Hawker Siddeley HS.121 Trident

Air China

Following a wrong approach configuration at Guilin Airport, the three engine aircraft landed too far down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its right main gear and came to rest in a grassy area. All 107 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Weather conditions were poor at the time of the accident with rain showers and limited visibility. Thus, the runway surface was wet and the braking action was limited.

CAAC - Civil Aviation Administration of China

A Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 2E passenger jet, registered B-2218, was damaged beyond repair in a landing accident at Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. There were 78 passengers and seven crew members crew members on board. The airplane operated on CAAC flight 301 from Guangzhou-Baiyun Airport (CAN) to Hong Kong-Kai Tak International Airport (HKG). As the aircraft neared runway 31 the right outboard trailing edge wing flap struck the innermost approach light and the right main landing gear tyres hit the facing edge of the runway promontory. The right main gear was torn from the wing. The aircraft became airborne again and next contacted the ground 600 metres down the runway. It then veered off the runway to the right, yawed to the right and slid diagonally sideways across the grassed runway strip. The nosewheel and left main gear collapsed, and the aircraft continued until it crossed the parallel taxiway and slid sideways over the edge of the promontory into Kowloon Bay. The aircraft came to rest in the water with the rear extremity of the fuselage supported on a ledge of stone blocks that jutted out from the promontory. Part of the forward fuselage, including the flight compartment, was partially detached from the remainder of the fuselage and hung down at a steep angle into the water from control cables and secondary structure. A fire started in the centre engine intake duct. Weather at the time of the accident was poor including rain and fog with 450 m visibility. Seven occupants, six crew members and one passengers, were killed.

CAAC - Civil Aviation Administration of China

While taxiing at Guilin Airport, the airplane was hit by a Chinese Air Force Harbin H-5 bomber that apparently crashed upon landing. The Trident broke into several pieces and caught fire. Eleven passengers, all foreign citizens, were killed, while 27 other people were injured and 68 escaped uninjured.

CAAC - Civil Aviation Administration of China

After touchdown at Fuzhou Airport, the three engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest few dozen meters further. All 96 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

CAAC - Civil Aviation Administration of China

While descending to Guilin Airport on a flight from Guangzhou-Baiyun Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. In limited visibility, the three engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Yangsu located about 40 km from Guilin. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 112 occupants were killed.

CAAC - Civil Aviation Administration of China

The crew departed Beijing-Xijiao Airport for a local training mission. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the three engine airplane lost height and crashed in a huge explosion into a factory located near the airport. All 12 occupants as well as at least 180 people in the factory were killed.

British Airways

Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 3B operated by British Airways as flight BE476 and a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32, operated by Inex-Adria Aviopromet, were destroyed when both aircraft crashed near Vrobec following a mid-air collision. All 176 on board both aircraft were killed. The Trident was on a scheduled flight from London-Heathrow Airport in England to Istanbul-Yesilköy Airport in Turkey, carrying 54 passengers and a crew of 9. The aircraft took off at 08:32 GMT and the flight proceeded normally. First contact with the Zagreb Area Control Centre was established on the Upper Sector frequency 134,45 MHz at 10:04 GMT. The flight was requested to report passing the Zagreb VOR at flight level 330. The aircraft flew along the centreline of airway UB5 with slight side deviation 1-2 km to the right due to wind. At 2 minutes and 50 seconds before the collision, the aircraft changed heading to 115° to head back towards the airway centreline. Airspeed was 295 Kts. The DC-9 departed Split Airport at 09:48 GMT to fly 108 West German tourists back to Cologne. Flight JP550 was issued instructions to climb to FL180. At 09:54 the flight, on passing flight level 130, switched to the Zagreb Area Control Centre lower sector east frequency of 124.6 MHz, receiving clearance to climb to FL240 and later to FL260. At 10:03 the crew switched to the frequency of the middle sector controller, responsible for safety and regulation of traffic between flight levels 250 and 310. This controller cleared to flight to FL350. The aircraft assumed a heading of 353° and a speed of 273 Kts as it passed a beam and to the west of the KOS NDB, approximately 2-3 km from the airway centreline. While heading towards the Zagreb VOR, the flight crew radioed the Upper Sector controller on frequency 134,45 MHz at 10:14:04 GMT and reported that they were climbing through FL325. The controller then requested, in Serbo-Croatian, flight JP550 to maintain their present altitude and report passing the Zagreb VOR. The controller stated that an aircraft was in front passing from left to right at FL335, while in fact BE476 was at FL330. At 10:14:38 the crew replied, also in Serbo-Croatian, that they where maintaining FL330. Three seconds later both aircraft collided. The outer five meters of the DC-9's left wing cut through the Trident's cockpit. Due to the sudden decompression, the forward part of the Trident's fuselage disintegrated. The remaining part of the fuselage struck the ground tail-first. With it's left wing torn off, the DC-9 tumbled down and hit the ground right-wing first.

British Airways

The taxi drills were actioned by the First Officer and the Flight Engineer during this time and "runway items" were completed after the Commander turned the aircraft through 180° close to the threshold of runway 28, aligned it on the runway centre line, and selected the wheel brakes to park. A power setting of 100 per cent thrust was made, all engine indications were checked as correct, and the engine relight switches were selected 'ON' before the wheel brakes were released and the takeoff run commenced at about 13:46 with the Commander piloting the aircraft. The aircraft accelerated normally ; the First Officer called out the indicated airspeeds at 80 knots and 100 knots and made a call of 'Wet V1' at 117 knots then removed his hand from the throttles. At the time or just after 'Wet V1' was called the Flight Engineer and the First Officer heard a noise which the latter crew member attributed to the aircraft's entry into standing water. According to the Flight Engineer the aircraft appeared to decelerate at the same time that he heard the noise. The Commander felt a marked deceleration consistent with a loss of engine power, whereupon he immediately closed the throttles, called "Abandon", deployed the airbrakes and lift dumpers and applied the wheel brakes fully. However according to the Flight Engineer all engine indications had been normal prior to the closing of the throttles. On seeing a hand close the throttles the First Officer selected emergency reverse thrust on the pod engines, checked the engine indications were correct and maintained the application of emergency reverse thrust until the aircraft eventually came to rest. The First Officer and the Commander checked the indicated pressures on the wheel brake gauges which showed the wheel brakes were fully applied. The initial deceleration felt satisfactory to the crew, then quickly deteriorated and the First Officer formed the impression that the aircraft was aquaplaning. The Flight Engineer then noticed that the aircraft had begun to drift gradually to the left of the runway centreline apparently as the result of a deliberate action by the Commander. Subsequently it became evident to the Commander that he could not bring the aircraft to a halt within the runway confines. Some 200 metres to 300 metres before the end of the runway he turned the aircraft to the left using nose-wheel steering and applied full left rudder. As the nose wheels ran off the runway onto the grass, the aircraft slewed to the left then skidded broadside to the right for a short distance before it came to an abrupt stop at the side of the runway in a right wing down attitude with the right wing tip close to the threshold lights of runway 10. Evacuation drills were initiated and the passengers left the aircraft in a reasonably orderly manner, the majority by slide from the main exit doors and foremost right overwing emergency exit. Catering equipment in the galleys came out of stowage during the accident obstructing access to the forward emergency exit door and preventing use of this exit and its slide during the evacuation. All 117 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

British European Airways - BEA

Following a normal takeoff roll on runway 28R, the aircraft rotated 42 seconds after brakes were released and lifted off 2 seconds later at 145 knots IAS. At 63 seconds the autopilot was engaged 355 feet above the runway at 170 knots IAS; the IAS speed lock was selected shortly thereafter. At 74 seconds the aircraft started a 20° banked turn to port towards the Epsom Non-Directional Beacon (NDB). At 83 seconds the captain reported 'Climbing as cleared'. He was then instructed to change frequency and contact London Air Traffic Control Centre. At 93 seconds the noise-abatement procedure was initiated. On the assumption that the captain was the handling pilot, this would involve the second officer selecting the flaps fully up and operating the thrust levers to reduce power to the pre-calculated figure. At 100 seconds the captain called 'Passing 1500' and at 103 seconds the aircraft was cleared to climb to Flight Level 60. This message was acknowledged by the captain at 108 seconds with the terse call 'up to 60'. This was the last message received from the flight. At second 114 when the airspeed was 162 knots and the altitude 1,772 feet, the droop lever was selected up putting the aircraft into the area of the stall as the droop started to move. At second 116 the stick-pusher stall recovery device operated, causing the autopilot automatically to disengage and the nose of the aircraft to pitch down and the stick-push to cease as the incidence decreased. Since the elevator trim would stay at its position on autopilot disengagement which at that speed with the droop up would be - the incidence then increased causing a second stick-push at second 124 and a third at second 127. At second 128 the stall recovery system was manually inhibited by pulling the lever. The aircraft then pitched up rapidly, losing speed and height, entering very soon afterwards the true aerodynamic stall and then a deep stall from which at that height no recovery was possible. Impact was at second 150 in a field next to the A30 motorway. The aircraft was totally destroyed and none of the 118 occupants survived the crash.

British European Airways - BEA

While parked on apron at Heathrow Airport, the three engine airplane was struck by a BKS Air Transport Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador 2 that crashed on landing. The aircraft was empty so there were no injuries but it irreparable.

Kuwait Airways

Flight KU32 was a scheduled international flight from Beirut, Lebanon to Kuwait. It departed Beirut at 1855 hours GMT and apart from a tendency for the autopilot pitch lock to disconnect the flight to the descent point was uneventful. The aircraft was cleared to commence descent at 2028 hours GMT from flight level 300 to flight level 95 by the DY NDB - the pilot-in-command decided to carry out a visual approach and advised the co-pilot accordingly. The aircraft reached flight level 95 some three minutes before reaching the DY NDB and it maintained this level until passing the beacon at about 2039 hours GMT at which time it was cleared to descend to 3 000 ft it being agreed the aircraft would report on left base for runway 33R. By visual navigation and ADF indications from the MG NDB the aircraft was positioned on a left hand base leg for runway 33R passing abeam the MG NDB 1 - 2 miles to the south. The rate of descent was 1500 ft/min with the outboard engines at idle and 10 400 rpm on the centre engine. At about this time and when at flight level 50 the flight reported the field in sight - the pilot-in-command and flight engineer having sighted the airport rotating beacon and the co-pilot the rotating beacon and some airport lights - and the aircraft was cleared for final. A left turn on to final was cow menced at about 4 000 ft and the flight reported its position as 6 miles from the airport when at 2 300 ft. Rate of descent was 1 500 ft/min and airspeed was 178 kt. During all these manoeuvres the aircraft was being flown on the autopilot and the co-pilot had been requested to set 1 500 ft in the "acquire height" box of the autopilot. The ADF was tuned to the KWS locator which is 2 224 m from the runway threshold, and the co-pilot was occupied with the landing checks. At this stage of the flight the aircraft was at 1 830 ft almost abeam of the MG NDB inbound and 80 seconds from impact with the ground. Desired approach speed was 154 kt with a descent rate of 700 ft/min and a threshold speed of 134 kt. The aircraft struck the ground and crashed approximately 4 km short of the runway threshold, slightly to the left of the centreline at an elevation of approximately 185 ft. (Latitude 29013'25"N, Longitude 47058'05"E). The accident occurred at approximately 2046 hours GMT at night.

Hawker Siddeley Aircraft

The aircraft took-off from Hatfield at 1652 hours to carry out the first of a series of production test flights for the purpose of qualifying for a Series Certificate of Airworthiness. The schedule for the flight called for stalling tests should the aircraft and the flight conditions be suitable. After take-off the aircraft climbed towards the north-east and at about 1830 hours, after completing the greater part of the flight test schedule, the stalling tests were begun. Three approaches to the stall were made in order to check the aircraft's stall warning and stall recovery systems and the flight engineer's log shows that with the aircraft in the landing configuration the stick shaker operated at 102 kt and the stall recovery system at 93 kt. The fourth stalling run was made at a height of 11 600 ft with the aircraft still in the landing configuration but, in accordance with the requirements of the test schedule, the stall warning and stall recovery systems had been made inoperative. Radio telephony communication with the aircraft consisted only of routine 11 messages until at 1834 hours when the pilot-in-command reported We are in a superstall at the moment". This was the last radiocommunication received. At about this time the aircraft was seen over Felthorpe flying very slowly heading south-west at about 10 000 ft. The nose was seen to go up 30 to 40 degrees and the aircraft began to turn to port; the starboard wing then dropped sharply and, following a short burst of engine power, the aircraft went into a flat spin to starboard. The spin continued, the aircraft turning once every 6 to 8 seconds until it reached the ground about a minute and a half later. All four crew members were killed.