Boeing 777-200

Ethiopian Airlines

Parked at position 306 at Shanghai-Pudong Airport, the aircraft was prepared for a cargo service to Santiago de Chile with intermediate stops in Addis Ababa and São Paulo, when a fire erupted in the cargo compartment. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire and damaged beyond repair. No one was injured.

Malaysian Airlines System - MAS

Flight MH17 departed the gate at Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport, the Netherlands at 12:13 hours local time, bound for Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was airborne at 12:31 (10:31 UTC) from runway 36C and reached a cruising altitude of FL310 at 12:53 (10:53 UTC). Ninety minutes into the flight, at 12:01 UTC and just prior to entering Ukrainian airspace, the flight climbed to FL330. According to the flight plan, flight MH17 would continue at the flight level until the waypoint PEKIT, which is on the Flight Information Region (FIR) boundary between Kiev FIR (UKBV) and Dnipropetrovs’k FIR (UKDV). From waypoint PEKIT the flight plan indicates a climb to FL350 on airway L980 for the remaining part over Ukraine. According to ATC data, at 12:53 UTC the aircraft was flying within the Dnipropetrovs’k FIR, Control Sector 2, at FL330, controlled by Dnipro Control. At that time, Dnipro Control asked whether MH17 was able to climb to FL350 in accordance with the flight plan and also to clear a potential separation conflict with other traffic in the area. This traffic was Singapore Airlines flight SQ351 from Copenhagen, a Boeing 777, flying at FL330 and approaching from behind. The crew replied they were unable to comply and requested to maintain at FL330. This was agreed by Dnipro Control. As an alternative to solve the separation conflict, the other traffic climbed to FL350. According to ATC data, at 13:00 UTC the crew of flight MH17 requested to divert the track 20 NM to the left, due to weather. This also was agreed by Dnipro Control, after which the crew requested whether FL340 was available. Dnipro control informed MH17 that FL340 was not available at that moment and instructed the flight to maintain FL330 for a while. At 13:07 UTC the flight was transferred to Dnipropetrovs’k CTA 4, also with call sign Dnipro Control. At 13:19:53 UTC, radar data showed that the aircraft was 3.6 NM north of centreline of airway L980 having deviated left of track, when Dnipro Control directed the crew to alter their route directly to waypoint RND due to other traffic. The crew acknowledged at 13:19:56 hrs. At 13.20:00 hrs, Dnipro Control transmitted an onward ATC clearance to "proceed direct to TIKNA after RND", no acknowledgement was received. Data from the Flight Data Recorder and the Digital Cockpit Voice Recorder both stopped at 13:20:03 hrs. No distress messages were received from the aircraft. The airplane apparently broke up in mid-air as debris was found in a large area. The centre section of the fuselage along with parts of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers was found near Hrabove. The cockpit and lower nose section came down in a sunflower field in Rozsypne, nearly four miles (6,5 km) west-southwest of Hrabove. The L2 and R2 doors along with various parts of the fuselage were found near Petropavlivka, about 5 miles (8 km) west of Hrabove. At the point of last contact it was flying 1000 feet above airspace that had been classified as restricted by Ukrainian authorities as a result of ongoing fighting in the area. In the preceding days before the accident two Ukraine Air Force aircraft that were shot down in the region: a Su-25 and an An-26 transport plane.

Malaysian Airlines System - MAS

The Boeing 777-2H6ER took off from Kuala Lumpur Airport runway 32R at 0041LT bound for Beijing. Some 40 minutes later, while reaching FL350 over the Gulf of Thailand, radar contact was lost. At this time, the position of the aircraft was estimated 90 NM northeast of Kota Bharu, some 2 km from the IGARI waypoint. More than 4 days after the 'accident', no trace of the aircraft has been found. On the fifth day of operation, several countries were involved in the SAR operations, in the Gulf of Thailand, west of China Sea and on the Malacca Strait as well. All operations are performed in coordination with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. No distress call or any kind of message was sent by the crew. The last ACARS message was received at 0107LT and did not contain any error, failure or technical problems. At 0119LT was recorded the last radio transmission with the crew saying "All right, good night". At 0121LT, the transponder was switched off and the last radar contact was recorded at 0130LT. Several hypothesis are open and no trace of the aircraft nor the occupant have been found up to March 18, 2014. It is now understood the aircraft may flew several hours after it disappeared from radar screens, flying on an opposite direction from the prescribed flight plan, most probably to the south over the Indian Ocean. No such situation was ever noted by the B3A, so it is now capital to find both CVR & DFDR to explain the exact circumstances of this tragic event. Considering the actual situation, all scenarios are possible and all hypothesis are still open. On Mar 24, 2014, the Malaysian Prime Minister announced that according to new computations by the British AAIB based on new satellite data, there is no reasonable doubt that flight MH370 ended in the South Indian Ocean some 2,600 km west of Perth. Given the situation, the Malaysian Authorities believe that there is no chance to find any survivors among the 239 occupants. *************************** According to the testimony of 6 Swiss Citizens making a cruise between Perth and Singapore via Jakarta, the following evidences were spotted on March 12 while approaching the Sunda Strait: 1430LT - latitude 6° S, longitude 105° E, speed 17,7 knots: life jacket, food trays, papers, pieces of polystyrene, wallets, 1500LT: a huge white piece of 6 meters long to 2,5 meters wide with other debris, 1530LT: two masts one meter long with small flags on top, red and blue, 2030LT - latitude 5° S, longitude 107° E, speed 20,2 knots. This testimony was submitted by these 6 Swiss Citizens to the Chinese and Australian Authorities. On April 21, 2016, it was confirmed that this testimony was recorded by the Swiss Police and transmitted to the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), the State authority of the Swiss Confederation which has a mandate to investigate accidents and dangerous incidents involving trains, aircraft, inland navigation ships, and seagoing vessels. The link to the STSB is http://www.sust.admin.ch/en/index.html. *************************** On July 29, 2015, a flaperon was found on a beach of the French Island of La Réunion, in the Indian Ocean. It was quickly confirmed by the French Authorities (BEA) that the debris was part of the Malaysian B777. Other debris have been found since, in Mozambique and South Africa. On May 12, 2016, Australia's TSB reported that the part has been identified to be a "the decorative laminate as an interior panel from the main cabin. The location of a piano hinge on the part surface was consistent with a work-table support leg, utilised on the exterior of the MAB Door R1 (forward, right hand) closet panel". The ATSB reported that they were not able to identify any feature on the debris unique to MH-370, however, there is no record that such a laminate is being used by any other Boeing 777 customer. *************************** On September 15, 2016, the experts from the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) have completed their examination of the large piece of debris discovered on the island of Pemba, off the coast of Tanzania, on June 20, 2016. Based on thorough examination and analysis, ATSB with the concurrence of the MH370 Safety Investigation Team have identified the following: - Several part numbers, along with physical appearance, dimensions, and construction confirmed the piece to be an inboard section of a Boeing 777 outboard flap. - A date stamp associated with one of the part numbers indicated manufacture on January 23, 2002, which was consistent with the May 31, 2002 delivery date for MH370, - In addition to the Boeing part number, all identification stamps had a second 'OL' number that were unique identifiers relating to part construction, - The Italian part manufacturer has confirmed that all numbers located on the said part relates to the same serial number outboard flap that was shipped to Boeing as line number 404, - The manufacturer also confirmed that aircraft line number 404 was delivered to Malaysian Airlines and registered as 9M-MRO (MH370) As such, the experts have concluded that the debris, an outboard flap originated from the aircraft 9M-MRO, also known as flight MH370. Further examination of the debris will continue, in hopes that further evidence may be uncovered which may provide new insight into the circumstances surrounding flight MH370.

Asiana Airlines

On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.

Egyptair

On July 29, 2011, the said Boeing 777-200, Egyptian registration SU-GBP, operated by EgyptAir, arrived from Madina, Saudi Arabia (Flight No 678) and stopped at Gate F7, terminal 3, Cairo international airport almost at 0500 UTC time. Necessary maintenance actions (After Landing Check ALC, Transit Check) have been performed by EgyptAir engineers and technicians, to prepare the aircraft for the following scheduled flight (Cairo/Jeddah, scheduled at 0730 UTC, same day 29 July 2011, flight number 667). The cockpit crew (Captain and F/O) for the event flight (Cairo/Jeddah), started the cockpit preparation including checking the cockpit crew oxygen system as per normal procedures. The F/O reported that the oxygen pressure was within normal range (730 psi). At almost 0711 UTC, and while waiting for the last passengers to board the aircraft, the F/O officer reported that a pop, hissing sound originating from the right side of his seat was heard, associated with fire and smoke coming from the right side console area below F/O window #3 (right hand lower portion of the cockpit area) [The aircraft was still preparing for departure at Gate F7, Terminal 3 at Cairo Airport at the time the crew detected the fire]. The Captain requested the F/O to leave the cockpit immediately and notify for cockpit fire. The captain used the cockpit fire extinguisher bottle located behind his seat in attempt to fight and extinguish the fire. The attempt was unsuccessful, the fire continued in the cockpit. The F/O left the cockpit, he asked the cabin crew to deplane all the passengers and crew from the aircraft, based on captain’s order. He moved to the stairs and then underneath the aircraft in attempt to find anyone with a radio unit but he could not. He returned to the service road in front of the aircraft and stopped one car and asked the person in the car to notify the fire department that the aircraft is burning on the stand F7 using his radio unit. The cabin crew deplaned the passengers using the two doors 1L and 2L. The passenger bridge was still connected to the entry doors that were used for deplaning. The first fire brigade arrived to the aircraft after three minutes. The fire was extinguished. Extinguishing actions and cooling of the aircraft were terminated at 0845 UTC (1045 Cairo local time). The aircraft experienced major damage resulting from the fire and smoke. Passengers deplaned safely, some (passengers, employees) suffered mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation. Passengers and crew were as follows: Passengers 307, Cockpit Crew 2, Cabin Crew 8.

British Airways

G-YMMM was on a scheduled return flight from Beijing, China, to London (Heathrow) with a flight crew consisting of a commander and two co-pilots; the additional co-pilot enabled the crew to take in-flight rest. There had been no reported defects with G-YMMM during the outboard flight from London (Heathrow) to Beijing, China. The flight plan for the return sector, produced by the aircraft’s operator, required an initial climb to 10,400 m (FL341) with a descent to 9,600 m (FL315) because of predicted ‘Extreme Cold’ at POLHO (a waypoint that lies on the border between China and Mongolia). Having checked the flight plan and the weather in more detail the crew agreed on a total fuel load for the flight of 79,000 kg. The startup, taxi, takeoff at 0209 hrs and the departure were all uneventful. During the climb, Air Traffic Control (ATC) requested that G-YMMM climb to an initial cruise altitude of 10,600 m (FL348). The crew accepted this altitude and, due to the predicted low temperatures, briefed that they would monitor the fuel temperature en route. The initial climb to altitude was completed using the autopilot set in the Vertical Navigation (VNAV) mode. Approximately 350 nm north of Moscow the aircraft climbed to FL380; this step climb was carried out using the Vertical Speed (VS) mode of the autoflight system. Another climb was then carried out whilst the aircraft was over Sweden, this time to FL400, and again this was completed in VS mode. During the flight the crew monitored the fuel temperature displayed on the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) and noted that the minimum indicated fuel temperature en route was -34°C. At no time did the low fuel temperature warning annunciate. The flight continued uneventfully until the later stages of the approach into Heathrow. The commander was flying at this time and during the descent, from FL400, the aircraft entered the hold at Lambourne at FL110; it remained in the hold for approximately five minutes, during which it descended to FL90. The aircraft was radar vectored for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 27L at Heathrow and subsequently stabilised on the ILS with the autopilot and autothrottle engaged. At 1,000 ft aal, and 83 seconds before touchdown, the aircraft was fully configured for the landing, with the landing gear down and flap 30 selected. At approximately 800 ft aal the co-pilot took control of the aircraft, in accordance with the briefed procedure. The landing was to be under manual control and the co-pilot intended to disconnect the autopilot at 600 ft aal. Shortly after the co-pilot had assumed control, the autothrottles commanded an increase in thrust from both engines. The engines initially responded but, at a height of about 720 ft, 57 seconds before touchdown, the thrust of the right engine reduced. Some seven seconds later, the thrust reduced on the left engine to a similar level. The engines did not shut down and both engines continued to produce thrust above flight idle, but less than the commanded thrust. At this time, and 48 seconds before touchdown, the co-pilot noted that the thrust lever positions had begun to ‘split’. On passing 500 ft agl there was an automatic call of the Radio Altimeter height, at this time Heathrow Tower gave the aircraft a landing clearance, which the crew acknowledged. Some 34 seconds before touchdown, at 430 ft agl, the commander announced that the approach was stable, to which the co-pilot responded “just”. Seven seconds later, the co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was reducing below the expected approach speed of 135 kt. On the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) the flight crew were heard to comment that the engines were at idle power and they attempted to identify what was causing the loss of thrust. The engines failed to respond to further demands for increased thrust from the autothrottle and manual movement of the thrust levers to fully forward. The airspeed reduced as the autopilot attempted to maintain the ILS glide slope. When the airspeed reached 115 kt the ‘airspeed low’ warning was annunciated, along with a master caution aural warning. The airspeed stabilised for a short period, so in an attempt to reduce drag the commander retracted the flaps from flap 30 to flap 25. In addition, he moved what he believed to be an engine starter/ignition switch on the overhead panel. The airspeed continued to reduce and by 200 ft it had decreased to about 108 kt. Ten seconds before touchdown the stick shaker operated, indicating that the aircraft was nearing a stall and in response the co-pilot pushed the control column forward. This caused the autopilot to disconnect as well as reducing the aircraft’s nose-high pitch attitude. In the last few seconds before impact, the commander attempted to start the APU and on realising that a crash was imminent he transmitted a ‘MAYDAY’ call. As the aircraft approached the ground the co-pilot pulled back on the control column, but the aircraft struck the ground in the grass undershoot for 27L approximately 330 m short of the paved runway surface and 110 m inside the airfield perimeter fence. During the impact and short round roll the nose landing gear (NLG) and both the main landing gears (MLG) collapsed. The right MLG separated from the aircraft but the left MLG remained attached. The aircraft came to rest on the paved surface in the undershoot area of Runway 27L. The commander attempted to initiate an evacuation by making an evacuation call, which he believed was on the cabin Passenger Announcement (PA) system but which he inadvertently transmitted on the Heathrow Tower frequency. During this period the co-pilot started the actions from his evacuation checklist. Heathrow Tower advised the commander that his call had been on the tower frequency so the commander repeated the evacuation call over the aircraft’s PA system before completing his evacuation checklist. The flight crew then left the flight deck and exited the aircraft via the escape slides at Doors 1L and 1R. The cabin crew supervised the emergency evacuation of the cabin and all occupants left the aircraft via the slides, all of which operated correctly. One passenger was seriously injured, having suffered a broken leg, as a result of detached items from the right MLG penetrating the fuselage. Heathrow Tower initiated their accident plan, with a crash message sent at 1242:22 hrs and fire crews were on scene 1 minute and 43 seconds later. The evacuation was completed shortly after the arrival of the fire vehicles. After the aircraft came to rest there was a significant fuel leak from the engines and an oxygen leak from the disrupted passenger oxygen bottles, but there was no fire. Fuel continued to leak from the engine fuel pipes until the spar valves were manually closed.