Saab 340

FlyBe

The aircraft had been prepared for a Commercial Air Transport flight from Stornoway Airport to Glasgow Airport with 26 passengers and three crew on board; the commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). At 0825 hrs the aircraft was taxied towards Holding Point A1 for a departure from Runway 18. At 0832 hrs G-LGNL was cleared to enter the runway from Holding Point A1 and take off, and the ATC controller transmitted that the surface wind was from 270° at 27 kt. The commander commented to the co-pilot that the wind was across the runway and that there was no tailwind. As the aircraft taxied onto the runway, the co-pilot applied almost full right aileron input consistent with a cross-wind from the right, and the commander said to the co-pilot “charlie1, one hundred, strong wind from the right”. The commander advanced the power levers, the co-pilot said “autocoarsen high” and the engine torques increased symmetrically. The commander instructed the co-pilot to “set takeoff power” to which the co-pilot replied “apr armed”. Approximately one second after this call, the engine torques began to increase symmetrically, reaching 100% as the aircraft accelerated through 70 kt. During the early stages of the takeoff, left rudder was applied and the aircraft maintained an approximately constant heading. As the aircraft continued accelerating, the rudder was centralised, after which there was a small heading change to the left, then to the right, then a rapid heading change to the left causing the aircraft to deviate to the left of the runway centreline. The pilot applied right rudder but although the aircraft changed heading to the right in response, it did not alter the aircraft’s track significantly and the aircraft skidded to the left, departing the runway surface onto the grass at an IAS of 80 kt. The power levers remained at full power as the aircraft crossed a disused runway and back onto grass. During this period the nose landing gear collapsed before the aircraft came to a halt approximately 38 m left of the edge of the runway and 250 m from where it first left the paved surface. After the aircraft came to a halt, the captain saw that the propellers were still turning and so called into the cabin for the passengers to remain seated. One of the passengers shouted for someone to open the emergency exit but the cabin crew member instructed the passengers not to do so because the propellers were still turning. The co-pilot observed that the right propeller was still turning so operated the engine fire extinguishers to shut down both engines. When the passenger seated in the emergency exit row on the right of the aircraft saw that the right propeller had stopped, he decided to open the exit. He climbed out onto the wing and helped the remaining passengers leave the aircraft through the same exit, instructing them to slide off the rear of the wing onto the ground. The left propeller was still turning at the time the right over-wing exit was opened and the passenger seated in the left-side emergency exit row decided not to open the left exit. The crash alarm was activated by ATC at 0833 hrs. An aircraft accident was declared and the aerodrome emergency plan was put into action. When the Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) arrived at the scene, passengers were still exiting the aircraft and the left propeller was still turning. After leaving the aircraft, the cabin crew member confirmed to the RFFS that all passengers had exited the cabin and had been accounted for outside. The passengers were taken to the fire station and then on to the passenger terminal. There were no injuries.

Nok mini

Following an uneventful flight from Chiang Mai, the crew completed the landing on runway 30 at Udon Thani Airport. The aircraft vacated runway and was taxiing when control was lost. The airplane veered to the right, entered a soft grassy area, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All 28 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sky Bahamas

On Thursday June 13, 2013 at approximately 1750UTC (1:50pm local time), a fixed wing, twin turboprop regional airliner, was involved in an accident as a result of a runway excursion while landing during heavy rain showers at Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft, a SAAB 340B aircraft was operated by SkyBahamas Airlines and bore Bahamas registration C6-SBJ, serial number 316. C6-SBJ departed Fort Lauderdale Int’l Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida in the USA as Tropical Sky 9561. The airline, SkyBahamas Airline is a Bahamas Air Operator Certificate Holder with approved scheduled operations to and from Fort Lauderdale International Airport, Florida USA (KFLL) and Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco in the Bahamas. The crew received weather information and IFR route clearance from KFLL Control Tower. This passenger carrying flight departed KFLL at 1706UTC (1:06pm local) on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The point of intended landing was Marsh Harbor International Airport, Abaco, Bahamas (MYAM). The crew selected runway 09 at MYAM for landing. At 17:45:30, the aircraft leveled off at 1,500 feet ASL on a heading of 096 degrees magnetic, with airspeed of 236 knots indicated (KIAS). The flaps were extended to 15 degrees at 17:47:18 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 4.2 nm on the approach. The autopilot was disconnected at 17:47:26 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 3.8 nm on the approach. Heading was 097 degrees magnetic and airspeed was 166 KIAS. The Landing Gear was extended and in the down and locked position by 17:48:01 as the aircraft descended through 730 feet ASL. At 17:48:03, the flaps were extended to landing flap 20 degrees with the aircraft approximately 1.9 nm from the runway on the approach. At 17:48:47, as the aircraft approached the threshold, the power levers were retarded (from 52 degrees) and the engine torques decreased from approximately 20%. Approximately one second later, the aircraft crossed the threshold at a radio altitude of 50 feet AGL on a heading 098 degrees magnetic and airspeed of 171 KIAS. The crew encountered rain showers and a reduction in visibility. The aircraft initially touched down at 17:49:02 with a recorded vertical load factor of +2.16G, approximately 14 seconds after crossing the threshold. There were no indications on the runway to indicate where the initial touchdown had occurred. Upon initial landing however, the aircraft bounced and became airborne, reaching a calculated maximum height of approximately 15 feet AGL. The aircraft bounced a second time at 17:49:07 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.19* G. During this second bounce, the pitch attitude was 1.8 degrees nose down, heading 102 degrees magnetic and airspeed 106 KIAS. The aircraft made consecutive contact with the runway approximately three times. The third and final bounce occurred at 17:49:14 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.66G*. During the third bounce, the pitch attitude was 2.2 degrees nose down, heading 099 degrees magnetic and airspeed 98 KIAS. As a result of the hard touchdown, damage was sustained to the right wing and right hand engine/propeller. The right hand engine parameters recorded a rapid loss of power with decreasing engine speed and torque, and subsequent propeller stoppage. The aircraft veered off to the right at approximate time of 17:49:20 on a heading of 131 degrees magnetic at a point approximately 6,044 feet from the threshold of runway 09. The recorded airspeed was 44 KIAS with the left hand engine torque at 26 % and the right hand engine torque at 0%. The aircraft came to a full stop at approximate time 17:49:25 on a heading of 231 degrees magnetic. When the aircraft came to a stop, the flight and cabin crew and twenty-one (21) passengers evacuated the aircraft. The evacuation was uneventful using the main entrance door. Due to the damage sustained by the right wing and engine, evacuation on the right side was not considered. The evacuation occurred during heavy rainfall. No injuries were reported as a result of the accident or evacuation process. The airplane sustained substantial damage as a result of the impact sequence. The elevation of the accident site was reported as approximately 10 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) uncovered that this crew used no crew resource management or adherence to company standard operating procedures. During the final seconds of the flight, there was complete confusion on the flight deck as to who was in control of the aircraft. After failure of the windshield wiper on the left side of the aircraft, the captain continued to maneuver the aircraft despite having no visual contact of the field due to heavy rain. Sterile Cockpit procedures were not adhered to by this crew as they continued with non-essential conversation throughout the flight regime from engine start up in KFLL up until the “before landing checklist” was requested prior to landing.

SOL Lineas Aéreas

While taxiing to runway 18 for a departure to Neuquén, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off taxiway to the left and rolled onto a soft ground four about 40 metres before coming to rest. The nose gear sank in soft ground, causing both propeller blades to struck the ground and to be partially torn off. The fuselage was hit by debris. All 33 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

SOL Lineas Aéreas

On 18 May 2011, the pilot in command (PIC) and the crew - composed of the copilot (COP) and cabin crew members (CCM) - initiated the flight OSL5428 from Rosario International Airport (ROS) in the province of Santa Fe at 20:35, the final destination being the Comodoro Rivadavia International Airport (CRD), in the province of Chubut. The flight had scheduled intermediate stopovers at Córdoba International Airport (COR), Mendoza (MDZ), and Neuquén (NQN), according to the company's plans. The company designated aircraft Saab 340A, with registration number LV-CEJ, for the flight. After having made the intermediate stopovers in Córdoba (COR) and Mendoza (MDZ), the pilot landed the aircraft at the airport in Neuquén at 22:20. After refuelling and carrying out the planned dispatch, the crew and 19 passengers (18 adults and one minor) on board, prepared to make the last leg of the flight OSL5428, from Neuquén Airport (NQN) to the final destination: Comodoro Rivadavia International Airport (CRD). The flight took off at 23:05. After the take-off, the aircraft started to climb AWY T 105, to reach FL190, in accordance with the flight plan. After flying for 24 minutes, the pilot levelled the aircraft at 17,800 feet, and remained at this level for approximately 9 minutes. Due to the fact that the meteorological conditions at this level caused icing, the technical crew descended to FL (flight level) 140. Shifting to FL140 took five minutes. During this stage of the flight the icing conditions steadily worsened. By the time the aircraft had reached FL140, the icing conditions were severe. The aircraft flew for approximately two minutes with a straight and level flight attitude, increasing the accumulation of ice. Then the aircraft completely lost lift, which resulted in a loss of control, and the subsequent entry into abnormal flight attitude. The aircraft plunged towards the earth and impacted the ground, which resulted in a fire. Everyone on board perished and the aircraft was destroyed. The accident happened at night under IMC conditions.

Sky Bahamas

Two crew took place in the cockpit to prepare the aircraft for a scheduled commercial service to Marsh Harbour. In unknown circumstances, all three landing gear retracted, causing the aircraft to fall on the ground. Both occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is unknown if the retraction of the undercarriage was the consequence of a mechanical failure or a mishandling from the crew.

First Kuwaiti General Trading %26 Contracting Company

While taxiing at Kuwait City Airport, preparing for a flight to Beirut, the twin engine aircraft collided with a vehicle, causing serious damages to the right wing. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

United Express

During the approach, the flightcrew was unable to get the right main landing gear extended and locked. After several attempts, while conferring with the checklist and company personnel, the flightcrew performed an emergency landing with the unsafe landing gear indication. During the landing, the right main landing gear slowly collapsed, and the airplane came to rest off the right side of the runway. Examination of the right main landing gear revealed that the retract actuator fitting was secured with two fasteners, a smaller bolt, and a larger bolt. The nut and cotter key were not recovered with the smaller bolt, and 8 of the 12 threads on the smaller bolt were stripped consistent with an overstress pulling of the nut away from the bolt. The larger bolt was bent and separated near the head, consistent with a tension and overstress separation as a result of the smaller bolt failure. The overstress failures were consistent with the right main landing gear not being locked in the extended position when aircraft weight was applied; however, examination of the right main landing gear down lock system could not determine any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Further, the right main landing gear retract actuator was tomography scanned, and no anomalies were noted. The unit was then functionally tested at the manufacturer's facility, under the supervision of an FAA inspector. The unit tested successfully, with no anomalies noted.

AeroLitoral

While descending to Tijuana-General Abelardo L. Rodríguez Airport in good weather conditions, the crew informed ATC about the failure of both engines. The captain attempted an emergency landing in an open field located in the Las Palmas Valley, about 24 km from Tijuana Airport. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres and came to rest. All 32 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

American Eagle

The captain was the flying pilot for the night landing on runway 01 in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), with a right cross wind from 110 degrees at 14 gusting 18 knots, drizzle, and a wet runway. Prior to starting the approach, the flightcrew determined that the landing approach speed (Vref) and the approach speed (Vapp) were 122 and 128 knots, respectively. DFDR data showed the airplane flying on autopilot as it passed the middle marker at 200 feet AGL at 130 knots on the ILS approach. Approximately 3 seconds after the first officer called "runway in sight twelve o'clock," the captain disconnected the autopilot, while at a radio altitude of 132 feet and on a heading of approximately 18 degrees. Within approximately 11 seconds after the autopilot disconnect, the glideslope and localizer deviation increased. The first officer called "runway over there." Approximately 5 seconds before touchdown, the airplane rolled right, then left, then right. DFDR data-based performance calculations showed the airplane crossed the threshold at an altitude of 35 feet and 130 knots. The airplane touched down 2,802 feet from the approach end of the 5,495-foot runway (844- foot displaced threshold) at 125 knots on a heading of 10 degrees. The airplane overran the runway and struck a ditch 175 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. Landing roll calculations showed a ground roll of 2,693 feet after touchdown, consisting of 1,016 feet ground roll before braking was initiated and 1,677 feet ground roll after braking was initiated until the airplane exited the pavement. According to Saab, for a wet runway, the aircraft would have needed 1,989 feet from the time of braking initiation to come to a complete stop. The American Eagle Airlines, Inc., FAA approved aircraft operating manual (AOM), states in part: Stabilized approaches are essential when landing on contaminated runways. Landing under adverse weather conditions, the desired touch-down point is still 1,000 feet from the approach end of the runway. Touchdown at the planned point. Cross the threshold at Vapp, then bleed off speed to land approximately Vref -5. Use reverse, if needed. To achieve maximum braking effect on wet runway, apply maximum and steady brake pressure. In 1992, the City of Killeen submitted a proposal that included extending the north end of runway 01 by 194 feet. The FAA originally disapproved the proposal, in part, because the runway extension decreased the length of the runway safety area (RSA) which was already shorter than the recommended 1,000 feet for a 14 CFR Part 139 certificated airport. The proposal was subsequently approved and a drainage ditch was installed in the north RSA, perpendicular to the runway and approximately 175 feet north of the departure end of runway 01. In 1993, the airport received FAA Part 139 certification. The 1998 and 1999, FAA airport certification inspection reports noted the inadequate RSA; however, neither letter of correction, sent from the FAA to the City of Killeen following the inspections, mentioned the RSA. Following this accident, the ILS runway 01 was flight checked by the FAA and all components were found to be operating within prescribed tolerances. Examination of the airplane found no anomalies that would have prevented it from operating per design prior to departing the runway and encountering the ditch.

Crossair

Aircraft HB-AKK had landed in Zurich on 10 January 2000 as Crossair flight CRX 842 from Guernsey and reached stand F74 at 16:00 UTC, which is located near to the threshold of runway 28. The aircraft was then prepared for the next flight at this stand. According to statements from the Swissport ground personnel the preparation of the aircraft took place without any special occurrence. During its time on the ground, the aircraft was supplied with electric power by a ground power unit (GPU). An air-conditioning truck was not used and the aircraft was not de-iced. The crew prepared for the flight using the computer-aided briefing system. The following description of the history of the flight was reconstructed with the help of recordings from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), digital flight data recorder (DFDR), voice radio communications and ATC radar (cf. Annex 1). According to the available recordings, the commander, as planned by the crew, was pilot flying (PF) and the first officer was pilot non flying (PNF) throughout the flight. At 16:39:14 UTC, flight CRX 498 to Dresden received from clearance delivery (DEL) the following ATC-clearance: "runway two eight, Dresden, Zurich East One Yankee Departure, squawk three zero zero four". The crew was then instructed to change to the apron (APR) frequency. Permission to start engines was given at 16:45:00 UTC by APR. At 16:49:22 UTC the first officer signaled readiness to taxi to APR. While the crew waited for taxi clearance, a few points of the taxi checklist were performed. At 16:50:30 UTC APR cleared flight CRX 498 to follow a Swissair Airbus A320 (SWR 014) to the holding position of runway 28. In accordance with this clearance, CRX 498 started to move. The flight crew performed the outstanding items on the taxi checklist and contacted the tower (TWR), which gave line-up clearance at 16:52:36 UTC. Take-off clearance was given at 16:54:00 UTC: "Crossair four nine eight, wind three zero zero degrees, three knots, cleared take-off runway two eight". According to the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) at 16:50 UTC the following meteorological conditions existed: wind 290° at 2 knots, visibility 6 km in drizzle, broken, cloud base at 500 feet above ground level, temperature 2 °C, dew point 1 °C, QNH 1032 hPa. The aircraft began its take-off roll at 16:54:10 UTC in darkness. The landing lights were on and the flaps were fully retracted. After take-off at 16:54:31 UTC the landing gear was retracted. Then, on the commander's order, the flight director (FD) was switched on and the NAV mode was armed. Both pilots confirmed that the long range navigation system number 1 (LRN 1) was following the track (LRN 1 captured). The commander controlled the aircraft in a stable climb with a pitch of 15° attitude nose up (ANU) and a speed of 136 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). For the remaining flight, the autopilot was never engaged. Since the cloud base was indicated as 500 ft above ground level (AGL), it can be assumed that the aircraft, once above an altitude of approx. 1900 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The initial flight path, at a heading of 276°, followed the centre line of the runway. After the request from TWR, CRX 498 switched to the departure control frequency (DEP) at 16:55:07 UTC. The radar recording then showed a deviation in the flight path by 5° to the south. However, this slight deviation was reduced before waypoint DME 2.1 KLO was reached by initiating a right turn. At 16:55:15 UTC flight CRX 498 was cleared to climb to flight level 110. At 16:55:39 UTC, Zurich departure issued the instruction to turn to VOR ZUE: "four nine eight, turn left to Zurich East". The first officer confirmed by radio: "turning left to Zurich East, Crossair four niner eight". At the same time the aircraft reached waypoint DME 2.1 KLO. At this point the departure procedure ZUE1Y specifies a left turn, in order to capture and follow radial 255 of VOR KLO. At 16:55:45 the bank angle to the left reached a maximum of 16.9° on a compass heading of 270°. At 16:55:47 UTC the first officer informed the commander that the LRN system was programmed from the present position to ZUE: "from present, LRN is to Zurich East, yeah". The commander confirmed with: "checked". The left turn instruction from DEP was not mentioned. After the aircraft had remained briefly at a 16° bank angle to the left, it began to roll to the right. From 16:55:47 UTC the bank angle rate amounted to 3°/s to the right. In this phase the first officer was very busy carrying out the orders routinely issued by the commander ("CTOT/APR off, yaw damper on, bleed air on"). All relevant flight parameters in this phase indicated a stable climb with a pitch of 13-14° ANU. The communication being conducted internally did not give any indication of difficulties of any kind. At 16:55:55 UTC, at a bank angle of 8.4° to the right, the bank angle rate increased and the nose of the aircraft began to drop from 14.2° to 10.8° ANU. At 16:56:00 UTC the right bank angle attained a value of 31.0°, when the commander gave the order to set climb power: "set climb power". The first officer confirmed with a whispered "coming" and began to set the climb power – a procedure which takes quite some time. Between 16:56:03 UTC and 16:56:10 UTC the commander stabilized the bank angle to the right between 39° and 42° by corresponding flight control inputs. The pitch reduced further and stabilized at a value of 1° ANU at 16:56:06 UTC as a result of corresponding elevator inputs for four seconds. As a consequence, the trajectory reached its maximum altitude of 4720 ft AMSL. According to information from the crew of the preceding flight SWR 014 the cloud top at that time was approx. 5000 ft AMSL. The speed of the aircraft involved in the accident increased to 158 KIAS. 16:56:10 UTC marked the beginning of a nine-second period which was characterized by destabilization of the attitude. It featured uncoordinated deflections of the ailerons to the left and right. Meanwhile, the elevator remained practically in the neutral position. Since the rightward deflections of the aileron were dominant, the bank angle increased from 42° to 80° to the right. Given the neutral position of the elevator, because of the high bank angle the pitch increased to 25° attitude nose down (AND). The aircraft therefore quickly lost altitude and its speed increased to 207 KIAS. At 16:56:12 UTC the first officer made the commander aware that they should turn left to ZUE: "turning left to Zurich East, we should left". At 16:56:15 UTC, at a bank angle of 65.8° to the right, the commander muttered unclearly: "ohna-na". Three seconds later at 16:56:18 UTC, DEP requested confirmation that the aircraft was turning to the left: "Crossair four nine eight, confirm you are turning left". The first officer responded immediately: "moment please, standby". DEP then instructed the crew to continue the right turn: "ok, continue right to Zurich East." In the final phase of flight, beginning at 16:56:20 UTC, the aircraft went into a spiral dive. As a result of massive aileron deflections, the aircraft attained a maximum bank angle of 137° to the right. The engines still provided high power, since setting of climb power had not yet been terminated. At a speed of 250 KIAS the over speed warning horn sounded. At 16:56:24 UTC the first officer vigorously warned the commander to turn left: "turning left, left, left, left... left!" At the end of the data recording at 16:56:25 UTC the aircraft still exhibited a bank angle of 76° to the right. The nose of the aircraft had dropped to 63° AND at an air speed of 285 KIAS. Several witnesses observed the aircraft breaking out of the clouds in a steep descent and performing a right turn. At 16:56:27.2 UTC the aircraft crashed in an open field near Au, Nassenwil, ZH. None of the three crew members and seven passengers survived the impact.

Formosa Airlines

When the crew boarded the aircraft in Hsinchu for the flight to Kaohsiung it had been a long and demanding day for the captain who was to fly the aircraft. He had been on duty more than 11 hours and performed nine flights. The accident flight, which was planned to be his last flight of the day, was to take place in darkness. The weather was above minima but IMC. During the pre-flight check the crew noted a failure in the RH Main Bus. This caused a number of systems to be unavailable, a.o.: the autopilot, the left hand EFIS, LH/RH Flight Director, LH RMI, EFIS Comparators, and the no. 2 engine anti-ice start bleed valve being open (as a result of this, the ITT on this engine was approximately 15°C higher than normal at selected power on this engine). Despite the fact that, according to the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), taking off for a flight with any of the Main Buses inoperative was not allowed, the captain decided to continue. During taxi to runway 05 the aircraft was cleared for a Chunan One (CN1) departure. The aircraft took off at 19:29:09. Because of the autopilot was not available, the captain now had to fly manually. In addition, the flying had to be performed without support from the yaw-damper that was also inoperative as a result of the RH Main Bus failure. This means that more active rudder control was required, while the DFDR-data shows that such input was not made. The more than 30°C ITT-split between the engines, of which approximately 15°C was caused by the RH Engine Anti-ice Start Bleed Valve being open, did have little effect on the behavior of the aircraft in the initial start-sequence. But when the crew, 30 seconds after lift off, disengaged CTOT and started to manually adjust the RH PLA downwards, possibly to get equal ITT in the engines, this ended up in a torque-split of more than 13% between the engines, with the RH engine being lower in torque. This asymmetry tended to yaw and roll the aircraft to the right and required higher aileron input than normal to the left in order to keep the aircraft at a constant bank angle. Normally the flaps are retracted at around 1,000 feet during initial climb. In this flight the flap retraction was not initiated until the first officer was reading the Climb Check List in which the flap position should be checked and verified. Flap retraction was done just prior to the aircraft reaching VFE15 (175 KIAS, which is the maximum allowed speed with flaps extended). When the climb power was set, a symmetric PLA change was made. However, due to the earlier RH Power Lever Angle (PLA) pull in combination with the normal backlash in the power lever cables between the PLA and the HMU, the RH engine torque was decreased while the LH engine torque remained unchanged. Hence, a torque split occurred. This resulted in an increased aerodynamic asymmetry giving a force tending to yaw and bank the aircraft to the right. Consequently, still more aileron input was required in order to maintain a correct bank angle. Because the behavior of the aircraft was very different from what the captain was used to, the need for continuous manual flying under IMC-conditions may have totally occupied his capacity. This could also explain why, during this phase of flight, he did not observe the aircraft starting a turn to the right 78 seconds after take off instead of continuing the left turn for a heading of 260. At about this same time, and for no obvious reasons, the positive rate of climb decreased and the aircraft leveled out at approximately 2,000 feet for a short time instead of continuing the climb to its assigned altitude of 3,000 feet. The captain's actions could be interpreted as signs that he might have been suffering from fatigue or spatial disorientation. It is difficult to determine if the F/O was aware of the captain's deviation from the cleared departure route. All indications point to the fact that he was not aware or that he out of respect for the captain did not report of the deviations. For example, the F/O transmitted back to Taipei Approach 114 seconds after takeoff, "Left 230, Bravo 12255," while at the same time the aircraft was in a right turn with a 21 degree right bank, passing through a heading of 312 degrees. In fact, his primary means for monitoring the flight were very limited due to dark, IMC-conditions since his EFIS instruments were black or flagged. This could also explain why the captain did not receive any support from the F/O about the flight becoming more and more uncontrolled. Not until 124 seconds after takeoff and 37 seconds prior to the last DFDR-recording did the captain state that he was having a problem with the heading and asked for help with the magnetic compass. At that time the aircraft was in a 24° right bank and 10° pitch up position and had a heading and roll rate by one degree per second. From that moment a continuous decrease in pitch angle was recorded down to -65,4° just prior to the impact. Just 19 seconds before the last DFDR-recording, with a heading of 022 and a bank angle of 36° to the right, the captain said "Ask for a radar vector." At this moment, he also initiates a short aileron input to the right, further increasing the bank angle. The other crewmembers did not answer or give any notable response to the captain's request for help with the magnetic compass. The reason might be that they also were very confused about the situation and unable to take any relevant action. When the captain, 14 seconds before the last DFDR-recording, said "Wah Sei!!! Everything is wrong." the aircraft was in a 8,4° pitch down and the right bank angle was 47,5°. Finally, only 10 seconds before the last data point was recorded, the first officer responds by asking "Sir, shall we look at this one? ". Pitch down was then 15,8° and the right roll angle 71,7°. In the last part of the flight the pitch and bank angles were at extreme values not to be experienced in normal operation. At this stage of the flight, the control inputs recorded are rapid aileron inputs to the right that further increased the adverse attitudes. The aircraft was then totally uncontrolled and the airspeed and sink rate increased dramatically. Four seconds before impact the Vmo warning started. The aircraft then crashed into the sea.

Regional Lineas Aéreas

Because of construction works on runway 35, the threshold at Porto was displaced by 760 metres. This was published in a Notam but during the flight preparation at Madrid-Barajas Airport, the crew was not informed about this notice. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared to descent and received instructions for a landing on runway 35 but no information about the displaced threshold. On final approach, the controller realized that the aircraft was approaching too low and instructed the crew to 'overshoot please'. The crew did not react to this instruction and continued the approach when the aircraft undershot the displaced threshold and landed in the construction area. It struck several trenches which caused the undercarriage to be torn off and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. All 37 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

KLM Cityhopper

After take off from runway 24, the aircraft followed a VALKO departure as cleared by Air Traffic Control (ATC) . During climb, passing flight level 165 (FL165), the Master Warning was triggered by the right engine oil pressure Central Warning Panel (CWP) light. The Captain slowly retarded the right hand power lever to flight idle and called for the emergency checklist. After completion of the emergency checklist procedure, the right hand engine oil pressure CWP light was still on and the Captain decided to return to Amsterdam . The right hand engine remained in flight idle during the remainder of the flight. While returning to Amsterdam, the flight was radar vectored by ATC for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach on runway 06 . After passing approximately 200 feet height, the aircraft became displaced to the right of the runway and a go around was initiated. During the go around, control of the aircraft was lost and, at 12 :46 UTC, the aircraft hit the ground, in a slight nose low attitude with approximately 80° bank to the right, approximately 560 meters right from the runway 06 centerline, just outside the airport. Two passengers and the Captain died in the accident; eight passengers and the First Officer (FO) were seriously injured.

Express Airlines

During the approach, the 1st officer (FO) asked the captain if he wanted to '...pop the boots?' to remove ice off the wings. The capt responded '...it's going to the hangar. I'll run'em on the ground...' The FO retarded power over the threshold and the sink rate increased; the capt observed 900 fpm. The FO applied additional back pressure on the yoke, but it was inadequate to arrest the high sink rate. Additional back pressure was applied, and the stall horn sounded followed shortly thereafter by the captain stating 'I got it.' During the hard landing the right main landing gear broke, the fuel tank ruptured, and the right wing rear spar bent upward. Aprx 18 hrs after the accident, 3/16 inch of rime mixed with clear ice was observed on the leading edges of the wing, horizontal stab, and vertical stab. The ice had finger-like protrusions positioned vertically to the wing surfaces. The company's line ops manual does not discuss flight characteristics or landing techniques specific to wing ice. Neither pilot had received company's current crm training.