "Are we going straight at the moment sir" to which the controller replied that the aircraft looked to be going straight. Seconds later the first officer asked: "Any report of the tops sir". This was the last recorded transmission from the aircraft, although at 17:52 hrs a brief carrier wave signal was recorded but it was obliterated by the controller's request to another departing aircraft to see if its pilot could help with information on the cloud tops. At this point, the aircraft had reached an altitude of 3,600 feet, having maintained a fairly constant rate of climb and airspeed. The ATC clearance to 3000 feet had not been amended. After the controller had confirmed that the aircraft appeared to be on a steady northerly heading, the aircraft immediately resumed its turn to the left and began to descend. The angle of bank increased to about 45° while the altitude reduced to 2,900 feet in about 25 seconds. As the aircraft passed a heading of 230° it ceased to appear on the secondary radar. There were four further primary radar returns before the aircraft finally disappeared from radar. There had been a recent thunderstorm in the area and it was raining intermittently with a cloud base of about 400 feet and a visibility of about 1,100 metres. Residents in the vicinity of the accident site reported dark and stormy conditions. Several witnesses described the engine noise as pulsating or surging and then fading just prior to impact. Other witnesses saw a fireball descending rapidly out of the low cloud base and one witness saw the aircraft in flames before it stuck the ground. All of the occupants died at impact. From subsequent examination it was apparent that, at a late stage in the descent, the aircraft had broken up, losing a large part of the right wing outboard of the engine, and the right horizontal stabiliser. There was some disruption of the fuselage before it struck the ground. The airborne structural failure that had occurred was the result of flight characteristics which were beyond the design limits of the aircraft following the loss of control shortly before impact.

Purus Aerotaxi

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Feijó to Rio Branco with an intermediate stop in Tarauacá, carrying two pilots and a load of 635 kilos of various goods. As the flight to Tarauacá was 10 minutes only, the crew decided to leave the undercarriage down. Shortly after takeoff from Feijó Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the right engine. The aircraft lost speed and height so the captain decided to raise the landing gear but this was too late. The aircraft struck a tree, causing 3,2 metres of the right wing to be torn off. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

Alas Chiricanas

The aircraft departed Colón-Enrique Adolfo Jiménez Airport in poor weather conditions (low pressure zone). During initial climb, the aircraft suffered an explosion and crashed 10 km from the airport. The crew did not send any distress call. The aircraft disintegrated and all 21 occupants were killed, among them 12 Jewish businessman.

Rico Taxi Aéreo - Rondonia Importaçao e Comercio

The crew encountered poor weather conditions on approach to São Gabriel da Cachoeira Airport with low visibility due to fog. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed few hundred metres short of runway. All 16 occupants were injured, three seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.

Sahakol Air

The crew was engaged in a local post maintenance test flight at Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew encountered technical problems with the left main gear. After being cleared by ATC, the crew decided to return for an emergency landing and made a turn then completed a belly landing. The aircraft came to rest on the main runway and was damaged beyond repair. Both pilots escaped uninjured.

TAM Brasil - Taxi Aéreo Marilia - Transportes Aéreos Regionais

About 42 minutes after takeoff from Cuiabá Airport, while cruising at 10,000 feet, the captain obtained the permission to reduce his altitude to 8,000 feet to avoid a low pressure area with thunderstorm activity and heavy rain falls. Few seconds later, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed in an open field located in Tangará da Serra. All four passengers and both pilots were killed. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact.

Titan Airways

The aircraft departed Southend at 06:59 UTC, about one hour before sunrise, on a Special VFR clearance. The aircraft flew to Wallasey via Daventry, White gate and the Liverpool Special Rules Zone at 2,400 feet. It could not be determined why the commander chose to fly this route however, some two weeks before the accident he had spent a short holiday at Haverigg which is close to the direct track from Wallasey to Glasgow. On leaving Wallasey, the aircraft tracked north towards Glasgow and, at 08:01 hrs, the crew called Warton aerodrome stating that they were descending to 1,000 feet and requesting a 'Radar Service'. At 08:10 hrs, an aircraft that had just taken off from Blackpool reported a cloud base of between 2,500 and 3,000 feet and a visibility greater than 20 km. At this time the radar transponder on the aircraft was operating but the height encoding facility had not been selected. Recordings of the Great Dunn Fell and the St Anne's ATC radar heads indicated that the aircraft had left Wallasey on a track of 007°M which was maintained until radar contact was lost at 08:13 hrs at a position one mile to the south west of Walney Island airfield near Barrow in Furness. Consideration of the obscuration due to terrain between the radar heads and the aircraft indicated that, at the time of loss of radar contact, the aircraft would have been no higher than 350 feet amsl and possibly lower. At 08:09 hrs, the time of local sunrise, the crew had called Walney Island stating that they were nine miles south of the airfield at 1,000 feet and requesting overflight of the airfield. At 08:12 hrs, the controller at Walney Island sighted the aircraft abeam the airfield at an estimated height of 800 feet and asked the crew to report at Millom which is about eight miles north of Walney Island. At about the same time, a witness on the beach near the airfield saw the aircraft heading north in and out of cloud at a height estimated to be not above 400 feet. The aircraft did not make the requested position report at Millom and, at 08:16 hrs, the controller advised the crew to call London Information for further service. There was no reply to this call. The last person to see the aircraft reported that it was flying steadily north towards Ponsonby Fell and that the cloud in the area of the Fell was covering the ground at 500 feet above sea level. At about 08:15 hrs a farmer, who was some 600 metres from the crash site, heard a bang from the direction of Ponsonby Fell. He stated that at the time that he heard the bang the weather was very bad with a strong wind, rain and mist covering the fell. The aircraft had flown into ground about 15 metres below the top of Ponsonby Fell. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both occupants were killed.

Nordeste Linhas Aéreas Regionais

While descending to Guanambi Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. At an altitude of 3,400 feet, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Taquari located near Caetité, about 35 km northeast of Guanambi. The aircraft was destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.

Nordeste Linhas Aéreas Regionais

During the takeoff roll on runway 36 at Recife-Guararapes Airport, the right engine failed. The crew decided to continue the takeoff procedure and completed the rotation after a course of 900 metres. Thirty seconds after rotation, at a height of about 100 feet, the right engine caught fire and exploded. The crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in the district of Ipsep near the airport. The aircraft and several buildings were destroyed. All 15 occupants as well as two people on the ground were killed.

BAC Express Airlines

Icing conditions forced the crew to descend from 9,000 feet to get below the clouds. The twin engine aircraft struck an ice sheet at a speed of 180 knots at a height of 5,125 feet. Cloud base was reported to be 3,000 feet with a wind at 7 knots from 7° and 10 km visibility in moderate rain. All three crew members survived the accident and were picked up by the Danish Navy in a Lynx helicopter. The departure airport of the ferry flight was Springfield Airport, MO (SGF) and the final destination was going to be Southend Municipal Airport (SEN), UK.

Transporte Aéreo Militar de Uruguay - TAMU

While descending to Montevideo-Carrasco Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The crew completed an emergency landing in an open field located 11 km from the airport. All occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The aircraft had the dual registration CX-BJK (civil) and T-581 (military).

Government of the State of Pernambuco

The copilot was preparing the flight as the captain came late in the cockpit. The crew precipitated the departure and after takeoff from runway 12, while climbing by night, the aircraft rolled to the right, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the Atlantic Ocean few hundred meters offshore. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all 12 occupants were killed.

Gabonese Air Force - Forces Aériennes Gabonaises

Crashed in unknown circumstances while approaching Moabi Airport. There were no casualties.

Provincetown-Boston Airline - PBA

After conducting ground training all day, the instructor/director of operations and his trainee flew an EMB-110P1 to Memphis to exchange airplanes. Ground fog had started to form prior to departure. After exchanging airplanes, they made the return flight to Columbia. They obtained radar vectors to the final approach course for the SDF at Columbia. The thick fog resulted in a missed approach. During the missed approach, the runway was visible from above and the crew indicated that they would try for a VFR approach and landing. The airplane collided with trees 2,350 feet from the runway in a wings level attitude. The tops of the trees were broken 41 feet above the runway threshold altitude. The trainee had been without rest for at least 30 hours prior to the accident. One pilot was killed while the second was seriously injured.

Wasawings

Following an uneventful flight from Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, the crew started a night approach to Seinäjoki-Ilmajoki Airport. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area located 800 meters short of runway 32. Both pilots and four passengers were killed while six other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. There was no fire. At the time of the accident, the RVR for runway 32 was 1,200 meters with a vertical visibility of 300 feet.

Transporte Aéreo Federal

En route from Uruapan to Lázaro Cárdenas, while cruising in poor weather conditions, the twin engine airplane struck the slope of a mountain located about 15 km from Arteaga, in the Sierra Madre Mountain Range. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 20 occupants were killed.

Atlantic Southeast Airlines - ASA

The number one (left) engine failed during the takeoff from runway 35. It was reported that the aircraft yawed sharply left and climbed to between 50 and 100 feet agl before it began losing altitude. The aircraft struck the ground and continued to move forward on the ground several hundred feet until it struck the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft came to rest 1,600 feet west of the runway, on a heading of 290°. A post-crash fire destroyed the cargo area of the aircraft. Examination of the left engine revealed a compressor turbine blade airfoil separation. Disassembly of the propeller on the left engine indicated that the propeller had autofeathered normally after the engine failed. The captain reportedly made the takeoff. All eight occupants were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.