Cessna 501 Citation I

JL %26 GL Productions LP

On May 29, 2021, about 1055 central daylight time, a Cessna 501 Citation, N66BK, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident shortly after takeoff from the Smyrna Airport (MQY), Smyrna, Tennessee. The pilot and six passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan with a destination of Palm Beach International (PBI) Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida. He purchased 414 gallons of Jet A fuel prior to the flight, which topped-off the fuel tanks (574 gallons total). The pilot then taxied to runway 32. Preliminary review of air traffic control (ATC) communications and radar data revealed the pilot was cleared for takeoff and instructed to turn to a heading of 090°, and to climb and maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot initially read back the clearance as “at or above 3,000 ft”, and the controller corrected him. The airplane departed at 1053:06 and made a climbing right turn to the east and the pilot was instructed to contact Nashville departure control. At 1054:27, when the airplane was about 3 miles north of the airport, a departure controller contacted the airplane and asked if they were “on frequency.” The pilot responded with, “N66BK with you.” The controller then instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading 130°; however, the pilot did not acknowledge. At 1054:46, the controller asked the pilot if he “copied” the heading instruction. The pilot responded about 4 seconds later and said, “130…Bravo Kilo.” At 1055:11, the controller instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 15,000 ft msl, but there was no response. The controller then made multiple attempts to re-establish communications with the airplane; however, there were no further communications. A review of radar data revealed that after the pilot established contact with departure control the airplane made a series of heading changes along with several climbs and descents before it entered a steep, descending left turn. The last radar return, at 1055:05, indicated the airplane was at an altitude of about 700 ft msl, descending about 31,000 ft-per-minute, on a heading of 090°. A witness was fishing about 150 ft west of the Fate Sanders Recreation Area boat ramp located on Lake Percy Priest, about 2.7 miles northeast of MQY. He described the weather as a very low ceiling in mist. The witness heard what he thought was a low flying military jet before he saw the airplane impact the lake in a “straight down” nose first attitude. He did not see any evidence of fire or an explosion. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted a shallow section of the lake that was about 2 to 8-ft-deep. First responders and recovery personnel used underwater side sonar to identify larger pieces of wreckage, along with underwater rescue divers. The divers reported that the visibility in the water was poor due to the deep mud and silt that made up the lakebed. About two-thirds of the airplane were recovered from the lake, which included both engines, the main cabin door, portions of the main cabin windows, the left nose baggage door, all threelanding gear, most of the tail section, and sections of both wings, including portions of the flaps and ailerons. Several fractured seat frames and pieces of the interior were also recovered. There was no evidence of an in-flight fire observed on any of the recovered sections of airframe or engines. The airplane was not equipped; nor was it required to be equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). No other sources of non-volatile recorded data were identified as being installed on the airplane. The airplane wreckage was retained for further examination. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot held a type rating for the airplane with no restrictions. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued on November 12, 2019, with the limitation that he “must wear corrective lenses.” Initial review of the plot’s logbook revealed he had accumulated about 1,680 total flight hours; of which 83 hours were in the accident airplane.

Remonia Air

On February 8, 2020, at 1013 eastern standard time, a Cessna 501, N501RG, was substantially damaged after an inflight breakup near Fairmount, Georgia. The private pilot, commercial pilot, and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was owned and operated by Remonia Air, LLC. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Falcon Field (FFC), Atlanta, Georgia around 0945. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 and had an intended destination of John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee. According to a fuel receipt, the airplane was "topped off" with 104 gallons of Jet A fuel that was premixed with Prist prior to departing on the accident flight. According to flight plan information that was filed with a commercial vendor, the accident flight was scheduled to depart at 0930 from FFC and arrive at JWN around 1022. Then, another flight plan was filed from JWN back to FFC departing at 1030 and arriving at JWN around 1119. In addition, the flight plan noted in the remarks section that the flight was a "training flight." A preliminary review of air traffic control communications and radar data revealed that a controller issued local weather information and instructed the pilots to climb to 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The controller issued the pilots a pilot report (PIREP) for trace to light rime icing between 9,000 ft and 11,000 ft, and one of the pilots acknowledged. Then, the controller instructed the pilots to climb to 10,000 ft and to turn right to 020°. The controller observed the airplane on a northwest bound heading and asked the pilots to verify their heading. A pilot responded that they were returning to a 320° heading, to which the controller instructed him to maintain 10,000 ft. The controller asked the pilots if everything was alright, and a pilot responded that they had a problem with the autopilot. The controller instructed the pilots to again maintain 10,000 ft and to advise when they were able to accept a turn. The controller again asked if everything was alright or if they needed assistance; however, neither pilot responded. The controller again asked the pilots if everything was under control and if they required assistance, to which one of the pilots replied that they were "OK now." The airplane climbed to 10,500 ft and the controller instructed the pilots to maintain 10,000 ft and again asked if everything was under control. A pilot responded in the affirmative and stated that they were "playing with the autopilot" because they were having trouble with it, and the controller suggested that they turn off the autopilot and hand-fly the airplane. The airplane descended to 9,000 ft and the controller instructed the pilots to maintain 10,000 ft and asked them if they could return to the departure airport to resolve the issues. One of the pilots requested a higher altitude to get into visual flight rules (VFR) conditions, and the controller instructed him to climb to 12,000 ft, advised that other aircraft reported still being in the clouds at 17,000 ft, and asked their intentions. The pilot requested to continue to their destination and the controller instructed him to climb to 13,000 ft. One of the pilots established communication with another controller at 11,500 ft and stated they were climbing to 13,000 ft on a 360° heading. The controller instructed the pilot to climb to 16,000 ft and inquired if their navigation issues were corrected. A pilot advised the controller that they had problems with the left side attitude indicator and that they were working off the right side. The controller cleared the airplane direct to the JWN and asked if they were above the clouds as they were climbing through 15,400 ft. The airplane then began a left turn and soon after radar contact was lost at 1013. The controller attempted numerous times to contact the airplane with no response.

Kelly Panteluk Construction

The aircraft belly landed at Stella Maris-Estate Airport, Bahamas. No one was hurt but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Apparently, the approach checklist was interrupted by the crew for unknown reason and the landing procedure was performed with the landing gear still retracted. The aircraft was owned by the private Canadian company Kelly Panteluk Construction and the airplane was inbound from Fort Lauderdale-Executive.

Theo Steil

On Friday, 10 January 2014, the airplane had flown from Trier to Shoreham, where it landed at 1456 UTC. Two pilots and two passengers were on board the aircraft. Over the weekend, the passengers wanted to participate in a hunt. On the afternoon of 11 January 2014 the PIC told the service provider, tasked by the aircraft owner with the flight planning, to prepone the scheduled return flight on Sunday, 12 January 2014, from 1400 UTC to 1015 UTC. In the ATC flight plan Trier-Föhren Airfield was the destination aerodrome and Luxembourg Airport the alternate aerodrome. According to the flight plan the change of flight rules from IFR to VFR was to occur at reporting point PITES. The handling agent at Shoreham Airport stated that the PIC and the co-pilot had arrived on Sunday at 0850 UTC. The airport made the recordings of a video camera for apron surveillance available to the BFU. These recordings show that the airplane was refuelled in the presence of the pilots. The two passengers arrived at 0936 UTC and about 11 minutes later the aircraft taxied from the apron. At 1000 UTC, the airplane took off from runway 20. At 1138:25 hrs, the co-pilot established contact with Langen Radar. At that time the airplane was in Flight Level (FL) 170. At 1142:51 hrs, after the airplane had descended to FL140, the controller issued the descent clearance to FL70. Approximately one minute later the controller said: "… proceed direct destination again and descend altitude five thousand feet … Spangdahlem QNH one zero two five." The pilot in command acknowledged the clearance. At 1145:23 hrs the PIC said: "… standing by for cancelling IFR." The controller answered: "... roger, IFR is cancelled at one zero two five, your position is one five miles northwest of your destination airfield, squawk VFR, approved to leave." According to radar data, the airplane was approximately in FL90 and continued to fly with a southern heading. At 1147:26 hrs, about 5 NM east of the omnidirectional radio beacon Nattenheim (VOR NTM), the altitude was 4,900 ft AMSL. According to the radar data at 1148:10 hrs the airplane had reached 3,500 ft AMSL. The flight path continued east until 1149 hrs when, in the area of the city of Wittlich in an altitude of 3,500 ft AMSL, the airplane turned right. The ground speed was approximately 180 kt. In the course of the right turn until 1150:30 hrs, the altitude decreased further to about 2,800 ft AMSL and the ground speed to about 160 kt. At 1151:10 hrs the aircraft turned left maintaining altitude until it had reached a southern heading. From 1151:30 hrs on it continued to descend. At the time the airplane was approximately 6.7 NM from the runway threshold and about 0.5 NM north of the extended runway centre line. Approximately 15 seconds later it reached the extended runway centre line of runway 22 while it turned right into the final approach direction. It was in about 2,300 ft AMSL and approximately 5.7 NM from the runway. From 1152:20 hrs on, at approximately 4.6 NM from the threshold, the aircraft began to leave the extended runway centre line to the south. At that time, altitude was approximately 1,600 ft AMSL and ground speed about 160 kt. The last radar target was recorded at 1152:40 hrs with an altitude indication of approximately 1,300 ft AMSL and a ground speed of about 140 kt. The attention of several witnesses, located about 600 m north-east and south-east, respectively, of the accident site in the valley of the river Salm, was drawn to the airplane by engine noise. They congruently stated that the aircraft had come from the direction of the town Esch and flown in low altitude, below the fog or cloud cover, toward the south-west. One of the witnesses estimated the altitude was 15 to 20 m above the trees bordering the river Salm, approximately the same height as the open wire located in the area. According to congruent witnesses’ statements, the engine thrust was increased and the airplane pulled up shortly before reaching a wooded escarpment rising by about 60 m, banked left and disappeared in the fog. Immediately afterwards fire had become visible and impact noises had been heard. The airplane impacted the ground in an inverted position. The occupants suffered fatal injuries and the aircraft was destroyed. The Flugleiter (A person required by German regulation at uncontrolled aerodromes to provide aerodrome information service to pilots) at Trier-Fohren Airfield stated, that on the morning of the accident day, at about 1010 hrs, he had received a phone call from the PIC. During the call the arrival of the airplane had been announced for 1230 hrs. The Flugleiter had informed the PIC about the severe fog prevailing at the airfield. He had also told him that, if at all, he expected visibility would increase after 1330 or 1400 hrs. After the phone conversation the Flugleiter assumed, that the airplane would fly to another airport. According to statements by the PIC’s wife, she had talked with her husband on the landline and then witnessed the PIC’s phone conversation on his mobile phone with the passenger, where he was asked to prepone the return flight to late morning. An unexpected appointment of the passengers was named as reason for the wish. During a phone conversation prior to departure her husband had explained that he had talked with Trier Airfield and learned that fog was prevailing there and one would fly either to Hahn or Luxembourg. The son of the passengers stated at the police that on the morning of the day of the accident his father had called him. He had told him that the airplane would probably land at Frankfurt-Hahn Airport. He stated that for his parents there was no deadline pressure. He said, that for him it is “völlig unvorstellbar (entirely inconceivable)” that his father would pressure the pilot to fly to Trier. In the past deviation to another airport had often been the case. It had never been a problem.

BigTex Trailers

The pilot was not familiar with the mountain airport. The airplane was high during the first visual approach to the runway. The pilot performed a go-around and the airplane was again high for the second approach. During the second approach, the approach angle steepened, and the airplane pitched nose-down toward the runway. The nosegear touched down about halfway down the runway followed by main gear touchdown. The airplane then bounced and the sound of engine noise increased as the airplane banked right and the right wing contacted the ground. The airplane subsequently flipped over and off the right side of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The examination also revealed that the right engine thrust reverser was deployed during the impact sequence, and the left engine thrust reverser was stowed. Although manufacturer data revealed single-engine reversing has been demonstrated during normal landings and is easily controllable, the airplane had already porpoised and bounced during the landing. The pilot’s subsequent activation of only the right engine’s thrust reverser would have created an asymmetrical thrust and most likely exacerbated an already uncontrolled touchdown. Had the touchdown been controlled, the airplane could have stopped on the remaining runway or the pilot could have performed a go-around uneventfully.

Frandley Aviation Partnership

The flight crew reported for duty at Liverpool Airport at 0845 hrs. Their original task was to fly to Belfast City Airport, collect a transplant organ, and take it to Cambridge Airport. However, on their arrival at Belfast the transfer was no longer required, so they were given a new task to fly to Belfast Aldergrove Airport and collect an organ to carry to Birmingham Airport. The aircraft departed Belfast Aldergrove at 1450 hrs with the co-pilot as pilot flying. The flight was uneventful and the aircraft was given a radar vector to intercept the ILS for a straight-in approach to Runway 15 at Birmingham. The Runway 15 ILS course is 149°M. The autopilot was engaged and the aircraft was flying on a track of 135°M, 13 nm from the touchdown zone and at a groundspeed of 254 kt, when it crossed the localiser centreline. The aircraft then turned right onto a corrective track but once again passed through the localiser course. Further corrections were made and the aircraft passed through the localiser once more before becoming established at 5 nm. The co-pilot later reported that, because the autopilot was not capturing the localiser, he had disconnected it and flown the approach manually. When the aircraft was at 10 nm, the radar controller broadcast a message advising of the presence of a fog bank on final approach and giving RVRs of 1,400 m at touchdown and in excess of 1,500 m at both the mid-point and stop end. The airfield was sighted by the commander during the approach but not by the co-pilot. A handover to the tower frequency was made at around 8 nm. When the aircraft was at 6 nm, landing clearance was given and acknowledged. The tower controller then advised the aircraft that there was a fog bank over the airfield boundary, together with the information that the touchdown RVR was 1,400 m. The commander responded, saying: “WE’VE GOT ONE END OF THE RUNWAY”. The aircraft was correctly on the localiser and the glideslope at 4 nm. The Decision Altitude (DA) of 503 feet amsl (200 feet aal) for the approach was written on a bug card mounted centrally above the glare shield. Both pilots recollected that the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) calls of “500 above” and “100 above” DA were made by the commander. However, neither pilot could recall a call of ‘decision’ or ‘go-around’ being made. At between 1.1 nm and 0.9 nm, and 400 feet to 300 feet aal, the aircraft turned slightly to the right, onto a track of 152°M. This track was maintained until the aircraft struck the glideslope antenna to the right of the runway some 30 seconds later (see Figure 3, page 11). The aircraft came to rest in an upright position on the grass with a fire on the left side. The co-pilot evacuated through the main cabin door, which is located on the left side of the fuselage, and suffered flash burns as he passed through the fire. The commander was trapped in the cockpit for a time.

Aviones Taxi AIFE

The aircraft departed Culiacán on a round trip to Veracruz with intermediate stops in Puebla and Minatitlán, carrying two pilots and six employees of the Coppel Company. One minute after takeoff from Minatitlán Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea off Coatzacoalcos. A day later, few debris were found on beaches. The main wreckage was not found and all eight occupants were killed. Crew: Javier Montoya, Bernardo Estrada. Passengers: Salvador Leyva, David Jurado, Norma Torres, Brenda Camacho, Alejandro Quintero, Freddy Peraza.

Corus Hardware Corporation

The aircraft departed Santo Domingo-Las Améericas Airport at 2026LT on a positioning flight to San Juan, Porto Rico. While climbing in night conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in the sea few km offshore. SAR operations were initiated but no trace of the aircraft nor the pilot was found.

Premier Air Management

On short final to Mexicali Airport, the aircraft encountered windshear and lost height. The undercarriage struck the ground short of runway threshold and were torn off. The aircraft landed on its belly and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Hasit Trockenmörtel

The aircraft was performing a business flight from Baku to Sulaymaniyah with 5 passengers and one pilot on board. It departed Munich to Baku via Budapest on February 14. As it descended through the altitude of 8,000 feet, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and crashed near Buschin, few dozen km from Sulaymaniyah Airport. The wreckage was found on February 19 in a snow covered and hilly terrain. All 6 occupants were killed, among them 4 German businessmen, one pilot and one translator. The aircraft was owned by the German Company Hasit Trockenmörtel, specialised in building reconstruction.