Cessna 340

SCH Aviation Trustee

Justin Roberts

Aonvo Investment

ALM Holding

Nixon Enterprises

Shortly after takeoff from Covington Airport Runway 10, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed on the General Mills Plant located about 1,5 km southeast of the airfield, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. There were no casualties on the ground.

Private Mexican

The pilot, sole on board, departed Los Mochis International Airport on a flight to the Club Aéreo Nuevo Santa Rosa located east-northeast of the city. After landing on a road, the airplane suffered an apparent undercarriage failure, veered to the right and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. The pilot evacuated safely while the aircraft suffered serious damages due to fire.

Samarth Aviation

On October 11, 2021, at 1214 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 340A, N7022G, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Santee, California. The pilot and one person on the ground were fatally injured, and 2 people on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The flight departed from Yuma International Airport (NYL), Yuma, AZ at 1121 mountain daylight time and was destined for Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport (MYF), San Diego, California. Review of Federal Aviation Administration Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities and recorded Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that at 1203:58, the controller broadcasted a weather update for MYF and reported the visibility was 10 miles, ceiling 1,700 ft broken, overcast skies at 2,800 ft, and runway 23 was in use. At 1209:20, the controller issued instructions to the pilot to turn right to a 259° heading to join final, to which the pilot acknowledged while at an altitude of 3,900 ft mean sea level (msl). About 28 seconds later, the pilot queried the controller and asked if he was cleared for the ILS Runway 28R approach, with no response from the controller. At 1210:04, the controller told the pilot that he was 4 miles from PENNY intersection and instructed him to descend to 2,800 ft until established on the localizer, and cleared him for the ILS 28R approach, circle to land runway 23. The pilot partially read back the clearance, followed by the controller restating the approach clearance. The pilot acknowledged the clearance a second time. At this time, the ADS-B data showed the airplane on a westerly heading, at an altitude of 3,900 ft msl. Immediately following a traffic alert at 1211:19, the controller queried the pilot and stated that it looked like the airplane was drifting right of course and asked him if he was correcting. The pilot responded and stated “correcting, 22G.” About 9 seconds later, the pilot said [unintelligible], VFR 23, to which the controller told the pilot he was not tracking the localizer and canceled the approach clearance. The controller followed by issuing instructions to climb and maintain 3,000 ft, followed by the issuance of a low altitude alert, and stated that the minimum vectoring altitude in the area was 2,800 ft. The pilot acknowledged the controller’s instructions. At that time, ADS-B data showed the airplane on a northwesterly heading, at an altitude of 2,400 ft msl. At 1212:12, the controller instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 3,800, to which the pilot responded “3,800, 22G.” ADS-B data showed that the airplane was at 3,550 ft msl. About 9 seconds later, the controller issued the pilot instructions to turn right to 090° for vectors to final, to which the pilot responded “090 22G.” At 1212:54, the controller instructed the pilot to turn right to 090° and climb immediately and maintain 4,000 ft. The pilot replied shortly after and acknowledged the controller’s instructions. About 3 seconds after the pilot’s response, the controller told the pilot that it looked like he was descending and that he needed to make sure he was climbing, followed by an acknowledgment from the pilot. At 1213:35, the controller queried the pilot about his altitude, which the pilot responded 2,500 ft. The controller subsequently issued a low altitude alert and advised the pilot to expedite the climb to 5,000 ft. No further communication was received from the pilot despite multiple queries from the controller. ADS-B data showed that the airplane continued a right descending turn until the last recorded target, located about 1,333 ft northwest of the accident site at an altitude of 1,250 ft msl. Figure 1 provides an overview of the ADS-B flight track, select ATC communications, and the location of the destination and surrounding area airports. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted a residential street on a heading of about 113° magnetic heading. The debris path, which consisted of various airplane, vehicle, and residential structure debris was about 475 ft long and 400 ft wide, oriented on a heading of about 132°. Numerous residential structures exhibited impact related damage and or fire damage. All major structural components of the airplane were located throughout the debris path.

William J. Weatherspoon

On April 19, 2021, about 1346 central daylight time, a Cessna 340A airplane, N801EC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Tatum, Texas. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight test. According to information provided by a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) at the East Texas Regional Airport (GGG), the intention of the flight was to do a functional test of a newly upgraded autopilot system. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that the airplane took off from runway 13 at GGG about 1340. According to preliminary Air Traffic Control (ATC) information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the controller cleared the pilot to operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to the east of the airport and to remain in class C airspace. Communications between ground control, tower control, and the pilot were normal during the ground taxi, takeoff, and climb-out. Six minutes after takeoff, radio and radar communications were lost and controllers initiated ALNOT procedures. There were no radio distress calls heard from the pilot. After takeoff, ADS-B data showed the airplane in a steady climb to the east of GGG. The airplane climbed to an altitude of 2,750 ft mean sea level (msl) and then descended to 2,675 ft msl. There were no other data points recorded. The accident site was located directly east, about ¾ mile from the last recorded data point. Groundspeeds and headings were consistent throughout the climb, with no abrupt deviations. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident; however, a local resident located about 1 mile from the accident site reported that he was inside his residence when he heard and felt a “boom” that shook the windows. He immediately saw black smoke rise, found the wreckage, and called 911. The accident site was located at an elevation of 361 ft msl. The airplane impacted the vegetated terrain in a nose-down, vertical flight attitude. The fuselage and cabin were embedded into the ground and were mostly consumed from a post-impact fire. The empennage was folded forward over the cabin area. Both left and right wings showed leading edge crushing along their respective spans. Portions of both wings were fire damaged. Both left and right engine nacelles were separated from the wings and the engine and propeller assemblies were embedded in 3-foot-deep craters.

Private American

On final approach to Orléans-Loiret Airport (ex Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel), the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to make an emergency landing. The twin engine aircraft crash landed in a wooded area located about 3 km short of runway 23 and burst into flames. Both occupants aged 55 and 60 escaped uninjured while the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

Lyle Boman

On approach to Ponoka-Labrie Field, the pilot encountered technical problems with the autopilot and decided to make a go-around. While in the circuit pattern, the autopilot failed to disconnect properly so the pilot attempted an emergency landing in a field. The airplane belly landed then contacted trees. Upon impact, the tail was torn off and the aircraft came to rest. The pilot was seriously injured.

Gospel Ministries International

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a humanitarian flight from Bolivia to Brazil, carrying one passenger and a pilot. Shortly after takeoff from a little private airstrip located in the suburb of Santa Cruz, the crew was supposed to land at Santa Cruz-Viru Viru International Airport before continuing to Manaus, Brazil. After takeoff, the pilot encountered engine problems (power issue) and decided to return for an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and belly landed in a grassy area located in Barrio Lindo. Both occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flex Air Services

The private pilot of the multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument approach during night visual meteorological conditions. About 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from the final approach fix, the right engine lost total power. The pilot continued the approach and notified air traffic control of the loss of power about 1 minute and 13 seconds later. Subsequently, the pilot contacted the controller again and reported that he was unable to activate the airport's pilot-controlled runway lighting. In the pilot's last radio transmission, he indicated that he was over the airport and was going to "reshoot that approach." The last radar return indicated that the airplane was about 450 ft above ground level at 72 kts groundspeed. The airplane impacted the ground in a steep, vertical nose-down attitude about 1/2 nm from the departure end of the runway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear and the flaps were extended and that the right propeller was not feathered. Data from onboard the airplane also indicated that the pilot did not secure the right engine following the loss of power; the left engine continued to produce power until impact. The airplane's fuel system held a total of 203 gallons. Fuel consumption calculations estimated that there should have been about 100 gallons remaining at the time of the accident. The right-wing locker fuel tank remained intact and contained about 14 gallons of fuel. Fuel blight in the grass was observed at the accident site and the blight associated with the right wing likely emanated from the right-wing tip tank. The elevator trim tab was found in the full nose-up position but was most likely pulled into this position when the empennage separated from the aft pressure bulkhead during impact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although there was adequate fuel on board the airplane, the pilot may have inadvertently moved the right fuel selector to the OFF position or an intermediate position in preparation for landing instead of selecting the right wing fuel tank, or possibly ran the right auxiliary fuel tank dry, which resulted in fuel starvation to the right engine and a total loss of power. The airplane manufacturer's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) stated that the 20-gallon right- and left-wing locker fuel tanks should be used after 90 minutes of flight. However, 14 gallons of fuel were found in the right-wing locker fuel tank which indicated that the pilot did not adhere to the POH procedures for fuel management. The fuel in the auxiliary fuel tank should be used when the main fuel tank was less than 180 pounds (30 gallons) per tank. As a result of not using all the fuel in the wing locker fuel tanks, the pilot possibly ran the right auxiliary fuel tank empty and was not able to successfully restart the right engine after he repositioned the fuel selector back to the right main fuel tank. Postaccident testing of the airport's pilot-controlled lighting system revealed no anomalies. The airport's published approach procedure listed the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, which activated the pilot-controlled lighting. It is possible that the pilot did not see this note or inadvertently selected an incorrect frequency, which resulted in his inability to activate the runway lighting system. In addition, the published instrument approach procedure for the approach that the pilot was conducting indicated that the runway was not authorized for night landings. It is possible that the pilot did not see this note since he gave no indication that he was going to circle to land on an authorized runway. Given that the airplane's landing gear and flaps were extended, it is likely that the pilot intended to land but elected to go-around when he was unable to activate the runway lights and see the runway environment. However, the pilot failed to reconfigure the airplane for climb by retracting the landing gear and flaps. The pilot had previously failed to secure the inoperative right engine following the loss of power, even though these procedures were designated in the airplane's operating handbook as "immediate action" items that should be committed to memory. It is likely that the airplane was unable to climb in this configuration, and during the attempted go-around, the pilot exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Additionally, the pilot had the option to climb to altitude using singleengine procedures and fly to a tower-controlled airport that did not have any landing restrictions, but instead, he decided to attempt a go-around and land at his destination airport.

Aviation Transportation

The instrument-rated private pilot and four passengers boarded the multiengine airplane inside a hangar. The pilot then requested that the airplane be towed from the hangar to the ramp, since he did not want to hit anything on the ramp while taxiing in the dense fog. Witnesses heard the pre-takeoff engine run-up toward the end of the runway but could not see the airplane as it departed; the engines sounded normal during the run-up and takeoff. A witness video recorded the takeoff but the airplane was not visible due to the dense fog. During the takeoff roll the airplane's tires chirped, which is consistent with the wheels touching down on the runway with a side load. The video ended before the accident occurred. The witnesses stated that the takeoff continued and then they heard the airplane impact the ground and saw an explosion. The weather conditions at the time of the accident included visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and an overcast ceiling at 300 ft above ground level. The airplane's weight at the time of the accident was about 105 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight, which exceeded the center of gravity moment envelope. The excess weight would have likely extended the takeoff roll, decreased the climb rate, and increased the amount of elevator pressure required to lift off of the runway. A majority of the airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. The ground impact marks and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane rolling left over the departure end of the runway and impacting the ground inverted in a nearly vertical, nose-low attitude. Examination of the engines revealed operating signatures consistent with takeoff power at the time of impact. The elevator trim tab and actuator were found beyond their full up travel limits and the trim cable exhibited tension overload separations near the actuator. It is likely that, when the cable separated in overload, the chain turned the sprocket and extended the actuator rod beyond full travel. No anomalies were observed with the airframe, engines, or cockpit instrumentation that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation was unable to determine the status of the autopilot during the accident takeoff. Based on the evidence it's likely that when the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions the pilot experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

Weather Modification

The airplane was equipped with an air sampling system used to collect air samples at various altitudes. The accident occurred when the pilot was returning to the airport after taking air samples at various altitudes over oil fields. As he was being vectored for an instrument approach, the airplane overshot the runway's extended centerline. The pilot then reported that he had a fire on board. The airplane lost altitude rapidly, and radar contact was lost. Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane struck the ground at high velocity and a low impact angle. One piece of the airplane's shattered Plexiglas windshield exhibited soot streaking on its exterior surface. This soot streaking did not extend onto the piece's fracture surface, indicative of the smoke source being upstream of the windshield and the smoke exposure occurring before windshield breakup at impact. Both nose baggage compartment doors were found about 2 miles south of the main wreckage, which indicative that they came off at nearly the same time and most likely before the pilot's distress call. Although there was no soot deposits, thermal damage, or deformation to the doors consistent with a "high energy explosion," the separation of the luggage compartment doors could have occurred due to an overpressure caused by the ignition of a fuel air mixture within the nose portion of the airplane. The ignition of fuel air mixtures can create overpressure events when they occur in confinement. An overpressure in the nose baggage compartment may have stretched the airframe enough to allow the doors to push open without deforming the latches. If it was a lean fuel air mixture, it would likely leave no soot residue. Post-accident examination revealed no evidence that the air sampling system, which was strapped to the seat tracks behind the copilot's seat, was the cause of the fire. The combustion heater, which was mounted in the right front section of the nose baggage compartment, bore no evidence of fuel leakage, but a fuel fitting was found loose.

Ninerxray Inc.

The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated passenger were departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight from runway 4 in a Cessna 340A about the same time that a private pilot and pilot rated passenger were departing on a visual flight rules repositioning flight from runway 36 in a Cessna 172M. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport. The runways at the nontowered airport converged and intersected near their departure ends. According to a witness, both airplanes had announced their takeoff intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), which was not recorded; the Cessna 340A pilot's transmission occurred about 10 to 15 seconds before the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission. However, the witness stated that the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission was not clear, but he was distracted at the time. Both occupants of the Cessna 172M later reported that they were constantly monitoring the CTAF but did not hear the transmission from the Cessna 340A pilot nor did they see any inbound or outbound aircraft. Airport video that captured the takeoffs revealed that the Cessna 172M had just lifted off and was over runway 36 approaching the intersection with runway 4, when the Cessna 340A was just above runway 4 in a wings level attitude with the landing gear extended and approaching the intersection with runway 36. Almost immediately, the Cessna 340A then began a climbing left turn with an increasing bank angle while the Cessna 172M continued straight ahead. The Cessna 340A then rolled inverted and impacted the ground in a nose-low and left-wing-low attitude. The Cessna 172M, which was not damaged, continued to its destination and landed uneventfully. The Cessna 340A was likely being flown at the published takeoff and climb speed of 93 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The published stall speed for the airplane in a 40° bank was 93 KIAS, and, when the airplane reached that bank angle, it likely exceeded the critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall. Examination of the Cessna 340A wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Because of a postcrash fire, no determination could be made as to how the radios and audio panel were configured for transmitting and receiving or what frequencies were selected. There were no reported discrepancies with the radios of the Cessna 172M, and there were no reported difficulties with the communication between the Cessna 340A and the Federal Aviation Administration facility that issued the airplane's IFR clearance. Additionally, there were no known issues related to the CTAF at the airport. Toxicological testing detected unquantified amounts of atorvastatin, diphenhydramine, and naproxen in the Cessna 340A pilot's liver. The Cessna 340A pilot's use of atorvastatin or naproxen would not have impaired his ability to hear the radio announcements, see the other airplane taking off on the converging runway, or affected his performance once the threat had been detected. Without an available blood level of diphenhydramine, it could not be determined whether the drug was impairing or contributed to the circumstances of the accident.

Private German

The twin engine aircraft departed Mönchengladbach on a flight to Augsbourg, carrying four passengers and one pilot. On descent to Augsburg Airport, the pilot was informed by ATC that weather conditions at destination were worse than predicted, that the visibility was estimated between 225 and 250 metres, thus below minimums. The pilot acknowledged and informed ATC about his intention to attempt an approach and that he would divert to Oberpfaffenhofen if necessary. On short final, at a height of 200 feet, the pilot established a visual contact with the runway lights and decided to continue. After passing over the threshold, he reduced the engine power when the aircraft entered a stall and impacted the runway surface. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for 104 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Four occupants were seriously injured and the fifth was slightly injured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

American King Air

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Heraklion to Riyadh with an intermediate stop in Hurghada, Egypt. On final approach to Riyadh-King Khaled Airport, at an altitude of about 600 feet, the left engine lost power and failed, followed 10 seconds later by the right engine. The crew reported his situation to ATC when the aircraft lost height, impacted ground and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest against a pile of rocks. One of the pilot suffered a broken wrist while the second pilot escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aqua Sun Investments

On 18 August, 2014 at 10:02am local time (1402Z) UTC a fixed wing, twin-engine, Cessna 3 4 0 A aircraft, United States registration N340MM, serial number 340A0635, crashed into waters while on a left base to runway 06 at Grand Bahama International Airport (MYGF) Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas. The aircraft departed Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (KOMN) at 8:51am local time (1251Z) for Grand Bahama International Airport (MYGF) on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan with the pilot and three passengers aboard. Sometime after 9:00am (1300Z) an IFR inbound flight plan on N340MM was received by Freeport Approach Control from Miami Center. Upon initial contact with Freeport Approach Control the pilot was given weather advisory, re-cleared to Freeport VOR and told to maintain four thousand feet and report at JAKEL intersection. He was also advised to expect an RNAV runway six approach. After the pilot’s acknowledgement of the information he later acknowledged his position crossing JAKEL. Freeport Approach then instructed the aircraft to descend to two thousand feet and cleared him direct to JENIB intersection for the RNAV runway six (6) approach. After descending to two thousand feet the pilot indicated to Freeport Approach that he had the field in sight and was able to make a visual approach. Freeport Approach re-cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and instructed the pilot to contact Freeport Control Tower on frequency 118.5. At 9:57am (1357Z) N340MM established contact with Freeport Tower and was cleared for the visual approach to runway six; he was told to join the left base and report at five (5) DME. At 10:01am (1401Z) the pilot reported being out of fuel and his intention was to dead stick the aircraft into the airport from seven miles out at an altitude of one thousand five hundred feet. A minute later the pilot radioed ATC to indicate they “were going down and expected to be in the water about five miles north of the airport.” Freeport Tower tried to get confirmation of the last transmission but was unable to. Several more calls went out from Freeport Tower to N340MM but communication was never reestablished. Freeport Control Tower then made request of aircrafts departing and arriving to assist in locating the lost aircraft by over flying the vicinity of the last reported position to see if visual contact could be made. An inbound aircraft reported seeing an aircraft down five miles from the airport on the 300 degree radial of the ZFP VOR. Calls were made to all the relevant agencies and search and rescue initiated. The aircraft was located at GPS coordinates 26° 35.708’N and 078° 47. 431 W. The aircraft received substantial damage as a result of the impact and crash sequence. There were no survivors.

Stephen George

The instrument-rated pilot was on a cross-country flight. According to air traffic control records, an air traffic controller provided the pilot vectors to an intersection to fly a GPS approach. Federal Aviation Administration radar data showed that the airplane tracked off course of the assigned intersection by 6 nautical miles and descended 800 ft below its assigned altitude before correcting toward the initial approach fix. The airplane then crossed the final approach fix 400 ft below the minimum crossing altitude and then continued to descend to the minimum descent altitude, at which point, the pilot performed a missed approach. The missed approach procedure would have required the airplane to make a climbing right turn to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl) while navigating southwest back to the intersection; however, radar data showed that the airplane flew southeast and ascended and descended several times before leveling off at 2,800 ft msl. The airplane then entered a right 360-degree turn and almost completed another circle before it descended into terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. During the altitude and heading deviations just before impact, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that adverse weather was causing the airplane to lose "tremendous" amounts of altitude; however, weather radar did not indicate any convective activity or heavy rain at the airplane's location. The recorded weather at the destination airport about the time of the accident included a cloud ceiling of 400 ft above ground level and visibility of 3 miles. Although the pilot reported over 4,000 total hours on his most recent medical application, the investigation could not corroborate those reported hours or document any recent or overall actual instrument experience. In addition, it could not be determined whether the pilot had experience using the onboard GPS system, which had been installed on the airplane about 6 months before the accident; however, the accident flight track is indicative of the pilot not using the GPS effectively, possibly due to a lack of proficiency or familiarity with the equipment. The restricted visibility and precipitation and maneuvering during the missed approach would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the variable flightpath off the intended course was consistent with the pilot losing airplane control due to spatial disorientation. Toxicological tests detected ethanol and other volatiles in the pilot's muscle indicative of postmortem production.

James M. Parrish

Witnesses located at a gun club reported observing the airplane make a high-speed, low pass from north to south over the club's buildings and then maneuver around for another low pass from east to west. During the second low pass, the airplane collided with a radio tower that was about 50 ft tall, and the right wing sheared off about 10 ft of the tower's top. The tower's base was triangular shaped, and each of its sides was about 2 ft long. One witness reported that the airplane remained in a straight-and-level attitude until impact with the tower. The airplane then rolled right to an almost inverted position and subsequently impacted trees and terrain about 700 ft southwest of the initial impact point. One witness reported that, about 3 to 4 years before the accident, the pilot, who was a client of the gun club, had "buzzed" over the club and had been told to never do so again. A postaccident examination of the engines and the airframe revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.

Paul S. Soule Enterprises

Four minutes after taking off on an instrument flight rules flight, during an assigned climb to 4,000 feet, the pilot advised the departure air traffic controller that the airplane was having "instrument problems" and that he wanted to "stay VFR" (visual flight rules), which the controller acknowledged. As directed, the pilot subsequently contacted the next sector departure controller, who instructed him to climb to 8,000 feet. The pilot stated that he would climb the airplane after clearing a cloud and reiterated that the airplane was having "instrument problems." The controller told the pilot to advise when he could climb the airplane. About 30 seconds later, the pilot told the controller that he was climbing the airplane to 8,000 feet, and, shortly thereafter, the controller cleared the airplane to 11,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. Per instruction, the pilot later contacted a center controller, who advised him of moderate-to-heavy precipitation along his (northbound) route for the next 10 miles and told him that he could deviate either left or right and, when able, proceed direct to an intersection near his destination. The pilot acknowledged the direct-to-intersection instruction, and the controller told the pilot to climb the airplane to 13,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. The pilot did not advise the center controller about the instrument problems. The airplane subsequently began turning east, eventually completing about an 80-degree turn toward heavier precipitation, and the controller told the pilot to climb to 15,000 feet, but the pilot did not respond. After two more queries, the pilot stated that he was trying to maintain "VFR" and that "I have an instrument failure here." The controller then stated that he was showing the airplane turning east, which "looks like a very bad idea." He subsequently advised the pilot to turn to the west but received no further transmissions from the airplane. Radar indicated that, while the airplane was turning east, it climbed to 9,500 feet but that, during the next 24 seconds, it descended to 7,500 feet and, within the following 5 seconds, it descended to just above ground level (the ground-based radar altitude readout was 0 feet). The pilot recovered the airplane and climbed it northeast-bound to 1,500 feet during the next 20 seconds. It then likely stalled and descended northwest-bound into shallow waters of a wildlife refuge. Weather radar returns indicated that the airplane's first descent occurred in an area of moderate-to-heavy rain but that the second descent occurred in light rain. The ceiling at the nearest recording airport, located about 20 nautical miles from the accident site, was 1,500 feet, indicating that the pilot likely climbed the airplane back into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)before finally losing control. The investigation could not determine the extent to which the pilot had planned the flight. Although a flight plan was on file, the pilot did not receive a formal weather briefing but could have self-briefed via alternative means. The investigation also could not determine when the pilot first lost situational awareness, although the excessive turn to the east toward heavier precipitation raises the possibility that the turn likely wasn't intentional and that the pilot had already lost situational awareness. Earlier in the flight, when the pilot reported an instrument problem, the two departure controllers coordinated between their sectors in accordance with air traffic control procedures, allowing him to remain low and out of IMC. Although the second controller told the pilot to advise when he was able to climb, the pilot commenced a climb without further comment. The controller was likely under the impression that the instrument problem had been corrected; therefore, he communicated no information about a potential instrument problem to the center controller. The center controller then complied with the level of service required by advising the pilot of the weather conditions ahead and by approving deviations. The extent and nature of the deviation was up to the pilot with controller assistance upon pilot request. The pilot did not request further weather information or assistance with deviations and only told the center controller that the airplane was having an instrument problem after the controller pointed out that the airplane was heading into worsening weather. Due to impact forces, only minimal autopsy results could be determined. Federal Aviation Administration medical records indicated that the 16,560-hour former military pilot did not have any significant health issues, and the pilot's wife was unaware of any preexisting significant medical conditions. The wreckage was extremely fractured, which precluded thorough examination. However, evidence indicated that all flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident scene and that the engines were under power at the time of impact. The airplane was equipped with redundant pilot and copilot flight instruments, redundant instrument air sources, onboard weather radar, and a storm scope. The pilot did not advise any of the air traffic controllers about the extent or type of instrument problem, and the investigation could not determine which instrument(s) might have failed or how redundant systems could have been failed at the same time. Although the pilot stated on several occasions that the airplane was having instrument problems, he opted to continue flight into IMC. By doing so, he eventually lost situational awareness and then control of airplane but regained both when he acquired visual ground contact. Then, for unknown reasons, he climbed the airplane back into IMC where he again lost situational awareness and airplane control but was then unable to regain them before the airplane impacted the water.

Flying G Aviation

The pilot entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern to land to the north. A surface wind from the west prevailed with gusts to 15 knots. Radar data revealed that the airplane was on final approach, about 1.16 miles from the runway and about 210 feet above the ground. The airplane then crashed in a pasture south of the airport, in a slight left-wing-low attitude, and came to rest upright. The cockpit and cabin were consumed in a postcrash fire. The pilot's wife, who was in the aft cabin and survived the accident, recalled that it was choppy and that they descended quickly. She recalled hearing two distinct warning horns in the cockpit prior to the crash. The airplane was equipped with two aural warning systems in the cockpit: a landing gear warning horn and a stall warning horn. The pilot likely allowed the airspeed to decay while aligning the airplane on final approach and allowed the airplane to descend below a normal glide path. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear were in transit toward the retracted position at impact, indicating that the pilot was attempting to execute a go-around before the accident. The pilot made no distress calls to air traffic controllers before the crash. The pilot did not possess a current flight review at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage, including a test run of both engines, revealed no evidence of a pre-existing mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

Maparca Compañía Aérea

The twin engine aircraft departed Valera Airport on a charter flight to San Antonio del Táchira with an intermediate stop in El Vigía, carrying five passengers and one pilot. All flight was completed under VFR mode but while descending to San Antonio del Táchira, weather conditions worsened and the pilot switched to IFR mode. Shortly later, control was lost and the aircraft crashed on the slope of Mt Laja, near Lobatera. The wreckage was found about 25 km northeast of San Antonio del Táchira Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed.

Pacific Cataract and Laser Institute

About 14 minutes after departing on the cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane was observed on radar climbing through 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). At this time, the pilot radioed to air traffic control (ATC) that he was returning to the departure airport. About 7 seconds later, the pilot transmitted that he had lost an engine and again stated that he was returning to the departure airport. About 50 seconds later, the pilot transmitted, “We’re losing it.” There was no further communication with the pilot. Radar data revealed that at 14,800 feet msl the airplane began a right 360-degree turn at 8 degrees per second, and about 120 degrees into the turn, it began a descent averaging 5,783 feet per minute. The airplane remained in a right turn until radar contact was lost at 10,700 feet msl. The airplane impacted a 30-degree slope of a densely forested mountain about 2,940 feet msl in a near vertical, slightly right-wing-low attitude. A logger working in the area reported hearing a “very loud roaring sound,” like an airplane diving toward his location and that it seemed to be “really under power.” The logger described the weather as being “socked in,” with light rain and not much wind. Post accident examination revealed that propeller damage was the result of impact forces, with no indications of fatigue or propeller failure before impact. It was also noted that the left propeller was being operated under conditions of some power at impact, while the right propeller was not operating under conditions of significant power at impact. Based on these findings, it is most likely that the pilot experienced a partial loss of power of the right engine and, after incorrectly initiating a right turn into the failed engine, allowed the rate of turn to increase to the point that the airplane became uncontrollable before impact with terrain. The reason for the partial loss of engine power was not determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

Everett R. Arinwine

The pilot was on a cross-country flight near mountainous terrain when he encountered clouds along the flight path. A comparison of recorded radar data and weather reports in the local area indicated that the pilot was maneuvering near the cloud bases in an area with low visibility and ceilings. Based on the erratic and circling flight path, it is likely that the pilot was having difficulty determining his location and desired flight track when the airplane collided with terrain. Post accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.

Private Venezuelan

The twin engine aircraft departed Valle de la Pascua Airport on a private flight to Charallave. While approaching Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport, the crew encountered limited visibility due to low clouds when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near Quiripital, about 15 km southeast of Charallave Airport. The wreckage was found the following day. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

Albert A. Norris

The pilot reported that he was cleared for a GPS approach and broke out of the clouds at 1,800 feet. He entered a left hand traffic pattern and his last recollection was turning base. He woke up in the crashed airplane which was on fire. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of airplane systems revealed no anomalies.

Michael John Bybyk

The airplane departed under daytime visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country flight from an airport on the east side of a mountain range to a destination on the west side of the mountains. The airplane, which had been receiving flight following, then collided with upsloping mountainous terrain in a mountain pass while in controlled flight after encountering instrument meteorological conditions. The controller terminated radar services due to anticipation of losing radar coverage within the mountainous pass area, and notified the pilot to contact the next sector once through the pass while staying northwest of an interstate highway due to opposing traffic on the south side of the highway. The pilot later contacted the controller asking if he still needed to remain on a northwesterly heading. The controller replied that he never assigned a northwesterly heading. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. Radar data revealed that while proceeding on a northeasterly course, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 6,400 feet mean sea level (msl). A few minutes later, the radar data showed the airplane turning to an easterly heading and initiating a climb to an altitude of 6,900 feet msl. The airplane then started descending in a right turn from 6,900 feet to 5,800 feet msl prior to it being lost from radar contact about 0.65 miles southeast of the accident site. A weather observation station located at the departure airport reported a scattered cloud layer at 10,000 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation system located about 29 miles southwest of the accident site reported a broken cloud layer at 4,000 feet agl. A pilot, who was flying west bound at 8,500 feet through the same pass around the time of the accident, reported overcast cloud coverage in the area of the accident site that extended west of the mountains. The pilot stated that the ceiling was around 4,000 feet msl and the tops of the clouds were 7,000 feet msl or higher throughout the area. Postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

Private American

During the landing approach, a witness saw the twin-engine airplane slow and stall. The airplane crashed short of the runway, in a residential backyard. An airport manager flew with the pilot 8 days before the accident. The manager reported that during his flight the pilot flew the approach and landing with the aural stall warning horn activated. The manager advised the pilot of the aural warning, however no corrective action was taken by the pilot during that flight. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. The pilot had about 12.6 hours of flight time in the accident airplane, of which 7.7 hours were dual instruction. Due to the lack of any mechanical problems with the airplane, the pilot's minimal experience in twin-engine airplanes, and his history of flying the airplane too slow, it is probable that he allowed the airspeed to decay below a safe speed, and inadvertently stalled it.

Roy E. Ladd

The pilot arrived in the vicinity of his destination airport, which was located in a narrow river valley. The airport was located within a large area of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions with clear skies and almost unlimited visibility, but the pilot discovered that the airport was covered by a localized dense layer of fog about 200 to 250 feet thick. There were no instrument approaches to the non-controlled airport. Witnesses reported that the pilot flew at low-level up the valley, and eventually entered the fog as the flight approached the airport. About one mile prior to reaching the airport, the pilot attempted to climb out of the valley, but the airplane began impacting trees on the rising terrain. The airplane eventually sustained sufficient damage from impacting the trees that it descended into the terrain. Post-accident inspection of the airframe and engines found no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction.

Steve Posluszny

While on downwind the airplane experienced a loss of engine power and collided with houses and other obstacles during a forced landing on a residential neighborhood street. The pilot stated that he took off to troubleshoot a landing gear anomaly. He departed the airport area to the south. He cycled the landing gear and upon getting questionable indications in the cockpit of gear position he requested another aircraft confirm his landing gear configuration. Once he got the confirmation that all three wheels were down he proceeded back to the airport. About 2 miles away and approximately 1,800 feet agl the right engine began to lose power. He troubleshot the engine by attempting a restart, cycling the fuel pump off then on, and selected the right auxiliary fuel tank. The right engine did regain some power. He had lost some altitude during the process of troubleshooting the engine. He raised the landing gear to reduce drag, and entered right hand traffic for runway 17. At this point the left engine lost power, the airplane turned left, and he entered a descent to help maintain airspeed. He put the left propeller in feather, and switched to a new fuel tank, but the engine did not regain power. He did not have any altitude to exchange for airspeed and steered the airplane towards a clear residential street. The airplane impacted the roofs of at least two houses before colliding with the street. The pilot egressed through the rear of the airplane. An FAA inspector that examined the airplane wreckage stated that there was very little evidence of fuel onboard the airplane. The pilot stated that the left engine had failed due to fuel starvation and that he had fuel onboard but it was not in the right places.

Color Ink

The flight was on a VHF Omni Range (VOR) instrument approach to the destination airport at the time of the accident. Radar track data indicated that the airplane passed the VOR at 2,800 feet. After passing the VOR, it turned right, becoming established on an approximate 017- degree magnetic course. The published final approach course was 341 degrees. The airplane subsequently entered a left turn, followed immediately by a right turn, until the final radar data point. Altitude returns indicated that the pilot initiated a descent from 2,800 feet upon passing the VOR. The airplane descended through 2,000 feet during the initial right turn, and reached a minimum altitude of 1,400 feet. The altitude associated with the final data point was 1,600 feet. The initial impact point was about 0.18 nautical miles from the final radar data point, at an approximate elevation of 1,235 feet. The minimum descent altitude for the approach procedure was 1,720 feet. Review of weather data indicated the potential for moderate turbulence and low-level wind shear in the vicinity of the accident site. In addition, icing potential data indicated that the pilot likely encountered severe icing conditions during descent and approach. The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing, during which the briefer advised the pilot of current Airman's Meteorological Information advisories for moderate icing and moderate turbulence along the route of flight. The briefer also provided several pilot reports for icing and turbulence. A postaccident inspection of the airframe and engines did not reveal any anomalies associated with a preimpact failure or malfunction.

Ray Baxter Armistead

According to an airport employee at the Charleston Executive Airport (JZI), Charleston, South Carolina, the pilot contacted the JZI UNICOM radio frequency to request an airport advisory. The airport employee informed the pilot that the "winds were from 180 at 12 knots gusting to 17." The pilot then responded that he would be landing on runway 18, and was advised by the employee that there was no "runway 18." The pilot then stated that he would land on runway 27, and shortly thereafter said that he would land on runway 22. The employee said that out of curiosity he stepped outside to witness the approach of the airplane. He said that the airplane was southwest of the airport moving northeast perpendicular to runway 22, at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. He watched as the airplane was on a left base for runway 22. He said that the airplane overshot the runway and began a "tight, low right turn" away from the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane stalled and completed two revolutions before it was lost from his sight. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assemblies and accessories revealed no evidence of a pre-crash mechanical failure or malfunction. A forensic toxicology test was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The specimens contained, Tramadol (also known by the trade name Ultram), which is used for the management of moderate to severe pain. The level of Tramadol found in the pilot's blood on post-mortem toxicology testing was at least twice that of maximal regular doses of the substance. Single doses have been shown to cause mild impairment of psychomotor abilities in healthy volunteers. Diphenhydramine was also found in the blood of the pilot. The pilot may have been impaired, at that time, due to the use of Tramadol or Diphenhydramine or both.

RAC Ltd

A commercial pilot with two passengers on a business flight was arriving at the destination airport in a light twin-engine airplane. The air traffic tower controller advised the pilot to follow a slower airplane that was on base leg. The controller subsequently asked the accident pilot if he could reduce his speed,"a little bit." The accident pilot responded that he was slowing down. Less than a minute later, the controller told the accident pilot that he was cleared to land. The accident pilot's last radio transmission was his acknowledgement of the landing clearance. The controller stated that he did not see the accident airplane other than on the radar scope, but did see a plume of smoke on the final approach course for the active runway. Ground witnesses described the airplane as flying slowly with its wings wobbling, turn right, and dive into the ground. The majority of the airplane was consumed by a post crash fire. Inspection of the flight controls and engines disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical problems. Low speed flight reduces the margin between a safe operating speed and an aerodynamic stall. Wing "wobble" at low speeds is often an indicator of an incipient aerodynamic stall. Toxicological samples from the pilot’s blood detected diphenhydramine (a sedating antihistamine commonly known by the trade name Benadryl) at a level consistent with recent use of at least the maximum over-the-counter dose. Diphenhydramine is used over-the-counter for allergies and as a sleep aid, and has been shown to impair the performance of complex cognitive and motor tasks at typical doses. The FAA does not specifically prohibit the use of diphenhydramine by pilots, though Federal Air Regulation 91.17, states, in part: "No crewmember may act, or attempt to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft...while using any drug that affects the person's faculties in any way contrary to safety..."

Agni Aviation

Shortly after takeoff from Bangalore-Jakkur Airport runway 08, while in initial climb, the aircraft suffered an engine failure. It stalled and crashed in shallow water in Jakkur Lake, about one km northeast of the aerodrome. Both pilots were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Private German

The twin engine aircraft departed runway 12 at a speed of 112 knots following a longer than normal takeoff course. After rotation, it encountered difficulties to gain sufficient height when it successively collided with the airport perimeter fence and an embankment located about 150 metres from the runway 30 threshold. The aircraft crashed and was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. All five occupants were killed.

Ward County Irrigation District N°1

On February 7, 2005, about 0634, Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 340, N5790M, registered to and operated by Ward County Irrigation District N°1, impacted with terrain in a mountainous area in Mendoza, Argentina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and the flight plan information is unknown. The pilot and copilot received fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight originated from Aerodrome San Rafael (SAMR), Argentina, earlier that day, at an unspecified time. The initial notification from Argentina's Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviacion Civil ( JIAAC) stated the airplane was on a cloud-seeding mission to prevent thunderstorms from developing in that agricultural area.

James T. Gillespie

Witnesses first observed the aircraft on final approach for landing, with the engine(s) making a backfiring sound. While the aircraft was on short final, another aircraft pulled onto the runway and initiated its takeoff roll. The accident aircraft was observed to initiate a go-around, but did not appear to be gaining altitude and was at what the witnesses thought was a slow airspeed. About mid-field, the accident aircraft made an approximate 45 degree turn from runway heading. Within 1/4 mile from the runway, the aircraft lost altitude. The witness stated that the aircraft was about 80 feet agl when the aircraft stalled, rolled inverted (left wing down) and collided with the flat open terrain in a nose low attitude. A post-crash fire subsequently consumed the wreckage. During the post-crash inspection of the engines, it was found that both engines displayed signs of operating at a lean mixture setting. The left engine pistons and spark plugs displayed a more serious lean condition than the right side and displayed the early signs of detonation on the piston heads. No other mechanical failure or malfunction was noted to either the engines or airframe.

WSP Leasing

During a nighttime takeoff initial climb, the airplane collided with terrain near the airport. Witnesses reported watching the airplane accelerate on runway 12, rotate, and climb to 200 to 300 feet above ground level. The climb rate decreased and the airplane appeared to initiate a left turn, with the roll continuing to a wings vertical attitude. At this point the airplane descended into the terrain. One witness north of the accident site described the landing lights going from horizontal to vertical followed by a decrease in engine sound just before impact. According to the airplane owner, the pilot had never flown the accident airplane before the first leg to the accident location to drop off the owner and another passenger. Examination of the pilot records failed to locate any previous flight time in Cessna 300 or 400 series airplanes. In the last 30 days he had given instruction in a smaller light twin engine airplane. Post accident examination of the wreckage revealed the landing gear to be in the down position at the time of impact. The retractable landing lights were extended and the nose gear taxi light was destroyed. Both propellers exhibited symmetrical power signatures. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified. The impact site was east of the airport about 0.68 nautical miles. The departure direction is towards a mountain range with sparse population and few ground reference lights. The moon's disk was 25 degrees above the southeastern horizon and was 89 percent illuminated. The FAA AC61-23C Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge addresses the environmental factors and potential in-flight visual illusions, which could affect pilot performance. The reference material describes Somatogravic Illusion as, "a rapid acceleration during takeoff can create the illusion of being in a nose up attitude. The disoriented pilot will push the airplane into a nose low, or dive attitude. A rapid deceleration by a quick reduction of the throttles can have the opposite effect, with the disoriented pilot pulling the airplane into a nose up, or stall attitude."

Lear 171

The pilot was flying a three leg IFR cross-country, and was on an ILS approach in IMC weather conditions for his final stop. Radar data indicated that the pilot had crossed the final approach fix inbound and was approximately 3 nm from the runway threshold when he transmitted that he had "lost an engine." Radar data indicates that the airplane turned left approximately 180 degrees, and radar contact was lost. A witness said "the airplane appeared to gain a slight amount of altitude before banking sharply to the left and nose diving into the ground just over the crest of the hill." Postimpact fuel consumption calculations suggest that there should have been 50 to 60 gallons of fuel onboard at the time of the accident. Displaced rubber O-ring seals on two Rulon seals in the left fuel valve and hydraulic pressure/deflection tests performed on an exemplar fuel valve suggest that the fuel selector valve was in the auxiliary position at the time of impact. The airplane's Owner's Manual states: "The fuel selector valve handles should be turned to LEFT MAIN for the left engine and RIGHT MAIN for the right engine, during takeoff, landing, and all emergency operations." No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies, which might have affected the airplane's performance, were identified.

Bee Bee Aviation

The pilot of a Cessna 340 departed Bankstown, NSW at 1223 ESuT, for Townsville, Qld via Walgett, St George, Roma, Emerald and Clermont. He reported that he climbed the aircraft to 16,000 ft and adopted a long range power setting of about 49% which equated to a true air speed (TAS) of 168 kts and a fuel burn of 141 lbs per hour. As the pilot approached the ‘OLDER’ waypoint north of Clermont, he reviewed his fuel situation and, because of a strong tailwind decided to continue on to Cairns. He informed an enroute controller of his decision and requested, for fuel planning purposes, a clearance to allow him to track in the opposite direction on a one-way air route. The controller was unable to approve his request but offered the pilot a direct track to Biboohra, a navigation aid 20 NM west of Cairns. The pilot accepted the amended track with the intention of later requesting a more direct route to Cairns. About 15 minutes later, the pilot requested a more direct track, but was told to call the approach controller for a possible clearance. He contacted the approach controller and told the controller that he had minimum fuel. The controller asked the pilot if he was declaring an emergency, to which he replied affirmative. The pilot later commented that he did this in the hope of expediting his arrival. He was instructed to descend to 6,500 ft and track direct to Cairns. The controller asked the pilot if he preferred to join the runway 15 circuit via a left downwind or right downwind, to which the pilot requested to join a left downwind. The pilot later commented that the aircraft fuel flow gauges were indicating a total flow of 140 lbs per hour and the fuel quantity gauges for the selected main tanks, although wandering somewhat, were ‘displaying a healthy amount’ considering that he was about 12 NM from his destination. As the pilot approached 6,500 ft, he requested a clearance for further descent, to which the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 4,000 ft. As the aircraft descended to 4,000 ft, the pilot saw Cairns City, but could not see the runway at Cairns airport. The aircraft's distance measuring equipment (DME) indicated 9 NM to the DME navigation aid at Cairns Airport. The pilot reported that at about this time, he observed one of the fuel flow gauges indicating zero, while at the same time, one or both engines began to surge and run roughly. He immediately informed the controller of the situation. The controller asked the pilot if he was familiar with a local airstrip (Greenhill which is 10 NM to the southeast of Cairns airport), to which the pilot replied that he wasn't. The controller indicated to the pilot that the strip was situated in his two o'clock position at a range of about two miles and to be aware of power lines and the sugar cane. The pilot was unsure of what to look for and was unable to see the strip, but after conducting a number of steep turns, saw a cleared strip in a field. He decided that he had to land. He extended the landing gear, but realised that the aircraft was too high and attempted a 360-degree steep turn onto final to reposition the aircraft. However, the airspeed was rapidly decreasing and there was insufficient height to complete the approach. At 1729 EST, the aircraft impacted the ground short of the strip and slid for about 20 metres. The pilot was seriously injured and the passengers received minor injuries.

Harold S. Bercu

While on an IFR clearance, the pilot reported to approach control that he was unable to maintain 4,000 feet msl, and did not give a reason. Shortly thereafter, the pilot contacted approach control and stated that he had "fuel starvation" in the right engine and the left engine had just quit. Radar data depicted the aircraft at an altitude of 3,400 feet. The controller asked the pilot if they were completely without power, and the pilot responded, "yes, we're now gliding." The controller gave the pilot instructions to the nearest airport, which was approximately 4.5 nautical miles away. After passing 2,100 feet, the pilot informed the controller that he would be landing short. During the forced landing, the airplane struck the top of a tree, crossed over a house, struck another tree, struck a telephone wire which crossed diagonally over a street, and then cleared a set of wires which paralleled the street. The airplane then impacted a private residence within a residential area, and a fire erupted damaging the airplane and the private residence. Ten gallons of fuel were drained from the left locker tank, which supplements the left main fuel tank. Examination of the airframe and engines did not disclose any structural or mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Examination of the propeller revealed that neither propeller had been feathered.

Richard C. Runyon

During an aborted nighttime takeoff, the airplane continued off the end of the 4,987-foot-long runway, vaulted an embankment, and impacted a guardrail on an airport service road 30 feet below. According to the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the takeoff distance required for the ambient conditions was 1,620 feet and the accelerate-stop distance was 2,945 feet. Several witnesses reported observing the airplane traveling along the runway at an unusually high speed, with normal engine sound, and without becoming airborne; followed by an abrupt reduction in engine power and the sound of screeching tires. Skid marks were present on the last 1,000 feet of the runway. In the wreckage, the gust lock/control lock was found engaged in the pilot's control column.

Air San Luis

The airline transport rated pilot was returning an organ transplant nurse passenger to an uncontrolled, no facilities airport, with ground fog present about 0400 in the morning. The pilot had obtained two abbreviated preflight weather briefings while waiting for his passenger, and prior to departing at 0235. According to witnesses he attempted to land twice on runway 28, then he made an approach and attempted a landing on runway 10. Witnesses reported that the airport was engulfed in ground fog at the time of the approaches. They said that you could see straight up but not horizontally. The airplane collided with grape vineyard poles and canal/wash berms, about 250 feet short of the runway 10 displaced threshold. Approach charts for two airports with instrument approaches within 20 miles were found lying on the instrument panel glare shield. The passenger's car was parked at the uncontrolled airport.

Marko Foam Products

During en route cruise flight at an assigned altitude of 11,000 feet (msl) in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane impacted mountainous terrain at 5,300 feet, in wings level, descending flight. During the final 12 minutes of the flight (from 1046 to 1058 Pacific daylight time), recorded military search radar height values (primary radar returns) show the aircraft in a steady descent from 11,000 feet to 5,600 feet, where radar contact was lost. During the same time interval, recorded Mode C altitudes received at Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Center (Center) and SoCal Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) indicated the aircraft was level at 11,000 feet. At 1055:49, when the pilot was handed off from SoCal TRACON to Los Angeles Center, the pilot checked in with the Center ". . . level at one one thousand." At 1057:28, the pilot asked the Center controller "what altitude you showing us at" to which the controller responded "not receiving your mode C right now sir." At 1057:37, the pilot transmitted "o k we'd like to climb to vfr on top, our uh altimeter just went down to uh fifty three hundred." The controller approved the pilot's request to climb to VFR conditions on-top and, at 1057:54, the pilot responded "roger we're out." No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The airplane was equipped with a single instrument static pressure system with two heated static ports. The static system and static system instruments were damaged or destroyed by impact and post-crash fire sufficiently to preclude post-accident testing.