McDonnell Douglas MD-83
Safety Rating
7/10Total Incidents
14
Total Fatalities
420
Incident History
World Atlantic Airlines
World Atlantic Airlines flight WL261, a, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, was descending towards Miami, Florida, when it encountered turbulence. One cabin crew member sustained serious injuries. A convective Sigmet was active for the area at the time of the accident.
Caspian Airlines
On Jan. 27, 2020, at 03:12 UTC Caspian Airlines (CPN) Flight 6936, an MD83, EP-CPZ took off from Mehrabad International Airport and climbed to FL320 as final cruising level. At about 03:45:37 UTC, the aircraft was flying according to the flight plan route on Airway B417 at an assigned FL320. Due to another traffic departing flight, an A320, IRA356 from Abadan Airport (OIAA) to destination Mashhad International Airport (OIMM), the ACC controller issued direct routing to the flight CPN 6936 position GODMO. At 03:49:34 UTC, CPN6936 requested descent clearance, so the flight was cleared to FL100. At 03:52:30 UTC, the pilot called Mahshahr AFISO and reported position 50 nm inbound GODMO and estimated time over GODMO at 03:59 UTC. At 03:52:51 UTC, Mahshahr AFISO reported necessary information as below: "RWY active is 31; wind is now 280/08kts, CAVOK, temperature +06, DP 04 and QNH 1023, expected VOR approach RWY 31 via GODMO 1E ARRIVAL" At 03:53: 33 UTC, the pilot requested RWY 13 and Mahshahr AFISO performed VOR/DME approach RWY 13, via GODMO 1F arrival. At 03:59:39 UTC, the pilot reported, “we are approaching position GODMO in contact with destination Mahshahr.” At 04:00:41UTC, the pilot reported his position “GODMO” to Mahshahr AFISO. At 04:02:46 UTC, the pilot reported leaving of IAF and received landing clearance for RWY13. Finally, at 04:06:11 UTC, the aircraft landed on RWY 13, passed two-thirds of RWY length and ran off the end of runway13 after landing at Mahshahr Airport at 04:06 UTC, Khuzestan province. The accident flight was being operated on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan in a Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). The main door of the accident aircraft was opened in emergency condition, but the slide skid did not operate automatically. The cabin floor was just too close to the ground (grass surface) due to the impact of the nose and main landing gears strut which were broken after the runway overrun. The evacuation was performed from the main door, and all 136 passengers and 8 crew members disembarked.
Bravo Airways
On June 14, 2018, according to the flight assignment, BAY 4406 charter flight en-route Antalya - Kyiv (Zhulyany) on MD-83 aircraft, state and registration number UR-CPR of Bravo Airways, was operated by PIC, co-pilot and five flight attendants. According to PIC’s Statement, the flight was delayed by 6 hours (departure time - 03:30 pm.) The Investigation Team did not establish the departure time from Antalya Airport. According to the PIC, the crew arrived at the airport at 02:00 pm. The takeoff time was 03:41 pm. The airline said the flight was delayed because of the aircraft non-arrival. Bravo Airways is the aircraft operator responsible for the flight and technical operation of the aircraft, maintaining its airworthiness and ensuring the flight safety. The Pilot Flying duties were performed by the PIC, and the Pilot Monitoring was the co-pilot. In accordance with the flight assignment, the PIC cross checked the copilot. According to his Statement, the flight preparation of the crew was carried out one and a half hours before the actual departure at Antalya Airport (PIC received aeronautical and meteorological information from a representative of Turkish Ground Services), after which, the PIC took a decision to perform the flight. Climb and level flight were performed in a normal mode. Landing approach was carried out to RW08 in the conditions of thunderstorm activity with ILS system. At 05:40 pm, at landing on the aerodrome of the Kyiv International Airport (Zhulyany) (hereinafter – Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome), during the landing run, at the distance of 1260 m from the entrance threshold, the aircraft suffered a runway excursion to the left of the air strip and stopped outside the cleared and graded area of the air strip at the distance of 123 m from the runway center line (according to the tire footprints at the occurrence site.) As a result of the accident, the aircraft has sustained substantial damage, in particular, to the structural elements. None of passengers or crew members received serious injuries.
World Atlantic Airlines
The airplane suffered a right main landing gear collapse during landing at the destination airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right lower wing skin when it contacted the runway after the landing gear collapse. The crew stopped the airplane on the runway and an emergency evacuation was performed through three of the four doors on the airplane. The escape slide at the left forward door did not deploy or inflate due to the depletion of the gas charge in the reservoir. The reservoir depleted due to a leak in the valve assembly and was not caught during multiple inspections since installation of the slide assembly in the airplane. The landing gear cylinder fractured under normal landing loads due to the presence of a fatigue crack on the forward side of the cylinder in an area subject to an AD inspection for cracks. The most recent AD inspection of the cylinder was performed 218 landings prior when the fatigue crack was large enough to be detectable. A previous AD inspection performed 497 landings prior to the accident also did not detect the crack that would have been marginally detectable at the time.
Ameristar Jet Charter
A McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration N786TW, suffered a runway excursion following an aborted takeoff from runway 23L at Detroit-Willow Run Airport, Michigan, USA. The aircraft had been chartered by the University of Michigan Basketball team for a flight to a game in Washington, DC. The flight crew prepared for take-off and calculated V-speeds (V1, VR, V2) using "Normal Thrust Takeoff", a 10 kts headwind, and a take-off weight of 146,600 lbs. The V-speeds for this configuration were 139 kts, 142 kts, and 150 kts, respectively. However, the flight crew chose to increase VR to 150 kts to allow for more control during take-off in the presence of windshear. During takeoff roll, at 14:51:56 (about 3,000 ft down the runway) and about 138 kts of airspeed, the control column was pulled back slightly from a non-dimensional value of -7 to -5.52. The airplane’s left elevator followed the control input and moved from a position of -15° trailing edge down to -13° trailing edge down. The right elevator did not change and stayed at approximately -16° trailing edge down. At 14:52:01 a large control column input was made (151 kts and 4100 ft down the runway) to a non-dimensional 18.5 and the left elevator moves to a position near 15° trailing edge up. After 14:52:05 the right elevator moves to -13° trailing edge down, but no more. The airplane does not respond in pitch and does not rotate. The captain decided to abort the takeoff. The maximum ground speed was 163 kts (173 kts airspeed) and the airplane began to decelerate as soon as the brakes were applied at 14:52:08. Spoilers were deployed at 14:52:10 and thrust reversers were deployed between 14:52:13 and 14:52:15. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway. The airplane’s ground speed was 100 kts when it left the paved surface. The aircraft overran the end of the runway, damaged approach lights, went through the perimeter fence and crossed Tyler Road. It came to rest on grassy terrain, 345 meters past the end of the runway, with the rear fuselage across a ditch. The nose landing gear had collapsed. Runway 23L is a 7543 ft long runway.
Zagros Airlines
Following an uneventful flight from Isfahan, the crew initiated the approach to Mashhad Airport by night and poor weather conditions with low visibility due to snow falls. After touchdown on runway 31R, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems. The aircraft skidded then veered off runway to th left, lost its both main undercarriage and came to rest 55 metres to the left of the runway, some 1,311 metres from the runway threshold. All 162 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Swiftair
The Swiftair MD-83 was performing flight AH5017 on behalf of Air Algérie (this regular schedule is performed four times a week). The aircraft left Ouagadougou at 0117Z and was attempting to land in Algiers at 0510LT but failed to arrive. 116 people (110 passengers and a crew of 6) were on board. The last position of the MD-83 was west of Gao, Mali. In the evening of July 24 (some 16 hours after the aircraft disappearance), the wreckage was eventually located and spotted some 50 km west of the city of Gossi, south Mali. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and no survivors was found among the 116 occupants. At the time of the accident, bad weather conditions with storm activity, winds, turbulence and icing was confirmed over the region of Gao, until an altitude of 40,000 feet. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was flying west of this marginal weather area and referring to the French BEA graphic, the aircraft did not properly get around this turbulent area. It was confirmed the aircraft started a left turn from the altitude of 31,000 feet and then spiraled to the ground in less than three minutes (140° bank left and 80° nose down until impact). The last position recorded by the FDR at 0147LT and 15 seconds was at the altitude of 1,600 feet (490 meters) and at a speed of 380 KIAS (740 km/h) with a very high rate of descent.
Dana Air
On 3rd June, 2012 at about 1545:00hrs, 5N-RAM, a Boeing MD-83, a domestic scheduled commercial flight, operated by Dana Airlines (Nig.) Limited as flight 0992 (DANACO 0992), crashed into a densely populated area of Iju-Ishaga, a suburb of Lagos, following engine number 1 loss of power seventeen minutes into the flight and engine number 2 loss of power while on final approach to Murtala Muhammed Airport Lagos, Nigeria. Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. All 153 persons onboard the airplane, including the six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire. The flight originated at Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). The airplane was on the fourth flight segment of the day, consisting of two round-trips between Lagos and Abuja. The accident occurred during the return leg of the second trip. DANACO 0992 was on final approach to runway 18R at LOS when the crew declared a Mayday call “Dual Engine Failure – negative response from the throttles.” According to records, the flight arrived ABV as Dana Air flight 0993 at about 1350:00hrs and routine turn-around activities were carried out. DANACO 0992 initiated engine start up at 1436:00hrs. Abuja Control Tower cleared the aircraft to taxi to the holding point of runway 04. En-route ATC clearance was passed on to DANACO 0992 on approaching holding point of runway 04. According to the ATC ground recorder transcript, the aircraft was cleared to line-up on runway 04 and wait, but the crew requested for some time before lining-up. DANACO 0992 was airborne at 1458:00hrs after reporting a fuel endurance of 3 hours 30 minutes. The aircraft made contact with Lagos Area Control Centre at 1518:00hrs and reported 1545:00hrs as the estimated time of arrival at LOS at cruising altitude of 26,000 ft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retained about 30 minutes 53 seconds of the flight and started recording at 1513:44hrs by which time the Captain and First Officer (F/O) were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. However, they did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight. The flight crew continued to monitor the condition and became increasingly concerned as the flight transitioned through the initial descent from cruise altitude at 1522:00hrs and the subsequent approach phase. DANACO 0992 reported passing 18,100ft and 7,700ft, at 1530:00hrs and 1540:00hrs respectively. After receiving radar vectors in heading and altitude from the Controller, the aircraft was issued the final heading to intercept the final approach course for runway 18R. According to CVR transcript, at 1527:30hrs the F/O advised the Captain to use runway 18R for landing and the request was made at 1531:49hrs and subsequently approved by the Radar Controller. The crew accordingly changed the decision height to correspond with runway 18R. At 1531:12hrs, the crew confirmed that there was no throttle response on the left engine and subsequently the Captain took over control as Pilot Flying (PF) at 1531:27hrs. The flight was however continued towards Lagos with no declaration of any distress message. With the confirmation of throttle response on the right engine, the engine anti-ice, ignition and bleed-air were all switched off. At 1532:05hrs, the crew observed the loss of thrust in No.1 Engine of the aircraft. During the period between 1537:00hrs and 1541:00hrs, the flight crew engaged in prelanding tasks including deployment of the slats, and extension of the flaps and landing gears. At 1541:46hrs the First Officer inquired, "both engines coming up?" and the Captain replied “negative” at 1541:48hrs. The flight crew subsequently discussed and agreed to declare an emergency. At 1542:10hrs, DANACO 0992 radioed an emergency distress call indicating "dual engine failure . . . negative response from throttle." At 1542:35hrs, the flight crew lowered the flaps further and continued with the approach and discussed landing alternatively on runway 18L. At 1542:45hrs, the Captain reported the runway in sight and instructed the F/O to retract the flaps and four seconds later to retract the landing gears. At 1543:27hrs, the Captain informed the F/O, "we just lost everything, we lost an engine. I lost both engines". During the next 25 seconds until the end of the CVR recording, the flight crew attempted to recover engine power without reference to any Checklist. The airplane crashed into a densely populated residential area about 5.8 miles north of LOS. The airplane wreckage was approximately on the extended centreline of runway 18R, with the main wreckage concentrated at N 06o 40.310’ E 003o 18.837' coordinates, with elevation of 177ft. During the impact sequence, the airplane struck an uncompleted building, two trees and three other buildings. The wreckage was confined in a small area, with the separated tail section and engines located at the beginning of the debris trail. The airplane was mostly consumed by post crash fire. The tail section, both engines and portions of both wings representing only about 15% of the airplane, were recovered from the accident site for further examination.
Swiftair
On Tuesday, 24 January 2012, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration EC-JJS and operated by Swiftair, took off from the Dubai Airport (United Arab Emirates) at 02:08 UTC on a scheduled flight to the Kandahar Airport (Afghanistan). Its callsign was SWT094 and there were 86 passengers (one of them a company mechanic), three flight attendants and two cockpit crew onboard. Swiftair, S.A. was operating this regularly scheduled passenger flight under an ACMI arrangement with the South African company Gryphon Airlines. The crew was picked up at its usual hotel in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah (United Arab Emirates) at 21:00. The airplane was parked in the Ras al-Khaimah airport and had to be flown empty to the Dubai Airport. This flight departed at 00:20 UTC en route to Dubai. Once there, an agent for Gryphon Airlines gave the crew the documentation for the flight to Kandahar. They went through customs at the Dubai Airport, boarded the passengers and the cargo and refueled the airplane with enough fuel to make the return the flight, a typical practice so as to avoid refueling in Kandahar. The airplane took off from runway 30R at the Dubai Airport at 02:08 on standard instrument departure RIKET2D and climbed to flight level FL290. The first officer was the pilot flying. At 03:42, while over SERKA, they were transferred to Kabul control, which instructed them to descend to FL280. The crew reported its ISAF callsign (ISF39RT) to this ATS station, which allowed the aircraft to fly over Afghan airspace, and entered the new stipulated squawk code. Kabul Control instructed the crew to follow some radar vectors that took them to point SODAS, where they were transferred to Kandahar Control at 03:46. The crew reduced the airspeed to 250 kt above this point. Kandahar Control cleared them for an RNAV (GPS) approach to runway 05, providing a direct vector to point FALOD (the IAF), and to descend to 6,000 ft. The weather information provided on the ATIS “F” broadcast was runway in use 05, wind from 060º at 17 kt gusting to 24 kt, visibility 1,200 m, scattered clouds at 2,700 ft and broken clouds at 3,000 ft, temperature 1 ºC, dewpoint -7 ºC and QNH 30.06 in Hg (1,018 mbar). This information was practically the same as that radioed to the crew by the Kandahar control tower a few minutes before landing: wind from 060 at 15 kt gusting to 21 kt. They reached point FALOD (IAF) under cloud cover (and thus in IMC conditions). They did not exit the clouds until 1,500 ft before minimums which, for this approach, according to the associated chart, was an altitude of 3,700 ft, or 394 ft AGL. They established visual contact with the runway 500 ft above minimums and noted that they were a little right of the runway centerline. Since the captain had more operational experience at the destination airfield, he decided to take over the controls and fly the last phase of the approach maneuver. The PAPI was out of service, meaning that in final approach they only had visual references to the runway and over the ground. During short final they corrected the deviation from the runway centerline by adjusting their path from right to left. They landed at 03:58. During the flare, the crew noticed the airplane was shifting to the left, threatening to take them off the runway, as a result of which the captain applied a right roll angle. This caused the right wing tip to strike the ground before the wheels made contact with the ground. The captain regarded the maneuver as a hard landing, although the first officer thought they might have struck the runway. The autopilot was engaged until visual contact was established with the runway and the auto-throttle until the landing. On exiting the runway, the airport control tower personnel (who had witnessed the contact with the ground) ordered the crew to stop and informed them of the damage they had seen during the landing. They dispatched the emergency services (firefighters), which forced them to turn off their engines. Once it was confirmed that there was no fuel leak or damage to the wheels or brakes, they allowed the crew to restart the engines and proceed to the stand. The wing made contact with the ground some 20 m prior to the threshold, resulting in five threshold lights being destroyed by the aircraft and in damage to the aircraft’s right wing. According to the crew’s statement, the passengers were not really aware of the contact between the wing and the ground and they were subsequently disembarked normally.
AtlasJet Airlines
The aircraft departed Istanbul-Atatürk Airport at 0051LT on a schedule service to Isparta, carrying 50 passengers and 7 crew members. After being cleared to proceed to a VOR/DME approach to Isparta Airport runway 05, the crew was supposed to fly over IPT VOR then to follow a 223° heading. But the crew failed to input the arrival procedures in the FMS and started the approach by night over rising terrain. As the EGPWS failed to activate, the crew did not realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a mountainous area located near Çukurören, about 12 km west of Isparta Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 57 occupants were killed.
AMC Airlines - Aircraft Maintenance Company
En route from Hurghada to Warsaw, while cruising over Turkey, the crew contacted ATC and reported electrical and hydraulic problems. The crew was cleared to divert to Istanbul-Atatürk Airport for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest near the ILS antenna after both main gears collapsed. All 163 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
AeroRepública
After landing at Cali-Alfonso Bonilla Aragón Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to decelerate properly. It overrun the runway 19 (which is 9,842 feet long), lost its undercarriage, collided with the perimeter fence and came to rest on its belly. Six passengers were slightly injured while all other occupants escaped unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Alaska Airlines
On January 31, 2000, about 1621 Pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines, Inc., flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 261 was operating as a scheduled international passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz International Airport, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop planned at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Korean Air
On approach to Pohang Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and strong winds. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure and started a second approach few minutes later. On approach to runway 10, the wind component changed and the crew continued the descent with a 20 knots tailwind. At an excessive speed of 158 knots, the aircraft landed 1,500 feet past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 10 is 7,000 feet long), overran, struck a 3 metres high embankment and came to rest in a ravine, broken in two. All 156 occupants were rescued, among them 60 passengers were injured, two seriously.
Safety Profile
Reliability
Reliable
This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.
