Beechcraft E18

Island Air Service

After taking off from runway 9L at his home airport and making an easterly departure, the pilot, who was also the president, director of operations, and chief pilot for the on-demand passenger and cargo operation, advised the air traffic controller that he was turning downwind. According to witnesses, the airplane did not sound like it was developing full power. The airplane climbed to about 100 feet, banked to the left, began losing altitude, and impacted a tree, a fence, and two vehicles before coming to rest in a residential area. A postcrash fire ensued, which consumed the majority of the cabin area and left wing. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had struck the tree with its left inboard wing about 20 feet above ground level. Multiple tree branches exhibiting propeller cuts were found near the base of the tree. Propeller strike marks on the ground also corresponded to the location of the No. 1 (left side) propeller. There were minimal propeller marks from the No. 2 (right side) propeller. Examination of the propellers revealed that the No. 1 propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratching and S-bending, consistent with operation at impact, but the No. 2 propeller blades did not exhibit any chordwise scratching or bending, which indicates that the No. 2 engine was not producing power at the time of impact. There was no evidence that the pilot attempted to perform the manufacturer’s published single engine procedure, which would have allowed him to maintain altitude. Contrary to the procedure, the left and right throttle control levers were in the full-throttle position, the mixture control levers were in the full-rich position, neither propeller was feathered, and the landing gear was down. Postaccident examination of the No. 1 engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. However, the No. 2 engine's condition would have resulted in erratic and unreliable operation; the engine would not have been able to produce full rated horsepower as the compression on four of the nine cylinders was below specification and both magnetos were not functioning correctly. Moisture and corrosion were discovered inside the magneto cases; the left magneto sparked internally in a random pattern when tested and its point gap was in excess of the required tolerance. The right magneto's camshaft follower also exhibited excessive wear and its points would not open, rendering it incapable of providing electrical energy to its spark plugs. Additionally, the main fuel pump could not be rotated by hand; it exhibited play in the gear bearings, and corrosion was present internally. When the airplane was not flying, it was kept outdoors. Large amounts of rain had fallen during the week before the accident, which could have led to the moisture and corrosion in the magnetos. Although the pilot had been having problems with the No. 2 engine for months, he continued to fly the airplane, despite his responsibility, particularly as president, director of operations, and chief pilot of the company, to ensure that the airplane was airworthy. During this period, the pilot would take off with the engine shuddering and would circle the departure airport to gain altitude before heading to the destination. On the night before the accident, the director of maintenance (DOM) replaced the No. 1 cylinder on the No. 2 engine, which had developed a crack in the fin area and had oil seeping out of it. After the DOM performed the replacement, he did not do a compression check or check the magnetos; such checks would have likely revealed that four of the remaining cylinders were not producing specified compression, that the magnetos were not functioning correctly, and that further maintenance was necessary. Review of the airplane's maintenance records did not reveal an entry for installation of the cylinder. The last entry in the maintenance records for the airplane was an annual and a 100-hour inspection, which had occurred about 11 months before the accident.

Air Supply Alaska

The pilot reported that the runway at the destination airport was ice-covered, and that upon touchdown the surface was slicker than he had anticipated. He aborted the landing by applying full power to take off. The airplane was unable to out-climb the rising terrain at the end of the runway, and it collided with terrain, sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot indicated that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane that precluded its normal operation.

Brazoria County Mosquito Control District

The pilot was spraying a marshy area for mosquitoes. After making a spray pass, he made a right 180-degree turn to an easterly heading and the right wing struck a radio tower. The pilot didn't know the extent of the damage and there appeared to be a "controllability issue." He elected to land in a pasture. During the landing, the airplane struck and killed a cow and a bull, then collided with a pile of wood, resulting in substantial damage. The unlit 100-foot radio tower was within the walls of a correctional facility, was used for ground communications, and has been there for several years. It was not marked on sectional charts.

Wayne R. Monson

The pilot purchased the airplane approximately one year prior to the accident with the intention of restoring it for flight. The airplane had not been flown for approximately five years and had been used for spare parts. The pilot was flying the airplane to another airport to pick up passengers prior to returning. The pilot was cleared for takeoff and to circle the airport at 2,500 feet prior to departing the area. Witnesses reported that after taking off the airplane seemed to “wobble” at a slow airspeed in a nose-high attitude and that it never got higher than 500 feet. Some witnesses reported the engine(s) sputtering, and another stated that the airplane was loud and "didn't sound good," although other witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal. One witness reported seeing white smoke coming from the left engine and hearing the engine "popping" as the airplane took off. The airplane made three left turns and it appeared as if the pilot was attempting to return to land. Witnesses described the left wing rising prior to the airplane banking hard to the left and the nose dropping straight down. The airplane impacted the ground just northeast of the airport property and a postimpact fire ensued. Flight control continuity was established. The right side of the elevator/tailcone structure exhibited black rub marks and scrapes. Grass and nesting material was found inside the left wing. The left fuel valve was found in the OFF position and the right fuel valve was positioned to the rear auxiliary tank. Neither the fuel crossfeed valve nor the fuel boost pump switch was located. The left engine sustained substantial fire and impact damage. The right engine sustained heavy impact damage. The airplane was last fueled one month prior to the accident with 120 gallons of fuel. About 20 engine test runs in addition to high-speed taxi tests had been conducted since then. A Special Flight Permit had been obtained but had not been signed by the mechanic, who did not know that the pilot was going to fly the airplane on the day of the accident. The pilot reportedly did not have any Beech 18 flight experience.

Eagle Point Inc.

An airplane impacted the runway shortly after takeoff. According to the pilot, the airplane rolled sharply to the left immediately after liftoff from the runway. The passenger in the back seat stated the airplane banked sharply to the left after takeoff. The pilot then applied right rudder and aileron to stop the roll. Unable to level the airplane with the horizon, the pilot elected to reduce power to idle on both engines and land on the remaining runway. The airplane impacted the runway, slid into the grass and erupted into flames.

Aleutian Air

The certificated airline transport pilot was departing on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The purpose of the flight was to deliver a load of wooden roofing shakes to a friend's remote lodge. Witnesses reported that just after takeoff, as the airplane climbed to about 200 to 300 feet above the ground, the airplane abruptly pitched up about 70 degrees, and drifted to the right. The airplane continued to turn to the right as the nose of the airplane lowered momentarily. As the airplane flew very slowly the landing gear was extended. The nose of the airplane pitched up again, the right wing dropped, and the airplane descended. One witness described the descent as: "The wings rocked back and forth as it descended, like a card in the wind, with the nose of the airplane slightly higher." The airplane impacted shallow water in an area of tidal mud flats. A postaccident investigation revealed that the estimated gross weight of the airplane at takeoff was 11,500.8 pounds, 1,400.8 pounds in excess of the airplane's maximum takeoff gross weight. The airplane's center of gravity could not be calculated due to the fact that the exact location/station of the cargo could not be determined. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies.

Northern Airmotive

The airplane was observed to depart normally for a positioning flight conducted during night visual meteorological conditions. In addition, the landing gear was observed to retract after takeoff. A witness who lived near the accident site heard a "loud" engine noise and observed the airplane just above the trees. The airplane then pitched down, impacted the ground, and exploded. The airplane impacted in a soybean field about a 1/2 mile from the departure end of the runway. Two pairs of ground scars were observed at the beginning of the debris path. The initial pair of ground scars were about 2 to 3 feet in length and were located about 380 feet south of the main wreckage. A pair of 10 to 12 foot long ground scars were located about 10 feet forward of the initial ground scars and they contained portions of the left and right engines; respectively. There was no impact damage observed to the portion of the soy bean field located in-between the second ground scar and the main wreckage. Prior to the flight, maintenance personnel replaced a frayed elevator trim cable. The work was supervised and checked by the accident pilot. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact failure; however, a significant portion of the airplane was consumed in a post crash fire. Examination of the propellers revealed damage consistent with engine operation at the time of impact. The pilot reported 22,500 hours of total flight experience, with over 17,00 flight hours in make and model.

Phillips Air Service

The pilot lost control of the airplane following the loss of engine power from the right engine during takeoff. The pilot stated that the engine power loss was not sudden, but rather a slow continued reduction of power. The pilot further stated that the loss of power occurred after he placed the landing gear selector in the retract position. He added that his airspeed at the time of the power loss was between Vmc (86 mph) and Vy (120 mph). The airplane started to roll towards the right (dead) engine as the pilot reduced the power on the left engine. The outboard portion of the right wing impacted the ground short of a taxiway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the left engine was torn from the airframe. The reason for the loss of engine power was not determined.

May Air Express

The pilot reported that the airplane lifted off at 70 knots. After accelerating in ground effect the airplane became 'unstable in the roll axis' so he added power. He reported that the left wing tip contacted the runway approximately 3/4 the way down the runway. The pilot then added additional power at which point the left wing contacted the grass off the left side of the departure end of the runway. The pilot then reduced the power to idle and landed the airplane in the grass collapsing the landing gear. The pilot reported that the engines sounded normal throughout the accident sequence. Investigation revealed another Beech 18 had taken off on the same runway, but in the opposite direction of N916TM less than one minute prior to the accident.

Polaris Aviation

The flight had been delayed due to severe weather over the departure airport. The preflight weather briefing received by the pilot included AIRMETS and SIGMETS for icing and severe thunderstorms, possible tornadoes, hail to 2 inches, and wind gusts to 70 knots near the ground. The Beech 18 was not equipped with a storm scope or weather radar. Prior to takeoff, a passenger stated to a witness that the weather was 'really really bad,' and that they would have to 'do some deviating to get around it.' After takeoff, the airplane cruised at 10,000 feet uneventfully for 1 hour and 50 minutes, when a center controller advised that radar contact was lost, which the pilot acknowledged. The next and last transmission occurred 13 minutes later when the controller received a 'Mayday' radio transmission that the airplane was 'going down.' The last radar target revealed a 6,000 foot per minute rate of descent. Training records revealed the pilot, also the company chief pilot, had flown solo 6.3 hours in the Beech 18 and credited it as dual flight instruction. He then passed a Part 135 evaluation with the FAA Principal Operations Inspector (POI), which lasted 1.6 hours. The next day the POI issued the pilot check airmen authorization for the Beech 18, all models. According to the POI, the airplane was not approved for Part 135 operations; however, the company had a bogus approval for the airplane, signed by the POI, that allowed the company to apply to Canadian Authorities for authorization to operate in Canada. The bogus approval had been used to justify the accident flight.