Grumman G-21A Goose

Paul C. Ehlen

The airline transport pilot was repositioning the airplane to an airport near the owner's summer home. The airplane was not maintained for instrument flight, and the pilot had diverted the day before the accident due to weather. On the day of the accident, the pilot departed for the destination, but returned shortly after due to weather. After waiting for the weather conditions to improve, the pilot departed again that afternoon, and refueled the airplane at an intermediate airport before continuing toward the destination. The route of flight followed a highway that traversed a mountain pass. A witness located along the highway stated that he saw the accident airplane traveling northbound toward the mountain pass, below the overcast cloud layer. He also stated that the mountain pass was obscured, and he could see a thunderstorm developing toward the west, which was moving east toward the pass. A second witness, located near the accident site, saw the airplane descend vertically from the base of the clouds while spinning in a level attitude and impact the ground. The second witness reported that it was snowing and that the visibility was about ¼ mile at the time of the accident. The airplane impacted terrain in a level attitude, and was consumed by a postcrash fire. Examination of the flight controls, airframe, and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of aircraft control upon encountering instrument meteorological conditions. The airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack and entered a flat spin at low altitude, resulting in an uncontrolled descent and impact with terrain.

Triple S Aviation

On 27 February 2011, at approximately 12:12:20 UTC, a mechanic working on McKinnon G-21G, registration mark N221AG, called the operational telephone line of Al Ain International Airport tower and informed the Aerodrome Controller (ADC) that the Aircraft would depart that evening. The Aerodrome Controller requested the estimated time of departure (ETD) and the mechanic stated that the departure would not be before 1400 outbound to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The ADC asked if the flight crew were still planning to perform a test flight before departure to the planned destination. The mechanic answered that they have not flown the Aircraft for a while and they want to stay in the pattern to make sure everything is “okay” prior to departure on the cleared route. The ADC advised that they could expect a clearance to operate in the circuit until they were ready to depart. The mechanic advised that there would be no need land, they only wished to stay in the circuit and to go straight from there towards the cleared route. The ADC asked the mechanic about the Aircraft type, the mechanic answered that it is Grumman Goose equipped with turbine engines and it would be heading back to the United States for an autopilot installation and annual inspection and “everything”. The mechanic commented to the ADC that the Aircraft was unique in the world with the modifications that it had. At 13:53:15, the ADC contacted the mechanic and requested an ETD update. The mechanic advised that there would be a further one-hour delay due to waiting for fuel. A witness, who is an instructor at the flight academy where the Aircraft was parked, stated that he had formed the impression that the maintenance personnel “…looked stressed out and they were obviously behind schedule and were trying to depart as soon as possible for the test flight so everything would go as planned and they could depart to Riyadh the same evening”. At approximately 14:10, the Aircraft was pushed out of the hangar, and the two mechanics moved luggage from inside the hangar and loaded it onboard the Aircraft. The mechanics also loaded a bladder extra fuel tank onboard and placed it in the cabin next to the main passenger door. At 14:17, the Aircraft was fueled with 1,898 liters of Jet-A1 which was 563 liters less than the 650 USG (2,461 liters) requested by the crew. At approximately 15:00, and after performing exterior checks, the male, 28 year old pilot in command (PIC), and another male, 61 years old pilot boarded the Aircraft and occupied the cockpit left and right seats, respectively. The two mechanics occupied the two first row passenger seats. The PIC and the other pilot were seen by hangar personnel using torchlights while following checklists and completing some paperwork. At 15:44:48, the PIC contacted the Airport Ground Movement Controller (GMC) on the 129.15 MHz radio frequency in order to check the functionality of the two Aircraft radios. Both checks were satisfactory as advised by the GMC. Thereafter, and while the Aircraft was still on the hangar ramp, the PIC informed the GMC that he was ready to copy the IFR clearance to Riyadh. The GMC queried if the Aircraft was going to perform local circuits and then pick up the IFR flight plan to the destination. The PIC replied that he would like to make one circuit in the pattern, if available, then to [perform] low approach and from there he (the PIC) would be able to accept the clearance to destination. The GMC acknowledged the PIC’s request and advised him to expect a left closed circuit not above two thousand feet and to standby for a clearance. The PIC read back this information correctly. At 15:48:58, the GMC gave engine start clearance and, at 15:50:46, the PIC reported engine start and requested taxi clearance at 15:52:16. The GMC cleared the Aircraft to taxi to the holding point of Runway (RWY) 19. The GMC advised, again, to expect a left hand (LH) closed circuit not above two thousand feet VFR and to request IFR clearance from the tower once airborne. The GMC instructed the squawk as 3776, which was also read back correctly. At 15:55:13, the PIC requested a three-minute delay on the ramp. The GMC acknowledged and instructed the crew to contact the tower once the Aircraft was ready to taxi. At 15:56:03, the PIC called the GMC and requested taxi clearance; he was recleared to the holding point of RWY 19. At 15:57:53, the GMC advised that, after completion of the closed circuit, route to the destination via the ROVOS flight planned route on departure RWY 19 and to make a right turn and maintain 6,000 ft. The PIC read back the instructions correctly. At 16:02:38, and while the Aircraft was at the holding point of RWY 19, the PIC contacted the ADC on 119.85 MHz to report ready-for-departure for a closed circuit. The ADC instructed to hold position then he asked the PIC if he was going to perform only one closed circuit. The PIC replied that it was “only one circuit, then [perform] a low approach and from there capture the IFR to Riyadh.” At 16:03:56, the ADC instructed the PIC “to line up and wait” RWY 19 which, at that time, was occupied by a landing aircraft that vacated the runway at 16:05:23. At 16:05:37, the Aircraft was cleared for takeoff. The ADC advised the surface wind as 180°/07 kts and requested the crew to report left downwind which was acknowledged by the PIC correctly. The Aircraft completed the takeoff acceleration roll, lifted off and continued initial climb normally. When the Aircraft reached 300 to 400 ft AGL at approximately the midpoint of RWY 19, it turned to the left while the calibrated airspeed (CAS) was approximately 130 kts. The Aircraft continued turning left with increasing rate and losing height. At approximately 16:07:11, the Aircraft impacted the ground of Taxiway ‘F’, between Taxiway ‘K’ and ‘L’ with a slight nose down attitude and a slight left roll. After the impact, the Aircraft continued until it came to rest after approximately 32 m (105 ft) from the initial impact point. There was no attempt by the PIC to declare an emergency. The Aircraft was destroyed due to the impact forces and subsequent fire. All the occupants were fatally injured.

Pacific Coastal Airlines - PCA

At 0708 Pacific daylight time, the Pacific Coastal Airlines G-21A amphibian (registration C-GPCD, serial number B76) operating as a charter flight departed Port Hardy Airport, British Columbia, on a visual flight rules flight to Chamiss Bay, British Columbia. At 0849 and again at 0908, the flight follower attempted to contact the tugboat meeting the aircraft at Chamiss Bay by radiotelephone but was unsuccessful. At 0953, the flight follower reported the aircraft overdue to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Victoria, British Columbia, and an aerial search was initiated. A search and rescue aircraft located the wreckage on a hillside near Alice Lake, approximately 14 nautical miles from its departure point. A post-crash fire had ignited. The emergency locator transmitter had been destroyed in the crash and did not transmit. The accident happened at about 0722. Of the seven occupants, the pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, one passenger suffered serious injuries, while another suffered minor injuries. The two survivors were evacuated from the accident site at approximately 1610.

PenAir - Peninsula Airways - Alaska Airlines Commuter

The airline transport pilot was on an approach to land on Runway 30 at the conclusion of a visual flight rules (VFR)scheduled commuter flight. Through a series of radio microphone clicks, he activated threshold warning lights for vehicle traffic on a roadway that passes in front of the threshold of Runway 30. Gates that were supposed to work in concert with the lights and block the runway from vehicle traffic were not operative. On final approach, the pilot, who was aware that the gates were not working, noticed a large truck and trailer stopped adjacent to the landing threshold. As he neared the runway, he realized that the truck was moving in front of the threshold area. The pilot attempted to go around, but the airplane's belly struck the top of the trailer and the airplane descended out of control to the runway, sustaining structural damage. The truck driver reported that, as he approached the runway threshold, he saw the flashing red warning lights, but that the gates were not closed. He waited for about 45 seconds and looked for any landing traffic and, seeing none, drove onto the road in front of the threshold. As he did so, he felt the airplane impact the trailer, and saw it hit the runway. The accident truck's trailer is about 45 feet long and 13 feet tall. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Facility Directory/Alaska Supplement recommends that pilots maintain a 25-foot minimum threshold crossing height. The NTSB's investigation revealed that the gate system had been out of service for more than a year due to budgetary constraints, and that there was no Notice to Airman (NOTAM) issued concerning the inoperative gate system. The FAA certificated airport is owned and operated by the State of Alaska. According to the Airport Certification Manual, the airport manager is responsible to inspect, maintain, and repair airport facilities to ensure safe operations. Additionally, the airport manager is responsible for publishing NOTAM's concerning hazardous conditions. A 10-year review of annual FAA certification and compliance inspection forms revealed no discrepancy listed for the inoperative gates until 16 days after the accident.

Wave Runner Aviation

On January 29, 2008, about 1723 eastern standard time, a Grumman G-21A, amphibian airplane N21A, impacted the ocean during landing near Marathon, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and passenger received serious injuries and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was operated as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan was filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed from the Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH) in Marathon, Florida, on January 29, 2008, about 1615. According to the pilot he departed MTH and after take off and the checklist accomplished he proceeded in a westerly direction to inspect a water-work area. The pilot stated that other then that, he had no further recollection of the flight. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the passenger stated that the pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings. During a water landing, the left wing contacted the water and the airplane water looped. A Good Samaritan rescued them from the water in his boat and brought them ashore where rescue personal were waiting. Examination of the airplane by the FAA revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane or engine, and none were reported by the pilot or passenger.

Jetcraft Corporation

The purpose of the flight was for the flight instructor to provide multiengine airplane training, in a late 1930's vintage amphibious airplane, to his brother, a single engine airplane rated private pilot. No published performance data was available for the airplane, and according to the flight instructor, much of what he knew about the performance of the airplane he learned from previous flights. Just after takeoff on the accident flight, and about 600 feet above ground level (agl), and as the pilot was retracting the landing gear and starting a left turn to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern, the flight instructor retarded the right throttle in order to simulate a failure of the right engine. The pilot executed the procedures for an in-flight engine failure and the instructor looked out of the window to check for traffic in the airport traffic pattern. The flight instructor then heard the pilot state "I am at blue line but losing altitude." The flight instructor continued to scan for traffic and moved the right throttle forward to about the "half throttle" position. The pilot could not recall if he had adjusted either of the power controls after the initial application of power for takeoff. The airplane continued to descend, impacted the ground, and caught fire.

Tropic Bird Landing

The pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to their initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and rpm was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The No. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the No. 4 front forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engines were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the No.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 rpm drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 rpm drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA Form 4040.6 revealed she was not Event Based Current (EBC) for the 4th quarter of the Flight Standards EBC program, and she did not meet the EBC quarterly events required by the end of the 14-day grace period. FAA Order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be EBC current., and inspectors should not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA Order. Managers and supervisors should not assign inspectors who are not current. The FAA inspector's supervisor was aware that the inspector was not current. He contacted the FAA Safety Regulation Branch, FAA Southern Region Headquarters, and stated that FAA Southern Region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA Southern Region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the FAR's, Inspector Handbook or FAA Order.

PenAir - Peninsula Airways - Alaska Airlines Commuter

On August 11, 1996, about 1615 Alaska daylight time, an amphibious Grumman G21-G, N660PA, is presumed to have been involved in a fatal accident about 20 miles south of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country on demand passenger flight under Title 14 CFR Part 135 when the accident occurred. The airplane, registered to and operated by Peninsula Airways Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, is presumed to have been destroyed. The certificated airline transport pilot, and the sole passenger are presumed to have received fatal injuries. Low ceilings were reported in the area of departure by the operator. VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from Anderson Bay, on the Island of Unalaska, about 1610.

Air Classic Museum

This was the first flight of the Grumman G-21 in two years. Also, the pilot had not flown the G-21 for two years. Before taking off, the pilot reported that three takeoffs and landings would be needed for purposes of becoming current. After takeoff, he flew the airplane approximately one hour and made two full stop landings. During the third takeoff, the airplane was described as lifting off in a short distance and going into a nose high attitude below an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then rolled left, struck the ground in a steep descent, and burned. Witnesses reported that the engines were providing power until impact; the engines and propellers had evidence of rotational damage. The flap actuators were found extended to a position that equated with 30° of flaps (half flaps). Four G-21 pilots were interviewed. According to them, flaps were not normally used for takeoff in this airplane. They reported that the turboprop engines had substantial power for the weight of the airplane, especially when the plane was not loaded, and that the G-21 would tend to become airborne quickly with flaps extended. No pre impact mechanical problem was noted during the investigation.

Alaska Department of Public Safety

Crashed in unknown circumstances near Haines while completing a survey flight on behalf of the fish and wildlife Department. Both occupants were killed.