British Midland Airways - BMA

Boeing 737-400

British Midland Airways Flight BD092 took off from London-Heathrow Airport at 1952LT on a flight to Belfast, Northern Ireland. Some 13 minutes later, while climbing through FL283, moderate to severe vibration was felt, accompanied by a smell of fire in the cockpit. The outer panel of one of the n°1 engine fan blades detached, causing compressor stalls and airframe shuddering. Believing the n°2 engine had been damaged the crew throttled it back. The shuddering stopped and the n°2 engine was shut down. The crew then decided to divert to East Midlands Airport. The flight was cleared for an approach to runway 27. At 900 feet, 2.4 nm from the runway threshold, the n°1 engine power suddenly suffered a decrease in power. As the speed fell below 125 knots, the stick shaker activated and the aircraft struck trees at a speed of 115 knots. The aircraft continued and impacted the western carriageway of the M1 motorway 10 meters lower and came to rest against a wooded embankment, 1'023 meters short of runway threshold. 47 passengers were killed while all other occupants were injured, some of them seriously.

Fokker F27 Friendship

The BMA Fokker F-27 aircraft was engaged on crew training at East Midlands Airport (EMA). The commander, who was an experienced training captain, occupied the right pilot's seat and a first officer undergoing training for conversion to captaincy occupied the left seat as handling pilot. Another captain refreshing on type sat on the jump seat behind the pilots' seats, the intention being that he should move into the left seat after the first officer's training period. The weather was: wind 150 degrees at 7 kts, visibility 4 km and cloud 7 oktas stratus, base 1000 feet. The surface temperature was 2 °C and the QNH 1030. The training session began with a practice abandoned takeoff after which the aircraft took off at 13:08 and flew three practice ILS approaches followed by touch-and-go landings on runway 09, climbing to 2000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) after each takeoff. The runway in use was then changed and the aircraft flew a simulated asymmetric ILS approach to runway 27 followed by a missed approach (go-around) with the left engine throttled back. The runway was then changed again and an ILS approach to runway 09 was flown with the left engine still throttled back. This approach was followed by a touch-and-go landing during which both engines were brought up to full power. Very soon after becoming airborne the training captain again simulated failure of the left engine and the aircraft was climbed to 2000 feet amsl. Soon after the aircraft levelled off, the handling pilot commented on the large amount of rudder required to counteract the simulated failure of the left engine after takeoff. The training captain then said that he was deliberately putting more drag on the left side than would have been the case if the propeller had auto-feathered so that the climb performance corresponded better with that of an aircraft with passengers on board. He went on to say that if the handling pilot could cope with that extra drag, he could expect to control the aircraft if the failed engine auto-feathered because the rudder pedal force would then not be quite so great. The crew then began a procedural NDB approach to runway 09, for which instrument screens were fitted in front of the handling pilot. It was intended that the aircraft should be landed after the NDB approach for the pilot in the jump seat to take over as handling pilot. Decision altitude for the approach was 740 feet and touchdown altitude was 305 feet. It was company practice for beacon passage to be identified by the movement of the radio compass needle and, as the aircraft passed about one third of a mile north of the marker beacon inbound, descending through approximately 1300 feet amsl, the handling pilot said "Over the beacon now". No audio signal from the marker beacon was heard on the cockpit voice recorder. The landing checklist was completed during the following 20 seconds, including confirmation that the undercarriage was down, fuel heaters were off, two blue propeller lights were illuminated and fuel was trimmed up. 48 seconds after passing the beacon the aircraft reached decision altitude, and the training captain asked the handling pilot "How long and where is it?", to which the handling pilot replied "Got about a minute and ten seconds to go - should be straight in front". 22 seconds later and some 36 seconds before impact the training captain said "Why are we at 650 feet?" and pointed out that the handling pilot had allowed the aircraft to descend below decision altitude when he was, for training purposes, still in IMC. The handling pilot responded by saying "Intend going around then", or words to that effect. The training captain then said "Yes, well I'll let you see it now. There it is". As the training captain was saying this, the sound of an engine power increase was heard on the CVR, and, about 25 seconds before impact, the rpm of one engine was increased to 14,800 rpm, a setting 200 rpm below maximum continuous power. 10 seconds later the training captain was heard to say "Hang on, that's the - that's the field there. See it?" The handling pilot then said "Hold tight", at which point, some 13 seconds before impact, the CVR recorded the sound of another engine increasing power to 14,800 rpm. A moment later the handling pilot said "Haven't got it", and the training captain said "I've got it". The F-27 yawed to the left before banking steeply to the right. The aircraft struck the ground on the northern side of the Castle Donington motor racing circuit in a nose-down attitude, banked to the left and with considerable left sideslip. After the accident an accumulation of mixed rime and glaze ice was found on the leading edges of the wings and tail surfaces which had formed rough-surfaced horns one inch high above and below the airflow stagnation point. No ice was found on the flaps or landing gear.

Vickers Viscount

Shortly after takeoff from runway 28R at London-Heathrow Airport, while climbing to a height of 1,000 feet, the engine n°4 failed and caught fire. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an emergency landing on the same runway. For undetermined reason, the crew was unable to feather the propeller. Following a normal approach, the airplane landed and was stopped in flames after a course of several hundred yards. All 42 occupants were quickly evacuated and there were no casualties. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Vickers Viscount

The crew (two pilots and two flight attendants) was completing a positioning flight to Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport. Both pilots took the opportunity to make some training and decided to simulate an engine failure at takeoff. Shortly after liftoff at Manchester-Ringway Airport, while in initial climb, the crew shut down the engine n°4 and feathered its propeller when the airplane started to yaw sharply to starboard. Control was lost then the aircraft crashed inverted and burst into flames. A flight attendant was injured while three other occupants were killed. Crew: I. Wallace, pilot, † R. A. Weeks, copilot, † S. Wallis, stewardess, † Jane Timson, stewardess.

Vickers Viscount

On approach to East Midlands Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions (snow falls) and the captain decided to go-around. During a second attempt to land on runway 10, the pilot-in-command failed to realize his exact position when the airplane struck the ground 1,000 feet prior to the touchdown zone. Upon impact, the nose gear was torn off and the aircraft came to rest in a snow covered field, broken in two. All 53 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.

Canadair C-4 North Star

The aircraft was on a non-scheduled international flight from Manchester to Palma and return. It landed at Palma at 0220 hours GMT, was refuelled and took off for Manchester at 0406 hours GMT. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft from the right-hand seat and the flight was uneventful - between 0856 hours and 0900 hours the aircraft was descending for approach and landing and was being vectored towards the ILS localizer. At 0901:30 hours the flight was informed that it was 9 miles from touchdown and well left of the centre line and it was asked if it was receiving the ILS. The pilot-in-command replied that he was and would turn right a little. Shortly thereafter one engine, most probably No. 4, ceased to deliver power, followed some 15 seconds later by the other engine on the same side. The pilot-in-command took over the controls and just after 0903 hours the Controller told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown and asked if it was established on the ILS localizer. This message was not acknowledged by the flight and 7 seconds later the Controller asked if it was still receiving. The pilot-in-command then replied "Hotel Golf is overshooting, we've got a little bit of trouble with rpm". The aircraft's indicated air speed was then only 116 kt and its height 1 838 ft AMSL. The Controller then ordered the pilot-in-command to turn left on to 160'~ and climb to 2 500 ft QNH. He then asked the reason for overshooting and was told "We've a little bit of trouble with rpm, will advise you". At 0903:51 hours the pilot-in-command asked what the left turn was on to. The Controller noted that the aircraft had already turned through 25' to the right instead of to the left, so he ordered the pilot to continue turning right on to 020' and climb to 2 500 ft on QNH. This was acknowledged by the co-pilot. At 0904:41 hours the Controller asked the flight to advise when ready to recommence the approach. By this time the aircraft's IAS had dropped to 111 kt, its height to 1 287 ft ONH, and it had broken cloud and was seen by an eyewitness. Thereafter it flew below cloud in conditions of reasonable visibility. At 0905:26 hours the Controller told the flight that it was 7 miles from the airfield on a bearing of 040' and requested its height. The flight reported at 1 000 ft. This was the first indication to the Controller that the aircraft was faced with an emergency and after checking that the height given was correct he put full emergency procedure into operation at the airfield and ordered the aircraft to turn right on to 180 M, so that it would close the ILS localizer. At 0905:47 hoursthe Controller asked the flight if it could maintain height. The pilot-in-command now at 981 ft AMSL and only some 800 ft above the ground replied "just about". He was told he was 8 miles from touchdown and should continue his right turn on to 200% and maintain as much height as possible. At this point 341 ft of height were lost in 10 seconds after the IAS had fallen to 100 kt and the pilot-in-command said he was not able to maintain height at the moment. The Controller told him that he was 8 miles from touchdown and closing the ILS localizer from the right. At 0907:09 hours, the Controller informed the flight that radar contact had been lost due to the aircraft's low height and asked the pilot to adjust his heading on the ILS and report when established. The co-pilot replied that they had "the lights to our right'' and were at 800 ft, just maintaining height, and the pilot-in- command asked for the emergency to be laid on. At 0907:35 hours the pilot-in-command requested his position and was told 7; miles to run to touchdown. Half a minute later the Controller repeated that he had no radar contact, and cleared the flight for landing, the surface wind being 270°/12 kt. At this stage the PAR Controller, who had overheard that the Approach Controller had lost radar contact, saw a contact at the bottom of his elevation display, and told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown. The co-pilot then gave their altitude as being 500 ft. The terrain clearance was only 300 ft and the IAS was below 105 kt and falling. The aircraft was approximately on the line of the ILS localizer and heading for the very centre of the built up area of Stockport. A few seconds after 0909 hours the aircraft struck the ground more or less level in pitch, slightly right wing down, and slightly yawed to the right. From the evidence of two eyewitnesses who saw the aircraft just before the crash it was clear the pilot-in-command deliberately cut the power very shortly before impact and deliberately put the aircraft down on what was the only pocket handkerchief of relatively open space available, immediately before tall blocks of flats, the town hall, the police station, and Stockport Infirmary. Three crew members and 69 passengers were killed while 12 other occupants were injured.