Beechcraft 90 King Air
Safety Rating
9.8/10Total Incidents
239
Total Fatalities
558
Incident History
Bank of Utah
The twin engine airplane departed Acapulco-General Juan N. Álvarez Airport on a private flight to Cuernavaca, carrying six passengers and one pilot. On final approach to Cuernavaca Airport runway 20, the airplane crashed on a supermarket located in Temixco, some 2 km short of runway. The pilot and two passengers were killed while four other occupants were injured.
N290KA LLC
On November 15, 2021, about 1245 eastern standard time, a Beech E-90, N290KA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Boyne City, Michigan. The airline transport pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. A review of preliminary air traffic control (ATC) information revealed that the airplane departed Oakland County International Airport (PTK), Pontiac, Michigan, at 1150 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and climbed to 16,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane was enroute to Boyne City Municipal Airport (N98), Boyne City, Michigan. The airplane descended toward N98 and the pilot was cleared for the RNAV GPS Runway 27 approach. While on the final approach course, the airplane’s groundspeed gradually slowed from 129 to 88 knots over a period of one minute and the last recorded location showed the airplane was 3.3 nautical miles east of the Runway 27 threshold, about 1,500 ft msl (800 ft above ground level), and slightly left of the approach course. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground about 600 ft west of the last recorded location. Broken tree limbs indicated the airplane was in a steep descent of about 70° while on a west heading. Two witnesses located about ¼ mile southeast of the accident site heard the airplane fly overhead, followed by a loud thud. The witnesses observed very heavy sleet with low visibility conditions for about 10 minutes, before and after the accident time. The sleet had a high liquid content and would melt quickly after ground impact. An Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET) for icing was valid for the accident location. Initial examination revealed the entire airplane was present at the accident site and no anomalies were noted with the airplane’s flight controls that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was retained for further examination.
PEC Taxi Aéreo
The twin engine aircraft departed Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport on a taxi flight to Caratinga, carrying three passengers and two pilots. On approach to Caratinga-Ubaporanga Airport, the airplane stalled and crashed in a river bed located about 4,1 km short of runway 02. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all five occupants were killed, among them the Brazilian singer Marília Mendonça aged 26.
Aspa Servicios
Upon landing at Durango-Guadalupe Victoria Airport following an uneventful flight from San Luis Potosí, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a grassy area, coming to rest upside down and bursting into flames. A pilot and two passengers were killed while four other occupants were injured.
Falcon Executive Aviation
On July 10, 2021, about 1255 mountain standard time, a Beech C-90, turbo prop airplane, N3688P, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Wikieup, Arizona. The pilot and Air Tactical Group supervisor were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a public-use firefighting aircraft in support of the Bureau of Land Management conducting aerial reconnaissance and supervision. The airplane was on station for about 45 minutes over the area of the Cedar Basin fire. Preliminary radar data showed that the airplane had accomplished multiple orbits over the area of the fire about 2,500 ft above ground level (agl). The last radar data point showed the airplane’s airspeed about 151 knots, its altitude about 2,300 ft agl, and that it was in a descent, about 805 ft east southeast of the accident site. According to a witness, the airplane was observed in a steep dive towards the ground. Subsequently, the airplane impacted side of a ridgeline in mountainous desert terrain about 15 miles northeast of Wikieup. The wreckage was consumed by a post-crash fire. Debris was scattered over an area of several acres. The left wing was located about 0.79 miles northeast of the main wreckage and did not sustain thermal damage. No distress call from the airplane was overheard on the radio.
Private Brazilian
The pilot, sole on board, was completing a flight from Jundiaí to São Paulo. While approaching Campo de Marte Airport in limited visibility, the twin engine airplane crashed in a wooded area located in the Cantareira Mountain range, about 10-12 km north of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and the pilot was killed.
Oahu Parachute Center
On June 21, 2019, about 1822 Hawaii-Aleutian standard time, a Beech King Air 65-A90 airplane, N256TA, impacted terrain after takeoff from Dillingham Airfield (HDH), Mokuleia, Hawaii. The pilot and 10 passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by N80896 LLC and was operated by Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) LLC under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a local parachute jump (skydiving) flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. OPC had scheduled five parachute jump flights on the day of the accident and referred to the third through fifth flights of the day as “sunset” flights because they occurred during the late afternoon and early evening. The accident occurred during the fourth flight. The accident pilot was the pilot-in-command (PIC) for each of the OPC flights that departed on the day of the accident. The pilot and 8 of the 10 passengers initially boarded the airplane. These eight passengers comprised three OPC tandem parachute instructors, three passenger parachutists, and two OPC parachutists performing camera operator functions. The pilot began to taxi the airplane from OPC’s location on the airport. According to a witness (an OPC tandem instructor who was not aboard the accident flight), the two other passengers—solo parachutists who had been on the previous skydiving flight and were late additions to the accident flight—“ran out to the airplane and were loaded up at the last minute.” The pilot taxied the airplane to runway 8 about 1820, and the airplane departed about 1822. According to multiple witnesses, after the airplane lifted off, it banked to the left, rolled inverted, and descended to the ground. One witness stated that, before impact, the airplane appeared to be intact and that there were no unusual noises or smoke coming from the airplane. A security camera video showed that the airplane was inverted in a 45° nose-down attitude at the time of impact. The airplane impacted a grass and dirt area about 630 ft northeast of the departure end of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder. The accident flight was not detected by radar at the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Hawaii Control Facility, which was the air traffic control (ATC) facility with jurisdiction of the airspace over HDH. The FAA found no audio communications between the accident airplane and ATC on the day of the accident.
Grupo Gambatto
The pilot departed Florianópolis-Hercílio Luz Airport at 1100LT on a flight to Chapecó. Following an uneventful flight, the pilot initiated the descent to Chapecó-Serafim Enoss Bertasco Airport but encountered marginal weather conditions with limited visibility. While descending under VFR mode, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located in Ipumirim, some 50 km east of Chapecó Airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the pilot, sole occupant, was killed.
Gabriel Claudio de Sales
The twin engine airplane departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha-Carlos Drummond de Andrade Airport at 0820LT on a private flight to Confresa, carrying five passenger and one pilot. While descending to Confresa, the pilot decided to fly directly to the farm of the owner (Fazenda Angola) located in Vila Rica, about 80 km northeast of Confresa Airport. On final approach, the aircraft was too low when it struck the surface of a lake then its bank. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft crash landed and came to rest on its belly. There was no fire. All six occupants were injured, one seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Videplast
While approaching Campo de Marte Airport by night following an uneventful flight from Videira, the crew encountered technical problems with the landing gear and was cleared to complete two low passes over the runway to confirm visually the problem. While performing a third approach, the twin engine airplane rolled to the left then overturned and crashed inverted about 100 metres to the left of runway 30, bursting into flames. Six occupants were injured and one pilot was killed.
U.Y. Aviation Private Ltd
Following a technical maintenance, a test flight was scheduled with two engineers and two pilots. The twin engine airplane departed Mumbai-Juhu Airport and the crew completed several manoeuvres over the city before returning. On approach in heavy rain falls, the aircraft went out of control and crashed at the bottom of a building under construction located in the Ghatkopar West district, some 3 km east from Mumbai Intl Airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed as well as one people on the ground.
L3 Airline Academy
The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.
Edward B. Noakes III
The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.
King Industries
The commercial pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan and was departing in dark night visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country personal flight. A witness at the departure airport stated that during takeoff, the airplane sounded and looked normal. The witness said that the airplane lifted off about halfway down runway 24, and there was "plenty" of runway remaining for the airplane to land. The witness lost sight of the airplane and did not see the accident because the airport hangars blocked her view. The wreckage was located about 2,400 ft southeast of the departure end of runway 24. Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane impacted in a nose-down attitude with a left bank of about 20°. A left turn during departure was consistent with the airport's published instrument departure procedures for obstacle avoidance, which required an immediate climbing left turn while proceeding to a navigational beacon located about 7 miles east-northeast of the airport. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had reportedly been awake for about 15 hours and was conducting the departure about the time he normally went to sleep and, therefore, may have been fatigued about the time of the event; however, given the available evidence, it was impossible to determine the role of fatigue in this event. Although the circumstances of the accident are consistent with spatial disorientation, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether it may have played a role in the sequence of events.
EagleMed
The pilot stated that the engine start and airplane power-up were normal for the air medical flight with two medical crewmembers. The engine ice vanes were lowered (as required for ground operations) and then were subsequently raised before takeoff. Takeoff and climbout were routine, and the pilot leveled off the airplane at the assigned cruise altitude. The air traffic controller informed the pilot of heavy showers near the destination airport, and the pilot "put the ice vanes down." The pilot indicated that, shortly afterward, the airplane experienced two "quick" electrical power fluctuations in which "everything went away and then came back," and "[s]econds later the entire [electrical] system failed." Due to the associated loss of navigation capability while operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the pilot set a general course for better weather conditions based on information from his preflight weather briefing. While the pilot attempted to find a suitable hole in the clouds to descend through under visual conditions, the left engine lost power. The pilot ultimately located a field through the cloud cover and executed a single-engine off-airport landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the right engine mount and firewall. A postaccident examination of the airplane and systems did not reveal any anomalies consistent with an in-flight electrical system malfunction. The three-position ignition and engine start/starter-only switches were in the ON position, and the engine anti-ice switches were in the ON position. When the airplane battery was initially checked during the examination, the voltmeter indicated 10.7 volts (normal voltage is 12 volts); the battery was charged and appeared to function normally thereafter. The loss of electrical power was likely initiated by the pilot inadvertently selecting the engine start switches instead of the engine anti-ice (ice vane) switches. This resulted in the starter/generators changing to starter operation and taking the generator function offline. Airplane electrical power was then being supplied solely by the battery, which caused it to deplete and led to a subsequent loss of electrical power to the airplane. A postaccident examination revealed that neither wing fuel tank contained any visible fuel. The left nacelle fuel tank did not contain any visible fuel, and the right nacelle fuel tank appeared to contain about 1 quart of fuel. The lack of fuel onboard at the time of the accident is consistent with a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. This was a result of the extended flight time as the pilot attempted to exit instrument conditions after the loss of electrical power to locate a suitable airport. Further, the operator reported that 253 gallons (1,720 lbs) of fuel were on board at takeoff, and the accident flight duration was 3.65 hours. At maximum range power, the expected fuel consumption was about 406 lbs/hour, resulting in an endurance of about 4.2 hours. Thus, the pilot did not have the adequate fuel reserves required for flying in IMC. Both the pilot and medical crewmembers described a lack of communication and coordination among crewmembers as the emergency transpired. This resulted in multiple course adjustments that hindered the pilot's ability to locate visual meteorological conditions before the left engine fuel supply was exhausted.
Hotel Emiliano
The twin engine aircraft departed Campo de Marte Airport at 1301LT bound for Paraty. With a distance of about 200 km, the flight should take half an hour. The approach to Paraty Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls reducing the visibility to 1,500 metres. While descending to Paraty, the pilot lost visual contact with the airport and initiated a go-around. Few minutes later, while completing a second approach, he lost visual references with the environement then lost control of the aircraft that crashed in the sea near the island of Rasa, about 4 km short of runway 28. Quickly on site, rescuers found a passenger alive but it was impossible to enter the cabin that was submerged. The aircraft quickly sank by a depth of few metres and all five occupants were killed, among them Carlos Alberto, founder of Hotel Emiliano and the Supreme Court Justice Teori Zavascki who had a central role overseeing a massive corruption investigation about the Brazilian oil Group Petrobras.
PA Scale Company of Florida
The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Cuatro Vientos Airport on a private flight to Cascais, Portugal, carrying three passengers and one pilot. One of the reasons for the flight was to repair the weather radar at a Portuguese maintenance center that specialized in this equipment. The pilot had to delay the takeoff until 1557LT due to bad weather conditions. The aerodrome of Cuatros Vietnos was in instrument conditions (IMC), which forced its closing from 0900LT until 1444LT. At 1615LT, the aircraft was en route, climbing from flight level 190 to its authorized cruise level of 210. Moments later, according to a detailed analysis of the data taken from the radar, there was a yaw to the left, and the aircraft started to turn in this direction and suddenly lose altitude. After this event, the airspeed fell quickly and gradually until the aircraft stalled. The aircraft went into a spin, which after some time turned into a flat spin. As the airplane descended out of control, and with the spin fully developped, loads were placed on the horizontal tail that exceeded the design loads, causing the tail to break up in flight into five parts before the aircraft impacted the ground. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the impact and sibsequent fire, and its four occupants were killed in the accident.
St Tammany Parish Mosquito Abatement District
The airline transport pilot and commercial copilot were conducting a mosquito abatement application flight. Although flight controls were installed in both positions, the pilot typically operated the airplane. During a night, visual approach to landing at their home airfield, the airplane was on the left base leg and overshot the runway's extended centerline and collided with 80-ft-tall power transmission towers and then impacted terrain. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Both pilots were experienced with night operations, especially at their home airport. The pilot had conducted operations at the airport for 14 years and the copilot for 31 years, which might have led to crew complacency on the approach . Adequate visibility and moon disk illumination were available; however, the area preceding the runway is a marsh and lacks cultural lighting, which can result in black-hole conditions in which pilots may perceive the airplane to be higher than it actually is while conducting an approach visually. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot experiencing the black hole illusion which contributed to him flying an approach profile that was too low for the distance remaining to the runway. It is likely that the pilot did not maintain adequate crosscheck of his altimeter and radar altimeter during the approach and that the copilot did not monitor the airplane's progress; thus, the flight crew did not recognize that they were not maintaining a safe approach path. Further, it is likely that neither pilot used the visual glidepath indicator at the airport, which is intended to be a countermeasure against premature descent in visual conditions.
Ciro Nogueira Comercio de Motocicletas
The twin engine airplane departed Teresina on a business flight to Floriano, carrying seven passengers and one pilot, among them Ciro Nogueira, Senator of the State of Piauí and Margarete Coelho, Vice-Governor of the State of Piauí. En route to Floriano, the pilot was informed about the deterioration of the weather conditions at destination and decided to divert to Oeiras Airfield. After touchdown on runway 11 that was wet due to recent rain falls, the aircraft started to skid. Control was lost and the aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a wooded area, some 10 metres from the runway. All eight occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Supermercados Shibata
The twin engine aircraft departed Campo de Marte Airport at 1334LT on a positioning flight to Paraty, with an ETA at 1415LT. While descending to Paraty Airport, the crew encountered instrument meteorological conditions. On final, while approaching under VFR mode, the aircraft impacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located in hilly terrain few km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.
Chopaire
Shortly after takeoff in day visual meteorological conditions, when the airplane was climbing through 3,000 ft mean sea level, a complete electrical failure occurred that affected electrical instrumentation and additional airplane equipment, including the landing gear. The pilot reported that he performed the electrical failure checklists and could not restore power. After additional troubleshooting with no success, he chose to divert to and land at another airport. While in the traffic pattern at his diversion airport, he attempted to lower the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures but could not confirm the landing gear were down and locked. Without any capability to communicate or confirmation that the landing gear were down, he decided to leave the airport traffic pattern and land on a nearby field to avoid airport traffic; the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, landing gear doors, engines, and propellers during the off-airport landing. The reason for the loss of electrical power could not be determined. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the landing gear's emergency engage handle, also known as the "J" handle, was not pulled up and turned, which was one of the steps listed in the airplane flight manual for the manual landing gear extension procedure. The "J" handle engages the clutch and allows for the handle to operate the landing gear chain. Without engaging the "J" handle, the landing gear handle pumping action would not have worked, which resulted in the gear-up landing.
Absher Air
The airplane was fueled with 140 gallons of fuel before the second of three flight segments. The pilot reported that, while en route on the third segment, a fuel crossfeed light illuminated. He reset the indicator and decided to land the airplane to troubleshoot. He requested to divert to the nearest airport, which was directly beneath the airplane. Subsequently, the right engine lost power, and the autofeather system feathered the right engine propeller. He reduced power on the left engine, lowered the nose, and extended the landing gear while entering the traffic pattern. The pilot indicated that, after the landing gear was extended, the electrical system "failed," and shortly after, the left engine would not respond to power lever inputs. As the flight was on a base leg approach, the airplane was below the intended flightpath to reach the runway. The pilot stated that he pulled "gently on the control wheel"; however, the airplane impacted an embankment and came to rest on airport property, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the engines and airframe revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures on the left propeller indicated that the engine was likely producing power at the time of impact; however, actual power settings could not be conclusively determined. Signatures on the right propeller indicated that little or no power was being produced. The quantity of fuel in the airplane's fuel system, as well as the configuration of the fuel system at the time of the accident, could not be determined based on the available evidence. Although the position of the master switch (which includes the battery, generator 1, and generator 2) was found in the OFF position, the airplane had been operating for about 30 minutes when the electrical power was lost; thus, it is likely that the airplane had been operating on battery power throughout the flight. This could have been the result of the pilot's failure to activate, or his inadvertent deactivation of, the generator 1 and 2 switch. If the flight were operating on battery power, it would explain what the pilot described as an electrical system failure after the landing gear extension due to the exhaustion of the airplane's battery. The postaccident examination of the left engine and propeller revealed that the engine was likely producing some power at the time of impact, and an explanation for why the engine reportedly did not respond to the pilot's throttle movements could not be determined. Additionally, given the available evidence, the reason for the loss of power to the right engine could not be determined.
Atlântica Exportaçao e Importaçao
The twin engine airplane departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha-Carlos Drummond de Andrade Airport on a flight to Setubinha-Fazenda Sequóia Airfield, carrying one employee of the company and two pilots. Prior to takeoff, the captain informed the copilot he wanted to perform an 'American' takeoff with full engine power followed by a steep climb. After liftoff, the crew raised the landing gear then continued over the runway at low height until the end of the terrain to reach a maximum speed, then initiated a steep climb at 90°. The aircraft reached the altitude of 1,700 feet in 15 seconds then stalled and entered an uncontrolled descent. It dove into the ground and crashed in a vertical attitude into a houses located in a residential area some 800 metres from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed. One people on the ground was slightly injured.
Droguería Meta
The twin engine airplane departed Laguna del Sauce Airport on a charter flight to San Fernando Airport near Buenos Aires, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. Shortly after a night takeoff from Laguna del Sauce Airport runway 01, the aircraft entered a controlled descent and crashed in shallow water some 2 km northwest of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all 10 occupants were killed.
Remote Area Medical
According to the pilot's written statement he departed runway 05 and the airplane veered "sharply" to the right. The pilot assumed a failure of the right engine and turned to initiate a landing on runway 23. Seconds after the airplane touched down it began to veer to the left. The pilot applied power to the left engine and right rudder, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that he had failed to configure the rudder trim prior to takeoff and that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Private Venezuelan
En route from Anaco to Santa Bárbara del Zulia, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances by a wooded area located near Casigua El Cubo. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed. It is believed that the aircraft was engaged in an illegal contraband flight.
BECS LLC
On June 25, 2014, about 0750 central daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company C90A, N800MK, was substantially damaged following a runway excursion during an attempted go-around at Houston, Mississippi (M44). The commercial-rated pilot, co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured, while one passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was operated by BECS, LLC under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for corporate flight that originated at Memphis, Tennessee (MEM). According to the pilot, who was seated in the left, cockpit seat, he was at the controls and was performing a visual approach to runway 21. Just prior to touchdown, while at 90 knots and with approach flaps extended, the right wing "rose severely and tried to put the airplane into a severe left bank." He recalled that the co-pilot called "wind shear" and "go around." As he applied power, the airplane rolled left again, so he retarded the throttles and allowed the airplane to settle into the grass on the left side of runway 21. The airplane struck a ditch, spun around, and came to rest in the grass, upright. A post-crash fire ensued in the left engine area. The pilot and passengers exited the airplane using the main entry door. The pilot reported no mechanical anomalies with the airplane prior to the accident. The co-pilot reported the following. As they turned onto final, he noticed that the wind "picked up" a little by the wind sock. The final approach was stable, and as the pilot began to flare, he noticed the vertical speed indicator "pegged out." The airplane encountered an unexpected wind shear just above the runway. He called out for a go around. The pilot was doing everything he could to maintain control of the airplane. It was a "jarring" effect when they hit the shear. It felt like the wind was trying to lift the tail and cartwheel them over. He felt that the pilot did a good job of keeping the airplane from flipping over. In his 30,000-plus hours flying airplanes, he has never experienced anything quite like what they experienced with this shear. He has instructed on the King Air and does not feel that the pilot could have done anything different to avoid the accident.
Ambulancias Aéreas de Colombia
The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado Airport at 0600LT on an ambulance flight to Araracuara, State of Caquetá, carrying two doctors, one patient and two pilots. Fifteen minutes into the flight, the crew contacted ATC, reported problems and was cleared to divert to Villavicencio. On approach to Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a wooded area parallel to a road, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed.
Crane Load Technology
The pilot and two passengers were planning to fly from Rand Airport to Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in the early hours of the morning with the intention to clear customs. It was still dark and the weather forecast thunderstorms with rain for most areas of Gauteng. Rand Tower requested clearance from FAOR approach before departure. The aircraft took off from Runway 29 following the clearance given and proceeded in a westerly direction. At 6500 feet above mean sea level (AMSL), Rand handed the aircraft over to Approach for further clearances. Reported visibility at FALA was 600m and the cloud base was 600 feet AGL. The pilot then requested a VHF Omnidirectional range (VOR) Z approach for Runway 07. He started the approach at 8000 feet and approximately 14nm from LIV. At 12nm and established on Radial 245 Approach handed him over to FALA. Once in contact with FALA the pilot was advised of the heading to turn to at missed approach point (MAP). At MAP the pilot did not have the runway in sight and advised tower that they were going around. They turned left 360° and climbed to 8000 feet as instructed by FALA. FALA handed them back to Approach for repositioning for Radial 245. Approach advised the aircraft that visibility at Wonderboom was better but the pilot said if not successful they would route to Polokwane. At 12nm the aircraft was handed over to FALA. During the descent, the pilot started repeating messages more than twice. Close to MAP the pilot indicated that he had the field in sight. FALA gave them landing clearance. Soon after, the pilot said he did not have it in sight. When FALA instructed him to go around and route Polokwane, the pilot came back on frequency indicating that the aircraft was in distress. After that, the tower heard a loud bang accompanied by black smoke from behind a hangar.
Axis Jet
The commercial pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF), and the airplane transport pilot, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), were conducting an aeromedical positioning flight. The pilots reported that, during a night approach, they visually identified the airport, activated the runway lighting system, and then canceled the instrument flight plan for a visual approach. The PNF reported that, after turning onto the final approach, the flaps were fully lowered and that the airplane was in a “wings level, stabilized approach.” The PF reported that he was initially using the vertical approach slope indicator (VASI) for guidance but that the airplane drifted below the glidepath during the approach, and he did not correct back to the glidepath. On short final, the pilots verified that the landing gear were in the down-and-locked position by noting the illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights, and the airspeed indicator indicated 110 knots. Both pilots reported that the landing was “firm” and that it was followed by a loud bang and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear. The airplane slid on its belly for about 825 ft down the runway before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated the airplane, which was subsequently consumed by a postaccident fire. Both pilots reported that the airplane was operating normally with no discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the runway about 100 ft short of its displaced threshold. Broken components of the landing gear were located along the debris field, which extended about 565 ft beyond the initial impact point. It is likely that the PF's failure to correct and maintain the VASI glidepath after allowing the airplane to descend below the glidepath and the touchdown at a high descent rate resulted in a hard landing and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear.
ATA Aerolineas - Aero Transportes Araucanía
The crew departed Viña del Mar-Torquemada Airport on a positioning flight to Santiago de Chile. Shortly after takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and elected to return. On approach, both engines failed and on short final by night, the aircraft stalled and crashed 450 metres short of runway 05. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
J %26 G Aviation
As the airplane was descending toward its destination airport, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller en route that he needed to change his destination to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. The controller advised him to land at an airport that was 4 miles away. Shortly after, the pilot contacted the alternate airport’s air traffic control tower (ATCT) and reported that he was low on fuel. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land, and, about 30 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was not going to make it to the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted a field 3.25 miles southeast of the airport. One witness reported hearing the engine sputter, and another witness reported that the engine “did not sound right.” Forty-foot power lines crossed the field 311 feet from the point of impact. It is likely that the pilot was attempting to avoid the power lines during the forced landing and that the airplane then experienced an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled collision with terrain. About 1 quart of fuel was observed in each fuel tank. No evidence of fuel spillage was found on the ground; no fuel stains were observed on the undersides of the wing panels, wing trailing edges, or engine nacelles; and no fuel smell was observed at the accident site. However, the fuel totalizer showed that 123 gallons of fuel was remaining. Magnification of the annunciator panel light bulbs revealed that the left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 1 month before the accident, the pilot had instructed the fixed-base operator at Camden, Arkansas, to put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing tank; however, it is unknown how much fuel was already onboard the airplane. Although the fuel totalizer showed that the airplane had 123 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the crash, information in the fuel totalizer is based on pilot inputs, and it is likely the pilot did not update the fuel totalizer properly before the accident flight. The pilot was likely relying on the fuel totalizer instead of the fuel gauges for fuel information, and he likely reported his low fuel situation to the ATCT after the annunciator lights illuminated.
We Fly
The airplane was equipped with two main fuel tanks (132 usable gallons each) and two nacelle fuel tanks (60 usable gallons each). In normal operation, fuel from each nacelle tank is supplied to its respective engine, and fuel is automatically transferred from each main tank to its respective nacelle tank. While at the airplane's home airport, the pilot noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full, and he believed that the main tanks had fuel sufficient for 30 minutes of flight. The pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. Thirty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank; they were not topped off. The airplane, with two passengers, then flew to an interim stop about 45 miles away, where a third passenger boarded. The airplane then flew to its destination, another 165 miles away. The pilot reported that, at the destination airport, he noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full; he surmised that the main fuel tanks were not empty but did not note the actual quantity of fuel. Forty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank. Again, the main tanks were not topped off, and the pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. The return flight to the interim stop was uneventful. The third passenger deplaned there, and the airplane departed for its home airport. While on final approach to the home airport, both engines stopped developing power, and the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field about 1.2 miles short of the runway. The pilot later reported that, at the time of the power loss, the fuel quantity gauges indicated that there was still fuel remaining in the airplane. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all four fuel tanks were devoid of fuel. The examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies, including fuel leaks, that would have precluded continued flight. The airplane manufacturer conducted fuel-consumption calculations for each of the two city pairs. Because the pilot did not provide any information regarding flight routes, altitudes, speeds, or times for any of the flight segments, the manufacturer's calculations were based on direct routing in zero-wind conditions, nominal airplane and engine performance, and assumed cruise altitudes and speeds. Although the results are valid for these input parameters, variations in any of the input parameters can significantly affect the calculated fuel requirements. As a result, although the manufacturer's calculations indicated that the round trip would have burned less fuel than the total available fuel quantity that was derived from the pilot-provided information, the lack of any definitive information regarding the actual flight parameters limited the utility of the calculated value and the comparison. The manufacturer's calculations indicated that the accident flight leg (from the interim airport to the home airport) would have consumed about 28.5 gallons total. Given that the airplane was devoid of fuel at the accident site, the pilot likely departed the interim airport with significantly less than the manufacturer's minimum allowable departure fuel quantity of about 39.5 gallons per side. The lack of any observed preimpact mechanical problems with the airplane, combined with the lack of objective or independently substantiated fuel quantity information, indicates that the airplane's fuel exhaustion was due to the pilot's inadequate and improper pre- and inflight fuel planning and procedures.
Aircraft Guaranty Corporation Trustee
The pilot and two passengers departed Sarlat-Domme Airport for a training mission over the region of Bordeaux. A precision approach was completed at Bordeaux-Mérignac Airport followed by a go-around procedure. The IFR flight plan was closed and the pilot continued under VFR mode to Bordeaux-Léognan-Saucats Aerodrome where he landed. A passenger deplaned, the engine remained running and the aircraft took off few minutes later to Bergerac where a refueling was planned. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The pilot reduced his altitude, selected gear down and attempted and emergency landing in a vineyard. Upon landing, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Sauo Aero Services
The lineman who spoke with the pilot/owner of the accident airplane before its departure reported that the pilot stated that he and the flight instructor were going out to practice for about an hour. The flight instructor had given the pilot/owner his initial instruction in the airplane and flew with the pilot/owner regularly. The flight instructor had also given the pilot/owner about 58 hours of dual instruction in the accident airplane. The pilot/owner had accumulated about 51 hours of pilot-in-command time in the airplane make and model. It is likely that the pilot/owner was the pilot flying. Several witnesses reported observing the accident sequence. One witness reported seeing the airplane pull up into vertical flight, bank left, rotate nose down, and then impact the ground. One witness reported observing the airplane go from east to west, turn sharply, and then go north of the runway. He subsequently saw the airplane hit the ground. One witness, who was a pilot, stated that he observed the airplane enter a left bank and then a nose-down attitude of about 75 degrees at an altitude of about 300 feet above ground level, which was too low to recover. It is likely that the pilot was attempting a go-around and pitched up the airplane excessively and subsequently lost control, which resulted in the airplane impacting flat desert terrain about 100 feet north of the active runway at about the midfield point in a steep nose-down, left-wing-low attitude. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact forces and thermal damage. All components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, an examination of both propellers revealed rotational scoring and twisting of the blades consistent with there being power during the impact sequence. No anomalies were noted with either propeller that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicological testing of the pilot was negative for drugs and alcohol. The flight instructor’s toxicology report revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Given the elevated levels of metabolite in the urine and kidney, the absence of quantifiable THC in the urine, and the low level of THC in the kidney and liver, it is likely that the flight instructor most recently used marijuana at least several hours before the accident. However, the effects of marijuana use on the flight instructor’s judgment and performance at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the flight instructor’s personal medical records indicated that he had a number of medical conditions that would have been grounds for denying his airman medical certificate. The ongoing treatment of his conditions with more than one sedating benzodiazepine, including oxazepam, simultaneously would also likely not have been allowed. However, none of the prescribed, actively sedating medications were found in the flight instructor’s tissues, and oxazepam was only found in the urine, which suggests that the flight instructor used the medication many hours and possibly several days before the accident. The toxicology findings indicate that the flight instructor likely did not experience any impairment from the benzodiazepine medication itself; however, the cognitive effects from the underlying mood disturbance could not be determined.
Z. Air Investimentos e Participações
The twin engine aircraft departed Maringá Airport at 1837LT on a flight to São Paulo, carrying four passengers and one pilot. 35 minutes into the flight, about five minutes after he reached its assigned altitude of 21,000 feet, the aircraft stalled and entered an uncontrolled descent. The pilot was unable to regain control, the aircraft partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a flat attitude in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.
Oneal Aviation
During the cross-country instrument flight rules flight, the pilot was in contact with air traffic control personnel. The controller cleared the airplane to flight level 210 and gave the pilot permission to deviate east of the airplane's route to avoid weather and traffic. A review of radar data showed the airplane heading southward away from the departure airport and climbing to an altitude of about 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned north, and the controller queried the pilot about the turn; however, he did not respond. The airplane wreckage was located on ranch land with sections of the airplane's outer wing, engines, elevators, and vertical and horizontal stabilizers separated from the fuselage and scattered in several directions, which is consistent with an in-flight breakup before impact with terrain. A review of the weather information for the airplane's route of flight showed widely scattered thunderstorms and a southerly surface wind of 30 knots with gusts to 40 knots. An AIRMET active at the time advised of moderate turbulence below flight level 180. Three pilot reports made within 50 miles of the accident site indicated moderate turbulence and mountain wave activity. An assessment of the humidity and freezing level noted the potential for clear, light-mixed, or rime icing between 10,700 and 17,300 feet msl. Postaccident airplane examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airframe and engines that would have precluded normal operation. It's likely the airplane encountered heavy to extreme turbulence and icing conditions during the flight, which led to the pilot’s loss of control of the airplane and its subsequent in-flight breakup.
Direct Aviation
The aircraft collided with a fence and a ditch when it overran runway 8R (2,272 feet by 38 feet, asphalt) while landing at the Sylvania Airport (C89), Sturtevant, Wisconsin. The commercial pilot was not injured and his passenger received minor injuries. The airplane sustained damage to its fuselage and both wings. The airplane was registered to Direct Action Aviation LLC, and was operated by Skydive Midwest. The accident flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a flight plan. The flight originated from the Jackson County Airport-Reynolds Field (JXN), Jackson, Michigan, about 1800. The pilot reported that the landing approach was normal and when the airplane crossed the runway threshold it floated and he pulled the engine power levers to the stops. He stated that although he did not remember the airplane bouncing, his passenger told him that it had. He pulled the power levers to reverse, but there was no immediate reverse thrust. He applied brakes and felt the airplane accelerate. He recognized that he would not be able to stop the airplane on the remaining runway and attempted to steer it to the north. The airplane left the runway, impacted two ditches and came to rest on a highway. The pilot stated that he should have recognized that braking action would be significantly reduced with the possibility of hydroplaning, that pulling the power levers to the stops before touchdown induced a lag in realization of reverse thrust, and that he should have executed a go-around when the airplane floated before landing. The pilot reported no mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane. At 1853, weather conditions reported at the Kenosha regional Airport (ENW), located 6 miles south of the accident site, included heavy rain.
Finolex Industries
The crew was completing a local training mission at Lohegaon Airport. On final approach to runway 28, the aircraft impacted ground, teared off several runway lights and came to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Safety Profile
Reliability
Reliable
This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.
