Douglas DC-10

Federal Express - FedEx

On October 28, 2016, about 1751 eastern daylight time, FedEx Express (FedEx) flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F, N370FE, experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse after landing on runway 10L at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the left wing subsequently caught fire. The airplane came to rest off the left side of the runway. The two flight crew members evacuated the airplane. The captain reported a minor cut and abrasions from the evacuation, and the first officer was not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was operating on an instrument flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 and originated at Memphis International Airport (KMEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both flight crew members stated in post accident interviews that the departure from MEM and the en route portion of the flight were normal. About 1745, air traffic control (ATC) cleared the flight for final approach to the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 10L at KFLL. Recorder data indicate that the first officer set the flaps at 35º about 1746 when the airplane was 3,000 ft above ground level (agl). The first officer disconnected the autopilot about 1749 when the airplane was 1,000 ft agl. Both flight crew members reported that the approach was stable at 500 ft agl. At 200 ft agl, the first officer began making airspeed corrections to compensate for the crosswind. About 1750, the first officer disconnected the autothrottles, as briefed, when the airplane was at 100 ft agl. At 50 ft agl, the first officer initiated the flare. The left MLG touched down about 1750:31 in the touchdown zone and left of the runway centerline. The first officer deployed the spoilers at 1750:34, and the nose gear touched down 3 seconds later. The thrust reversers were deployed at 1750:40. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, the captain instructed the first officer to begin braking about 1750:39 (the airplane was not equipped with autobrakes). FDR data indicate an increase in brake pedal position angle and increase in longitudinal deceleration (indicating braking) about 1750:41. In post accident interviews, the flight crew members reported hearing a "bang" as the first officer applied the brakes, and the airplane yawed to the left. About this time, the CVR recorded the sound of multiple thuds, consistent with the sound of a gear collapse. About 1750:48, the captain stated, "I have the airplane," and the first officer replied, "you got the airplane." The captain applied full right rudder without effect while the first officer continued braking. About 1750:53, the captain instructed the first officer to call and inform the tower about the emergency. An airport video of the landing showed that the No. 1 engine was initially supporting the airplane after the left MLG collapse when a fire began near the left-wing tip. The airplane eventually stopped off the left side of runway 10L, about 30º to 40º off the runway heading. About 1751, the flight crew began executing the evacuation checklist. The pilots reported that, as they were about to evacuate, they heard an explosion. The airport video showed a fireball erupted at the No. 1 engine. The captain attempted to discharge a fire bottle in the No. 1 engine, but it didn't discharge. They evacuated the airplane through the right cockpit window.

World Airways

The flight was conducting a straight-in approach during visual meteorological conditions. The approach was backed up by an ILS and was stable at 500 feet above touchdown. The initial touchdown was firm and main landing gear rebounded, possibly bouncing slightly off the runway. Control column input and possibly momentum from the touchdown resulted in a rapid pitch down and hard nose gear impact with the runway. Wing spoilers likely did not deploy due to the main gear bounce and/or throttle position. Following the nose gear impact, the airplane pitched up as expected and the column was held in a slightly forward position. Airspeed rapidly decayed, and engine power began to increase as the airplane pitch reversed to a downward motion for a second time. One of the crew, likely the FO, called “flare flare” and the column recorded a rapid nose up input, followed by a rapid nose down input, and the nose gear again struck the runway very hard, likely causing the majority of the damage at that point. Following the second nose gear impact, column inputs stabilized at a slightly nose up command, power was set on all three engines, and the go-around was successfully executed. A slight lag in the power increase on engine number 3 may have contributed to the nose down motion leading to the second nose gear impact, although the large forward (airplane nose down) column movement appears to be a much more significant contributor. It is unclear why the engine was slower to increase. Throttle lever angle was not recorded, but the engine operated as expected for all other phases of the flight, including after the impact, therefore it is possible the pilot did not advance the number 3 throttle concurrently with the others. The captain’s flight and duty schedule complied with Federal Aviation regulations, but he experienced a demanding 10-day trip schedule prior to the incident involving multiple time zone crossings and several long duty periods, and reported difficulties sleeping prior to the accident leg. The captain was likely further affected by a digestive system upset during the accident flight. It is likely that the captain’s performance was degraded by fatigue and some degree of physical discomfort brought on by a short-term illness. The captain had recently completed upgrade training to DC-10, having previously been flying as an MD-11 first officer. The training program was fragmented over approximately ten months, and while in accordance with FAA regulations, may have adversely affected his consolidation of skills and experience.

Federal Express - FedEx

The approach and landing were stabilized and within specified limits. Recorded data indicates that the loads experienced by the landing gear at touchdown were within the certification limits for an intact landing gear without any pre-existing cracks or flaws. The weather and runway conditions did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the accident crew, and the overall effect of the carbon brake modification did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. Post-accident modifications to the MD-10 carbon brake system were implemented due to investigative findings for the purposes of braking effectiveness and reliability. Post accident emergency response by the flight crew and ARFF was timely and correct. The left main landing gear (LMLG) outer cylinder on the accident airplane had been operated about 8 ½ years since its last overhaul where stray nickel plating likely was introduced in the air filler valve hole. Nickel plating is a permissible procedure for maintaining the tolerances of the inner diameter of the outer gear cylinder, however the plating is not allowed in the air filler valve bore hole. Literature and test research revealed that a nickel plating thickness of 0.008" results in a stress factor increase of 35%. At some point in the life of the LMLG, there was a load event that compressively yielded the material in the vicinity of the air filler valve hole causing a residual tension stress. During normal operations the stress levels in the air filler valve hole were likely within the design envelope, but the addition of the residual stress and the stress intensity factor due to the nickel increased these to a level high enough to initiate and grow a fatigue crack on each side of the air filler valve hole. The stresses at the air filler valve hole were examined via development of a Finite Element Model (FEM) which was validated with data gathered from an instrumented in-service FedEx MD-10 airplane. The in-service data and FEM showed that for all of the conditions, the stress in the air filler valve hole was much higher than anticipated in the design of the outer cylinder. Fatigue analysis of the in service findings and using the nickel plating factor resulted in a significantly reduced fatigue life of the gear cylinder compared with the certification limits. During the accident landing the spring back loads on the LMLG were sufficient to produce a stress level in the air filler valve hole that exceeded the residual strength of the material with the fatigue cracks present.

Arrow Air

The aircraft departed Miami-Intl Airport on a night cargo flight to Managua, carrying three crew members and a load consisting of 50 tons of chemical and toxic products. After touchdown on runway 09 which is 2,450 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a fence, lost its nose gear and came to rest 350 metres further in trees. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Biman Bangladesh Airlines

The aircraft departed Dubai on a flight to Dhaka with an intermediate stop in Chittagong, carrying 201 passengers and a crew of 15. Weather conditions at Chittagong Airport were poor with a visibility of 1,800 metres in rain, 5-7 oktas cloud at 700 feet, 3-4 oktas cloud at 1,300 feet, 0-2 oktas cloud at 2,600 feet, overcast at 8,000 feet with CB's, temporary visibility of 2 km and wind from 180 at 6 knots. On final approach, the aircraft was unstable but the captain decided to continue the descent. After touchdown on runway 23, the aircraft deviated from the centerline to the right, causing the right main gear to veer off runway. While contacting soft ground, it was torn off, causing the engine n°3 to be partially sheared off. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a grassy area along the runway. All 216 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Centurion Air Cargo

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Miami-Intl Airport on behalf of Lineas Aéreas Suramericanas, the crew started a night approach to Bogotá-El Dorado Airport. On final, the aircraft was unstable and too low when the GPWS alarm sounded five times. The captain increased engine power and elected to gain height, causing the aircraft to continue over the glide. At an excessive speed of 180 knots, the aircraft landed 1,500 feet past the runway 13L threshold (runway 13L is 3,800 metres long). After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran. It lost its undercarriage, collided with the ILS equipment, lost both engines n°1 and 3 and eventually came to rest few hundred metres further in a grassy area. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Federal Express - FedEx

On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five non revenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one non revenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The post crash fire destroyed the airplaneís right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

DAS Air Cargo - Dairo Air Services

The aircraft departed London-Gatwick Airport on a cargo flight to Entebbe, carrying seven crew members and a load of 50 tons of various goods. After landing by night on runway 17, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 17/35 is 12,000 feet long), overran and plunged in the Lake Victoria. The aircraft broke in two and all seven crew members were rescued 10 minutes later.

AOM French Airlines

Leased from AOM French Airlines, the aircraft was completing a charter flight (service CU1216) from Havana to Guatemala City on behalf of Cubana de Aviacion, carrying 18 crew members and 296 passengers who were mostly young Guatemalan citizens studying medicine in Cuba. After touchdown on runway 19, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down an embankment and eventually crashed onto several houses located in the district of La Libertad. Both pilots, six other crew members, eight passengers and two people on the ground were killed. Also, 57 people were injured (among them 20 on the ground) while 261 other occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Federal Express - FedEx

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.

Garuda Indonesian Airways

During the takeoff roll at Fukuoka-Itazuke Airport runway 16, at a speed of 158 knots, the captain started the rotation. During initial climb, at a height of about 3 metres, the right engine suffered a loss of power after a fan blade located on the 1st stage of the high pressure compressor disk separated. The N1 dropped to 23,7% and five seconds later, the flight engineer informed the crew about the failure of the engine n°1. The captain decided to abort the takeoff and landed back on runway. The aircraft contacted ground with a vertical acceleration of 2,1 g then thrust reversers were deployed and ground spoilers were extended. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, crossed a road, skidded for about 620 metres before coming to rest in an open field, bursting into flames. Three passengers were killed.

VIASA - Venezolana Internacional de Aviacion SA

Following an uneventful flight from Caracas, the crew started the descent to Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport but encountered poor weather conditions with ceiling down to 800 feet, heavy rain falls and windshear. The aircraft landed 750-800 metres past the runway threshold and was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 35 is 2,800 metres long). It overran and while contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest 180 metres further. All 123 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the runway surface was wet and the braking action was reduced.

American Airlines

At the time flight AA102 landed at DFW Airport, it was raining and there were numerous thunderstorms in the area. Shortly after touchdown on runway 17L, the pilot loss directional control when the airplane began to weathervane and the captain failed to use sufficient rudder control to regain the proper ground track. The airplane eventually departed the right side of the runway. At the time of landing the wind (a cross wind) was blowing at 15 knots with gusts approximately 5 knots above the steady wind speed. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and all 202 occupants were evacuated, among them 40 were injured, two seriously.

Martinair Holland

At 0552LT, the aircraft departed Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport on a charter flight to Faro. The flight had been delayed for 40 minutes due to n°2 engine reverser problems. After a flight of 2 hours and 17 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend to FL070. Shortly afterwards Faro Approach Control provided the crew with the following weather: wind 15°/18 knots; 2,500 metres visibility, thunderstorms with 3/8 clouds at 500 feet, 7/8 clouds at 2,300 feet and 1/8 cumulonimbus at 2,500 feet, OAT 16° C. Clearance to descend to 1,220 metres was given at 0820LT, followed by a clearance to 915 metres and 650 metres 4, respectively 6 minutes later. At 0829LT the crew were informed that the runway was flooded. At an altitude of 303 metres and at a speed of 140 knots, the aircraft became unstable and at 177 metres the first officer switched the autopilot from CMD (command mode) to CWS (control-wheel steering). One minute later it was switched from CWS to manual and the airspeed began falling below approach reference speed. About 3-4 seconds short of touchdown, elevator was pulled to pitch up and engine power was increased. When the n°3 and 5 spoilers extended, the aircraft banked to the right to an angle of 25°. The right main gear struck the the runway surface with a rate of descent of 900 feet per minute and at a speed of 126 knots. With a nose up attitude of 8,79° and a roll angle of 5,62°, the aircraft touched down with a positive acceleration of 1,95 g. Upon impact, the right wing separated while the aircraft slid down the runway and came to rest 1,100 metres from the runway 11 threshold and 100 metres to the right of the centreline, bursting into flames. Two crew members and 54 passengers were killed while 284 other occupants were evacuated, among them 106 were seriously injured.

Union des Transports Aériens - UTA

The DC-10 departed N'Djamena Airport at 1313LT bound for Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport. Forty-six minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet over Niger, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and the crew did not send any distress call. It was quickly understood that the aircraft exploded in mid-air and crashed somewhere in the desert. SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found a day later in the Ténéré Desert, about 650 km north of N'Djamena, northeast from the Termit Mountain Range. Debris scattered on 100 km2 and none of the 170 occupants survived the crash.

Korean Air

The approach to Tripoli Intl Airport was completed in below weather minima as the visibility was varying between 100 and 800 feet and the ILS on runway 27 was unserviceable. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a house, stalled and crashed in a residential area located 2,4 km short of runway. Three crew members and 72 passengers were killed as well as six people on the ground. 124 people in the aircraft were injured as well as few dozen on the ground.

United Airlines

United Flight 232 departed Denver-Stapleton International Airport, Colorado, USA at 14:09 CDT for a domestic flight to Chicago-O'Hare, Illinois and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There were 285 passengers and 11 crew members on board. The takeoff and the en route climb to the planned cruising altitude of FL370 were uneventful. The first officer was the flying pilot. About 1 hour and 7 minutes after takeoff, at 15:16, the flightcrew heard a loud bang or an explosion, followed by vibration and a shuddering of the airframe. After checking the engine instruments, the flightcrew determined that the No. 2 aft (tail-mounted) engine had failed. The captain called for the engine shutdown checklist. While performing the engine shutdown checklist, the flight engineer observed that the airplane's normal systems hydraulic pressure and quantity gauges indicated zero. The first officer advised that he could not control the airplane as it entered a right descending turn. The captain took control of the airplane and confirmed that it did not respond to flight control inputs. The captain reduced thrust on the No. 1 engine, and the airplane began to roll to a wings-level attitude. The flightcrew deployed the air driven generator (ADG), which powers the No. 1 auxiliary hydraulic pump, and the hydraulic pump was selected "on." This action did not restore hydraulic power. At 15:20, the flightcrew radioed the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested emergency assistance and vectors to the nearest airport. Initially, Des Moines International Airport was suggested by ARTCC. At 15:22, the air traffic controller informed the flightcrew that they were proceeding in the direction of Sioux City; the controller asked the flightcrew if they would prefer to go to Sioux City. The flightcrew responded, "affirmative." They were then given vectors to the Sioux Gateway Airport (SUX) at Sioux City, Iowa. A UAL DC-10 training check airman, who was off duty and seated in a first class passenger seat, volunteered his assistance and was invited to the cockpit at about 15:29. At the request of the captain, the check airman entered the passenger cabin and performed a visual inspection of the airplane's wings. Upon his return, he reported that the inboard ailerons were slightly up, not damaged, and that the spoilers were locked down. There was no movement of the primary flight control surfaces. The captain then directed the check airman to take control of the throttles to free the captain and first officer to manipulate the flight controls. The check airman attempted to use engine power to control pitch and roll. He said that the airplane had a continuous tendency to turn right, making it difficult to maintain a stable pitch attitude. He also advised that the No. 1 and No. 3 engine thrust levers could not be used symmetrically, so he used two hands to manipulate the two throttles. About 15:42, the flight engineer was sent to the passenger cabin to inspect the empennage visually. Upon his return, he reported that he observed damage to the right and left horizontal stabilizers. Fuel was jettisoned to the level of the automatic system cutoff, leaving 33,500 pounds. About 11 minutes before landing, the landing gear was extended by means of the alternate gear extension procedure. The flightcrew said that they made visual contact with the airport about 9 miles out. ATC had intended for flight 232 to attempt to land on runway 31, which was 8,999 feet long. However, ATC advised that the airplane was on approach to runway 22, which was closed, and that the length of this runway was 6,600 feet. Given the airplane's position and the difficulty in making left turns, the captain elected to continue the approach to runway 22 rather than to attempt maneuvering to runway 31. The check airman said that he believed the airplane was lined up and on a normal glidepath to the field. The flaps and slats remained retracted. During the final approach, the captain recalled getting a high sink rate alarm from the ground proximity warning system (GPWS). In the last 20 seconds before touchdown, the airspeed averaged 215 KIAS, and the sink rate was 1,620 feet per minute. Smooth oscillations in pitch and roll continued until just before touchdown when the right wing dropped rapidly. The captain stated that about 100 feet above the ground the nose of the airplane began to pitch downward. He also felt the right wing drop down about the same time. Both the captain and the first officer called for reduced power on short final approach. The check airman said that based on experience with no flap/no slat approaches he knew that power would have to be used to control the airplane's descent. He used the first officer's airspeed indicator and visual cues to determine the flightpath and the need for power changes. He thought that the airplane was fairly well aligned with the runway during the latter stages of the approach and that they would reach the runway. Soon thereafter, he observed that the airplane was positioned to the left of the desired landing area and descending at a high rate. He also observed that the right wing began to drop. He continued to manipulate the No. 1 and No. 3 engine throttles until the airplane contacted the ground. He said that no steady application of power was used on the approach and that the power was constantly changing. He believed that he added power just before contacting the ground. The airplane touched down on the threshold slightly to the left of the centerline on runway 22 at 16:00. First ground contact was made by the right wing tip followed by the right main landing gear. The airplane skidded to the right of the runway and rolled to an inverted position. Witnesses observed the airplane ignite and cartwheel, coming to rest after crossing runway 17/35. Firefighting and rescue operations began immediately, but the airplane was destroyed by impact and fire. The accident resulted in 111 fatal, 47 serious, and 125 minor injuries. The remaining 13 occupants were not injured.

American Airlines

A rejected takeoff was attempted when the slat disagree light illuminated and the takeoff warning horn sounded at 166 knots (V1). The pilot aborted the takeoff, but the aircraft accelerated to 178 knots ground speed before it began to decelerate. The deceleration was normal until 130 knots where an unexpected rapid decay in the deceleration occurred. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 95 knots, the nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to a stop 1,100 feet beyond the end of the runway. Eight of the ten brake sets failed. Post-accident exam of the brakes revealed that excessive brake wear occurred during the rejected takeoff. Testing showed that dc-10 worn brakes have a much greater wear rate during an rto. The faa does not require worn brake testing. Douglas did not use brake wear data from rto certification tests to set more conservative brake wear replacement limits. New brakes were used for those tests. All 254 occupants were evacuated, among them eight were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Nigeria Airways

The flight originated from Lagos, Nigeria, at 1320LT hours local time as a training flight. The training flight commenced from Lagos with the trainee Captain on the left seat as the Pilot Flying while the Instructor Captain was on the right seat as Pilot-in-Command. The point of intended landing and subsequent trainings was Ilorin Airport. Flight preparation was completed by the crew and ground dispatchers with 60.3 metric tonnes of fuel up-lift giving an estimated endurance of 8 hours. The flight was normal up till the altitude of 3,000 feet when the aircraft was inside the control zone of Ilorin Control Tower which had cleared the aircraft for a touch and go on runway 05. At 1,000 feet agl the aircraft had its landing gears in the down position and landing flaps set at 35°. At 400 feet agl the autopilot was disconnected and later at 80 feet the autothrottles were also disconnected. The aircraft was fully established on the ILS. As the trainee captain was on his very first flight on the aircraft type, the Nigeria Airways DC-10 flight transition syllabus item 9 has it that the sequence of training at this point in time should be '3 engine or single land demonstration-Full stop'. As the aircraft had already requested and cleared for a touch and go and established on ILS, it was clear that item 9 had been skipped and item 10 '3 engine Flight Director ILS approach -Touch and Go' was in progress. The trainee captain crossed the 05 threshold rather high at about 60 feet or more and a long time, interspersed with instructions by the instructor captain, was spent before the aircraft had its main landing gears on the ground at about 2,913 feet (888 m) from the threshold. Runway 05 had a Landing Distance Available if 3,100 meters. It appeared that the trainee captain did not recede the throttles fully back for the touchdown and the Instructor had to assist in doing so. The trainee captain then appeared to be holding the nosewheel off the ground and again the Instructor had to push the control column down. On nosewheel touchdown, the trainee immediately requested for takeoff power. The Instructor went into the aircraft reconfiguration procedure after the landing and was still busy on the required settings when the trainee Pilot raised an alarm as the runway threshold was approaching. The Instructor looked out into the 900m of slight haze visibility, felt that the aircraft would not takeoff with the limited runway available and immediately reached out to deploy the spoilers at the same time stepped on the brakes. Abort takeoff was not announced. At this point in time the engine throttles had already been advanced for takeoff. The aircraft was on heavy braking from about 1,390 feet (424 meters) before runway end as it overran the runway. The aircraft made significant impacts with the ILS antenna bars, electrical switch posts and the approach light support structures of runway 23 all located on the runway 05 clearway before it came to a halt. The location of the accident site was 44 meters to the left of the centreline and 649 meters along the extended centreline. A fire erupted and consumed the fuselage. All nine crew members escaped uninjured.

Korean Air

While taxiing out in fog, the KAL crew became disoriented and ended up on the wrong runway. During the takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with South Central Air Flight 59, a Piper PA-31 which was taking off from runway 06L-24R for a flight to Kenai. The 9 occupants of N35206 were injured. The DC-10 overran the runway by 1434 feet and came to rest 40 feet right of the extended centreline.

Spantax

Takeoff acceleration was normal, failure was not detected on engines, systems or structures. The crew registered a strong vibration at or close to V1. The captain felt how this vibration was highly increased as he began rotation, consequently rejecting the takeoff at a speed between VR and V2. Physical evidence shows how detachment of the tread of a tire of the nose gear, retreated, began before the aircraft had reached V1. The reject of takeoff began where there were another 1,295 meters (4,250 feet) of runway left. The aircraft crossed the runway end at a speed slightly over 110 knots, colliding with an ILS concrete building, breaking the metal fencing of the airport, crossing a highway, causing damage to three vehicles on the same, colliding then with farming construction. Engine number three detached after impact with the ILS building. Approximately three quarters of the right wing as well as the right horizontal stabilizer were detached as a result of the impact with the afore mentioned farming construction. The fuselage also ran over the construction with which the right wing collided. The aircraft stopped 450 meters (1,475 feet) away from the end of runway 14, and approximately 40 meters (130 feet) off to the left from the centerline. Neither the passenger department nor the cockpit showed damage that could impede survival when the aircraft stopped. Fuel was spilled off the right wing, from the time it collided with the farming construction, and the fire began in the rear of the fuselage. The fire destroyed the aircraft completely. There were 381 passengers and 13 crew members on board. 333 passengers and 10 crew survived, and as a result of the fire subsequent to the impact, 47 passengers and three assistant crew members died.

World Airways

Following a non-precision instrument approach to runway 15R at Boston-Logan International Airport, the airplane touched down about 2,800 feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the runway. About 1936:40, the airplane veered to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the fuselage in the impact after the airplane dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 212 persons on board, 2 persons are missing and presumed dead. The other persons onboard evacuated the airplane safely, some with injuries.

Air New Zealand

In preparation for Flight TE901 two of the pilots attended a route qualification briefing. This briefing consisted of an audio visual presentation, a review of a printed briefing sheet and a subsequent 45 minute flight in a DC 10 flight simulator for each pilot to familiarise him with the grid navigation procedures applicable to the portion of the flight south of 60o south latitude and the visual meteorological conditions (VMC) letdown procedure at McMurdo. This briefing was completed 19 days prior to the scheduled departure date. The briefing gave details of the instrument flight rules (IFR) route to McMurdo which passed almost directly over Mt Erebus, a 12450 ft high active volcano, some 20 nm prior to the most southerly turning point, Williams Field. It also stated that the minimum instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) altitude was 16000 ft and the minimum altitude after passing overhead McMurdo was 6000 ft providing conditions were better than certain specified minima well in excess of the standard VMC in New Zealand. On the day of the flight the crew participated in a normal pre-flight dispatch planning. At 1917 hours (Z) on 27 November 1979 Air New Zealand Flight TE 901, a DC10-30 (ZKNZP) departed from Auckland Airport on a non-scheduled domestic scenic flight which was planned to proceed via South Island New Zealand, Auckland Islands, Baleny Island, and Cape Hallett to McMurdo, Antarctica then returning via Cape Hallett and Campbell Island to Christchurch its first intended landing point. The flight was dispatched on an IFR computer stored flight plan route. The flight deck crew consisted of the captain, two first officers and two flight engineers. Beside the fifteen cabin crew there was an official flight commentator on the flight who was experienced in Antarctic exploration. The passenger load was reduced by 21 from the normal passenger seating capacity as a deliberate policy to facilitate movement about the cabin to allow passengers to view the Antarctic scenery. In a discussion with the McMurdo meteorological office at 0018 hours (Z) the aircraft crew was advised that Ross Island was under a low overcast with a base of 2000 ft and with some light snow and a visibility of 40 miles and clear areas approximately 75 to 100 nm northwest of McMurdo. At approximately 0043 hours (Z) Scott Base advised the aircraft that the dry valley area was clear and that area would be a better prospect for sightseeing than Ross Island. In response to the message that the area over the Wright and Taylor Valleys was clear the captain asked the commentator if he could guide them over that way. The commentator said that would be no trouble and asked if the captain wished to head for that area at the time. The captain replied he “would prefer here first”. The US Navy Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC) “Mac Centre” suggested that the aircraft crew take advantage of the surveillance radar to let down to 1500 feet during the aircraft’s approach to McMurdo and the crew indicated their acceptance of this offer. In the event however the aircraft was not located by the radar equipment prior to initiating its descent (or at any other time). The aircraft crew also experienced difficulty in their attempts to make contact on the very high frequency (VHF) radio telephone (R/T)and the distance measuring equipment (DME) did not lock onto the McMurdo Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) for any useful period. The aircraft was relying primarily on high frequency (HF) R/T during the latter part of its flight for communication with the ATCC. The area which was approved by the operator for VMC descents below 16000 feet was obscured by cloud while ZK-NZP was approaching the area, and the crew elected to descend in a clear area to the north of Ross Island in two descending orbits the first to the right and the second to the left. Although they requested and were granted a clearance from “Mac Centre” to descend from 10000 to 2000 feet VMC, on a heading of 180 grid (013oT) and proceed “visually” to McMurdo, the aircraft only descended to 8600 feet before it completed a 180° left turn to 375°G (190°T) during which it descended to 5,700 feet. The aircraft’s descent was then continued to 1500 feet on the flight planned track back toward Ross Island. Shortly after the completion of the final descent the aircraft collided with Ross Island. The aircraft’s ground proximity warning system (GWPS) operated correctly prior to impact and the crew responded to this equipment’s warning by the engineer calling off two heights above ground level, 500 and 400 feet, and the captain calling for “go round power”. The aircraft’s engines were at a high power setting and the aircraft had rotated upwards in pitch immediately prior to impact. The aircraft collided with an ice slope on Ross Island and immediately started to break up. A fire was initiated on impact and a persistent fire raged in the fuselage cabin area after that section came to rest. The accident occurred in daylight at 0050 hours (Z) at a position of 77° 25’30” S and 167° 27’30” E and at an elevation of 1467 feet AMSL. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and digital flight data recorder (DFDR) established that the aircraft was operating satisfactorily and the crew were not incapacitated prior to the accident.

Western Airlines

The airplane had taken off from Los Angeles International Airport, California, for Mexico City, at 0140LT on 31 October 1979. The Mexico centre had cleared the crew to approach Mexico City via Tepexpan, subsequently instructing the aircraft crew to change frequency to the control tower. The tower operator informed the crew that the runway in use was 23 Right and provided the crew with information on the weather conditions prevailing at Mexico City International Airport, and landing data. When the aircraft was on final approach, the control tower operator repeated that the runway in use was 23 Right and drew the attention of the pilot to the fact that he was left of the flight path he should be following to land on the runway in use. The pilot acknowledged the information and the fact that he was slightly to the left. The transcription of the magnetic tape which contains the communications between the control tower operator and the crew of aircraft N-903WA reveals that et one point the control tower operator asked the pilot whether he could see the approach lights on his left, to which the pilot replied "negative". The data obtained from the aircraft's flight recorder shows that the crew was making an instrument approach. The instrument landing procedure authorized in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) for Runway 23 Left with transition to 23 Right specifies that if the pilot does not have the runway in sight at 600 ft during an instrument landing approach, he must break off the approach and climb to 8 500 ft. In this case the crew continued with the landing procedure, ignoring the requirement to call out the altitude values and the decision minimum, and descended until the landing gear touched down off-centre of Runway 23 Left, which was closed to all operations. On the transcription of the cockpit voice recorder the pilot-in-command is heard to have said that he was on the flight path to Runway 23 Left, just before the left landing gear wheels touched down on the grass to the left of Runway 23 Left and the right landing gear wheels on the runway shoulder. The aircraft did not enter the runway until it had travelled some 100 m. According to the flight recorder data and the wheel traces at the site of the accident, the crew re-applied power for the go-around procedure and lifted the aircraft nose by 100-210. Now airborne, the aircraft's right landing gear collided with a truck located on the left shoulder of the runway which was closed for repairs. The impact left a distinct mark in the left-hand side of the vehicle's bonnet corresponding exactly to the shape and size of the aircraft's wheel. The collision with the truck, which was loaded with 10 tonnes of earth, removed the right landing gear leg with part or sections of the main gear beam to which it is attached, bursting three of the four tires. The two front tires came off the wheels, whose hubs disintegrated, scattering pieces away from the aircraft. The horizontal shaft which carries the two front wheels and the associated brake units also broke off and were projected forward over a distance of over 400 m. After breaking off, the right landing gear leg struck the right tailplane and elevator, severing the two almost completely. This caused the landing gear leg complete with the two rear tires, wheels and brake units to be thrown about 70 m beyond the point of collision with the truck. The left side panel of the truck's dumper body, the only part to break off, was thrown to the left of the runway; this panel bore traces of tires about halfway along its top edge. The inner right-hand section of the wing flaps also struck the dumper body, which removed the complete section; this was found to the right of the aircraft's flight path some 40 m beyond the final location of the dumper body. The underside of the flap was full of earth and the fractures in the structure contained earth from the truck. The right-hand side panel of the dumper body also bore evidence of having been struck by a metal object. The truck broke up completely and parts of it were scattered over a considerable distance on and off the runway, the area covered being some 400 m long by 100 m wide. Three seconds before the collision with the truck the engine throttles were opened. The collision occurred under these conditions and in spite of the violence of the impact the aircraft remained airborne and flew on, although lift was precarious due to the loss on the right side of the tailplane complete with elevator and the inner section of the wing flap. The aircraft was banked to the right and this inclination increased so much that when the aircraft was approximately 1 500 m from the threshold of Runway 23 Left, the outer section of the right wing flap struck the cab of an excavator which was parked parallel to the right-hand edge of Runway 23 Left. The impact completely destroyed the cab and parts of the trailing edge of the wing flap were found embedded in the twisted framework of the excavator. The aircraft continued, veering to the right and increasing its bank angle towards that side until the right wing tip was scraping Taxiway "A", leaving a deep score in the pavement, damaging a telephone manhole and destroying some taxiway edge lights. A severed section of the right wing was found deeply embedded in the ground at this point and the first signs of the fire which burned the nearby grass were also in this area. The distance from the marks left by the landing gear in the grass and on the runway shoulder 167 m from the threshold of Runway 23 Left, to the score made in Taxiway "A" by the right wing tip, is approximately 2 500 m, and over this entire distance the aircraft left no mark or trace on the ground, except a few metres beyond the excavator. From this point a score of constant depth and width had been made in the grass over a distance of about 70 m, possibly by something suspended underneath the aircraft. Small fragments of glass fibre, the material used for the trailing edges of the aircraft's control surfaces, were found along this score. The evidence above proves that the aircraft had remained airborne from the time it collided with the truck until reaching Taxiway "A", as confirmed by the flight recorder data. After the traces left by the right wing tip on Taxiway "A", scores of varying depths were made in Taxiway "Ptt by the aileron and the outer section of the right flap. A few metres further on the right wing collided with the corner of the PCV repair hangar, knocking down a pillar, a cross tie and part of the roof corner. Various aircraft components were found inside the hangar, e.g. the flap guides and hinges, sections of the leading edge of the right aileron, etc., besides the fuel which was spilled from the fractured wing onto a PCV under repair and on parked cars and vans. The collision of the right wing with the PCV repair hangar hardly interrupted the aircraft along its flight path and it finally crashed against the front of a building, which was demolished by the impact. This was the main impact, during which the tail fin complete with rudder and engine No. 2, the tail unit and the left tailplane with its elevator broke off, together with what remained of the right tailplane and elevator removed earlier by the right landing gear leg. The left wing was also severed at its attachment to the centre section and was thrown more than 200 m, turning over in the process and falling on a house outside the airport; part of this house was burned out. Engines No. 1 and 3 broke away from the wings and were destroyed by the impact and fire. 16 people were injured while 72 occupants, including nine crew members were killed as well as one people in the building.

American Airlines

American Airlines Flight 191, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10, crashed on takeoff from Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Illinois, USA. The aircraft was destroyed and all 271 occupants were killed. Additionally, two persons on the ground sustained fatal injuries. At 14:59 hours local time Flight 191 taxied from the gate at O'Hare Airport. The flight was bound for Los Angeles, California, with 258 passengers and 13 crew members on board. Maintenance personnel who monitored the flight's engine start, push-back, and start of taxi did not observe anything out of the ordinary. The weather at the time of departure was clear, and the reported surface wind was 020° at 22 kts. Flight 191 was cleared to taxi to runway 32R for takeoff. The company's Takeoff Data Card showed that the stabilizer trim setting was 5° aircraft nose up, the takeoff flap setting was 10°, and the takeoff gross weight was 379,000 lbs. The target low pressure compressor (N1) rpm setting was 99.4 percent, critical engine failure speed (V1) was 139 kts indicated airspeed (KIAS), rotation speed (VR) was 145 KIAS, and takeoff safety speed (V2) was 153 KIAS. Flight 191 was cleared to taxi into position on runway 32R and hold. At 15:02:38, the flight was cleared for takeoff, and at 15:02:46 the captain acknowledged, "American one ninety-one under way." The takeoff roll was normal until just before rotation at which time sections of the No.1 (left) engine pylon structure came off the aircraft. Witnesses saw white smoke or vapor coming from the vicinity of the No. 1 engine pylon. During rotation the entire No. 1 engine and pylon separated from the aircraft, went over the top of the wing, and fell to the runway. Flight 191 lifted off about 6,000 ft down runway 32R, climbed out in a wings-level attitude. About nine seconds after liftoff, the airplane had accelerated to 172 knots and reached 140 feet of altitude. As the climb continued, the airplane began to decelerate at a rate of about one knot per second, and at 20 seconds after liftoff, and an altitude of 325 feet, airspeed had been reduced to 159 knots. At this point, the airplane began to roll to the left, countered by rudder and aileron inputs. The airplane continued to roll until impact, 31 seconds after liftoff, and in a 112-degree left roll, and 21-degree nose down pitch attitude. At 15:04 Flight 191 crashed in an open field and trailer park about 4,600 ft northwest of the departure end of runway 32R. The aircraft was demolished during the impact, explosion, and ground fire. The No.1 engine pylon failure during takeoff was determined to have been caused by unintended structural damage which occurred during engine/pylon reinstallation using a forklift. The engine/pylon removal and reinstallation were being conducted to implement two DC-10 Service Bulletins. Both required that the pylons be removed, and recommended that this be accomplished with the engines removed. The Service Bulletin instructions assumed that engines and pylons would be removed separately, and did not provide instructions to remove the engine and pylon as a unit. Additionally, removal of the engines and pylons as a unit was not an approved Maintenance Manual procedure. The lack of precision associated with the use of the forklift, essentially an inability to perform the fine manipulations necessary to accomplish reinstallation of the engine/strut assembly, in combination with the tight clearances between the pylon flange and the wing clevis resulted in damage to the same part that had just been inspected. Inspections of other DC-10 pylon mounts following the accident resulted in nine additional cracked mounts being identified.

Continental Airlines

On March 1, 1978, Continental Air Lines, Inc., Flight 603, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 (N68045), was a scheduled flight from Los Angeles International Airport, California, to Honolulu, Hawaii. At 0857:18, Flight 603 called Los Angeles clearance delivery and was cleared for the route of flight which was to have been flown. About 2 min later, the flight received permission from Los Angeles ground control to push back from the gate. At 0901:37, Flight 603 was cleared by ground control to taxi to runway 6R. The runway was wet, but there was no standing water. At 0922:29, Los Angeles local control cleared Flight 603 to taxi into position on runway 6R and hold. At 0923:17, local control cleared Flight 603 for takeoff; however, the flightcrew did not acknowledge the instructions and did not comply with them. At 0923:57, local acknowledged the instructions. The captain stated that he delayed control, again, cleared the flight for takeoff. This time the flightcrew acknowledgment of the takeoff clearance because he believed that he had initially been given the clearance too soon after a heavy jet aircraft had made its takeoff. The flightcrew stated that acceleration was normal and that all engine instruments were in the normal range for takeoff. As the airspeed approached the V1 speed of 156 kns, the captain heard a loud "metallic bang" which was followed immediately by "a kind of quivering of the plane." The flightcrew noticed that the left wing dropped slightly. A rejected takeoff was begun immediately; however, according to the digital flight data recorder (DFDR), the airspeed continued to increase to about 159 kns as the rejected takeoff procedures were begun. The captain stated that he applied full brake pressure while simultaneously bringing the thrust levers back to idle power. Reverse thrust levers were actuated and full reverse thrust was used. The flightcrew stated that they noted good reverse thrust. First, the aircraft moved to the left of the runway centerline and appeared tb the flightcrew to be decelerating normally. With about of deceleration had decreased, and they believed that the aircraft would 2,000 ft of runway remaining, the flightcrew became aware that the rate not be able to stop on the runway surface. The captain stated that he maintained maximum brake pedal force and full reverse thrust as he steered the aircraft to the right of the runway centerline in an effort "to go beside the stanchions holding the runway lights" immediately off of the departure end of runway 6R. He stated further that he encountered no problems with directional control of the aircraft throughout the rejected takeoff maneuver. The aircraft departed the right corner of the departure end of runway 6R. About 100 ft beyond the runway, the left main landing gear broke through the nonload-bearing tar-macadam (tarmac) surface and failed rearward. Fire erupted immediately from this area. The aircraft dropped onto the left wing and the No. 1 (left) engine and rotated to the left as it continued its slide along the surface. It stopped between two of the approach light stanchions for runway 24L about 664 ft from the departure end of runway 6R and about 40 ft to the right of the runway 6R extended centerline; it came to rest on a heading of 008°, in an 11° left wing low, 1.3° noseup attitude. When the aircraft came to a stop, the evacuation was begun immediately. Two passengers were killed while all other occupants were evacuated, some of them with serious injuries.

Overseas National Airways - ONA

Leased by Saudi Arabian Airlines, the aircraft was completing a charter flight (hajj flight) from Jeddah to Ankara. En route, the crew was informed about poor weather conditions in Ankara (limited visibility due to foggy conditions) and was instructed to divert to Istanbul-Yesilköy Airport. On approach to runway 24, the copilot informed the captain that one of the VASI's light was red and that their altitude was insufficient. The captain increased engine power but the aircraft continued to descent until it struck the ground eight meters short of the concrete runway. On impact, the left engine (n°1) was torn off and both left main gear and central gear were also torn off when the airplane struck the shoulder of the first runway's concrete block. The aircraft slid on its belly for few hundred meters, veered to the left and came to rest in flames in a grassy area. All 376 occupants were quickly evacuated, among them 10 were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Overseas National Airways - ONA

The airplane was engaged in a positioning flight from New York to Jeddah via Frankfurt, carrying ONA employees only. The aircraft taxied to runway 13R and commenced takeoff at 13:10. Shortly after accelerating through 100 knots, but before reaching the V1 speed, a flock of birds were seen to rise from the runway. The aircraft struck many birds and the takeoff was rejected. Bird strikes had damaged the no. 3 engine's fan blades, causing rotor imbalance. Fan-booster stage blades began rubbing on the epoxy micro balloon shroud material; pulverized material then entered into the engine's HPC area, ignited and caused the compressor case to separate. A fire erupted in the right wing and no. 3 engine pylon. The aircraft couldn't be stopped on the runway. The pilot-in-command steered the aircraft off the runway onto taxiway Z at a 40 knots speed. The main undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest against the shoulder of the taxiway. The successful evacuation may be partially attributed to the fact that nearly all passengers were trained crew members.

Turkish Airlines - THY Türk Hava Yollari

On Sunday March 3, 1974 flight TK981 departed Istanbul for a flight to Paris and London. The DC-10 landed at Paris-Orly at 11:02 and taxied to stand A2. There were 167 passengers on board, of whom 50 disembarked. The aircraft was refueled and baggage was loaded onto the plane. The planned turnaround time of one hour was delayed by 30 minutes. An additional 216 passengers embarked. Most of the passengers were booked on this flight because of a strike at British Airways. The door of the aft cargo compartment on the left-hand side was closed at about 11:35. When all preparations were complete the flight received permission to taxi to runway 08 at 12:24. Four minutes later the crew were cleared to line up for departure and were cleared for departure route 181 and an initial climb to flight level 40. The aircraft took off at approximately 12:30 and was cleared by Orly Departure to climb to FL60, which was reached at 12:34. The North Area Control Centre then cleared TK981 further to FL230. Three or four seconds before 12:40:00 hours, the noise of decompression was heard and the co-pilot said: "the fuselage has burst" and the pressurization aural warning sounded. This was caused by the opening and separation of the aft left-hand cargo door. The pressure difference in the cargo bay and passenger cabin, the floor above the cargo door partly collapsed. Two occupied tripe seat units were ejected from the aircraft. All the horizontal stabilizer and elevator control cables routed beneath the floor of the DC-10 and were thus also severely disrupted. Also the no. 2 engine power was lost almost completely. The aircraft turned 9 deg to the left and pitched nose down. The nose-down attitude increased rapidly to -20 deg. Although the no. 1 and 3 engines were throttled back the speed increased to 360 kts. The pitch attitude then progressively increased to -4 degrees and the speed became steady at 430 kts (800 km/h). At a left bank of 17 degrees the DC-10 crashed into the forest of Ermenonville, 37 km NE of Paris. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 346 occupants were killed, among them 48 Japanese citizens and almost 250 British people.

Iberia - Lineas Aéreas de Espana

On approach to runway 33L at Boston-Logan Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with rain falls and a limited visibility to 3/4 mile in fog. While passing from IFR to VFR mode on short final, the captain failed to realize that the airplane lost height when the right main gear struck a dyke and was torn off. The airplane struck the runway surface, veered off runway to the right then lost its undercarriage and came to rest in flames. All 168 occupants were evacuated, six of them were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.