Bae Jetstream 41

Yeti Airlines

The approach to Siddharthanagar-Gautam Buddha Airport was completed in good weather conditions with a wind from the southeast at 4 knots and a 8 km visibility. After touchdown on runway 28, the twin engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in bushes, some 110 metres past the runway end. All 32 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sky Express

The Jetstream 41 aircraft, with registration number SX-DIA, operated by “SKY EXPRESS”, took off on 2nd February 2015 at 07:00 hrs. local time from the Airport of Heraklion ‘N. Kazantzakis’, performing the scheduled flight No. ‘SEH100’, the first in the day, destined for the Airport of Rhodes ‘Diagoras’. Pre-flight checks were completed with no findings and in this flight the Captain was designated as the Pilot Flying. A 3-member crew and 16 passengers were onboard. The flight crew reported for duty one hour prior to the time of flight and proceeded with all actions as laid down in the Company manual. The flight crew was also briefed that in the area of the Airport of Rhodes the winds were S-SE at 17 kt with Wind Gust 36 kt. At 07:23:54 hrs., approximately 12 min prior to landing, in the first contact of the flight crew with the Control Tower of the Airport of Rhodes, the flight crew was briefed by the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) with respect to the weather conditions at the area of the airport, variable winds prevailing with a direction from 20° to 160°, average wind direction from 110°, wind velocity 20 kt gusting 38 kt. As laid down in the airport procedures, ATC, given the weather conditions, alerted the fire service vehicles to be stationed in readiness at their designated positions on the taxiways. At 07:24:43 hrs. Rhodes ATC contacted the flight crew wishing to remind that as a result of the strong wind shear and turbulence, landing at the airport is not recommended under the circumstances. At 07:29:34 hrs. Rhodes ATC contacted again the flight crew informing that the wind is shifting from 40° to 260°, average wind direction from 120°, mean wind velocity 20 kt and wind gust 32 kt. At 07:32:36 hrs., at about 8nm to the airport, the ATC contacting again the flight crew informed that wind in the last ten minutes is shifting in all directions, with mean wind velocity 16 kt and wind gust 37 kt; ATC also reminded that under these conditions landing is not recommended. At 07:34:04 hrs., at about 4 nm to the airport, Rhodes ATC contacted again the flight crew informing that wind is shifting from 60° to 200°, mean wind velocity 15 kt, wind gust 32 kt and that runway 07 is free for landing. At 07:35:08 hrs. ATC again reports wind direction from 110°, 17kt. Communication between ATC and the flight crew was smooth without any problem, with the flight crew each time acknowledging the information provided by ATC. Given the prevailing winds, landing with 9° flaps and an airspeed of about 129 kt was selected. With the flight crew having performed all pre-landing checks prescribed in the manual and with the indicator lights for the ‘Down and Lock’ landing system being illuminated green, at about 07:36 hrs. the aircraft landed, with the right main landing gear touching down first. During deceleration immediately after touchdown, with the flight crew having performed all checks specified in the a/c manual and after ATC directed the aircraft to vacate the runway via taxiway ‘C’, the aircraft veered to the left and came to rest at the left edge of the runway without exiting the runway, with an eastward direction. With the fire service vehicle approaching the aircraft, the flight crew contacted the Control Tower of the airport stating that everything is ok, and then reporting inability to taxi when asked whether the aircraft is able to taxi; when asked whether a tire was burst, the flight crew confirmed that this is the case. At 07:37:49 hrs. the Fire Service advises the Control Tower of the airport that the fire truck sprays foam due to fuel leakage. At 07:41:08 hrs. the Control Tower, when so asked by the ‘follow me’ vehicle, inquired of the flight crew whether passengers could be disembarked and the answer was that getting off from the passenger door (forward left) would not be feasible given the presence of the fire-fighting foam on the runway, and that the rear right door (Emergency Exit) would be used instead. As reported by the Air Traffic Controller passengers were disembarked 15 minutes after the incident, and the process lasted approximately 10 minutes. Upon a first visual inspection at the accident site and before the left wing of the aircraft was raised on jacks, it appeared that the left main landing gear folded back resulting in the aircraft’s left side dragging the runway (the left main landing gear and its housing into contact with the runway) and stopping at the left edge of the runway facing to the east.

South African Airlink

During the take-off roll, the cockpit crew of another airliner observed smoke pouring from the right engine of ZS-NRM. They were shocked, yet reluctant to tell the crew of ZS-NRM to abort the take-off as they felt that they might be blamed had the abort gone wrong. Instead, the witnessing pilots enquired from the tower whether the aircraft was aware of the smoke. By the time the ATC responded, the aircraft was already in the air, but with its landing gear not yet retracted. Another aircraft lining up at the holding point informed ZS-NRM that their undercarriage was still extended, and the captain of ZS-NRM then transmitted (instead of using the intercom) an instruction to his co-pilot to raise the gear. During this transmission, the sound of what was possibly a warning sound could be heard in the background. The aircraft became airborne and climbed to approximately 500 ft above mean sea level before losing altitude and making a forced landing on a small field in the Merebank residential area, about 1,4 km from the end of the runway. During the forced landing, a member of the public was struck by the wing of the aircraft and the three crew members were seriously injured in the accident. The captain subsequently died from his injuries.

United Express

The twin-engine turboprop airplane touched down about 1,900 feet beyond the approach end of the 6,000-foot runway. During the rollout, the pilot reduced power by pulling the power levers aft, to the flight idle stop. He then depressed the latch levers, and pulled the power levers further aft, beyond the flight idle stop, through the beta range, into the reverse range. During the power reduction, the pilot noticed, and responded to a red beta light indication. Guidance from both the manufacturer and the operator prohibited the use of reverse thrust on the ground with a red beta light illuminated. The pilot pushed the power levers forward of the reverse range, and inadvertently continued through the beta range, where aerodynamic braking was optimum. The power levers continued beyond the flight idle gate into flight idle, a positive thrust setting. The airplane continued to the departure end of the runway in a skid, and departed the runway and taxiway in a skidding turn. The airplane dropped over a 60-foot embankment, and came to rest at the bottom. The computed landing distance for the airplane over a 50-foot obstacle was 3,900 feet, with braking and ground idle (beta) only; no reverse thrust applied. Ground-taxi testing after the accident revealed that the airplane could reach ground speeds upwards of 85 knots with the power levers at idle, and the condition levers in the flight position. Simulator testing, based on FDR data, consistently resulted in runway overruns. Examination of the airplane and component testing revealed no mechanical anomalies. Review of the beta light indicating system revealed that illumination of the red beta light on the ground was not an emergency situation, but only indicated a switch malfunction. In addition, a loss of the reverse capability would have had little effect on computed stopping distance, and none at all in the United States, where performance credit for reverse thrust was not permitted.

United Express

The airplane stalled and crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of runway 28L during an ILS approach. The captain initiated the approach at high speed & crossed the FAF at a high speed without first having the airplane properly configured for a stabilized approach. The airspeed was not monitored nor maintained by the flightcrew. The airline had no specified callouts for airspeed deviations during instrument approaches. The captain failed to apply full power & configure the airplane in a timely manner. Both pilots had low flight time and experience in in the airplane and in any EFIS-equipped airplane. Additionally, the captain had low time and experience as a captain. Inadequate consideration was given to the possible consequences of pairing a newly upgraded captain, on a new airplane, with a first officer who had no airline experience in air carrier operations, nor do current FAA regulations address this issue.