Antonov AN-12
Safety Rating
9.4/10Total Incidents
173
Total Fatalities
1107
Incident History
Grodno Aircompany
The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight, carrying two passengers, seven crew members and a load consisting of foods. While on a night approach to Irkutsk-Intl Airport Runway 30, the crew encountered poor visibility due to snow falls. On final, at a height of about 240 metres, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure when the aircraft impacted trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 3,1 km short of runway 30. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all nine occupants were killed.
Ukraine Air Alliance
On 03.10.2019, the crew of An-12BK UR-CAH aircraft operated by PJSC «AIRLINE «UKRAINE-AIR ALLIANCE», consisting of flight crew members and two aircraft technicians, performed flight UKL4010 en-route Toronto (Canada) - Toulouse (France) and at 06:15 UTC, it landed at the Toulouse aerodrome (France). The plane delivered 1537 kg cargo to the Toulouse aerodrome (France). After the completion of post-flight procedures, the flight crew went to rest at the hotel, while the technicians remained on the aircraft to perform technical works. The next flight was scheduled from Toulouse to Birmingham airport (Great Britain). However, during the day, at the initiative of the operator, it was decided to change the route and perform the flight en-route Toulouse - Vigo (Spain) - Istanbul (Turkey). At the Toulouse aerodrome, the plane was filled with 6,000 liters of fuel. Also in Toulouse, a flight engineer was replaced. At 16:16 UTC, the plane took off from Toulouse to Vigo without cargo. Landing at the Vigo aerodrome (Spain) was performed on 03.10.2020 at 18:20 UTC. At the Vigo aerodrome, the plane was loaded with vehicle spare parts with a total weight of probably 14078 kg. From the Vigo aerodrome (Spain), the plane took off on 03.10.2019 at 22:20, flight UKL4050, with a delay of 2 h 20 minutes. On 04.10.2020, at 03:17:29 UTC, the plane approached the airspace border of the Lviv control area. The crew contacted the controller of the Lviv ACC of LVE + LVW sector and reported about the approach to waypoint MALBE at FL250. The controller informed the crew about the establishment of the radar identification of the aircraft and instructed to wait for the procedure for radar guidance to RW-31 using the ILS system. At 03:20:27, under instruction the ACC controller, the crew listened to the ATIS "Romeo" information as follows: “Lviv, ATIS “Romeo” for 03:20. The ILS approach at the aerodrome uses low visibility procedures. Runway in use is RW-31. Runway surface condition known at 19:53 - wet, clear. The measured friction coefficient is 0.55. Estimated surface friction assessed as good. Transition level - 110. Warning: large flocks of birds in the aerodrome area and on the landing final. There is no wind. Visibility - 150 meters; visibility range on the runway at the touchdown point - 550 meters, in the middle of the runway - 550 meters, at the end of the runway - 550 meters, fog. Vertical visibility - 50 meters. Temperature + 3º<U+0421>, dew point + 3º<U+0421>. Atmospheric pressure QNH - 1013 hectopascals, QFE - 974 hectopascals. Weather forecast for TREND landing: visibility sometimes is 400 meters, fog; vertical visibility - 60 meters. Attention: the frequency "Lviv-taxiing" does not work, while taxiing, get in touch with the "LvivTower" at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. Please acknowledge receipt of Romeo's information." ATIS information was transmitted in English. At 03:22:14, the crew informed the controller about the completion of listening to ATIS information and received clearance to descend to FL120. At 03:22:40, the aircraft began its descent from FL250 and at 03:28:35 switched to the frequency of the ACC controller of the LVT sector. After contacting the controller of the ACC of the LVT sector, the crew reported a descend to FL120 to KOKUP point. At 03:29:08, the ACC controller of the LVT sector instructed the crew to continue descending to an altitude of 10,000 feet at atmospheric pressure QNH-1013 hPa, reported the transition level, and instructed to wait for radar guidance for ILS approach on RW-31. The crew confirmed the instruction to descent to 10,000 feet, QNH, transition level and reported expectation for radar guidance. At 03:30:14, LVT sector ACC controller began radar guidance. At 03:32:49, the controller instructed the crew to descend to 4,000 feet. At 03:35:33, LVT sector ATC controller instructed to descend to an altitude of 3200 feet, taking into account the temperature correction. The procedure for temperature correction at determination of flight levels by an air traffic controller during the radar vectoring was published in the Aeronautical Information Publication of Ukraine, UKLL AD 2.24.7-1 dated 12.09.2019. At 03:38:33, the ATC controller of the LVT sector provided the crew with information about its location of 27 km from VOR/DME LIV, instructed by the left turn to take a 340º heading, cleared the ILS landing approach to runway 31 and gave the control instruction to inform of “the localizer beam capture.” At 03:40:01 (the height above the runway was 1170 m, descent rate: -4 ... -4.5 m/s, speed 352 km/h, distance from the runway threshold: 15.7 km), the crew reported of the localizer beam capture. At 03:40:09, ATC controller of LVT sector instructed the crew to continue the ILS approach to RWY 31. At 03:40:26, the controller informed the crew about the weather conditions at the aerodrome: RW-31 runway visual range (RVR) in the touchdown zone – 800 meters, in the middle of the runway – 800 meters, at the end of the runway – 750 meters, vertical visibility – 60 meters, fog. The crew confirmed receipt of the information. At 03:41:22, the ATC controller of LVT sector instructed to switch the communication to the ATC Lviv controller at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. There were no irregularities in air traffic servicing of the An-12 aircraft, flight UKL4050, during the flight in the area of responsibility of the TMA Lviv "LVT" sector. To enter the glide path, the PIC increased the vertical descent rate. At 03:41:47, the crew established communication with the Tower controller. The distance from the threshold was 11.3 km, the elevation over the glide path was 70 m, the vertical rate of descent was -5.5 ... -6 m/s. After communication with the air traffic controller, the crew reported an ILS approach to RW-31 and the atmospheric pressure QNH setting of 1013 hPa. At 03:41:58, the Tower controller informed the crew about the absence of wind on the surface of RW-31 and gave clearance to land. The crew confirmed the landing clearance. According to the recorders, at this time the distance to the touchdown point was 7.58 km, the plane was 11 m below the glide path, the vertical descent rate was -4.5-5.5 m/s, and the speed was 290 km/h, the flight heading – 315º. At a distance of 5.0 km to the touchdown point, the plane was 25 m below the glide path. At a distance of 3 km from the touchdown, the plane descended to an altitude of 105 meters and continued the flight with the constant descent. At an altitude of 60 meters, an audible alarm was triggered on board the aircraft, when the decision height had been reached, to which none of the crew members responded. At a distance of 1348 meters from the threshold of the RW-31, at an altitude of 5-7 meters, the aircraft collided with trees, fell to the ground and came to rest at a distance of 1117 meters from the runway threshold. All three passengers were seriously injured and all five crew members were killed.
Congolese Air Force - Force Aérienne de la République Démocratique du Congo
The four engine aircraft departed Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport on a flight to Bukavu, carrying ammunition and two vehicles. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew reported technical problems and was cleared for an immediate return. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a prairie located in Nsele, about 20 km northeast of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.
Silk Way Airlines
On May 18, 2016 the crew of An-12B 4K-AZ25 aircraft operated by Silk Way Airlines including the Captain, First Officer, navigator, flight mechanic, flight radio operator and loadmaster was planned to fly via route Baku (Azerbaijan) - Bagram (Afghanistan) - Dwyer (Afghanistan) - Mary (Turkmenistan) - Baku. There were also two maintenance mechanics and an engineer on board the a/c. The preliminary training of the crew was conducted on 29.12.2015 by the Chief Navigator of Silk Way Airlines. The pre-flight briefing was conducted on 18.05.2016 by a captain-instructor and a navigator-instructor. The following has been determined so far. According to the information available at the moment the flight to Dwyer aerodrome was conducted in an acceptable way. At 09:11:27 the crew started up the engines at Dwyer aerodrome, Engine #2 was the last to be started up at 09:47:37. Before the takeoff the Captain distributed the duties within the crew, nominating the FO as the PF, and himself as PM. After the engine startup the crew initiated taxiing to perform takeoff with heading 229°. The concrete RWY of Dwyer aerodrome is measured 2439 m by 37 m. The a/c TOW and CG were within the AFM limitations. In the course of the takeoff, at 09:57:56 the flight mechanic reported an increase in MGT of Engine #3 above the acceptable level: "Engine #3, look, engine temperature over six hundred, over seven hundred", which was confirmed by the FO: "Yes, it's getting temperature" while the Captain asked to be more attentive. According to the crew reports the takeoff was performed with Flaps 15. As the checklist was being read, the Captain ordered to lock the propellers. After the Captain's order to lock the propellers a slight increase in torque-measuring device values was recorded on Engine #1 and #4, and in 17 seconds also Engine #2, which indirectly implies that propellers #1, #2 and #4 were at stops. There is no evidence that propeller of Engine #3 was locked. At 09:59:42 the crew initiated the takeoff. Before the takeoff the ATC advised the crew on the wind direction and speed on the RWY: 280° 14 knots (7 m/sec) gusting 26 knots (13 m/sec). Thus it was quartering headwind and the headwind component might have been 5 to 9 m/sec. While performing takeoff the crew first increased thrust on Engines #1 and #4 and then on Engine #2 after 10 seconds. The thrust of the three engines was about 50 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (lower than takeoff mode). The third engine was still operating in the ground idle mode, though the CVR did not record any crew callouts concerning Engine #3 operation parameters. Based on the CCTV system of Dwyer aerodrome the takeoff roll was initiated almost from the RWY threshold and was conducted to the left of the RWY centerline. No significant deviations from the takeoff course during the takeoff roll were recorded. During the takeoff roll the rudder was deflected left close to extreme. Probably the pilots were also applying differential control on Engine #2 to decrease the right torque moment. At 10:00:14 at approximately 120 km/h IAS the "Engine #3 negative thrust" signal was started to be recorded and was recorded on up to the end of the record. At that time the a/c was about 430 m away from the start of the takeoff roll. At 10:00:42 Engines #1 and #4 thrust was increased up to 63 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (consistent with takeoff mode for the actual flight conditions). At that time the IAS was about 150 km/h Engine #2 thrust was increased up to the same value only 23 seconds later at about 200 km/h IAS. At that time the a/c was about 840 m away from the RWY end. Engine #3 was still operating in ground idle mode. Approximately 260 m before the RWY end at a speed of 220 km/h IAS (maximum speed reached) the FDR recorded the start of nose up input on the control column. The a/c did not lift off After rolling all along the RWY the a/c overran the RWY onto the ground at a speed of 220 km/h While moving on the ground the aircraft sustained significant damage, which led to post-crash fire that destroyed most of the aircraft structures. Out of the nine persons on board seven were killed and two were seriously injured and taken to hospital.
Allied Services Limited
After takeoff from Juba Airport Runway 13, the four engine aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height. After a distance of some 800 metres, the aircraft impacted a hill and crashed on the shore of the White Nile. Two passengers were seriously injured while 41 other occupants were killed, among them all six crew members. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were marginal with rain showers. South Sudan Authorities reported the aircraft was unable to climb because it was overloaded, and the captain reported to ATC prior to departure he was carrying 12 passengers. According to Antonov, the aircraft was not airworthy at the time of the accident because its owner, Tajik Asia Airways, was not compliant with published procedures.
Ukraine Air Alliance
The four engine aircraft was performing a cargo flight from Glasgow-Prestwick to Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with intermediate stops in Ghardaïa and Tamanrasset. On board were seven crew members and a load consisting of oil equipment. About three minutes after takeoff from Tamanrasset-Aguenar-Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, radio contact was lost when the aircraft crashed in a mountainous terrain located some 15 km south of the airport. The wreckage was found few hours later. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven crew members (six Ukrainians and one Russian) were killed.
Irkut
The four engine aircraft departed Novosibirsk-Yeltsovka Airport on a cargo flight to Irkutsk, carrying three mechanics, six crew members and a load consisting of 1,5 tons of spare parts for the Irkut Group (Sukhoi, Beriev) based in Irkutsk. On approach to Irkust-2 Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with mist and limited visibility due to the night. On short final, the aircraft deviated to the right and descended too low until it impacted military vehicles and crashed onto several barracks of the 109th Arsenal of the Russian Army, coming to rest 770 metres short of runway 14 and about 90 metres to the right of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed. There were no victims on the ground.
Ukraine Air Alliance
On 8 August 2013 at 1914 hrs the airplane, arriving from Stockholm, Sweden, landed at Leipzig/Halle Airport. After the landing it taxied to apron 2 to stand 207. On board the airplane were the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot, one flight engineer, one navigator, one radio operator, and two flight mechanics. The driver of the fueling vehicle stated that the airplane was refuelled between 0058 and 0121 hrs with 22,809 l fuel. The flight engineer stated that approximately at the same time the loading had occurred and was completed at about 0140 hrs. Between 2330 and 0100 hrs the airplane was loaded with 48,960 one-day-old chickens. They had a total mass of 3,061 kg. Take-off for the flight to Mineralye Vody, Russia, was planned for 0215 hrs. At 0201 hrs the engine start-up clearance was issued and the APU started. After the APU was running, engine No 1, outer left, was started. Once engine No 1 had reached idle speed the start-up for engine No 4, outer right, was begun. During engine start-up of engine No 4 the crew noticed a dull bang and the airplane jerked. The co-pilot, who monitored the APU instruments during engine start-up, had observed rotary speed oscillations and a temperature rise. A short time later the APU fire warning indication illuminated. The crew shut off the two already running engines and triggered the APU fire extinguisher system. One photo (see Appendix) shows a glaring light on the left fuselage side. At this time propellers 1 and 4 were turning; propellers 2 and 3 stood still. Video recordings show fire in the area of the left main landing gear. The co-pilot stated that the PIC had then opened the cockpit door. Flames were already visible in the cargo compartment. The PIC stated that he sent one of the flight mechanics outside for a check. He left the aircraft through the emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. After he had left the airplane, he immediately reported that the APU was burning. Subsequently, the three fire extinguishers located in the cockpit were handed down. In addition, the flight engineer and the second flight mechanic left the airplane; they confirmed the fire. Together the three men tried to extinguish the fire with on-board fire extinguishers. The PIC instructed the radio operator to report the situation to the tower. At 0207:45 hrs the radio operator reported the fire and requested the fire brigade. Around 0208 hrs the fire was noticed by other witnesses. They stated that the area of the left main landing gear was burning and that in this area on the left side below the fuselage some liquid leaked on to the ground. At 0208:01 hrs the tower alerted the fire station east. Half a minute later the fire station west was alerted. At 0209:00 hrs the tower announced the location of the fire. At 0212:06 hrs the first fire truck reached the airplane and undertook the first extinguishing attempt with foaming agent. The crew members evacuated the airplane through the front emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. Then they left the danger zone and retreated to a grassy area about 50 m in front of the airplane.
Air Armenia
The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight to the Shindand AFB, carrying a load of 4'700 pounds of voting documents intended to the US soldiers based at Shindand AFB. For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard and bounced. On the second touchdown, the left main gear was torn off. The aircraft slid for about 1,750 metres then veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a drainage ditch. While all six occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was destroyed by impact and a post impact fire. US Federal Voting Assistance Program published a notice on 24OCT2012, informing that mail consisted of voting documents for US soldiers covering the US Presidential Election of 06NOV2012.
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Safety Profile
Reliability
Reliable
This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.
