Socata TBM-850
Safety Rating
9.9/10Total Incidents
12
Total Fatalities
10
Incident History
N965DM LLC
On October 2, 2020, about 1145 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700, N965DM, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Corfu, New York. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was topped off with 173 gallons of Jet A fuel prior to the first flight of the day on October 2, 2020. The first flight departed Buffalo Niagara International Airport (BUF), Buffalo, New York, at 0747 and landed at Manchester Airport (MHT), Manchester, NH, at 0914. According to personnel at a fixed based operator (FBO) at MHT, the passenger boarded the airplane and it departed without obtaining any services there. Preliminary radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration indicated the airplane departed from Runway 6 at MHT at 1019, and initiated a climbing left turn to the west. The airplane climbed to a cruise altitude of FL280 and remained at that altitude until about 1142. According to a review of air traffic control voice communication data, the pilot did not check in with the Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center during a routine handoff from one controller to another. The pilot subsequently re-established communication with a radar controller about 15 miles east of BUF, while still flying at FL280, and requested the ILS runway 23 approach into BUF. The controller instructed the pilot to descend to 8,000 ft, to expect the ILS runway 23 approach, and asked him if everything was okay, to which the pilot responded, “yes sir, everything’s fine.” Subsequently, the controller observed the airplane descending rapidly on radar and instructed the pilot to stop the descent at 10,000 ft. The pilot did not respond. The controller made several additional attempts to establish communications with the pilot, however, there were no further communications received from the pilot. Over the final 3 minutes of the flight, as the airplane descend from FL280, it accelerated from its previously established cruise groundspeed of 250 knots. As the airplane descended through 15,200 feet, it’s radar-derived groundspeed rose to more than 340 knots, and its estimated descent rate was 13,800 feet per minute. The airplane made one right 360° turn before radar contact was lost. According to several witnesses who heard the airplane shortly before the accident, the engine sounded very loud before they heard the sounds of impact. The airplane was located in a heavily wooded, swampy area. The airplane was fragmented and a postcrash fire ensued after the impact. Wreckage and components of the airplane were recovered from the surface of the terrain to a depth 15 ft below the surface. The smell of Jet A aviation fuel was noted at the accident site by first responders.
MT Margaret
The pilot reported that, during the approach and while the airplane was about 500 ft above ground level and 81 knots, he "felt the descent rate increase significantly." The pilot increased engine power, but "the high rate of descent continued," and he then increased the engine power further. A slow left roll developed, and he applied full right aileron and full right rudder to arrest the left roll. He also reduced the engine power, and the left roll stopped. The pilot regained control of the airplane, but the airplane's heading was 45° left of the runway heading, and the airplane impacted trees and then terrain. The airplane caught fire, and the pilot and passenger exited through the emergency exit. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the windscreens and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Oso Rio
The pilot of the turbine-powered airplane reported that, while landing in a gusting crosswind, it was "obvious" the wind had changed directions. He performed a go-around, but "the wind slammed [the airplane] to the ground extremely hard." Subsequently, the airplane veered to the right off the runway and then back to the left before coming to rest. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 270° at 19 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The pilot landed on runway 20.
TBM 850 536
The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, during cruise flight at 6,000 ft mean sea level, he observed a crew alerting system oil pressure message, followed by a total loss of engine power. An air traffic controller provided vectors to a local airport; however, the pilot reported that the airplane would not reach the runway. He did not attempt to restart the engine. He feathered the propeller and placed the power lever to "idle" and the condition lever to "cut off." The pilot subsequently attempted a forced landing to a sports field with the gear and flaps retracted. The airplane collided with trees and the ground and then came to rest upright. Examination of the engine revealed that it displayed contact signatures to its internal components and evidence of ingested unburned organic debris, consistent with the engine likely being unpowered and the engine gas generator and power sections wind-milling at the time of impact. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies or malfunctions to any of the engine components was found that would have precluded normal operation. Recorded GPS flight track and systems data showed that the loss of engine power was preceded by about 5 minutes of flight on a constant heading and altitude with an excessive lateral g force of about 0.17 g and a bank angle between about 8 and 10 degrees, consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The airplane then entered a right turn with the autopilot engaged, and it lost power at the end of the turn. The data indicated that, even though the autopilot was engaged, the lateral g forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was not engaged. Given that the yaw damper system operated normally after the flight, it is likely that the pilot inadvertently and unknowingly disengaged the yaw damper during flight with the autopilot engaged. During a postaccident interview, the pilot stated that he was not aware of a side-slip condition before the loss of engine power. Although the fuel tank system was designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it was not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of engine power. If the pilot had recognized the side-slip condition, he could have returned to coordinated flight and prevented the engine power loss. Also, once the airplane returned to coordinated flight, an engine restart would have been possible.
Aircraft Guaranty Corporation Trustee
On an ILS Z approach to Clermont-Ferrand-Auvergne Airport Runway 26 in IMC conditions, the pilot was instructed by ATC to climb to 6,000 feet to TIS VOR via a right turn because he failed to follow the published missed approach procedures. The single engine aircraft departed the approach path and control was lost after it completed several turns on climb and descent. It entered a high nose-down attitude and struck the ground at high speed about 6 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants aged respectively 70, 73 and 76 years old were killed. They were completing an intermediate stop at Clermont-Ferrand Airport to pick up two additional passengers before continuing to Biarritz.
Lorenzo Girones
The privately owned SOCATA TBM 700N (registration C-FBKK, serial number 621) departed from Ottawa/Carp Airport, Ontario, on an instrument flight rules flight plan to Goderich, Ontario. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot and sole occupant altered the destination to Wiarton, Ontario. Air traffic control cleared the aircraft to climb to flight level 260 (FL260). The aircraft continued climb through FL260 and entered a right hand turn, which quickly developed into a spiral dive. At approximately 1219 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft struck the ground and was destroyed. Small fires broke out and consumed some sections of the aircraft. The pilot was fatally injured. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter on board the aircraft was damaged and its signal was not sensed by the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT) system.
Green Plane
During cruise flight, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that the airplane was having engine fuel pressure problems. The controller advised the pilot of available airports for landing if necessary and asked the pilot's intentions. The pilot chose to continue the flight. GPS data recorded by an onboard avionics system indicated that the engine had momentarily lost total power about 20 seconds before the pilot reported a problem to the controller. About 7 minutes later, when the airplane was about 7,000 feet above ground level, the engine lost total power again, and power was not restored for the remainder of the flight. The pilot attempted to glide to an airport about 10 miles away, but the airplane crashed in a field about 3 miles from the airport. GPS data showed a loss of fuel pressure before each of the engine power losses and prolonged lateral g forces consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The rudder trim tab was found displaced to the left about 3/8 inch. Flight testing and recorded flight data revealed that the rudder trim tab displacement was consistent with that required to achieve no side slip during a typical climb segment. The GPS and flight data indicated that the lateral g-forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was either not engaged or not operating. The recorded data indicated autopilot system engagement, which should have automatically engaged the yaw damper system. However, the data indicated the yaw damper was not engaged; the yaw damper could have subsequently been turned off by several means not recorded by the avionics system. Testing of the manual electric rudder (yaw) trim system revealed no anomalies, indicating that the pilot would have still been able to trim the airplane using the manual system. It is likely that the pilot's failure to properly trim the airplane's rudder led to a prolonged uncoordinated flight condition. Although the fuel tank system is designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it is not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of fuel pressure and engine power. The propeller and propeller controls were not in the feathered position, thus the windmilling propeller would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide portion of the flight. The glide airspeed used by the pilot was 20 knots below the airspeed recommended by the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and the reduced airspeed also would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide. The flight and GPS data indicated that the airplane had a gliding range of about 16 nautical miles from the altitude where the final loss of engine power occurred; however, the glide performance was dependent on several factors, including feathering the propeller and maintaining the proper airspeed, neither of which the pilot did. Although the POH did not contain maximum range glide performance data with a windmilling propeller, based on the available information, it is likely that the airplane could have glided to the alternate airport about 10 miles away if the pilot had followed the proper procedures.
Urschel Air
The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach and was clear of clouds about 650 feet above ground level when he proceeded visually to the airport. About 1/2 mile from the runway, he thought the airplane was too high, but a few seconds later the airplane felt like it had an excessive rate of descent. His attempts to arrest the rate of descent were unsuccessful, and the left main landing gear struck the ground about 120 feet prior to the runway threshold. The recorded data downloaded from the airplane's non-volatile memory showed that the airplane's airspeed varied from about 71 - 81 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) during the 10 seconds prior to ground impact. The data also indicated that there was about a 3 - 5 knot tailwind during the final landing approach. The airplane's stall speed with the airplane in the landing configuration with landing flaps was 64 knots IAS at maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or system failure of the airplane.
Tahoe Investments
During the flight, the instrument-rated private pilot was monitoring the weather at his intended destination. He noted the weather and runway conditions and decided to conduct a global-positioning-system instrument approach to a known closed runway with the intention of circling to a different runway. As the airplane neared the missed approach point, the pilot established visual contact with the airport's runway environment and canceled his instrument flight rules clearance. As he entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for his intended runway, the pilot noticed that the first part of the runway was covered in fog and that the visibility was 0.75 of a mile with light snow. With at least 5,000 feet of clear runway, he opted to land just beyond the fog. Prior to touchdown, the pilot concluded that there was not enough runway length left to make a landing and performed a go-around by applying power, pitching up, and retracting the landing gear. During the go-around, the pilot focused outside the airplane cockpit but had no horizon reference in the dark night conditions. He heard the stall warning and realized that the aircraft was not climbing. The pilot pitched the nose down and observed only snow and trees ahead. Not being able to climb over the trees, the airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain, coming to rest upright in a wooded, snow-covered field. The pilot stated that there were no anomalies with the engine or airframe that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.
Angel Flight Central
The private pilot arrived at the accident airport as part of an Angel Flight volunteer program to provide transportation of a passenger who had undergone medical treatment at a local hospital. About 0937, the airplane landed on runway 30 (3,900 feet by 150 feet) with winds from 073-080 degrees and 5-6 knots, which continued to increase due to an atmospheric pressure gradient. The pilot met the passengers and departed the terminal about 1003, with winds at 101-103 degrees and 23-36 knots. About 1005 the airplane was near the approach end of runway 30 with wind from 089-096 degrees and 21-31 knots. The pilot stated that he began rotating the airplane about 3,000 feet down the runway. About 1006, the airplane was approximately 3,553 feet down the runway while flying about 30 feet above the runway. The airplane experienced an aerodynamic stall, and the left wing dropped before it impacted the ground. No mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane were noted during the investigation. The fatally injured passenger, who had received medical treatment, was 2 years and 10 months of age at the time of the accident. She was held by her mother during the flight, as she had been on previous Angel Flights, but was otherwise unrestrained. According to 14 CFR 91.107(3), each person on board a U.S.-registered civil aircraft must occupy an approved seat with a safety belt properly secured during takeoff, and only unrestrained children who are under the age of 2 may be held by a restrained adult. Although the accident was survivable (both the pilot and the adult passenger survived with non-life-threatening injuries), an autopsy performed on the child revealed that the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head.
Safety Profile
Reliability
Reliable
This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.
