Short 330

Air Cargo Carriers

The flight crew was conducting a cargo flight in instrument meteorological conditions. Takeoff from the departure airport and the en route portion of the flight were normal, with no reported weather or operational issues. As the flight neared Charleston Yeager International Airport (CRW) at an altitude of 9,000 ft, the captain and first officer received the most recent automatic terminal information service (ATIS) report for the airport indicating wind from 080º at 11 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 700 ft above ground level (agl), and a broken ceiling at 1,300 ft agl. However, a special weather observation recorded about 7 minutes before the flight crew's initial contact with the CRW approach controller indicated that the wind conditions had changed to 170º at 4 knots and that cloud ceilings had dropped to 500 ft agl. The CRW approach controller did not provide the updated weather information to the flight crew and did not update the ATIS, as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65X, paragraph 2-9-2. The CRW approach controller advised the flight crew to expect the localizer 5 approach, which would have provided a straight-in final approach course aligned with runway 5. The first officer acknowledged the instruction but requested the VOR-A circling instrument approach, presumably because the approach procedure happened to line up with the flight crew's inbound flightpath and flying the localizer 5 approach would result in a slightly longer flight to the airport. However, because the localizer 5 approach was available, the flight crew's decision to fly the VOR-A circling approach was contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP). The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 373 ft agl, and the MDA for the VOR-A approach was about 773 ft agl. With the special weather observation indicating cloud cover at 500 ft agl, it would be difficult for the pilots to see the airport while at the MDA for the VOR-A approach; yet, the flight crew did not have that information. The approach controller was required to provide the flight crew with the special weather report indicating that the ceiling at the arrival airport had dropped below the MDA, which could have prompted the pilots to use the localizer approach; however, the pilots would not have been required to because the minimum visibility for the VOR-A approach was within acceptable limits. The approach controller approved the first officer's request then cleared the flight direct to the first waypoint of the VOR-A approach and to descend to 4,000 ft. Radar data indicated that as the flight progressed along the VOR-A approach course, the airplane descended 120 feet below the prescribed minimum stepdown altitude of 1,720 ft two miles prior to FOGAG waypoint. The airplane remained level at or about 1,600 ft until about 0.5 mile from the displaced threshold of the landing runway. At this point, the airplane entered a 2,500 ft-per-minute, turning descent toward the runway in a steep left bank up to 42º in an apparent attempt to line up with the runway. Performance analysis indicates that, just before the airplane impacted the runway, the descent rate decreased to about 600 fpm and pitch began to move in a nose-up direction, suggesting that the captain was pulling up as the airplane neared the pavement; however, it was too late to save the approach. Postaccident examination of the airplane did not identify any airplane or engine malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Video and witness information were not conclusive as to whether the captain descended below the MDA before exiting the cloud cover; however, the descent from the MDA was not in accordance with federal regulations, which required, in part, that pilots not leave the MDA until the "aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal descent rate using normal maneuvers." The accident airplane's descent rate was not in accordance with company guidance, which stated that "a constant rate of descent of about 500 ft./min. should be maintained." Rather than continue the VOR-A approach with an excessive descent rate and airplane maneuvering, the captain should have conducted a missed approach and executed the localizer 5 approach procedure. No evidence was found to indicate why the captain chose to continue the approach; however, the captain's recent performance history, including an unsatisfactory checkride due to poor instrument flying, indicated that his instrument flight skills were marginal. It is possible that the captain felt more confident in his ability to perform an unstable approach to the runway compared to conducting the circling approach to land. The first officer also could have called for a missed approach but, based on text messages she sent to friends and their interview statements, the first officer was not in the habit of speaking up. The difference in experience between the captain and first officer likely created a barrier to communication due to authority gradient. ATC data of three VOR-A approaches to CRW flown by the captain over a period of 3 months before the accident and airport security footage of previous landings by the flight crew 1 month before the accident suggest that the captain's early descent below specified altitudes and excessive maneuvering during landing were not isolated to the accident flight. The evidence suggests that the flight crew consistently turned to final later and at a lower altitude than recommended by the operator's SOPs. The flight crew's performance on the accident flight was consistent with procedural intentional noncompliance, which—as a longstanding concern of the NTSB—was highlighted on the NTSB's 2015 Most Wanted List. The operator stands as the first line of defense against procedural intentional noncompliance by setting a positive safety attitude for personnel to follow and establishing organizational protections. However, the operator had no formal safety and oversight program to assess compliance with SOPs or monitor pilots, such as the captain, with previous performance issues.

Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces

On approach to Dodoma Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The captain attempted an emergency landing in a cornfield located near the Kizota district. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its nose gear and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 13 occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Air Cargo Carriers

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Greensboro, NC, the aircraft made a wheels-up landing on runway 18 at Myrtle Beach Airport, SC. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the main runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

SkyWay Enterprises

The airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions. The captain initially stated that the airplane was on the ILS approach with the engine power set at flight idle. About 300 feet above the ground, and 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the threshold, the captain made visual contact with the runway. The captain stated that the left engine then surged, which caused the airplane to yaw right and drift left. At the time, the airplane was in visual conditions, and on glideslope, with the airspeed decreasing through 106 knots. The captain aligned the airplane with the runway and attempted to go-around, but the throttles were difficult to move. The airplane began to stall and the captain lowered the nose. The airplane subsequently struck terrain about 500 feet prior to the runway. After the captain was informed that the engine power should not be at flight idle during the approach, he amended his statement to include the approach power setting at 1,000 lbs. of torque. The co-pilot initially reported that the engine anomaly occurred while at flight idle. However, the co-pilot later amended his statement and reported that the anomaly occurred as power was being reduced toward flight idle, but not at flight idle. Examination of the left engine did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Examination of the airplane cockpit did not reveal any anomalies with the throttle levers. Review of a flight manual for the make and model accident airplane revealed that during a normal landing, 1,100 lbs of torque should be set prior to turning base leg. The manual further stated to reduce the power levers about 30 feet agl, and initiate a gentle flare. The reported weather at the airport about 5 minutes before the accident included a visibility 3/4 mile in mist, and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. The reported weather at the airport about 7 minutes after the accident included visibility 1/4 mile in freezing fog and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. Review of the terminal procedure for the respective ILS approach revealed that the decision height was 200 feet agl, and the required minimum visibility was 1/2 mile.

Florida National Guard

The Sherpa departed Hurlburt Field AFB, Florida, on flight PAT528 to Oceana NAS, Virginia, carrying 18 passengers and a crew of three. While in cruising altitude over Georgia, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls, severe turbulences, windshear conditions and wind gusting up to 72 knots. The aircraft became unstable, lost 100 feet in three seconds then adopted a nose up attitude. Within the next 12 seconds, the aircraft suffered a positive aerodynamic acceleration then entered an uncontrolled descent, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in an open field. All 21 occupants were killed. Crew (171st Aviation Regiment Lakeland): CW4 Johnny W. Duce, CW2 Erik P. Larson, S/Sgt Robert F. Ward Jr. Passengers (213rd Red Horse Flight, Virginia Beach): M/Sgt James Beninati, S/Sgt Paul J. Blancato, T/Sgt Ernest Blawas, S/Sgt Andrew H. Bridges, M/Sgt Eric G. Bulman, S/Sgt Paul E. Cramer, T/Sgt Michael E. East, S/Sgt Ronald L. Elkin, S/Sgt James P. Ferguson, S/Sgt Randy V. Johnson, SRA Mathrew K. Kidd, M/Sgt Michael E. Lane, T/Sgt Edwin B. Richardson, T/Sgt Dean J. Shelby, S/Sgt John L. Sincavage, S/Sgt Gregory T. Skurupey, S/Sgt Richard L. Summerell, Maj Frederick V. Watkins III.

Streamline Aviation

The Short was departing Paris-Roissy-CDG Airport on a cargo service to Luton with two pilots on board. The crew were cleared to depart cargo stand N51 and proceed to runway 27 at 02:38. Around the same time Air Liberté Flight 8807 (an MD-83, F-GHED) also taxied to runway 27 for a flight to Madrid. At 02:44 the Charles de Gaulle ground controller asked Streamline 200 if they wished to enter runway 27 at an intermediate taxiway; the crew asked for and were granted to enter Taxiway 16. At 02:50:49 the tower controller cleared the MD-83 for takeoff: "Liberté 8807, autorisé au décollage 27, 230°, 10 à 15 kts.". The controller then immediately told the Shorts to line up and wait: "Stream Line two hundred line up runway 27 and wait, number two". As the MD-83 was travelling down the runway, the Shorts started to taxi onto the runway. At a speed of about 155 knots the left wing of MD-83 slashed through the cockpit of the Shorts plane; the MD-83 abandoned takeoff.

SAFT Gabon - Société Anonyme de Fret et de Transport

While approaching Booué Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. As a landing was impossible in such conditions, the crew decided to return to Libreville but en route, ATC confirmed that weather was poor and the crew decided to divert to La Lopé Airport. After landing on a wet runway surface (La Lopé runway is 800 metres long), the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance and overran. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed then the aircraft rolled for about 50 metres before coming to rest in a rocky area. All 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Government of Quebec

The two pilots were transporting Hydro-Québec employees in the aircraft to allow them to check electrical facilities in several villages along the Hudson Bay coast. The aircraft departed Kuujjuarapik, Quebec, at about 1444 eastern standard time (EST) on a flight to Umiujaq, Quebec, a distance of 86 nautical miles (nm) to the north. The pilot-in-command was flying the aircraft. After the take-off from Kuujjuarapik, the crew contacted the Kuujjuarapik Flight Service Station (FSS) to file a flight notification and request weather information. The crew received three weather reports for Umiujaq from that FSS. The flight was conducted at an altitude of 5,000 feet on an outbound track of 045 degrees from the Kuujjuarapik non-directional beacon (NDB). Thirty miles from Umiujaq, the crew commenced the descent. Seven miles from the village, the aircraft was at an altitude of 700 feet and the crew could see the ground. The crew used a global positioning system (GPS) waypoint to supplement visual navigation (before reaching a downwind position), and continued their step-down procedure to about 200 feet above ground level (agl) on a heading of 25 degrees magnetic (°M). At that altitude, the visibility was reported by the crew to be over one and one-half miles and the crew could recognize references on the ground and position the aircraft for landing. When turning onto the final approach to runway 21, the pilot-in-command initiated a turn with at least 35 degrees of bank angle, and the aircraft stalled. The pilot-in-command initiated a stall recovery and called for full power. The aircraft did not gain sufficient altitude to overfly the rising terrain, and it crashed. The two crew members and two of the passengers sustained minor injuries. They were given first aid treatment at the accident site by other passengers.

Atlantic Air BVI

During the takeoff roll at Tortola-Terrance B. Lettsome Airport, the pilot-in-command considered the aircraft behaviour as unsatisfactory and decided to abort. Despite an emergency braking procedure, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in the sea. All 30 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

United States Air Force - USAF

The Sherpa departed Fort Rucker-Cairns AAF on a training flight, carrying three crew members who were supposed to test the aircraft in special configuration. Two hours and 45 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 5,336 feet in good weather conditions, the aircraft became unstable and rolled to the right to an angle of 12° then to the left to an angle of 35°. It entered an uncontrolled descent before crashing in an open field located 4 miles north of Colquitt, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed. It was determined that control was lost while the aircraft' speed was 89 knots. Originally, the crew was supposed to simulate an engine failure at the altitude of 10,000 feet but apparently encountered problems as the aircraft' speed was dropping by the order of one knot per second before it became unstable. At the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft and its CofG were within limits.

Olympic Aviation

The crew started the approach to Samos Airport runway 09 in poor weather conditions. While flying under VFR mode in IMC conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Kerkis (1,430 meters high) located 25 km northwest of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 34 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor and the mountain was shrouded in clouds.

Fairflight

After being parked at Southend Airport for a long time without any maintenance and due to hydraulic problems, it was decided to ferry the aircraft from Southend to Biggin Hill. While taxiing, the nosewheel steering system failed and the crew lost control of the aircraft that veered to the left and collided with a parked British Air Ferries Vickers 806 Viscount registered G-APIM. Both pilots escaped uninjured and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.