Boeing 767-300

Atlas Air

On February 23, 2019, at 1239 central standard time, Atlas Air Inc. (Atlas) flight 3591, a Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, was destroyed after it rapidly descended from an altitude of about 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and crashed into a shallow, muddy marsh area of Trinity Bay, Texas, about 41 miles east-southeast of George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The captain, first officer (FO), and a nonrevenue pilot riding in the jumpseat died. Atlas operated the airplane as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 domestic cargo flight for Amazon.com Services LLC, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, Florida, about 1033 (1133 eastern standard time) and was destined for IAH. The accident flight’s departure from MIA, en route cruise, and initial descent toward IAH were uneventful. As the flight descended toward the airport, the flight crew extended the speedbrakes, lowered the slats, and began setting up the flight management computer for the approach. The FO was the pilot flying, the captain was the pilot monitoring, and the autopilot and autothrottle were engaged and remained engaged for the remainder of the flight. Analysis of the available weather information determined that, about 1238:25, the airplane was beginning to penetrate the leading edge of a cold front, within which associated windshear and instrument meteorological conditions (as the flight continued) were likely. Flight data recorder data indicated that, during the time, aircraft load factors consistent with the airplane encountering light turbulence were recorded and, at 1238:31, the airplane’s go-around mode was activated. At the time, the accident flight was about 40 miles from IAH and descending through about 6,300 ft msl toward the target altitude of 3,000 ft msl. This location and phase of flight were inconsistent with any scenario in which a pilot would intentionally select go-around mode, and neither pilot made a go-around callout to indicate intentional activation. Within seconds of go-around mode activation, manual elevator control inputs overrode the autopilot and eventually forced the airplane into a steep dive from which the crew did not recover. Only 32 seconds elapsed between the go-around mode activation and the airplane’s ground impact.

American Airlines

On October 28, 2016, about 1432 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 383, a Boeing 767-323, N345AN, had started its takeoff ground roll at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, when an uncontained engine failure in the right engine and subsequent fire occurred. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 161 passengers on board, 1 passenger received a serious injury and 1 flight attendant and 19 passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged from the fire. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The uncontained engine failure resulted from a high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk rupture. The HPT stage 2 disk initially separated into two fragments. One fragment penetrated through the inboard section of the right wing, severed the main engine fuel feed line, breached the fuel tank, traveled up and over the fuselage, and landed about 2,935 ft away. The other fragment exited outboard of the right engine, impacting the runway and fracturing into three pieces. Examination of the fracture surfaces in the forward bore region of the HPT stage 2 disk revealed the presence of dark gray subsurface material discontinuities with multiple cracks initiating along the edges of the discontinuities. The multiple cracks exhibited characteristics that were consistent with low-cycle fatigue. (In airplane engines, low-cycle fatigue cracks grow in single distinct increments during each flight.) Examination of the material also revealed a discrete region underneath the largest discontinuity that appeared white compared with the surrounding material. Interspersed within this region were stringers (microscopic-sized oxide particles) referred to collectively as a “discrete dirty white spot.” The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation found that the discrete dirty white spot was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in-service inspections using the procedures in place. The NTSB’s investigation also found that the evacuation of the airplane occurred initially with one engine still operating. In accordance with company procedures and training, the flight crew performed memory items on the engine fire checklist, one of which instructed the crew to shut down the engine on the affected side (in this case, the right side). The captain did not perform the remaining steps of the engine fire checklist (which applied only to airplanes that were in flight) and instead called for the evacuation checklist. The left engine was shut down as part of that checklist. However, the flight attendants had already initiated the evacuation, in accordance with their authority to do so in a life-threatening situation, due to the severity of the fire on the right side of the airplane.

LOT Polish Airlines - Polskie Linie Lotnicze

On November 1, 2011 a passenger LO 16 flight of B767-300ER airplane, registration marks SP-LPC, was scheduled from KEWR to EPWA. The Pre-Departure Check of the airplane was carried out by a ground engineer from a contracted service organization in accordance with Operator’s requirements. The ground engineer was responsible for conducting PRE-DEPARTURE CHECK and ETOPS CHECK. The above procedures did not include cockpit check. The ground engineer did not find any failures or irregularities and did not notice anything unusual. The flight crew arrived at Newark Liberty Airport at a time specified by Operator and in accordance with its operating procedures. When commencing the flight duty period the crew members were rested, refreshed, in a good psychophysical condition. They did not report overload by air operations. Upon arrival at the aircraft stand each flight crew member performed his duties as provided for in the operating procedures of the airline. CPT conducted Exterior Walk Around while FO conducted cockpit check. FO checked on-board equipment and the cockpit preparation for the flight. According to the flight crew statement no failures or irregularities were found. The crew deemed the airplane fully operational for the flight to Warsaw. The ground engineer from the contracted maintenance organization was not present in the cockpit during the flight crew preparation. During the flight CPT was PF and FO was PM. At 03:58:11 hrs the crew started the engines. The take-off took place at 04:19:08 hrs. After the take-off, during the retraction of landing gear and flaps the hydraulic fluid from the center hydraulic system (C system) flew out, which consequently led to pressure drop in this system. The pressure drop in the C system was signaled on the hydraulic panel – SYS PRESS and on EICAS - C HYD SYS PRESS and recorded by on-board flight data recorders. After completion HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE (C only) procedure contained in QRH and consultation with the Operator's MCC, the flight crew decided to continue the flight to Warsaw. The flight proceeded without significant distortions. Landing in Warsaw was to be carried out with the alternate landing gear extension system. This situation was well known to pilots due to numerous exercises carried out in a flight simulator. Taking advantage of the available time, the CPT and FO developed a plan for landing in accordance with the procedure contained in QRH and discussed an anticipated sequence of events. At 12:17 hrs, during approach to landing on EPWA aerodrome the flight crew performed the procedure of the lading gear extension using the alternate landing gear extension system. However, after the anticipated time the landing gear was not extended. The crew checked the correctness of execution of the procedure against QRH and again attempted to extend the landing gear. After failure of the second attempt to extend the landing gear with the alternate system the approach to landing was abandoned. At 12:22 hrs the crew reported to ATC inability to extend the landing gear and requested the Operator’s MCC assistance. Around 12:25 hrs the flight crew declared EMERGENCY. The airplane was directed to a holding zone. The Operator’s Operations Centre enabled the crew to communicate with experts. FO executed expert recommendations and checked the alternate landing gear extension switch and circuit breakers on P-11 and P6-1 panels. After that FO reported to Operations Centre and to CPT that the circuit breakers had been checked. FO also cycled (pulled and reset) the ALT EXT MOTOR circuit breaker as indicated by an expert. However, the landing gear was not extended. In the meantime pilots of two F-16s of the Polish Air Force inspected SP-LPC from the air and informed the crew that the landing gear was still in the retracted position but the tail skid was extended. After that information the crew attempted to extend the landing gear in a gravitational way, but it also ended in failure. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to extend the landing gear and due to low fuel quantity, the crew decided to carry out an emergency gear up landing. CC1 was instructed by Captain to prepare the cabin and passengers for emergency landing. During the preparation the passengers were calm, they carried out the crew instructions, there was no panic. Prior to the landing firefighters distributed foam over RWY 33 at a distance of about 3000 m. External services arrived at the airport (PSP and emergency ambulances). The plane touched down on RWY 33 of EPWA aerodrome (Figure 7) at 13:39 hrs. At the time of touchdown about 1600 kg of fuel (1939 liters at a density of 0.825 kg/l) was in its tanks, the engines were running and their recorded speeds were N1ACTL = 57%, N1ACTR = 38%. The plane was moving on RWY 33 along its centre line and stopped 42 m after the intersection with RWY 29. When the aircraft was moving, sparks were coming out of the right engine, and they were suppressed by the applied foam; then the engine caught fire. When the airplane came to rest, the crew evacuated the passengers and LSP extinguished the fire. During the evacuation none of the passengers or crew suffered any injuries. During the landing the aircraft sustained substantial damage, which caused its withdrawal from service.

Egyptair

EgyptAir Flight 990 departed Los Angeles International Airport, destined for Cairo, with a scheduled intermediate stop at New York-JFK. The aircraft landed at JFK about 23:48 EDT and arrived at the gate about 00:10 EDT. Two designated flight crews (each crew consisting of a captain and first officer) boarded the aircraft at JFK. The aircraft taxied to runway 22R and was cleared for takeoff at 01:19. Shortly after liftoff, the pilots of EgyptAir flight 990 contacted New York Terminal Radar Approach (and departure) Control (TRACON). New York TRACON issued a series of climb instructions and, at 01:26, instructed the flight to climb to FL230 and contact New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At 01:35, New York ARTCC instructed EgyptAir flight 990 to climb to FL330 and proceed directly to DOVEY intersection. About 01:40 the relief first officer suggested that he relieve the command first officer at the controls. The command first officer agreed and left the flightdeck. The airplane leveled at FL330 four minutes later. At 01:48, the command captain decided to go to the toilet and left the flightdeck. At 01:48:30, about 11 seconds after the captain left the cockpit, the CVR recorded an unintelligible comment. Ten seconds later, the relief first officer stated quietly, "I rely on God." There were no sounds or events recorded by the flight recorders that would indicate that an airplane anomaly or other unusual circumstance preceded the relief first officer's statement. At 01:49:18, the CVR recorded the sound of an electric seat motor and 27 seconds later the autopilot was disconnected. At 01:49:48, the relief first officer again stated quietly, "I rely on God." At 01:49:53, the throttle levers were moved from their cruise power setting to idle, and, one second later, the FDR recorded an abrupt nose-down elevator movement and a very slight movement of the inboard ailerons. Subsequently, the airplane began to rapidly pitch nose down and descend. Between 0149:57 and 0150:05, the relief first officer quietly repeated, "I rely on God," seven additional times. During this time, as a result of the nose-down elevator movement, the airplane's load factor decreased from about 1 to about 0.2 G (almost weightlessness). Then the elevators started moving further in the nose-down direction. Immediately thereafter the captain entered the flightdeck and asked loudly, "What's happening? What's happening?". As he airplane's load factor reached negative G loads (about -0.2 G) the relief first officer stated for the tenth time, "I rely on God." At 01:50:08, as the airplane exceeded its maximum operating airspeed (0.86 Mach), a master warning alarm began to sound and the relief first officer stated quietly for the eleventh and final time, "I rely on God," and the captain repeated his question, "What's happening?" At 0150:15, as the airplane was descending through about 27,300 feet the airplane's rate of descent began to decrease. About 6 seconds later the left and right elevator surfaces began to move in opposite directions. The engine start lever switches for both engines then moved from the run to the cutoff position. At 01:50:24 the throttle levers started to move from their idle position to full throttle, and the speedbrake handle moved to its fully deployed position. The captain again asked "What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?" At 01:50:26, the captain stated, "Get away in the engines ... shut the engines". The relief first officer replied "It's shut". Between 01:50:31 and 01:50:37, the captain repeatedly stated, "Pull with me." However, the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition (with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down) until the FDR and CVR stopped recording. at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively. The height estimates based on primary radar data from the joint use FAA/U.S. Air Force (USAF) radar sites indicated that the airplane's descent stopped about 01:50:38 and that the airplane subsequently climbed to about 25,000 feet msl and changed heading from 80º to 140º before it started a second descent, which continued until the airplane impacted the ocean.

Lauda Air

Lauda Air Flight 004 (NG004) was a scheduled passenger flight from Hong Kong to Vienna, Austria with an en route stop in Bangkok, Thailand. The flight departed Bangkok at 1602 hours on May 26, 1991 for the final flight sector to Vienna Austria. All pre-flight, ground, and flight operations appear routine until five minutes and forty five seconds after the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sounds of engine power being advanced for takeoff. At this point a discussion ensued between the crew members regarding an event later identified as a crew alert associated with a thrust reverser isolation valve. The crew discussed this alert for some four and one half minutes. The Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) was consulted to determine appropriate crew actions in response to the alert. No actions were required, and none were identified as being taken. Ten minutes and twenty seconds into the flight the co-pilot advised the pilot-in-command of the need for rudder trim to the left. The pilot-in-command acknowledged the co-pilot's statement. Fifteen minutes and one second into the flight, the co-pilot stated "ah reverser's deployed." Sounds similar to airframe shuddering were then heard on the CVR. Twenty nine seconds later the CVR recording ended with multiple sounds thought to be structural breakup. Flight conditions were recovered from non-volatile memory in the left engine electronic engine control (EEC). At the suspected point of reverser deployment, the EEC readout indicated that the airplane was at an approximate altitude of 24,700 feet, a speed of Mach 0.78, and developing climb power. The airplane crashed in mountainous jungle terrain at 14 degrees 44 minutes North latitude and 99 degrees 27 minutes East longitude at approximately 1617 hours. Night time visual meteorological conditions prevailed. All 223 occupants were killed.