ATR42-300

West Wind Aviation

On 13 December 2017, an Avions de Transport Régional ATR 42-320 aircraft (registration C-GWEA, serial number 240), operated by West Wind Aviation L.P. (West Wind), was scheduled for a series of instrument flight rules flights from Saskatoon through northern Saskatchewan as flight WEW282. When the flight crew and dispatcher held a briefing for the day’s flights, they became aware of forecast icing along the route of flight. Although both the flight crew and the dispatcher were aware of the forecast ground icing, the decision was made to continue with the day’s planned route to several remote airports that had insufficient de-icing facilities. The aircraft flew from Saskatoon/John G. Diefenbaker International (CYXE) to Prince Albert (Glass Field) Airport (CYPA) without difficulty, and, after a stop of about 1 hour, proceeded on toward Fond-du-Lac Airport (CZFD). On approach to Fond-du-Lac Airport, the aircraft encountered some in-flight icing, and the crew activated the aircraft’s anti-icing and de-icing systems. Although the aircraft’s ice protection systems were activated, the aircraft’s de-icing boots were not designed to shed all of the ice that can accumulate, and the anti-icing systems did not prevent ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces. As a result, some residual ice began to accumulate on the aircraft. The flight crew were aware of the ice; however, there were no handling anomalies noted during the approach. Consequently, they likely did not assess that the residual ice was severe enough to have a significant effect on aircraft performance. The crew continued the approach and landed at Fond-du-Lac Airport at 1724 Central Standard Time. According to post-accident analysis of the data from the flight data recorder, the aircraft’s drag and lift performance was degraded by 28% and 10%, respectively, shortly before landing at Fond-du-Lac Airport. This indicated that the aircraft had significant residual ice adhering to its structure upon arrival. However, this data was not available to the flight crew at the time of landing. The aircraft was on the ground at Fond-du-Lac Airport for approximately 48 minutes. The next flight was destined for Stony Rapids Airport (CYSF), Saskatchewan, with 3 crew members (2 pilots and 1 flight attendant) and 22 passengers on board. Although there was no observable precipitation or fog while the aircraft was on the ground, weather conditions were conducive to ice or frost formation. This, combined with the residual mixed ice on the aircraft, which acted as nucleation sites that allowed the formation of ice crystals, resulted in the formation of additional ice or frost on the aircraft’s critical surfaces. Once the passengers had boarded the aircraft, the first officer completed an external inspection of the aircraft. However, because the available inspection equipment was inadequate, the first officer’s ice inspection consisted only of walking around the aircraft and looking at the left wing from the top of the stairs at the left rear door, without the use of a flashlight on the dimly lit apron. Although he was unaware of the full extent of the ice and the ongoing accretion, the first officer did inform the captain that there was some ice on the aircraft. The captain did not inspect the aircraft himself, nor did he attempt to have it de-iced; rather, he and the first officer continued with departure preparations. Company departures from remote airports, such as Fond-du-Lac, with some amount of surface contamination on the aircraft’s critical surfaces had become common practice, in part due to the inadequacy of de-icing equipment or services at these locations. The past success of these adaptations resulted in this unsafe practice becoming normalized and this normalization influenced the flight crew’s decision to depart. Although the flight crew were aware of icing on the aircraft’s critical surfaces, they decided that the occurrence departure could be accomplished safely. Their decision to continue with the original plan to depart was influenced by continuation bias, as they perceived the initial and sustained cues that supported their plan as more compelling than the later cues that suggested another course of action. At 1812 Central Standard Time, in the hours of darkness, the aircraft began its take-off roll on Runway 28, and, 30 seconds later, it was airborne. As a result of the ice that remained on the aircraft following the approach and the additional ice that had accreted during the ground stop, the aircraft’s drag was increased by 58% and its lift was decreased by 25% during the takeoff. Despite this degraded performance, the aircraft initially climbed; however, immediately after liftoff, the aircraft began to roll to the left without any pilot input. This roll was as a result of asymmetric lift distribution due to uneven ice contamination on the aircraft. Following the uncommanded roll, the captain reacted as if the aircraft was an uncontaminated ATR 42, with the expectation of normal handling qualities and dynamic response characteristics; however, due to the contamination, the aircraft had diminished roll damping resulting in unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response. Although the investigation determined that the ailerons had sufficient roll control authority to counteract the asymmetric lift, due to the unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response, the roll disturbance developed into an oscillation with growing magnitude and control in the roll axis was lost. This loss of control in the roll axis, which corresponds with the known risks associated with taking off with ice contamination, ultimately led to the aircraft colliding with terrain 17 seconds after takeoff. The aircraft collided with the ground in a relatively level pitch, with a bank angle of 30° left. As a result of the sudden vertical deceleration upon contact with the ground, the aircraft suffered significant damage, which varied in severity at different locations on the aircraft due to impact angle and variability in structural design. The design standards for transport category aircraft in effect at the time the ATR 42 was certified did not specify minimum loads that a fuselage structure must be able to tolerate and remain survivable, or minimum loads for fuselage impact energy absorption. As a result, the ATR 42 was not designed with these crashworthy principles in mind. The main landing gear at the bottom of the centre fuselage section was rigid, and, on impact, did not absorb or attenuate much of the load. The impact-induced acceleration was not attenuated because the landing gear housing did not deform. This unattenuated acceleration resulted in a large inertial load from the wing, causing the wing support structure to fail and the wing to collapse into the cabin. The reduced survivable space between the floor above the main landing gear and the collapsed upper fuselage caused crushing injuries, such as major head, body, and leg trauma, to passengers in the middle-forward left section of the aircraft. Of the 3 passengers in this area, 2 experienced, serious life-changing injuries, and 1 passenger subsequently died. The collapse of part of the floor structure compromised the restraint systems, limiting the protection afforded to the aircraft occupants when they were experiencing vertical, longitudinal, and lateral forces. This resulted in serious velocity-related injuries and impeded their ability to take post-crash survival actions in a timely manner. Unaware of the danger, most passengers in this occurrence did not brace for impact. Because their torsos were unrestrained, they received injuries consistent with jackknifing and flailing, such as hitting the seat in front of them. As a result of unapproved repairs, the flight attendant seat failed on impact, resulting in injuries that impeded her ability to perform evacuation and survival actions in a timely manner. Although the TSB has previously recommended the development and use of child restraints aboard commercial aircraft, planned regulations have yet to be implemented by Transport Canada. As a result, the occurrence aircraft was not equipped with these devices, and an infant passenger who was unrestrained received flailing and crushing injuries during the accident sequence. By the time the aircraft came to a rest, all occupants had received injuries. Passengers began to call for help within minutes of the impact, using their cell phones. Numerous people from the nearby community received the messages and quickly set out to help. The passengers and crew began to evacuate, but they experienced significant difficulties as a result of the aircraft damage. It took approximately 20 minutes for the first 17 passengers to evacuate, and the remaining passengers much longer; it took as long as 3 hours to extricate 1 passenger, who required rescuer assistance. As a result of the accident, 9 passengers and 1 crew member received serious injuries, and the remaining 13 passengers and 2 crew members received minor injuries. One of the passengers who had received serious injuries died 12 days after the accident. There was no post-impact fire, and the emergency locator activated on impact.

Trigana Air Service

An ATR 42-300 aircraft registered PK-YRN was being operated by PT Trigana Air Service on 16 August 2015 as scheduled passenger flight with flight number IL267 from Sentani to Oksibil. On board of this flight were 54 persons. This flight was the fifth flight of the day and the second flight from Sentani to Oksibil. The aircraft departed Sentani at 0522 UTC and estimated time of arrival Oksibil was at 0604 UTC. The Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Flying while the Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring. The weather at Oksibil reported that the cloud was broken (more than half area of the sky covered by cloud) and the cloud base was 8,000 feet (4,000 feet above airport elevation) and the visibility was 4 up to 5 km. The area of final approach path was covered by clouds. The flight cruising at 11,500 feet and at 0555 UTC, the pilot made first contact with Oksibil Aerodrome Flight Information Services (AFIS) officer, reported on descent at position Abmisibil and intended to direct left base leg runway 11. At 0600 UTC, Oksibil AFIS officer expected the aircraft would have been on final but the pilot had not reported, the AFIS officer contacted the pilot but did not reply. The AFIS officer informed Trigana in Sentani that they had lost contact with IL267. The aircraft wreckage was found on a ridge of Tanggo Mountain, Okbape District, Oksibil at approximately 8,300 feet AMSL at coordinates of 04°49’17.34” S, 140°29’51.18” E, approximately 10 NM from Oksibil Aerodrome on bearing of 306°. All occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact force and post impact fire. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder were recovered and transported to KNKT recorder facility. The recovery of FDR data was unsuccessful while the recovery of CVR data successfully retrieved accident flight data. The CVR did not record any crew briefing, checklist reading not EGPWS warning prior to impact. The CVR also did not record EGPWS altitude call out on two previous flights. The investigation concluded that the EGPWS was probably not functioning.

Calm Air International

Following an uneventful flight from Thompson, the crew completed the approach and landing at Churchill Airport. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure and was vacating the runway when the right main gear collapsed. This caused the right propeller and the right wing to struck the ground. The aircraft was stopped and all five occupants evacuated safely. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Niugini Cargo

On 19 October 2013, an Avions de Transport Régional ATR42-320 freighter, registered P2-PXY (PXY) and operated by Air Niugini, was scheduled to fly from Madang to Tabubil, Western Province, as flight PX2900 carrying a load tobacco for a client company. There were three persons on board; the pilot in command (PIC), a copilot, and a PNG experienced DHC-8 captain whose function was to provide guidance during the approach into Tabubil. The PIC was the handling pilot and the copilot was the support monitoring pilot. The flight crew taxied to the threshold end of runway 25 intending to use the full length of the runway. The take-off roll was normal until the PIC tried to rotate at VR (speed for rotation, which the flight crew had calculated to be 102 knots). He subsequently reported that the controls felt very heavy in pitch and he could not pull the control column back in the normal manner. Flight data recorder (FDR) information indicated that approximately 2 sec later the PIC aborted the takeoff and selected full reverse thrust. He reported later that he had applied full braking. It was not possible to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway and it continued over the embankment at the end of the runway and the right wing struck the perimeter fence. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the accident by the impact, the post-impact fire and partial immersion in salt water. The right outboard wing section was completely burned, and the extensively damaged and burnt right engine fell off the wing into the water. Both propellers were torn from the engine shafts and destroyed by the impact forces.

Blue Islands

The crew, comprising a commander, co-pilot and cabin crewmember, reported for duty at 0620 hrs at Guernsey Airport. The commander was conducting line training of the co-pilot, a first officer who had recently joined the companyThe first sector was to be from Guernsey to Jersey. No problems were identified during the pre-flight preparation and the aircraft departed on time at 0705 hrs, with the commander acting as handling pilot. The short flight was without incident and the weather for landing was reported as good, with the wind from 210° at 16 kt, FEW cloud at 2,000 ft and visibility in excess of 10 km. The commander elected to carry out a visual approach to Runway 27 at Jersey, using a planned approach speed of 107 kt and flap 30 selected for landing. During the approach, the gear was selected down and the flight crew confirmed the three green ‘gear safe’ indication lights were illuminated, indicating that the gear was locked in the down position. The commander reported that both the approach and touchdown seemed normal, with the crosswind from the left resulting in the left main gear touching first. Just after touchdown both pilots heard a noise and the commander stated the aircraft appeared to settle slightly differently from usual. This made him believe that a tyre had burst. The cabin crew member also heard a noise after touchdown which she too thought was from a tyre bursting. The commander selected ground idle and partial reverse pitch and, as the aircraft decelerated through 70 kt, the co-pilot took over control of the ailerons, as per standard procedures, to allow the commander to take control of the steering tiller. The co-pilot reported that despite applying corrective inputs the aircraft continued rolling to the left. A member of ground operations staff, situated at Holding Point E, reported to the tower controller that the left landing gear leg of the aircraft did not appear to be down properly as it passed him. The aircraft continued to quickly roll to the left until the left wingtip and propeller contacted the runway. The aircraft remained on the runway, rapidly coming to a halt to the left of the centreline, approximately abeam Holding Point D. Both propellers continued to rotate and the commander selected the condition levers to the fuel shutoff position and pulled the fire handles to shut both engines down. The tower controller, seeing the incident, pressed the crash alarm and airfield emergency services were quickly in attendance.

Conviasa - Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos

Following two uneventful flights to Santiago Mariño and Maturín, the aircraft departed Porlamar on a flight to Puerto Ordaz with 47 passengers and a crew of four on board. While descending to Puerto Ordaz, at an altitude of 13,500 feet and at a distance of 79 km from the destination, the crew reported control difficulties. After being prioritized, the crew was instructed for an approach and landing on runway 07. At 1021LT, the crew reported his position at 3,000 feet and 28 km from the destination Airport. Two minutes later, the message 'mayday mayday mayday' was heard on the frequency. The aircraft went out of control and crashed in an industrial area located about 9 km short of runway, bursting into flames. Three crew members and 14 passengers were killed while 34 other occupants were injured, 10 seriously.

Trigana Air Service

On 11 February 2010, an Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42-300 aircraft, registered PK-YRP, was being operated by Trigana Air Service on a scheduled passenger service between Kalimarau Airport Berau (BEJ) and Samarinda (SRI) as flight TGN162. There were 52 persons on board; two pilots, one engineer, two flight attendants, one flight dispatcher and 46 passengers (43 adults, one child, and two infants). The aircraft departed from Berau at 0230 UTC1 and climbed to Flight Level 140. Balikpapan approach cleared the crew to track from en-route Way Point LOLOT direct to Samarinda. After transferring to Temindung Tower, Samarinda, the crew was cleared to track direct to left downwind for runway 04. The controller informed them that the wind was 060/12 knots. The crew did not report any abnormalities and the aircraft operation appeared to be normal. During the final approach for runway 04, the left ECU light illuminated followed by low oil pressure and torque indications. The Pilot in Command decided to go around, divert to Balikpapan, and carry out the QRH engine shut-down procedure. They commenced the climb to 4000 ft with the left engine inoperative. Approximately 16 Nm from Balikpapan Airport, while climbing through 3,800 feet, the right ECU light illuminated, immediately followed by low oil pressure and low torque indications. The right engine then failed. The crew broadcast a MAYDAY to Balikpapan Approach and decided to conduct a forced landing into a clear field in the Samboja area, about 16 Nm from the Balikpapan Airport. The PIC gave instructions to the Flight Attendant to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. After the aircraft came to a stop the PIC initiated an evacuation.

Federal Express - FedEx

Aircraft was on an instrument approach when it crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injuries, and the first officer sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to FedEx Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo flight. The flight departed from Fort Worth Alliance Airport, Fort Worth, Texas, about 0313. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.

Santa Barbara Airlines

After takeoff from Mérida-Alberto Carnevalli Airport runway 25, the aircraft climbed in clouds when it collided with a mountain located 10 km northwest of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 46 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 4,100 metres.

Pantanal Linhas Aéreas Sul-Matogrossenses

The aircraft departed Araçatuba on a flight to São Paulo with an intermediate stop in Bauru, carrying 21 passengers and a crew of four. After touchdown on wet runway 17R at Congonhas Airport, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the aircraft collided with a concrete block housing the electrical device supplying the runway light system. On impact, the nose gear was torn off and the aircraft came to rest. All 25 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Minerva Airlines

Following a normal taxi procedure at Rome-Fiumicino Airport, the crew was at the holding point of runway 25, ready for departure. On board were 42 passengers and a crew of three. Both engines were turning at 70% torque. When the crew released the brakes, the swinging lever of the left main gear failed. The aircraft sank on its belly and stopped. All 45 occupants evacuated safely and there were no injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Total Linhas Aéreas

The twin engine airplane departed São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport at 0440LT on a postal service (flight TTL5561) to Londrina with two pilots on board. About an hour into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the autopilot disconnected while the crew was encountering technical problems with the elevator trim system. The captain asked the copilot to pull out the circuit breaker but this instruction was not understood immediately. Nevertheless, the copilot executed this request few seconds later. Shortly later, the aircraft nosed down and the Vmo alarm sounded, indicating to the crew that the aircraft's speed was above the maximum operating speed. The crew reduced the engine power to 10% but the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 366 knots in an open field located 38 km south of Paranapanema. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and both pilots were killed. Some debris were found at a depth of three metres.

Israir

On approach to Tel Aviv-Ben Gurion Intl Airport, the right main gear remained stuck in its wheel well. The crew informed ATC about the situation and continued the approach. After touchdown, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres then veered off runway to the right and came to rest. All 42 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Si Fly

Arriving from Rome, the aircraft chartered by the World Food Program was going to land at Pristina. The meteorological conditions at the aerodrome corresponded to visibility of 4,000 metres with a layer of compact clouds at 3,000 feet. In radar and radio contact with the military air traffic control organisation for an ILS approach, the aircraft, which was outbound to the north at an altitude of 4,600 feet, entered a sector where the minimum safety altitude is 6,900 feet and struck a mountain whose peak is at 4,650 while turning to return towards the airport. The wreckage was found about 15 metres below the summit, some 18 km northeast of Kosovska Mitrovica and 42 km north of Pristina Airport. All 24 occupants were killed.

Air Botswana

In the early morning, an Air Botswana captain boarded a parked ATR42 and took off without permission. While circling over the Gaborone-Seretse Khama Airport, the pilot contacted ATC and wanted to talk to several people, among them the company's President who was not available at this time. Negotiation started between the pilot and local authorities but after two hours, he decided to crash the aircraft on the apron where two others ATR42 of the same operator were parked. The aircraft crashed at a speed of 200 knots and exploded on impact. The pilot was killed and all three aircraft were destroyed. The two other ATR42 were registered A2-ABC and A2-AJD. There were no casualties on the ground as the airport was evacuated.

Pantanal Linhas Aéreas Sul-Matogrossenses

On approach to Mucuri-Itabatã Airport runway 05, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed the checklist, continued the approach and completed a safe landing. After touchdown, the aircraft slightly deviated to the right and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

ItalAir

The encountered high winds on approach and landing at Alghero Airport. Upon touchdown on runway 03, the aircraft encountered unfavorable winds and floated before landing 750 metres past the runway 03 threshold. The aircraft landed hard, nose gear first. The aircraft bounced and landed firmly 1,300 metres further, to the right of the runway. It lost its undercarriage and came to rest after a distance of 400 metres. All 25 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, crosswinds were gusting up to 42 knots.

Royal Air Maroc - RAM

Ten minutes after takeoff from Agadir-Al Massira Airport, while climbing to the altitude of 16,000 feet, the aircraft nosed down and entered a rapid descent until it collided with mountainous terrain near Ameskroud, in the Atlas Mountain Range, about 24 km northeast of Agadir Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 44 occupants were killed. Part of the left wing was found about 5 km from the main wreckage.

Aero Trasporti Italiani - ATI

15 minutes after takeoff from Milan-Linate Airport, while climbing to the altitude of 14,700 feet, the crew encountered severe icing conditions. At a constant speed of 133 knots, the aircraft first rolled to the right to an angle of 41° then to the left to 100°, again 105° to the right and finally 135° to the left. Out of control, the aircraft nosed down and crashed on the slope of Mt Crezzo located 50 km north of Linate Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 37 occupants were killed.