Loganair

Britten-Norman Islander

The Glasgow based Islander aircraft was engaged on an air ambulance task for the Scottish Ambulance Service when the accident occurred. The pilot allocated to the flight had not flown for 32 days; he was therefore required to complete a short flight at Glasgow to regain currency before landing to collect a paramedic for the flight to Campbeltown Airport on the Kintyre Peninsula. Poor weather at Campbeltown Airport necessitated an instrument approach. There was neither radar nor Air Traffic Control Service at the airport, so the pilot was receiving a Flight Information Service from a Flight Information Service Officer in accordance with authorised procedures. After arriving overhead Campbeltown Airport, the aircraft flew outbound on the approach procedure for Runway 11 and began a descent. The pilot next transmitted that he had completed the ‘base turn’, indicating that he was inbound to the airport and commencing an approach. Nothing more was seen or heard of the aircraft and further attempts at radio contact were unsuccessful. The emergency services were alerted and an extensive search operation was mounted in an area based on the pilot’s last transmission. The aircraft wreckage was subsequently located on the sea bed 7.7 nm west-north-west of the airport; there were no survivors.

Short 360

The aircraft landed at Edinburgh Airport, Scotland, at 00:03 and was parked there on Stand 31 in conditions including light and moderate snowfall. After preparation for a Royal Mail charter flight 670A to Belfast, start clearance was given at 15:03. At 15:12 hrs the crew advised ATC they were shutting down due to a technical problem. The crew then advised their company that a generator would not come on line. An avionics technician carried out diagnosis during which both engines were ground-run twice. No fault was found and the flight crew requested taxi clearance at 17:10. A normal take off from runway 06 was carried out followed by a reduction to climb power at 1,200 feet amsl. At 2,200 feet amsl the aircraft anti-icing systems were selected on. Three seconds later the torque on each engine reduced rapidly to zero. A MAYDAY call was made by the crew advising that they had experienced a double engine failure. The aircraft was ditched in the Firth of Forth estuary some 100 meters from the shoreline near Granton Harbour. Both pilots were killed. Weather reported just before the accident with a temperature of +2°C, dewpoint of -3°C, visibility of more then 10 km, broken clouds at 4500 feet and cover at 8000 feet.

Britten-Norman Islander

At 2300 hrs the two Tingwall fire attendants opened the airstripfor the returning flight. The airstrip lights were turned on and the fire appliance made ready. The firemen reported that,sometime later, the pilot radioed Tingwall asking for the wind speed and direction. This was passed as 090° to 120°/20 kt. One of the firemen also reported that at the time there was veryfine drizzle but the visibility was good. Analysis of recorded radar data from the radar head at Sumburgh confirmed that the aircraft routed over Lerwick and then flew north turning west inland over Kebister Ness. The doctor reported that, on approaching Lerwick he could see the lights of the town and the visibility was good enough for him to identify his house. The aircraft then turned southwards to join downwind right hand for Runway 02. The doctor stated that there were not many lights on the ground to the north of the airstrip but some to the south in the vicinity of Veensgarth. He also stated that the ride at this stage was moderately turbulent. At the end of the downwind leg the aircraft banked 'sharply' to the right to position on finals. It had, however, been blown through the centreline by the gusty easterly wind and was to the left of the required approach. The doctor confirmed that although the aircraft appeared to be at the correct height for its position he could see that when they were lined up the airfield lights were to the right of the windscreen. The pilot, unable to complete the approach, carried out a go-around to the left of the runway,climbed to 550 feet and turned right to enter the downwind leg again. The doctor reported that the engines sounded normal throughout this manoeuvre and the runway lights were clearly visible again as the aircraft became established on the downwind track. Several witnesses saw the aircraft fly downwind and turn onto the final approach. One witness, positioned on higher ground to the east of the runway threshold, stated that the aircraft flew downwind along the line of the houses at Veensgarth and 'asit turned it descended all the while'. Radar information shows that for this second attempt the pilot extended the downwind legby approximately 800 metres before turning towards the airfield. The rapid turn onto finals was described by the doctor as being very steep but without the increase in 'g' that he would have expected for such an steep angle of bank. The nurse described the sensation as 'the aircraft dropped, with my cheeks and whole body being forced upwards'. Throughout the turn the pilot was seen by the passengers to be generally looking to the right, presumably for the airfield. Seconds later the aircraft hit the ground. After the impact the nurse found herself still in her seat with the aircraft in an upright position. She was relatively uninjured and soon released her seatbelt, released her trapped right foot and struggled clear of the wreckage through the open right rear aircraft window. She ran around the tail section to the doctor and released debris from around his head. Unable to move him because of his injuries, she ran to a nearby house to summon the emergency services. The doctor, although seriously injured, remained conscious throughout and managed to clamber clear of the aircraft to lie on the round some ten feet from the wreckage. The pilot had received fatal injuries at impact.

De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter

Loganair Flight LC423 was a scheduled passenger flight from Glasgow Airport (GLA) to Islay/Port Ellen (ILY). The handling pilot, who occupied the first pilot's position, had recently converted to flying the DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft, and was completing a series of supervised route flights required by the airline before the award of full command status. A company supervisory captain, the designated commander for this flight, occupied the co-pilot's position. The Twin Otter's engines were started at 14:38, and, at 14:44, Glasgow Airport ATC approved taxy clearance to the holding point of runway 28. The aircraft was operating on a stored Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan. The requested routeing was a Standard Instrument Departure (SID), to join Airway Blue 2 for the Skipness VOR beacon, and thereafter direct to the Islay/Port Ellen NDB. The direct track is the 272° Magnetic (M) radial from Skipness. At 14:46 Glasgow ATC advised LC423 of their flight clearance. The requirement to fly the SID was cancelled and the aircraft was cleared direct to Skipness, cruising level FL55. The aircraft took off from runway 28 at 14:48. The aircraft reported a position overhead the Skipness VOR at 15:08. At this point Scottish Airways Control informed LC423 that they should clear controlled airspace, contact Port Ellen, and that there was no known traffic to affect their descent. After passing overhead the Skipness VOR the aircraft did not depart that position on the 272° radial, but instead turned 15° left, and descended on the 257° radial towards the south of the island of Islay. At 15:10, having already started to descend, LC423 contacted Islay/Port Ellen, reported an arrival time of 15:23, and requested details of the latest weather. The Islay/Port Ellen radio operator replied that the weather details were a surface wind of 220°/05 knots, visibility 2000 metres in drizzle, cloud 3 oktas at 400 feet, 5 oktas at 700 feet, and 8 oktas at 1400 feet. The sea level barometric pressure was 1018 millibars. LC423 acknowledged the information and was asked to advise when overhead the aerodrome at 3600 feet, or when in visual contact. The aircraft then continued to descend, on a track of about 260° M towards the south of the island, until it disappeared from radar cover at a height of 1400 feet and at a position 12 nautical miles (nm) from Islay/Port Ellen aerodrome on the 106° M radial. From the position that the aircraft descended below radar cover it is estimated that a direct track was flown towards the southern coast of the Isle of Islay. The flight continued at very low level parallel to the south coast. At 15:21 the Islay/Port Ellen radio operator transmitted further weather information which recorded that cloud conditions were similar to the previous report but that there was then heavy drizzle. Changes in barometric pressure settings were also reported. LC423 acknowledged this information and reported "over Port Ellen". However, the aircraft was not, at that time, over Port Ellen, but was in fact turning inland at very low level over Laphroaig. From overhead Laphroaig the aircraft settled on to a northwesterly heading and very shortly afterwards crashed into rising ground, that was obscured in hill fog, approximately 1 nm from the coast at a height of 360 feet amsl.

Britten-Norman Islander

Loganair flight LC 621 was scheduled to fly from Kirkwall, on Orkney Island, to the Islands of Stronsay and Sanday, departing from Kirkwall at 07:30. The weather at Kirkwall was predominantly misty with low cloud and thus unsuitable for an on-schedule departure; accordingly, the commander decided to delay the flight pending an improvement. Because there are no formal weather reporting facilities at Stronsay or Sanday, crews must rely upon the area forecast and on any informal information passed by the respective aerodrome attendants. At about 07:25 hrs, the two airfield attendants telephoned, in turn, to say that the weather at Sanday was suitable for landing and that at Stronsay the visibility was then about 1½ miles. At 07:50 the commander decided that the weather conditions at Kirkwall were now better than the published takeoff minima and that the flight could be conducted under the Visual Flight Rules (VFR). Accordingly, the BN-2 Islander took off for Stronsay with six passengers on board. The flight was uneventful and the aircraft landed at Stronsay at 07:58. There two passengers disembarked and three joined for the 6 mile flight to Sanday, which departed at 08:03. As they passed the south-west tip of Sanday Island, the visibility was 2 miles with very low patchy stratus and with a higher layer of cloud. The pilot therefore flew the route below the upper layer of cloud, at 300 feet amsl and at a reduced airspeed of 90 knots, compared with the normal cruising speed of 130 knots. When the aircraft was about 3/4 mile out from Sanday airfield the commander recognised the chequered marker boards near the end of the grass runway 03. He next saw the windsock, which showed the wind to be about 140°/15-20 knots, and slowly descended to 250 feet amsl (190 feet above the aerodrome) to position the aircraft downwind for runway 11. Whilst doing so, he lost sight of the airfield in deteriorating visibility and, as the cloudbase ahead appeared to be getting lower, he climbed away in a northwesterly direction and levelled off above the layer of cloud, at 600 feet amsl. Whilst establishing the aircraft on the track to Kirkwall, the commander noticed some areas clear of cloud about 3 miles off the northwest coast of Sanday. As, in the opinion of the commander, these provided a safe area for descent over the sea, he used them to descend to 300 feet again and approached the northwest coast at 90 knots with the intention of map-reading his way back to Sanday aerodrome. Having carried out the descent and the relevant aircraft checks the commander saw the headland, which he knew to be Whale Point, some 2-3 miles distant. By reference to his map he was aware that he could follow the road which ran in a southwesterly direction and then turn southeast to a specific point which would lead him directly onto the final approach to runway 11. However, having failed to recognise the turning point, he navigated by reference to his map around the south, east and north of the aerodrome in order to intercept the road running southwest and thus relocate the turn-in point to the runway. The commander stated that he was aware that the meteorological conditions were very conducive to the formation of carburettor icing, so he applied the normal period of carburettor heat to each engine just before the final approach. He then turned the aircraft onto the final approach and, not yet seeing the airfield, used the school - which he could see and knew to be almost directly beneath the final approach path - to align the aircraft with the runway. As the aircraft passed abeam of the school the commander was able to identify the runway markers of runway 11. By this time the aircraft speed had reduced from the 65 knots at which the approach had been flown, but the speed actually achieved is not known. The left wing of the aircraft then dropped and the aircraft established a rate of sink. The stall warning system activated and the application of full throttle could not arrest the descent before ground contact. During this final descent, the aircraft turned through 55° to the left and struck the ground in a manner quoted by some passengers as not very different from a normal landing, although at a point some 450 feet (137 metres) short of the runway threshold. Thinking that the aircraft had merely bounced on the ground, the commander left the power applied and attempted to climb away. With full throttle still applied, the aircraft continued through two barbed wire fences, across a small quarry and a shallow ditch. It finally came to rest, after passing through another barbed wire fence, some 1,065 feet (325 metres) from the initial impact point. The commander then closed the throttles and shut down the engines.

Britten-Norman Trislander

Upon touchdown, the tree engine aircraft went out of control and came to halt. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.