Superior Aviation

Swearingen SA226 Metro II

The flight was following a heavy jet on landing approach. The crew agreed to fly the approach at a slightly higher altitude than normal to avoid any possible wake turbulence. The first officer, who was flying the airplane, called for the landing gear to be lowered. When the captain placed the gear handle in the DOWN position, he noted red IN-TRANSIT lights. He recycled the landing gear, but got the same result. He consulted the emergency checklist and thought he had manually extended the landing gear because he "heard the normal 'clunk feel' and airspeed started to decay." In addition, when power was reduced to FLIGHT IDLE, the GEAR UNSAFE warning horn did not sound. The first officer agreed, noting 2,000 pounds of hydraulic pressure. The airplane landed wheels up. Propeller blade fragments penetrated the fuselage, breaching the pressure vessel. Postaccident examination revealed the nose gear had been partially extended but the main landing gear was retracted. The crew said the GEAR UNSAFE indication had been a recurring problem with the airplane. The problem had previously been attributed to a frozen squat switch in the wheel well.

Swearingen SA226 Metro II

The airplane was destroyed on impact with trees and terrain after takeoff. A post-impact fire ensued. A courier stated that he put 14 cases and 5 bags into the airplane and that "everything took place as it normally does." A witness stated, "I heard a very low flying aircraft come directly over my house. ... It sounded very revved up like a chainsaw cutting through a tree at high speed." The accident airplane's radar returns, as depicted on a chart, exhibited a horseshoe shaped flight path. That chart showed that the airplane made a left climbing turn to a maximum altitude of 2,479 feet. That chart showed the airplane in a descending left turn after that maximum recorded altitude was attained. The operator reported the pilot had flown about 75 hours in the same make and model airplane and had flown about 190 hours in the last 90 days. The weather was: Wind 090 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 1 statute mile; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast 200 feet; temperature 9 degrees C; dew point 9 degrees C. No pre-impact engine anomalies were found. NTSB's Materials Laboratory Division examined the annunciator panel and recovered light assemblies and stated, "Item '29' was a light assembly with an identification cover indicating that it was the '[Right-hand] AC BUS' light. Examination of the filaments in the two installed bulbs revealed that one had been stretched, deformed and fractured and the other had been stretched and deformed." The airplane manufacturer stated that the airplane's left-hand and right-hand attitude gyros are powered by the 115-volt alternating current essential bus. Two inverters are installed and one inverter is used at a time as selected by the inverter select switch. The inverter select switch is located on the right hand switch panel. The airplane was not equipped with a backup attitude gyro and was not required to be equipped with one. The airplane was certified with a minimum flight crew of one pilot. Subsequent to the accident, the operator transitioned "from the single pilot operation of our Fairchild Metroliner to the inclusion of a First Officer."

Cessna 404 Titan

The pilot was departing from Lansing, Michigan, when he reported engine problems. The aircraft subsequently lost power to both engines. Fuel receipts were found that indicate that the aircraft was serviced with 25 gallons of jet fuel in each wing tank. No preexisting anomalies were found with regard to the aircraft or its systems. An FAA inspector interviewed the person that had fueled the aircraft and that person stated he had used a JET-A fuel truck to fuel the accident aircraft. The inspector also interviewed the safety director of the company that provided the fueling service. The safety director told the inspector that the fuel truck used to fuel the accident aircraft was found to have a small nozzle installed on one of the hoses and not the wide nozzle used on jet fueling trucks. He also said that, '...the small nozzle was used for the purpose of fueling tugs at the airport and that the small nozzles were immediately removed from all jet refueling trucks so that this could not happen again.'

Swearingen SA226 Metro II

During a landing approach, the pilot noted that the right engine remained at a high power setting, when he moved the power levers to reduce power. He executed a missed approach and had difficulty keeping the airplane straight and level. The pilot maneuvered for a second approach to land. After landing, he could not maintain directional control of the airplane and tried to go around, but the airplane went off the end of the runway and impacted the localizer antenna. The pilot did not advise ATC of the problem nor did he declare an emergency. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated that for a power plant control malfunction, the affected engine should be shut down, and a single engine landing should be made. The power control cable was found disconnected from the anchoring point. A safety tab was broken off the housing, allowing it to unscrew. About one month before the accident, maintenance had been performed on the right engine to correct a discrepancy about the right engine power lever being stiff. The mechanic re-rigged the right engine power cable.

Cessna 404 Titan

The pilot said that during the landing approach, the flight visibility was inadequate for landing, and he aborted the landing. Witnesses observed the airplane touchdown long and fast, then it entered fog that shrouded the runway. Subsequently, the airplane collided with trees, then impacted on marshland about 70 feet below the runway elevation. No mechanical anomalies were found with the airplane or engines that would prevent flight. On the day before the accident, the pilot's duty day began at 0500. He had a 9-hour rest period (during the day) that did not involve any sleep. The pilot said that after work on the day before the accident, he arrived home about 2300. His wife said he awoke about 0230 on the accident date, then he returned to bed and arose between 0430 and 0500, departing for work about 0530. During his regular duty day rest period, the pilot would drive a total of 4 hours to and from his home each day. The pilot said he would generally get to bed about 2300 to 2330, arising about 0430 each work day. Also, he said he needed between 6 and 8 hours of sleep at night.

Cessna 441 Conquest

During the takeoff roll on runway 30R, the MD-82, N954U, collided with the Cessna 441, N441KM, which was positioned on the runway waiting for takeoff clearance. The pilot of the Cessna acted on an apparently preconceived idea that he would use his arrival runway, runway 30R, for departure. After receiving taxi clearance to back-taxi into position and hold on runway 31, the pilot taxied into a position at an intersection on runway 30R, which was the assigned departure runway for the MD-82. The ATIS current at the time the Cessna pilot was operating in the Lambert-St. Louis area listed runways 30R and 30L as the active runways for arrivals and departures; there was no mention of the occasional use of runway 31. Air traffic control personnel were not able to maintain visual contact with the Cessna after it taxied from the well lighted ramp area into the runway/taxiway environment of the northeast portion of the airport. An operational ASDE-3, particularly ASDE-3 enhanced with AMASS, could be used to supplement visual scan of the northeast portion of the airport.

Cessna 402

The pilot received numerous weather briefings/updates before takeoff, which included two pilot reports of windshear by aircraft on the approach into Appleton. Shortly after takeoff convective sigmet 1E was transmitted by the radar controller on the same frequency he was working N87163. This sigmet called for embedded thunderstorms. About 10 minutes later, while being vectored for the approach into Appleton, the pilot was given heading deviations because of weather. The aircraft crashed 1/2 mile from the approach end of the runway. A witness whose residence is located between the OM and MM for the ILS approach reported a 'huge downpour' with 'very strong winds' at the time of the accident. Wreckage examination revealed that all power controls for both engines were in the full forward position, and that the left and right main landing gear mounting trunnions were displaced upward into the wing fuel tanks. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.