IAI 1124 Westwind

Transenergie

On the 5th July, 2021 at approximately 3:45PM, EDT (1945UTC), an Israeli Aircraft Industries, (IAI) Westwind 1124A aircraft, United States registration N790JR, crashed a short distance from the end of runway 32 at the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), Treasure Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft plowed through airport lighting equipment at the end of the runway, hitting and breaking several trees along its path. A trail of aviation fuel and pieces of the aircraft and avionics equipment from the flight deck, were left behind before the aircraft finally hit a small mound (hill), spinning, hitting several additional trees, breaking apart and bursting into flames. The aircraft came to rest at coordinates 26°45’21.50”N, 77°24’7.26”W, approximately 2,000 feet (.33 miles) from the end of runway 32. As this airport did not have a fire truck or crash and rescue personnel stationed on site, assistance with fire services were requested from the town. Two firetrucks from the township responded, however, due to the location of the crash, and no access road available, the trucks were unable to reach the crash site and assist in extinguishing the blaze. The fire continued unimpeded, dampened only by the intermittent downpour of rain, which did not aid in extinguishing the blaze, but rather, only limited the spread of the fire to surrounding bushes. The raging fire totally destroyed the aircraft and much of the control surfaces and components in the direct area of the blaze. On July 6, a team of investigators from the AAIA and CAA-B were dispatched to the scene. Upon arrival of the investigation team, surrounding brush and trees, as well as some parts and components of the aircraft were still burning. Initial assessments pointed to a possible failure of the aircraft to climb and perform as required. Runway 14/32 is 7,001 x 150 feet with an asphalt surface and based on the distance the aircraft traveled from the end of the runway to its final resting place, the signature marking on trees and airport lighting fixtures struck by the aircraft, in addition to the ground scars, along with pieces of the aircraft beyond the runway, up to the final resting place of the aircraft, it appears the aircraft was approximately 2 to 5 feet about the surface and not developing any lift or climb performance, while developing full power over the ground, striking trees and brush along its path. Investigations uncovered the private flight with a crew of two (2), proposed a flight time departure of 2:10PM EDT from the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), with a planned destination of Nassau, Bahamas (MYNN) and an arrival time of 2:33PM EDT, according to flight plan retrieved from Flightaware.com. The flight plan did not specify whether the flight would be operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). According to witness statements taken at Treasure Cay, witnesses recalled two pilots entering the ramp after 3 pm. Witnesses also stated that one of the persons onboard advised customs that they will be departing for Marsh Harbor for fuel in the aircraft (N790JR).

Lionair Inc.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in an ambulance flight carrying one Canadian patient with Covid-19 and medical staff to Tokyo-Haneda Airport. While taking off from runway 06 at Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport, the aircraft went out of control and crashed near the runway end, by the West Service Road, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

Sundance Airport FBO

The two commercial pilots were conducting a personal, cross-country flight. A video surveillance camera at the airport captured their airplane’s approach. Review of the video revealed that, as the airplane approached the approach end of the landing runway, it began to climb, rolled left, became inverted, and then impacted terrain. The left thrust reverser (T/R) was found open and unlatched at the accident site. An asymmetric deployment of the left T/R would have resulted in a left roll/yaw. The lack of an airworthy and operable cockpit voice recorder, which was required for the flight, precluded identifying which pilot was performing pilot flying duties, as well as other crew actions and background noises, that would have facilitated the investigation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it was not equipped, nor was required to be equipped, with a nose landing gear (NLG) ground contact switch intended to preclude inflight operation of the thrust reverser (T/R). The left T/R door was found unlatched and open, and the right T/R door was found closed and latched. Further, electrical testing of the T/R left and right stow microswitches within the cockpit throttle quadrant revealed that the left stow microswitch did not operate within design specifications. Disassembly of the left and right stow microswitches revealed evidence of arc wear due to aging. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s lack of an NLG ground contact switch and the age-related failure of the stow microswitches resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment while on approach and a subsequent loss of airplane control. Also, there were additional T/R system components that were found to unairworthy that would have affected the control of the T/R system. Operational testing of the T/R system could not be performed due to the damage the airplane incurred during the accident. Toxicology testing results of the pilot’s specimens indicated that the pilot had taken diazepam, which is considered impairing at certain levels. However, the detected amounts of both diazepam and its metabolite nordiazepam were at subtherapeutic levels, and given the long half-life of these compounds, it appears that the medication was taken several days before the accident; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident and thus that his use of diazepam was a not factor in the accident.

Synfuels Holdings Finance

A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.

Pel-Air

On 18 November 2009, the flight crew of an Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A aircraft, registered VH-NGA, was attempting a night approach and landing at Norfolk Island on an aeromedical flight from Apia, Samoa. On board were the pilot in command and copilot, and a doctor, nurse, patient and one passenger. On arrival, weather conditions prevented the crew from seeing the runway or its visual aids and therefore from landing. The pilot in command elected to ditch the aircraft in the sea before the aircraft’s fuel was exhausted. The aircraft broke in two after ditching. All the occupants escaped from the aircraft and were rescued by boat.

Government of the State of Colima

The aircraft departed Toluca Airport at 1516LT on a flight to Colima, carrying five members of the Colima Government and two pilots. Fifteen minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 16,000 feet, the crew informed ATC about control problems and was cleared to divert to Morelia Airport via radial 160. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded and mountainous terrain located near El Devanador. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed. Crew: Mario Torres, pilot, Germán Ascencio, copilot. Passengers: Gustavo Vázquez Montes, Governor of the State of Colima, Roberto Preciado Cuevas, delegate secretary for Tourism, Ignacio Peralta, delegate secretary for Economy, Luis Barreda Cedillo, delegate secretary for Finances, Guillermo Díaz, Director of Tourism.

Air Ambulance by Air Trek

On July 2, 2004, at 1338 eastern standard time, a U.S. registered Westwind model 1124 corporate jet, N280AT, operated by Air Trek, Inc., as a Part 135 commercial air ambulance flight, impacted terrain and crashed into a building after departing from the Tocumen International Airport (MPTY), Tocumen, Panama. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. All six occupants on the airplane were fatally injured. A seventh person was also fatally injured on the ground. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Quito, Ecuador, and stopped in Tocumen for fuel. The flight was destined for Milan, Italy, via another fuel and crew-change stop at the Dulles International Airport, near Washington, DC. According to the operator, the airplane was flown with the two pilots and two flight nurses from Punta Gorda, Florida, to Guayaquil, Ecuador, on July 1, 2004. The airplane was refueled with 450 gallons of Jet A upon arrival, and remained overnight. On July 2, 2004, the airplane was fueled with an additional 150 gallons of Jet A, and subsequently departed for Quito, Ecuador. Upon arriving in Quito, two passengers were boarded, and the flight departed for Panama, where it would be refueled. The airplane was not fueled during the stop in Quito. According to the Panama Autoridad Aeronautica Civil, the flight landed in Panama uneventfully, and proceeded to the north ramp at the main terminal. The flightcrew requested from ground service personnel that the airplane be refueled with 600 gallons of Jet A. The flightcrew specifically requested that 500 gallons of fuel be added utilizing the pressure point fueling station, and 100 gallons be added to the auxiliary tank, utilizing a gravity filler port. After refueling, the airplane was started and taxied to runway 03L. An air traffic controller observed the airplane as it began to takeoff. He recalled that, "It pitched up vertically, the nose then lowered, and the wings rocked side to side. The airplane then veered to the right and descended out of view." A witness, who was located north of the accident site, observed the airplane veering to the right, before descending from his view. The airplane impacted the ground on taxiway Hotel, north of taxiway Bravo, and a fire ensued. The right wing and right engine separated from the fuselage and fragmented into multiple pieces. The vertical stabilizer impacted the ground, and separated from the fuselage. The main fuselage, left wing, and left engine continued across a grass field, where it struck an airport worker, and impacted a concrete wall. The airplane continued through the wall, and came to rest inverted inside a building. Airport crash fire and rescue responded to the accident, and contained the post crash fire within 3 minutes. The wreckage path was oriented on a heading of about 80 degrees. Ground scars on the taxiway were consistent with the right wing tip tank impacting the taxiway surface with the airplane in a nose high attitude, banked 90 degrees to the horizon. The scars continued forward, with the airplane rolling onto its back, collapsing the vertical stabilizer. About 35 feet beyond the vertical stabilizer impact point, scars were observed from the left tip tank. Debris from the cockpit and forward cabin area was observed in the grass area along the wreckage path. Airport personnel tested the fuel truck used to refuel the airplane for contamination after the accident. No abnormalities were noted. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C. for further review. The left and right engines, the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator, and the airplane's annunciator warning panel, were also retained for further examination.

Richmor Aviation

After passing the initial approach fix, during an instrument approach to the destination airport, radar and radio contact were lost with the business jet. One witness reported hearing "distressed engine noises overhead," and looked up and saw what appeared to be a small private jet flying overhead. The engine seemed to be "cutting in and out." The witness further reported observing the airplane in a left descending turn until his view was blocked by a ridge. The witness then heard an explosion and saw a big cloud of smoke rising over the ridge. A second witness heard a loud noise and looked up and saw a small white airplane with two engines. The witness stated that the airplane started to turn left with the nose of the airplane slightly pointing toward the ground. The airplane appeared to be trying to land on a road. A third witness heard the roar of the airplane's engines, and looked toward the noise and observed the airplane in a vertical descent (nose dive) impact the ground. The witness "heard the engines all the way to the ground." Examination of the airframe and engines did not disclose any structural or mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The National Weather Service had issued a SIGMET for severe turbulence and mountain wave activity. Satellite images depicted bands of altocumulus undulates and/or rotor clouds over the accident site.

Bradley Aviation

During the activation of the crew oxygen system a fire erupted which consumed the entire pressure vessel. Representatives from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Testing Facility (WSTF), Las Cruces, New Mexico, examined the retained oxygen system components. Examination of these components revealed that the fire's initiation location was the first stage pressure reducer located in the oxygen regulator assembly.

Panda Leasing Company

After a 5-hour flight, the Westwind jet began its descent to the airport. Air traffic control instructed the flight crew to cross a VOR at 18,000 feet. The flight crew was then instructed to cross an intersection at 6,000 feet. The flight crew needed to descend the airplane 12,000 feet, in 36 nautical miles, to make the crossing restriction. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane struck treetops and impacted the ground in a wooded area. The accident flight was the airplane's first flight after maintenance. Work that was accomplished during the maintenance included disassembly and reassembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator. Examination of the actuator at the accident site revealed that components of the actuator were separated and that they displayed no damage where they would have been attached. Examination of the actuator by the Safety Board revealed that the actuator had not been properly assembled in the airplane. A similar actuator was improperly assembled and installed in a static airplane for a ground test. When the actuator was run, the jackscrews of the actuator were observed backing out of the rod end caps within the first few actuations of the pitch trim toward the nose-down position. As the pitch trim continued to be actuated toward the nose-down position, the jackscrews became disconnected from the rod end caps, and the horizontal stabilizer became disconnected from the actuator. The passenger was Peter Lahaye, founder and owner of the Lahaye Laboratories and the aircraft.

Inversiones Venezuela

While descending to Guatemala City-La Aurora Airport by night, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 14,4 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five occupants were killed.

Arkia Israeli Airlines

After landing on runway 33 at Rosh Pina Airport, the captain thought the thrust reverser systems did not work properly so he instructed the copilot to activate them again. The aircraft failed to decelerate correctly so the captain decided to veer off runway when the aircraft struck a concrete block, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All eight occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Pel-Air

The aircraft was on a scheduled freight service from Darwin via Tindal, Alice Springs, and Adelaide to Sydney under the IFR. The flight from Darwin to Tindal was apparently normal, and the aircraft departed Tindal slightly ahead of schedule at 1834 CST. The pilot in command occupied the left cockpit seat. At 1925, the aircraft reported at position DOLPI (200 miles north of Alice Springs) Flight Level 330, to Melbourne Control. Another Westwind aircraft was en route Darwin–Alice Springs and was more than 40 miles ahead of VH-AJS. Information from the aircraft cockpit voice recording confirmed that the pilot in command was flying the aircraft. At about 1929, he began issuing instructions to the co-pilot to program the aircraft navigation system in preparation for a locator/NDB approach to Alice Springs. The pilot in command asked the co-pilot to enter an offset position into the area navigation (RNAV) system for an 11-mile final for runway 12. The co-pilot entered the bearing as 292 degrees Alice Springs. (This was the outbound bearing from Alice Springs NDB to Simpson’s Gap locator indicated on the locator/NDB approach chart.) The pilot in command stated that he had wanted the bearing with respect to the runway, 296 degrees, entered but said that the setting could be left as 292 degrees. He then instructed the co-pilot to set Alice Springs NDB frequency on ADF 1, Simpson’s Gap locator on ADF 2, and to preset the Temple Bar locator frequency on ADF 2 so that it could be selected as soon as the aircraft passed overhead Simpson’s Gap. He indicated his intention to descend to 4,300 feet until overhead Simpson’s Gap, and said that the co-pilot should then set 3,450 feet on the altitude alert selector. On passing Temple Bar, the co-pilot was to set 2,780 feet on the altitude alert selector which the pilot in command said would be used as the minimum for the approach. At 1940, the co-pilot contacted Adelaide Flight Service (FIS) and was given the Alice Springs weather, including the local QNH. At 1945, he advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was leaving Flight Level 330 on descent. At about 30 miles from Alice Springs, the pilot in command turned the aircraft right to track for the offset RNAV position 292 degrees/11 miles Alice Springs. The crew set local QNH passing 16,000 feet and then completed the remaining transition altitude checks. These included selecting landing and taxi lights on. At 1949, the co-pilot advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was transferring frequency to the Alice Springs MTAF. At 1953, the aircraft passed Simpson’s Gap at about 4,300 feet and the copilot set 3,500 feet in the altitude alert selector. About 15 seconds later, the pilot in command told the co-pilot that, after the aircraft passed overhead the next locator, he was to set the ‘minima’ in the altitude alert selector. At 1954 , the pilot in command called that the aircraft was at 3,500 feet. A few seconds later, the co-pilot indicated that the aircraft was over the Temple Bar locator and that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The pilot in command repeated the 2,300 feet called by the co-pilot and asked him to select the landing gear down. The crew then completed the pre-landing checks. Eleven seconds later, the co-pilot reported that the aircraft was 300 feet above the minimum descent altitude. This was confirmed by the pilot in command. About 10 seconds later, there were two calls by the co-pilot to pull up. Immediately after the second call, the aircraft struck the top of the Ilparpa Range (approximately 9 kilometres north-west of Alice Springs Airport), while heading about 105 degrees at an altitude of about 2,250 feet in a very shallow climb. At approximately 1950, witnesses in a housing estate on the north-western side of the Ilparpa Range observed aircraft lights approaching from the north-west. They described the lights as appearing significantly lower than those of other aircraft they had observed approaching Alice Springs from the same direction. The lights illuminated buildings as the aircraft passed overhead and then they illuminated the northern escarpment of the range. This was followed almost immediately by fire/explosion at the top of the range.

Millar Western Industries

The privately owned Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Westwind II aircraft was en route from the Edmonton Municipal Airport, Alberta, to the Meadow Lake aerodrome, Saskatchewan. Low ceilings and reduced visibility were reported in the vicinity of the destination aerodrome. The crew completed a straight-in instrument approach to runway 08 at Meadow Lake, and began a circling procedure to the south of the aerodrome in order to set up to land on runway 26. The aircraft passed overhead the aerodrome at an altitude of approximately 400 feet above ground level (agl). It then turned and proceeded in level flight towards the southeast. Approximately two and one-half miles from the aerodrome, the aircraft entered a number of steep-banked rolling manoeuvres. Immediately following these manoeuvres, the aircraft descended and struck the ground in a nose-high, slightly right-wing-low attitude. The ground-strike produced very high deceleration forces. The aircraft broke into several sections, internal fuel tanks ruptured, and fuel was sprayed forward and outward from the initial impact point. A severe post-crash fire erupted and engulfed the entire wreckage trail. Emergency medical service and firefighting crews responded from the town of Meadow Lake and were on the scene within minutes of the accident. Both pilots died in the crash.

Martin Aviation

A Beech liner, Boeing 757 and Israel Westwind (WW) were vectored for landings on runway 19R. The 757 and WW were sequenced for visual approaches behind the Beech. Before being cleared for visual approach, the WW was closing 3.5 miles from the 757 on a converging course. The 757 and WW crews were told to slow to 150 knots. The 757 slowed below 150 knots and was high on final approach with a 5.6° descent. The WW continued to converge to about 2.1 miles behind the 757 on a 3° approach. ATC did not specifically advise, and was not required by ATC handbook to advise, the WW pilots that they were behind a Boeing 757. Captain discussed possible wake turbulence, flew ILS 1 dot high, noted closeness to the 757 and indicated there should be no problem. While descending thru approximately 1,100 feet msl, the WW encountered wake turbulence from the 757, rolled into a steep descent and crashed. The crew lacked specific wake turbulence training. Chlorpheniramine (common over-the-counter anti-histamine; not approved for flying) detected in pilot's lung tissue (0.094 ug/ml).

Air Sweden

During the takeoff roll at Umeå Airport, at a speed of 50 knots, the crew heard a noise when the tower controller informed the crew that the aircraft was on fire. The crew aborted the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking procedure. The aircraft was stopped on runway and all seven occupants were able to evacuate within 15 seconds. The fire was extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

PGA Tour Investments

The aircraft completed an instrument approach and landed hard on the runway surface first with the left gear then the right gear. The tires burst and the lower fuselage came into contact with the runway surface. After the nose gear touched down, the right main landing gear collapsed and the pilot lost control of the aircraft. It veered to the left and departed the runway, coming to rest approximately 150 to 200 yards from the point of departure. Initial touch down occurred about 12 feet from the threshold, ten feet left of centerline.

Drayton Associates

Airplane crashed during a uncontrolled descent, following a turbulence upset at FL370. The upset occurred as a result of clear air turbulences associated with a vip level 6 thunderstorm located within 7 miles of the last position of the airplane. After the upset, the airplane penetrated and descended thru the cell which contained lightning, extreme turbulences and severe icing. During the upset/descent both engines flamed out and the crew's attempts to recover the airplane were unsuccessful due to conditions in the cell. Crew received an improper briefing from FSS and reported their radar was malfunctioning to the deputy controller. Sigmet and AWW info was not given during the briefing. As the airplane came out of the bottom of the cell at 4,000 feet, the crew overstressed the airplane causing the left main landing door to separate and hit the left horizontal stab which subsequently separated in overload. Impact was 82° nose down. Nature of the airplane radar malfunction could not be determined. All seven occupants were killed.

Israel Aerospace Industries - IAI

The crew (two technicians and two pilots) was engaged in a test flight, the third of this model, part of the certification program. En route, an unexpected situation occurred and all four crew members decided to bail out and abandoned the aircraft that dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Beit She'an. While all four occupants were uninjured, the aircraft was destroyed.