Cessna 425 Conquest

K-Aero

On August 11, 2021 about 0900 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 425 Conquest 1, N723MB, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Helena, Montana. The pilot and two passengers sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 business flight. The pilot stated that on the morning of the accident, he physically refueled the airplane to full wing tanks by adding an additional 207 gallons of Jet A. Shortly thereafter, he departed from his home airport in Faribault, Minnesota and continued to his destination at a cruise altitude of 24,000 feet mean sea level. Investigators reviewed Air Traffic Control transmissions and flight track data covering the area of the accident using Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B) data. While en route, at 0847:35, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that the airplane had an engine flame out and requested a descent. The pilot opted to divert from the originally planned destination and contacted Helena approach control. He stated that the airplane was 16 miles from Helena and descending through 19,000 feet advising the controller that he may need to lose altitude to land on runway 27. The controller responded that the pilot could maneuver north of the airport to then align with the right base leg of the traffic pattern to the runway. At 0852:59 the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had an hour and a half of fuel on board and about 3 minutes later the airplane made a right turn to the north. At 0857:15, with the airplane about 7,900 feet msl, the pilot reported that the right engine experienced a loss of power (see Figure 1 below). At 0859:02, the pilot reported the airplane was going to collided with trees. The airplane came to rest with the right wing and empennage severed from the fuselage. The pilot noted that the airplane had undergone an annual inspection in March 2021, equating to about 10 flight hours prior to the accident.

Santa Fe Investments

On June 10, 2019, about 1030 central daylight time, a Cessna 425 multi-engine airplane, N622MM, registered to Santa Fe Investments Inc., of Wilmington, Delaware, and operated by the pilot, was destroyed during a forced landing after experiencing engine problems, near Butler, Missouri. The private pilot sustained fatal injuries. The cross country flight was being conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated at 0554 from the Vero Beach Municipal Airport (VRB), Vero Beach, Florida, and its planned destination was the New Century Air Center Airport (IXD), Olathe, Kansas. According to preliminary information provided by Air Traffic Control (ATC), the pilot was beginning to descend to set up his approach to IXD. Passing through about 17,000 feet msl, the pilot told the ATC controller that he was having problems retarding the power on the right engine. Passing through about 13,200 feet msl, the pilot told the controller that he was going to lower the landing gear and continue to proceed direct to IXD, and stated that he would have to shut down the right engine when he was in range of the airport. Passing through about 12,900 feet msl, The pilot told the controller that the right engine was still stuck at full power, and that he was going to have to shut the right engine down. Passing through about 7,800 feet msl, the pilot requested to change his destination to the nearest airport. The controller advised the pilot that the nearest airport was Butler Memorial Airport (BUM), about 8 miles away, and gave the pilot a vector to BUM. Passing through about 6,200 feet msl, the controller asked the pilot to change frequencies and the pilot acknowledged but did not have the airport in sight. The controller issued another vector toward BUM. Passing through about 5,400 feet msl, the pilot told the controller that he still did not have the airport in sight, and a few seconds later told the controller that he had the airport in sight. Passing through about 4,000 feet msl, the controller advised the pilot of a possible tailwind if landing on runway 18 at BUM, and the pilot responded that he would go-around and set up for runway 36. Passing through about 2,900 feet msl, the controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, and the pilot responded to standby and said, "I am trying to get this thing under control." Passing through about 1,800 feet msl, the pilot told the controller that, "she's going down," and stated that he was going to try to land on highway 69. The last radar information showed the airplane about 1,700 feet msl. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. A witness near the accident site saw the airplane at low altitude, nosing down toward a field. Evidence at the accident site showed that the airplane impacted a 75-foot tall grain silo and fell to the ground. The grain silo was located about one mile from a highway, and about 4 miles from BUM. Local residents responded to the accident site and reported the accident. The wreckage was moved to a secure facility and detailed examinations of the airframe fuel system and engines were conducted. Examinations of the engine accessories are ongoing.

Eros Air

On 29 January 2016, at 08:10 a Cessna 425 Conquest, which was privately operated, crashed approx. 300 meters NNE of threshold Runway 26. 1.1.2 According to the flight plan filled on the 28th January 2016, the flight was scheduled for a renewal of CPL and IR ratings for the two pilots by a Designated Examiner (DE). Departure time was scheduled at 07:45 at a cruising altitude of FL100 for Hosea Kutako Airport. The pilots requested a procedure for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach. The Air Traffic Controller (ATC) cleared them for the procedure for runway 26 ILS approach with QNH 1024. They were also asked to report when at nine miles-inbound. At around nine miles they reported their location and were instructed to continue the approach along the glide slope. The DE requested a VOR approach for their next approach and an early right hand turnout that was approved by ATC who also required them to report when going around. The ATC stated that he saw them at around 4nm on final approach. He then stated that he looked away for a moment after which he heard a slight bang, then saw a ball of flames at about 300 meters north of threshold runway 26. He called out to the aircraft three times whilst looking out for it when he finally concluded that it could have been V5-MJW that had crashed. The ATC pressed a crash alarm after a moment when it did not go off, the controller then called the fire station and alerted them of the occurrence. The Airport’s Fire and Rescue team after receiving the initial notification from the ATC took around 10 minutes to reach the site, by that time fire had engulfed the plane and its occupants. The team took 3-4 minutes to extinguish the fire. The weather was reported as fine with winds about 140° at 08 kts with scattered clouds at 4000ft and unrestricted visibility.

Crown Supply Company

While on a straight-in global-positioning-system approach, the airplane broke out of the clouds directly over the end of the runway. The pilot then remained clear of the clouds and executed a no-flap circling approach to the opposite direction runway. The pilot said that his airspeed was high when he touched down. The landing was hard, and the right main landing gear tire blew out, the airplane departed the runway to the left, and the left main landing gear collapsed. No preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation.

Aerowest

The aircraft took off at 0041 hrs from Hanover (EDDV) for a positioning flight to Munich (EDDM) with a crew of two pilots. The intention was to make a subsequent air ambulance flight from Munich to Kiel. During the climb the crew received the instruction for a direct flight to Munich and the clearance for a climb to Flight Level (FL) 230. The radar data showed that the aircraft turned south-east and climbed to FL230 after take-off. At 0123:45 hrs the crew made radio contact with Munich Radar. About five minutes later, the controller advised the crew that both runways were closed for snow removal, but that the southern runway would re-open in about 25-30 minutes. In response, the crew advised they would reduce the speed somewhat. The crew stated that the temperature in flight altitude had been -40 °C. At 0133:58 hrs the controller issued descent clearance to FL110. According to crew statements in this phase there were problems with the left engine. A system check indicated that the engine’s Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) had exceeded 900°C and the torque had reduced to zero. The crew then first worked through the memory items before "beginning with the engine failure checklist". In the presence of the BFU the crew gave their reasons for the shut-off of the engine as being the fast increase of the ITT and the decrease of the torque to zero. The crew could not give any other engine parameters like Ng per cent RPM, propeller RPM, fuel flow, oil pressure or oil temperature. The co-pilot reported via radio: "… we request to maintain FL150 … we have engine failure on the left side, call you back." At that time, the radar data showed the aircraft at FL214. As the controller asked at 0138:15 hrs if a frequency change to approach control were possible, the co-pilot answered: "... give us a minute, please, and then we report back, until we have everything secured ..." At 0143:22 hrs the co-pilot advised the controller that the engine had been "secured" and a frequency change was now possible. The crew subsequently reported that, three to five minutes later there had been brief, strong vibrations in the right engine. The crew could not state which actions they had carried out after the descent clearance and during shut-off and securing of the left engine. Both pilots stated that there was no attempt to re-start the left engine. After changing frequency to Munich Approach Control the crew was advised that runway 26L was available. The co-pilot declared emergency at 0143:48 hrs, about 25 NM away from the airport of destination, mentioning again the failure of the left engine. The controller responded by asking the crew what assistance they would require, and asked if a ten-mile approach would be acceptable. This was affirmed. At 0149:28 hrs the controller gave clearance for an ILS approach to runway 26L. At that time the radar data showed the airplane in FL78 flying with a ground speed of 210 kt to the south-east. The aircraft turned right towards the final approach and at 0151:53 hrs it reached the extended runway centre line about 17 NM prior to the runway threshold in 5,400 ft AMSL with a ground speed of 120 kt. At 0154:12 hrs the controller said: "… observe you a quarter mile south of the centre line." According to the radar data the aircraft was in 5,000 ft AMSL with a ground speed of 90 kt at that time. The co-pilot answered: "Ja, we are intercepting…". Twenty seconds later the controller gave clearance to land on runway 26L. Up until about 0157:30 hrs the ground speed varied between 80 and 90 kt. From 0157:43 hrs on, within about 80 seconds, the speed increased from 100 kt to 120 kt. Thereby, the airplane had come within 5.5 NM of the threshold of runway 26L. Up until 0200:53 hrs the airplane flew with a ground speed of 100 - 110 kt. At 0201:32 hrs ground speed decreased to 80 kt. At that time, the airplane was in 1,900 ft AMSL and about 1.5 NM away from the threshold. Up until the last radar recording at 0202:27 hrs the ground speed remained at 80 kt. The crew stated the approach was flown with Blue Line Speed. During the final approach the aircraft veered slightly to the left and tended to sink below the glidepath. Approximately 3 NM from the threshold the approach lights had become visible and the flaps and the landing gear were extended. Then the airplane veered to the left and sank below the glidepath. The co-pilot stated a decision for a go-around was made. When an attempt was made to increase power from the right engine, no additional power was available. The aircraft had lost speed and to counteract it the elevator control horn was pushed. Prior to the landing, rescue and fire fighting vehicles were positioned at readiness in the vicinity of the airport’s southern fire station. The weather was described as very windy with a light snow flurry. The fire fighters subsequently reported they had seen two white landing lights and the dim outline of an approaching aircraft. The aircraft’s bank attitude was seen to alter a number of times. Shortly before landing, the landing lights suddenly disappeared and the aircraft was no longer visible. The aircraft impacted the ground about 100 metres prior to the threshold of runway 26L. The crew turned off all the electrical systems and left the aircraft unaided. During the initial interviews by BFU and police the co-pilot repeatedly talked about a go-around the crew had intended and he had, therefore, pushed the power lever for the right engine forward. In later statements he stated that the engine power was to be increased. A few days after the accident, the BFU asked both pilots for a detailed written statement concerning the course of events. The BFU received documents with a short description of the accident in note form. The statements of the two pilots were almost identical in content and format.

Lyden Air Company

The pilot reported that during cruise descent the airplane accumulated about 1/2-to 3/4-inch of rime ice between 8,000 and 6,000 feet. During the approach, the pilot noted that a majority of the ice had dissipated off the leading edge of both wings, although there was still trace ice on the aft-portion of the wing deice boots. The pilot maintained an additional 20 knots during final approach due to gusting winds from the north-northwest. He anticipated there would be turbulence caused by the surrounding topography and the buildings on the north side of the airport. While on short final for runway 28, the pilot maintained approximately 121 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and selected flaps 30-degrees. He used differential engine power to assist staying on the extended centerline until the airplane crossed the runway threshold. After crossing the threshold, the pilot began a landing flare and the airspeed slowed toward red line (92 KIAS). Shortly before touchdown, the airplane "abruptly pitched up and was pushed over to the left" and flight control inputs were "only marginally effective" in keeping the wings level. The airplane drifted off the left side of the runway and began a "violent shuddering." According to the pilot, flight control inputs "produced no change in aircraft heading, or altitude." The pilot advanced the engine throttles for a go-around as the left wing impacted the terrain. The airplane cartwheeled and subsequently caught fire. No pre-impact anomalies were noted with the airplane's flight control systems and deice control valves during a postaccident examination. No ice shapes were located on the ground leading up to the main wreckage. The reported surface wind was approximately 4 knots from the north-northwest.

Services %26 Transports Aériens

The twin engine aircraft was performing an on-demand taxi flight from Toliara to the capital city Antananarivo with 4 pax and a two pilots on behalf of the company Magrama (Marbres & Granites de Madagascar). Less than two minutes after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft suffered an engine failure and crashed about 1,500 metres from the runway end, bursting into flames. All 6 occupants were killed, among them 4 Italians and 2 Madagascar citizens.

Tech II

The airplane was on the final approach segment of an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight that originated approximately 3 hours and 45 minutes prior to the accident when radio communications with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft wreckage was located the following day approximately 2.8 miles from the destination airport. The airplane impacted terrain in a vertical descent and flat attitude and came to rest upright on its fuselage and wings. The cockpit and cabin were intact and both wing assemblies remained attached to the fuselage. Evidence of forward velocity and/or leading edge deformation was not observed to the wings or fuselage. Mixed ice was noted along the leading edge of both wings. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were reported as low ceilings and low visibility due to snow and mist. The accident occurred during dark night conditions. Air traffic control (ATC) transcripts indicated that shortly after entering the holding pattern at 11,000 feet the pilot was issued an approach clearance for the ILS. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and approximately two minutes later ATC communications with the pilot were lost. Pilot logbook records showed that the pilot's total flight time was approximately 1,987 hours. In the six-month period preceding the accident, the pilot logged approximately 40 hours total time, 9 hours of actual instrument time and 7 instrument approaches in the accident airplane. The pilot's total night flying experience was approximately 51 hours. The pilot made no entries in his pilot logbook indicating that he had flown at night in the six-month time frame preceding the accident. Pilots flying the ILS approach prior to the accident aircraft reported mixed icing during the descent and final approach. Post accident examination of the aircraft revealed no evidence to indicate a mechanical malfunction or failure.

Sgavit Aviation

During an ILS approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane impacted terrain and was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. Prior to departure, the pilot obtained a weather briefing, which reported light rain, mist, and instrument meteorological conditions at the destination airport. After approaching the terminal area, the pilot received radar vectors to intercept the localizer for the Runway 35R ILS approach. The pilot's keying of the microphone and the timing of his speech exhibited decreased coordination during the approach phase of flight. After crossing the outer marker and at altitude of 7,700 feet, the pilot asked the controller what the current ceilings were at the airport, and the controller stated 500 feet. With the airplane at an altitude of 6,800 feet, the controller informed the pilot of a "low altitude alert" warning, at which the pilot responded, "Yeah, I am a bit low here." Approximately 20 seconds later, the pilot stated, "I'm back on glideslope." No further communications were received from the accident airplane. The controller issued another low altitude warning, and the radar target was lost. The accident site was located on a hilly, grass field at an elevation of 6,120 feet approximately 2.6 nautical miles from the runway threshold near the extended centerline of the runway. At 2027, the weather conditions at the airport were reported as wind from 360 degrees at 10 knots, visibility 2 statute miles with decreasing rain, scattered clouds at 500 feet, broken clouds at 1,100 feet, and an overcast ceiling at 2,800 feet. An acquaintance of the pilot, who had flown with him on other occasions, provided limited information about the pilot's proficiency, but stated, "a night ILS in IFR conditions would not be [the pilot's] first choice if he had an option." The pilot's logbooks were not located. The pilot did not hold a valid medical certificate at the time of the accident, and postaccident toxicological test revealed the presence of unreported prescription medications. No anomalies were noted with the airframe and engines. Ground inspection and flight testing of the airport's navigational equipment revealed that the equipment functioned satisfactorily.

Henry Guenther

The aircraft was on an IFR clearance and climbing through a cloud layer when it broke up in flight following an in-flight upset. The weather conditions included multiple cloud layers from 4,000 to 13,000 feet, with a freezing level around 7,000 feet msl. An AIRMET was in effect for occasional moderate rime to mixed icing-in-clouds and in-precipitation below 18,000 feet. As the airplane began to intercept a victor airway, climbing at about 2,000 feet per minute (fpm), and passing through 6,700 feet, the airplane began a series of heading and altitude changes that were not consistent with its ATC clearances. The airplane turned right and climbed to 8,600 feet, then turned left and descended to 8,000 feet. The airplane then turned right and climbed to 8,500 feet, where it began a rapidly descending right turn. At 1034:33, as the aircraft was descending through 7,000 feet, the pilot advised ATC "four Juliet victor I just lost my needle give me..." No further transmissions were received from the accident airplane and the last radar return showed it descending through 3,200 feet at about 11,000 fpm. Analysis of radar data shows the airplane was close to Vmo at the last Mode C return. Ground witnesses saw the airplane come out of the clouds in a high speed spiral descent just before it broke up about 1,000 feet agl. Examination of the wreckage showed that all structural failures were the result of overload. The aircraft was equipped with full flight instruments on both the left and right sides of the cockpit; however, the flight director system attitude director indicator and horizontal situation indicator were only on the left side. The aircraft was also equipped for flight into known icing conditions, with in part, heated pitot tubes (left and right sides), static sources, and stall warning vanes. During the on-scene cockpit examination, except for the pitot heat switches, the cockpit controls and switches were found to be configured in positions consistent with the aircraft's phase of flight prior to the in-flight upset. The right pitot heat switch was found in the ON position, while the left switch was in the OFF position. The left pitot heat switch toggle lever was noticeably displaced to the left by impact with an object in the cockpit. With the exception of the left pitot heat, the anti-ice and deice system switches were all configured for flight in icing conditions. The pitot heat switches, noted to be of the circuit breaker type (functions as both a toggle switch and circuit breaker), were removed from the panel and sent to a laboratory for examination and testing. Low power stereoscopic examination of the switches found that the right switch was intact, while the toggle lever mechanism of the left switch was broken loose from the housing. Microscopic examination of the left switches housing fracture surface revealed imbedded debris and wear marks indicative of an old fracture predating the accident. The broken left switch could be electrically switched by physically holding the toggle lever mechanism in the appropriate ON or OFF position. The electrical contact resistance measurements of the left switch varied between 0.3 and 1.4 ohms, and was noted to be intermittently open with the switch in the ON position. Both switches were then disassembled. While particulate debris was found in both switches, the left one had a significant amount of large coarse fibrous lint-like debris. The flexible copper conductor of the left switches circuit breaker section had several broken strands, and the electrical contacts were dirty. The laboratory report concluded that the left switches toggle was bent to the left in the impact sequence; however, the housing fracture predated the accident and allowed an internal build-up of large coarse fibrous lint-like debris. The combined effects of the broken housing, the resulting misalignment of the toggle mechanism, the dirty contacts, and the large coarse lint debris prevented reliable electrical switching of the device and presented the opportunity for intermittently open electrical contacts. Continuity of the plumbing from the pitot tubes and static ports to their respective instruments was verified. Electrical continuity was established from the bus power sources through the circuit breakers and switches to the heating elements of the pitot tubes and static sources. The heating elements were connected to a 12-volt battery and the operation of the heating elements verified.

Aerohawk Aviation

The accident aircraft had recently had maintenance work performed on its autofeather system pressure sensing switches, due to reports of the left engine not autofeathering properly in flight. The purpose of the accident flight was to verify proper inflight operation of the autofeather system following the maintenance work on the autofeather pressure sensing switches and a successful ground check of the autofeather system. Air traffic control (ATC) communications recordings disclosed that the pilot called ready for takeoff from runway 2 approximately 1207, and requested to orbit above the airport at 8,000 feet (note: the airport elevation is 4,740 feet.) The pilot subsequently reported established in a hold above the airport at 8,000 feet approximately 1213, and was instructed by ATC to report leaving the hold. Approximately 1215, an abbreviated radio transmission, "zero five four," was recorded. The Idaho Falls tower controller responded to this call but never got a response in return from the accident aircraft, despite repeated efforts to contact the aircraft. Witnesses reported that the aircraft banked to the left, or to the west, and that it entered a spiral from this bank and crashed (one witness reported the aircraft was flying at 200 to 300 feet above ground level when it entered this bank, and that it performed a "skidding" or "sliding" motion part way through the bank, about 1 second before entering the spiral.) The aircraft crashed about 2 miles north of the airport. On-site examination disclosed wreckage and impact signatures consistent with an uncontrolled, relatively low-speed, moderate to steep (i.e. greater than 22 degrees) angle, left-wing-low impact on an easterly flight path. No evidence of flight control system malfunction was found, and a large quantity of jet fuel was noted to be aboard the aircraft. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's engines indicated that the left engine was most likely operating in a low power range and the right engine was most likely operating in a mid to high power range at impact, but no indications of any anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal operation of the engines prior to impact was found. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's propellers disclosed indications that 1) both propellers were rotating at impact, 2) neither propeller was at or near the feather position at impact, 3) both propellers were being operated with power at impact (exact amount unknown), 4) both propellers were operating at approximately 14º to 20º blade angle at impact, and 5) there were no propeller failures prior to impact. Post-accident examination of the autofeather pressure sensing switches disclosed evidence of alterations, tampering, or modifications made in the field on all but one switch (a replacement switch, which had been installed just before the accident flight during maintenance) installed on the aircraft at the time of the accident. All switches except for the replacement switch operated outside their design pressure specifications; the replacement switch operated within design pressure specifications. Examination of the switches indicated that all switches were installed in the correct positions relative to high- or low-pressure switch installations. Engineering analyses of expected autofeather system performance with the switches operating at their "as-found" pressure settings (vice at design pressure specifications) did not indicate a likelihood of any anomalous or abnormal autofeather system operation with the autofeather switches at their "as-found" pressure settings. Also, cockpit light and switch evidence indicated that the autofeather system was not activated at the time of impact. The combination of probable engine power and propeller pitch on the left engine (as per the post-accident engine and propeller teardown results) was noted to be generally consistent with the "zero-thrust" engine torque and propeller RPM settings specified for simulated single-engine practice in the aircraft Information Manual.

Scan African Aviation

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a round trip from Dar es-Salaam to Ifakara, Mikumi and back to Dar es-Salaam, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. While approaching Dar es Salaam at an altitude of 4,000 feet, the right engine failed, followed few seconds later by the left engine. The pilot reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a banana plantation located about 20 km from Dar es Salaam. All eight occupants were rescued, among them two passengers were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Inductotherm Group

During preflight, the pilot noticed a discrepancy between his requested fuel load and what the fuel gauges indicated. He decided the right fuel quantity gauge was accurate and the left fuel quantity gauge was inaccurate, and started a multiple leg flight. Based on the right fuel gauge indication at an away airport, the pilot elected to not refuel prior to starting his return flight. About 50 miles from the destination, the left and right low fuel quantity lights illuminated, and the right fuel gauge indicated 390 pounds of fuel onboard. The pilot elected to continue to his destination. A few minutes later, both engines lost power. A forced landing was made in an open school field. Before coming to rest, the left wing struck a football training device, and the outboard 4 feet of the wing was separated from the airplane. Post accident investigation revealed, both fuel tanks, collector tanks, fuel lines, and filters were empty. When electric power was applied, the left fuel gauge indicated '0' and the right fuel gauge indicated 290 pounds of fuel remaining. The pilot reported that he should have monitored his fuel supply closer and landed at the first sign of any inconsistencies in fuel quantity readings.

US Dynamics Corporation

The pilot had received clearance for the ILS Runway 6 approach and was advised that the previous landing traffic reported '...breaking out at minimums.' Radar data revealed that the airplane descended in instrument meteorological conditions to the decision height altitude of 294 feet, approximately 3 miles from the missed approach point. The pilot did not perform the missed approach procedure. The airplane leveled off and continued at or below decision height altitude for approximately 28 seconds, traveling a distance of approximately 1 mile. Four low altitude alerts appeared on the tower controller's display. The controller stated he withheld the alert because '...it was a critical phase of flight and the aircraft appeared to be climbing...' The airplane collided with trees and terrain approximately 1.5 miles from the approach end of the landing runway.

Private German

The crew (one instructor and one student pilot) were completing a local training flight at Hanover-Langenhagen Airport. On final approach, the instructor shut down an engine to simulate a failure. The pilot-in-command lost control of the aircraft that stalled and crashed in a field short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were seriously injured. Few hours later, the pilot under supervision died from his injuries.

Aerowest Flugcenter

The twin engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Riga to Paris-Le Bourget with intermediate stops in Prague and Altenrhein. On approach to Altenrhein Airport, the aircraft lost height and crashed in the Constance Lake (Bodensee) about 4 km short of runway 10, off Rorschach. Three dead bodies were found few days later and the wreckage was located at a depth of 160 metres on February 7 only. The bodies of the pilot, a female passenger and a dog were never recovered.

Conquest Charter Corporation

The pilot stated that the airplane was cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet 30 minutes after refueling when the left engine lost power. He stated that he was in radio contact with Indianapolis ARTCC so he advised them of the situation and requested a lower altitude. The center cleared the flight to 10,000 feet msl. The pilot stated that his attempt to restart the engine was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter the pilot reported that the right engine lost power. According to the controller at the center, the pilot was nine miles from the nearest airport and he provided the pilot with radar vectors to the nearest airport, and the weather conditions. The airplane touched down in a wooded area. The faa examined the airplane at the accident site. The engines were removed to Pratt & Whitney for further examination. The examination of the engine and engine accessories did not disclose any pre-existing defects. Fuel samples were removed and tested at the laboratory at Pratt & Whitney. The tests revealed evidence of contaminants.

Ek-Pack Folien

On final approach to Leutkirch-Unterzeil Airport, the twin engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on a railway road located less than 500 metres short of runway 06 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.

Marina Aeroservice

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a ferry flight from Melilla to Málaga. While on approach to Málaga-Pablo Ruiz Picasso Airport runway 32, both engines stopped simultaneously. The pilot reduced his altitude and ditched the aircraft 80 metres offshore. The pilot was quickly rescued while the aircraft sank.

Maximo Air

The pilot departed VFR and flew to his destination and found it fogged in. He then requested and was given an IFR clearance for an ILS approach to another airport. He was observed to break out of the clouds at about 100 feet agl in a left bank and yaw. He then crashed short of the runway and to the left of the centerline. Examination of the airplane, engines and propellers revealed no preexisting failures. After the crash a fire partially consumed the wreckage. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

George N. Derenia

No record could be found showing the pilot received a weather briefing prior to takeoff. Unfavorable weather was in the vicinity. Several times the pilot had difficulties understanding and complying with instructions from clearance delivery, ground control, and departure control. After takeoff the pilot requested and received an IFR clearance. During the last five minutes of flight radar returns showed the airplane changing heading from 45° to as much as 180° about 10 times and descending or ascending several times from altitudes ranging from 4,500 feet msl to 11,500 feet msl. The altitude and heading changes were not directed by controllers. About 3 minutes before the accident departure control asked the pilot if he had a problem. The pilot indicated that he did and 'we're trying to get straight.' One minute later, the pilot said 'we're all right.' Shortly afterwards, radar data showed a loss of control. Radar and communications were lost and an on ground explosion was observed as the accident occurred. An FAA flight surgeon reviewed the pilot's medical records. Within one year of the accident the pilot had 3 physical conditions and was taking 3 separate prescriptions which would have prevented him from being medically qualified to pilot an aircraft. All seven occupants were killed.

FBG - Fahrzeugbetriebesgesellschaft

On approach to Hanover-Langenhagen Airport, the pilot encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Unable to locate the runway, he decided to initiate a go-around procedure when the aircraft lost height and crashed 200 metres short of runway 27R. The aircraft was destroyed and all seven occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 400 metres due to fog.

Morris Communication Corporation

The pilot detected an unacceptable sink rate on short final approach and initiated a go-around. After applying power and retracting the landing gear, the left wing dropped and struck the runway. The aircraft then ground looped and came to rest with substantial damage. The pilot escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Saint Hubert

The twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances near Lake Larouche. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Interstate Farm

The flight was cleared for a night ILS approach and advised that tower at destination had closed. Tower had reported at closing that fog was forming and the flight was advised of the fog. The aircraft was located on a remote part of the airport the next morning. The ELT had activated but the signal was weak due to crash damage. Passenger said they never saw runway lights, only taxi lights, and that pilot attempted to perform a go-around. Gear was retracted and aircraft hit level grassy area in a near level attitude. The pilot was not wearing a shoulder harness. The pax crouched in the aisle next to the pilot, helping him find the runway, not wearing restraining belts. No published approach plate for ILS procedure for that runway was found in aircraft. Toxicological report revealed pilot had 3 mcg/ml dextromethorphan, an ingredient found in over counter cold remedies. According to report, levels of that substance in blood greater than 0.1 mcg/ml was sufficient to cause drowsiness.

Taxair

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a charter flight from Bern to Düsseldorf, carrying one pilot and seven employees from the textile industry. Takeoff was completed from runway 32 partially covered with wet snow and after liftoff, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height and passed just over trees located from either side of the Aar River. Then the aircraft lost height, initiated a left turn then stalled and crashed in a snow covered field located near a wood, about 1,250 meters northwest of runway 14 threshold and 600 meters to the left of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

Jayhawk Aircraft Sales

During arrival, the pilot advised ARTCC that the destination airport appeared to be covered with fog. She then canceled her IFR flight plan. According to ground witnesses, the aircraft made several passes over the airport. Witnesses also reported that the horizontal visibility was nil, but they could see blue sky directly above. During the last pass, the aircraft crossed over the approach end of the runway with the gear and flaps extended, angling to the left of the runway heading. Moments later, witnesses heard the engines go to full power, then silence followed. The aircraft was found where it impacted rising snow covered terrain approximately 1/8 mile south of the midpoint of the airport. There was evidence that the aircraft was in a steep descending, right wing low attitude when it crashed. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found. A passenger was seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

Cessna Aircraft Company

The aircraft involved was experimentally configured with 4-bladed props and was on a test flight to determine handling characteristics following a throttle chop to idle power at 50 feet agl. This maneuver had been accomplished twice on the test flight without incident. On the third landing, the pilot later stated, that he retarded the throttles more briskly than on previous approaches. Observers on the plane and on the ground then saw a yaw and a wing drop. The right gear struck the runway first, followed by the left and nose gears. All three gear then sheared off. The aircraft slid to a stop off the runway 975 feet from initial impact. A postaccident teardown of the props revealed no preexisting misadjustments or abnormalities.

Donald J. Moore

The pilot stated that he was utilizing the autopilot and flight director to execute the ILS approach to runway 32. The autopilot was tracking the localizer while the pilot controlled the rate of descent along the glideslope with pitch command wheel on the autopilot, using the command bars as a steering reference in addition to the raw data glideslope needle on the hsi. All seemed normal, according to the pilot, until the aircraft struck trees about 450 feet above airport elevation two miles short of the runway and came to rest on the localizer centerline. A zero feet ceiling with an eighth mile visibility existed at the airport. During the investigations, it was determined that the 1000 a ifcs will not provide vertical steering commands as operated by the pilot, but is driven by the pitch wheel. This is not specifically stated in the poh. The pilot had flown extensively with the 800 series ifcs which will provide the expected steering commands. Extensive damage precluded a functional test of the raw data glideslope needle. Both occupants were slightly injured.

Blue Conquest Aviation

During arrival, there were indefinite delays at White Plains, NY, so the pilot diverted to Newburgh, NY. He was vectored for an ILS runway 09 approach. While en route, the pilot requested and was given the ILS frequency, minimums for the approach, the airport elevation (491 feet msl), the Newburgh weather and the frequency for the outer compass locator (even tho, current approach charts were on board). He was cleared for the approach, but the aircraft hit trees and crashed, 2.58 miles west of runway 09. Elevation of the crash site was about 580 feet. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 682 feet. An exam of the wreckage revealed no preimpact part malfunction or failure. The pilot was required to wear lenses to correct his vision. The area forecast called for icing, turbulence, low level wind shear, low ceilings, rain, drizzle, fog and a chance of light freezing rain/drizzle. Reportedly the pilot received a full weather briefing, but was not briefed on sigmets Juliett 7 and Lima 4 which called for moderate to severe turbulence and low level wind shear and occasional moderate to severe mixed/clear icing in clouds and precipitations below 8,000 feet.

Synergistic Flights

On approach to Natchez-Hardy Ander Field Airport, the pilot encountered limited visibility due to low ceiling, fog and night. Following an incorrect altimeter setting, the twin engine airplane descended too low until it struck the ground and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.