Cessna 560XLS Citation Excel

Brook Haven Properties

On September 2, 2021, at 0951 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 560XL airplane, N560AR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Farmington, Connecticut. The two pilots and two passengers were fatally injured. One person on the ground sustained serious injuries and three people sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The flight crew had filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from Robertson Field Airport (4B8), Plainville, Connecticut to Dare County Regional Airport (MQI), Manteo, North Carolina. After obtaining their IFR clearance from air traffic control, the flight crew taxied the airplane onto runway 2 for departure. Two witnesses observed the takeoff roll with one reporting the airplane was “going slower” than they had seen during previous takeoffs. When the airplane was about 2/3 down the runway, one witness noted a puff of blue colored smoke from the back side of the airplane. The other witness stated that the nose landing gear was still on the ground as the airplane passed a taxiway intersection near the mid-point of the runway and he said to a friend with him that something was wrong. A third witness, who was beyond the departure end of the runway, noted the airplane departed the runway in a level attitude. After clearing the runway, the airplane’s nose pitched up, but the airplane was not climbing. The airplane then impacted a powerline pole, which caused a small explosion near the right engine followed by a shower of softball-size sparks. After hitting the pole, the noise of the engine went from normal sounding to a much more grinding, metallic sound. The airplane then began to oscillate about its pitch and roll axis before the witness lost sight of it behind trees. Postaccident examination of the 3,665-ft-long runway revealed tire skid marks from the right main landing gear tire that were right of the runway centerline beginning about 2,360 ft from the approach end of the runway. The mark from the right tire continued, while a mark from the left main landing gear tire was noted left of runway centerline beginning about 2,480 ft from the approach end of the runway. The marks from both main landing gear tires continued and veered slightly to the right but were continuous from where first observed to the end of the runway and onto a short width of grass immediately adjacent to the departure end of the runway. The grassy terrain beyond the departure end of the runway then sloped steeply downward toward a road, and the elevation change between the runway area and the road was about 20 ft. An approximate 3-ft-long section of airplane’s right inboard flap was found near the damaged power pole, which was located about 361 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. A ground scar was located in a grassy area adjacent to a building, about 850 ft north of the damaged power pole. The airplane subsequently impacted the building, and the cockpit, cabin, and wings were nearly consumed by the postimpact fire; the aft empennage, which remained outside the building, was relatively intact. Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of any anomalies with any of the airplane’s primary or secondary flight control surfaces. Additionally, the parking brake handle in the cockpit, and the respective valve that it controlled, were both found in the brake set position. According to preliminary data recovered from the airplane’s flight data recorder (FDR), both thrust levers were set at 66°, and both engines remained at 91% N1 throughout the takeoff roll. While at an airspeed of about 100 knots, the elevator control surface position increased to a positive value, reaching about 16°. At this time the pitch of the airplane minimally changed to about +1°. The weight-on-wheels (WOW) indication remained in an on-ground state until beyond the departure end of the runway where the terrain began sloping downward. After departing the runway at an indicated airspeed of about 120 knots, the elevator position increased to a maximum recorded value of about 17° deflection, the airplane’s pitch rapidly increased to about +22°. Immediately thereafter the elevator position rapidly decreased to about -1.0° and the stick shaker (aerodynamic stall warning) activated. The FDR data further indicated that at about the time the WOW indication transitioned from on-ground to an in-air state, the airspeed accelerated from about 120 knots to a maximum airspeed of 123.75 knots. Additionally, the right engine fuel flow, N1, and N2 decreased with corresponding ITT increase about 1.8 seconds after the WOW transition. Given the airplane’s velocity between these two times, the deceleration of the right engine occurred when it was in close proximity to the power pole. Parking brake valve position and normal brake application were not recorded by the FDR, and the airplane’s takeoff configuration warning system did not incorporate parking brake valve position as part of its activation logic. Further review of the FDR data revealed that the longitudinal acceleration values recorded during the takeoff roll of the accident flight (0.245g) were less than the recorded values for the airplane’s two previous takeoffs (0.365g and 0.35g). Additionally, the time the airplane took to accelerate from 20 to 100 kts during the accident flight and the previous two takeoffs were 17 seconds, 11.5 seconds, and 12 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the elevator position and pitch attitude of the airplane at rotation during its previous takeoff were about 13°, and +1.6°, respectively. The pitch attitude then continued to increase to +10° and remained at that value as the airspeed increased and the elevator position decreased.

Air Charter Services

On 27 Aug 19, M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd Cessna Citation 560 XL aircraft (VTAVV), while operating a flight from Delhi to Aligarh (Dhanipur Airstrip) was involved in an accident during landing on runway 11.The operator is having a maintenance facility at Aligarh Airport and aircraft was scheduled to undergo ADS-B modification. There were 02 cockpit crew and 04 SOD onboard the aircraft. The aircraft was under the command of a PIC, who was an ATPL holder duly qualified on type with a CPL holder co-pilot, duly qualified on type as Pilot Monitoring. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots. Both, PIC and Co-Pilot had prior experience of operating to Aligarh airport, which is an uncontrolled airport. As per the flight plan, ETD from Delhi was 0800 IST and ETA at Aligarh was 0820 IST. The crew had reported around 0630 IST at Delhi airport and underwent BA test. The MET report to operate the aircraft to Aligarh was well within the VFR conditions. The aircraft Take-off weight was within limits including 1900 Kgs of fuel on board. As per the statement of PIC, the Co-pilot was briefed about pre departure checklists including METAR before approaching the aircraft. Once at the aircraft, prefight checks were carried out by PIC before seeking clearance from Delhi delivery (121.95 MHz). Aircraft was accorded start up clearance by Delhi ground (121.75 Mhz) at 0800 IST.ATC cleared the aircraft to line up on runway 11 and was finally cleared for takeoff at 0821 IST. After takeoff, aircraft changed over to Delhi radar control from tower frequency for further departure instructions. Aircraft was initially cleared by Radar control to climb to FL090 and was given straight routing to Aligarh with final clearance to climb to FL130. Thereafter, aircraft changed to Delhi area control for further instructions. While at approximately 45 Nm from Aligarh, VT-AVV made contact with Aligarh (personnel of M/s Pioneer Flying Club manning radio) on 122.625 MHz. Ground R/T operator informed “wind 100/2-3 Kts, QNH 1005, Runway 11 in use” and that flying of Pioneer Flying Club is in progress. Further, he instructed crew to contact when at 10 Nm inbound. After obtaining initial information from ground R/T operator, VT-AVV requested Delhi area control for descent. The aircraft was cleared for initial descent to FL110 and then further to FL080. On reaching FL080, aircraft was instructed by Delhi area control to change over to Aligarh for further descent instruction in coordination with destination. At approx 10 Nm, VT-AVV contacted ground R/T operator on 122.625 MHz and requested for long finals for runway 11. In turn, ground R/T operator asked crew to report when at 5 Nm inbound. As per PIC, after reaching 5 Nm inbounds, Aligarh cleared VTAVV to descend to circuit altitude and land on runway 11. Aircraft had commenced approach at 5 Nm at an altitude of 2200 ft. Approach and landing checks briefing including wind, runway in use were carried out by PIC. During visual approach, Co-pilot called out to PIC “Slightly low on profile”. As per PIC, Co-pilot call out was duly acknowledged and ROD was corrected. Thereafter, PIC was visual with runway and took over controls on manual. Co-pilot was monitoring instruments and parameters. While PIC was focused on landing, a loud bang from left side of the aircraft was heard by PIC when the aircraft was below 100 feet AGL. Aircraft started pulling towards left and impacted the ground short of runway 11 threshold. After impact, aircraft veered off the runway and its left wing caught fire. The aircraft stopped short of airfield boundary wall. Crew carried out emergency evacuation. Co-pilot opened main exit door from inside of the aircraft for evacuation of passengers. Aircraft was destroyed due to post crash fire. The fire tender reached the crash site after 45 Minutes.

Delta Private Jets

On August 21, 2019, about 1132 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 560XL airplane, N91GY, overran the departure end of runway 2 following a rejected takeoff from Oroville Municipal Airport (OVE), Oroville, California. The two airline-transport pilots and 8 passengers were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by a post-crash fire that consumed a majority of the airplane. The airplane was registered to Jotts LLC, and was operated by Delta Private Jets, as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand charter flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined for Portland International Airport (PDX), Portland, Oregon. The pilot flying reported that prior to takeoff, they had a waypoint fix and departure change, which he updated within the flight management system. As they taxied onto runway 2, he called for the before takeoff checklist. Following completion of the checklist, they initiated takeoff, and the non-flying pilot called "airspeed alive," V1, and Vr. The pilot flying stated that "it was just a weird sensation" as he pulled the yoke back and the airplane didn't lift off. The pilot flying further stated that he pulled the yoke back a second time and noticed no movement of the nose. Shortly after, the non-flying pilot called for an abort, and the pilot flying applied full thrust reversers and maximum braking. Subsequently, the airplane exited the departure end of the runway, impacted a ditch, and skidded across a grass covered area, where a post impact fire ensued. Review of surveillance video from a fixed-based operator (FBO) located at OVE showed the airplane holding short of runway 2 for about 3 minutes, 44 seconds. The airplane then taxied forward toward runway 2, stopped, and remained stationary for about 18 seconds, until it began to taxi again onto the runway. After lining up on the runway, the airplane remained stationary for about 16 seconds. Once the takeoff roll was initiated, the airplane traveled out of the camera frame 48 seconds later. The position where the airplane moves out of the camera frame was about 730 ft beyond the departure end of runway 2. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane came to rest about 1,990 ft beyond the departure end of runway 2, on a heading of about 060° magnetic. Review of a photo taken by a witness prior to the airplane being consumed by the fire, revealed that the airplane was mostly intact and resting on the underside of the fuselage and wings. Examination of the runway revealed tire transfer marks which originated from the runway 2 hold short line and progressed onto the runway, and continued throughout the entire length of the runway, overrun, adjacent runway, grassy area, taxiway, and grassy area near the main wreckage. The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination.

Grupo Andrade

The aircraft took off from Santos Dumont Airport (SBRJ) at 12:21 UTC, on a transport flight bound for Santos Aerodrome (SBST), with two pilots and five passengers on board. During the enroute phase of the flight, the aircraft was under radar coverage of the approach control units of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (APP-RJ and APP-SP, respectively), and no abnormalities were observed. Upon being released by APP-SP for descent and approach toward SBST, the aircraft crew, already in radio contact with Santos Aerodrome Flight Information Service (Santos Radio), reported their intention to perform the IFR ECHO 1 RWY 35 NDB approach chart profile. After reporting final approach, the crew informed that they would make a go-around followed by a holding procedure, and call Santos Radio again. According to an observer that was on the ground awaiting the arrival of the aircraft at Santos Air Base (BAST) and to another observer at the Port of Santos, the aircraft was sighted flying over the aerodrome runway at low height, and then making a turn to the left after passing over the departure end of the runway, at which point the observers lost visual contact with the aircraft on account of the weather conditions. Moments later, the aircraft crashed into the ground. All seven occupants were killed.

Bristow Helicopters

5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.