BAe 146

Mahan Air

On June 19, 2016, Mahan Air flight IRM 4525 was a scheduled passenger flight which took off from Ahwaz Airport at 1257 LMT (0827 UTC) to destination and landed at Khark Island Airport at 1335 LMT (0905 UTC). After delivery of the flight from BUZ approach to Khark tower, the flight was cleared to land on RWY 31 via visual approach. At 10 NM on final the pilot has asked weather information of the destination so, the captain requested to perform a visual approach for RWY 13. Finally the pilot in command accomplished an un-stabilized approach and landed on the runway after passing long distance of the Runway. Regarding to the length of the runway (7,657 feet) the aircraft overran the end of runway and made runway excursion on runway 13 and came to rest on the unpaved surface after 54 meters past the runway end. The nose landing gear strut has broken and collapsed. The captain instructed the cabin crew to evacuate the aircraft. No unusual occurrences were noticed during departure, en-route and descent.

Starbow

After landing on runway 23 at Tamale Airport, the four engine aircraft failed to stop within the remaining distance. It went through a fence that was delimiting a work area as the runway was subject to an extension. Upon impact, the nose gear was torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 76 occupants escaped uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was specified in a NOTAM that the runway 23 length was reduced to 1,860 meters and that works were in progress to extend runway 23, with the presence of men and equipment. So, caution was advised during landing and takeoff procedures.

Skyjet Airlines

The aircraft was performing a charter flight from Manila to Balesin, carrying tourists en route to the Balesin Island Club. The approach and landing were completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. After landing, the four engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest in the Lamon Bay, few dozen metres offshore. All 75 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aviastar Mandiri

On the morning of 9 April 2009, a British Aerospace BAe 146-300 aircraft, registered PK-BRD, was being operated by PT. Aviastar Mandiri Airlines as a scheduled passenger and cargo flight from Sentani Airport to Wamena Airport, Papua. The crew consisted of two pilots, two flight attendants, an engineer, and a load master. The aircraft performed a go-around from the initial landing approach on runway 15 at Wamena. The flight crew positioned the aircraft on a right downwind leg for another landing approach. As the aircraft was turned towards the final approach for the second landing approach at Wamena it impacted terrain and was destroyed. All of the occupants were fatally injured. The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) manufacturer performed simulations using data from the flight recorders, and two separate terrain data sources. The manufacturer informed the investigation that “the GPWS/EGPWS alerts recorded in the CVR were issued as designed”. However the enhanced Look-Ahead function appeared to have been inhibited following the go around. There was no evidence from the CVR that the crew had deliberately inhibited the terrain function of the EGPWS. The investigation determined that the EGPWS issued appropriate warnings to the flight crew, in the GPWS mode. The pilot in command did not take appropriate remedial action in response to repeated EGPWS warnings. The investigation concluded that flight crew’s lack of awareness of the aircraft’s proximity with terrain, together with non conformance to the operator’s published operating procedures, resulted in the aircraft’s impact with terrain. As a consequence of this accident, the operator took safety action to address deficiencies in its documentation for missed approach procedures at Wamena. As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) also issued safety recommendations to the operator and to the Directorate General Civil Aviation (DGCA) to ensure that relevant documented safety procedures are implemented. During the investigation, safety issues were identified concerning modification of aircraft and DGCA approval of those modifications. While those safety issues did not contribute to the accident, they nevertheless are safety deficiencies. Accordingly, the NTSC report includes recommendations to address those identified safety issues.

Romavia

Following an uneventful flight from Timisoara, the crew initiated the approach to Bucharest-Otopeni-Henri Coanda Airport in poor weather conditions. After touchdown, the crew encountered difficulties to stop the aircraft. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft deviated to the right, causing the right main gear to be torn off while contacting soft ground. The airplane came to rest, straddling on the runway edge. All 73 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Atlantic Airways

At 0724 hours, Flesland approach gave clearance for FLI670 to start to descend to 4,000 feet. Three minutes later, it was cleared to leave controlled airspace and transfer to Sørstokken's frequency. In the meantime, the AFIS duty officer at Stord airport had visual contact with the plane and obtained confirmation of its position from Flesland approach. Based on aerodrome data, wind direction and wind speed, temperature and the aircraft's landing weight, the crew found it acceptable to plan for a visual approach and landing on runway 33. This would shorten the approach. They assumed that landing on runway 33 would involve a small tailwind component. The AFIS duty officer was informed of the decision to land on runway 33. The AFIS duty officer confirmed that the wind was 110° 6 kt. When asked, the crew also stated that there were 12 passengers on board. 1.1.6 The approach proceeded as normal. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were extended stepwise. At 07:31:12 hours, the aircraft was 2 NM from the threshold for runway 33 at a height of 800 ft and with a ground speed of 150 kt. The flaps were then extended to 33° and, according to radar data, the ground speed dropped to 130 kt. At 07:31:27 hours, the AFIS duty officer repeated the 'runway free' message and described the wind as 120° 6 kt. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tells us that at 07:31:43 hours the first officer then confirmed that the plane was stabilised and held a speed of plus 5 (kt). Six seconds later, the first officer announced that the speed was plus 3 (kt). At 07:31:51 hours, the CVR recorded that a warning sound (ping) was emitted by the aircraft's audible warning Accident Investigation Board Norway system. The commander later told AIBN that he aimed for three red and one white on the PAPI (Precision approach path indicator). The first officer then announced twice that the speed was correct (bug speed). From the aircraft cockpit voice recorder (CVR) it is documented that the pilots kept a speed over threshold at Vref. According to the aircraft flight manual (AFM) correct airspeed is Vref =112 kt. According to data from the ground radar the aircraft's ground speed was 120 kt on passing the threshold for runway 33. The flight commander has stated that when the aircraft was approximately 50 ft above the runway, he lowered the thrust levers as normal to the 'Flight Idle' position. At 07:32:14 hours, sounds from the CVR indicated that the wheels touched the runway. Both pilots have stated that the landing took place a few metres beyond the standard landing point, and that it was a ‘soft’ landing. Next, the following occurred (times are stated in seconds after nose wheel touchdown): - 1 second: 'and spoilers' announced by first officer - 1.5 seconds: sound of spoiler lever being moved to aft position (LIFT SPLR) - 4 seconds: 'no spoilers' announced by first officer (standard phrase in accordance with the airline's standard operating procedures (SOP) when spoiler indicator lights does not come on) - 6.6 seconds: sound of brake selector switch being turned - 7.9 seconds: audio signal (single chime) from the aircraft's warning system - 12.8 seconds: The first screeching noises from the tyres are audible - 12.8 – 22.8 seconds: Varying degrees of screeching noises from the tyres can be heard - 22.8 seconds: The aircraft leaves the runway, at the same time as the AFIS duty officer activates the crash alarm. - 26 seconds: The cockpit voice recorder stops recording sound. The first officer has informed the AIBN that, after landing, he verified that the commander moved the thrust levers from 'Flight Idle' to 'Ground Idle', at the same time as the nose of the aircraft was lowered. He also saw that the commander moved the spoiler lever from 'AIR BRAKE' (air brake fully engaged) to 'LIFT SPLR' (spoilers deployed). The first officer expected the two spoiler indicator lights (SPLR Y and SPLR G, see section 1.6.6.3) to come on after approximately three seconds. He was therefore surprised when this did not happen. In accordance with the airline's procedures, the first officer then verified, among other things, that hydraulic pressure and other instruments showed normal values and that the switches in question were set to the correct positions. The commander has explained to the AIBN that, when the speed had dropped to approximately 80 kt, he kept his left hand on the nose wheel steering and his right hand on the thrust levers. The first officer then took over the control wheel. The commander has stated that he felt that the brakes were working until they were about half way down the runway, after which the expected retardation did not occur. The aircraft had then got so far down the runway that it was too late to abort the landing. The commander applied full force on both brake pedals, without achieving a normal braking action. In an attempt to improve retardation he moved the brake selector lever from the 'Green' position to the 'Yellow' position, but this did not help. He then moved the lever to the 'Emergency Brake' position, whereby the aircraft's anti-skid system was disconnected. At that point the commander realised that it was impossible to stop the aircraft, even by continuously applying full pressure on the brake pedals, and that the aircraft would probably run off the runway. He considered that it was not advisable to let the aircraft run off the runway towards the steep area to the left of the aircraft or towards the rocks on the right. His local knowledge told him that the best alternative was therefore to steer the aircraft towards the end of the runway. In a last attempt to stop the aircraft, he steered it towards the right half of the runway and then manoeuvred it with the intent to skid sideways towards the left. The commander hoped that skidding would increase friction and hopefully help to reduce the speed of the aircraft. The aircraft left the runway in a skid a few metres to the left of the centerline. The commander believed that he would have been able to stop the aircraft had the runway been longer by approximately 50-100 metres. The first officer believed that the aircraft had a speed of approximately 5-10 km/h when it left the edge and that they would have been able to stop had the runway been 10-15 metres longer. The AFIS duty officer has stated that he followed OY-CRG visually during parts of the approach and landing. He believed that the aircraft may have flown a little higher and faster than normal during the final approach. The duty officer was not quite sure about where the aircraft touched down, but he estimated that it was within the first third of the runway. For a moment during the rollout OY-CRG was obscured for the AFIS duty officer behind an aircraft of the same type (OY-RCW) from Atlantic Airways that was parked at the apron (see Figure 2). When the AFIS duty officer again got the aircraft in sight, he realised that something was not right. The aircraft had a greater speed than normal. He saw that the aircraft towards the end turned into the right half and then turned back towards the left half of the runway. The duty officer observed the plane leave the runway in a skid at approximately 45° in relation to the runway direction. The duty officer immediately triggered the crash alarm. The AFIS duty officer has stated that the speed of the aircraft was moderate enough for him to hope for a while that it would be able to stop before reaching the end of the runway. He suggested that the aircraft would perhaps have been able to stop had the runway been another 50 metres long. He felt that it was unreal when the aircraft's tail fin moved high into the air and he witnessed the aircraft disappear off the end of the runway. The AFIS duty officer had previously seen blue smoke coming from the main wheels of other aircraft of the same type during braking. He observed a great deal of dampness and smoke emanating from the back of the main wheels of OY-CRG during rollout. The spray, which was about 30% higher than the top of the main wheels, appeared to form a triangle behind the wheels. The spray was of a white colour, extended considerably higher than during previous landings and continued along the length of the runway. He did not register whether the aircraft's spoilers were deployed or not, but he saw that the aircraft continued to produce wake vortices during rollout. When smoke started rising from the crash site, he saw that the fire crews were already on their way. In accordance with procedure, the fire and rescue service at Stord airport are on standby beside the fire engines when aircraft take off and land at the airport. The duty officer and three firemen were therefore in position at the fire station and observed the landing. The duty officer believed that the aircraft touched down in the standard place, possibly a little further along the runway than usual. Everything appeared to be normal until an estimated five to ten seconds after touchdown, when they noticed that the speed of the aircraft was higher than usual. When OY-CRG passed the taxiway to the south, the duty officer and firefighter n°1 both heard that the aircraft was beginning to brake heavy, because of the extremely loud noises emitted by the aircraft’s tyres and brakes. The duty officer had heard similar noises on some other occasions, but only for a second or two as aircraft were brought to a full stop or passed painted areas of the runway. In the case of OY-CRG the noises were persistent. They also observed that the wings continued to produce wake vortices during rollout, something they had not seen before. They realised that the aircraft would need assistance and prepared to respond. The last that the duty officer saw of the aircraft was when it skidded with its nose pointing an estimated 45° towards the left and banked violently to the right as it left the runway. In his opinion, the speed of the aircraft at that point was approximately 30-70 km/h (16-38 kt). When the aircraft disappeared over the edge of the runway and the crash alarm was activated, the airport's two fire engines were on their way to the site. The passengers interviewed by the AIBN provided varying descriptions of the approach and landing, but none of them noticed any braking action after touchdown. All the passengers have confirmed that the aircraft swayed from side to side when nearing the end of the runway. They heard the 'screeching' of brakes and the aircraft turned leftwards. One person observed blue smoke coming from the wheels. One person believed that one of the engines on the left increased its speed. Most passengers felt that the speed was relatively low when the aircraft tipped over the edge of the runway. The cabin crew seated at the back of the cabin have stated that the flight proceeded as usual until the landing at Stord airport, apart from the fact that, shortly before landing, she heard a relatively loud whistling noise. She said that she has heard similar noises during other flights, but not so loud. She assumed that the noise came from the seal around the door to her left. She did not otherwise register anything out of the ordinary until the aircraft left the runway.

Asian Spirit

Following an uneventful flight from Manila, the crew started the approach to Catarman Airport. Weather conditions were marginal and the runway was wet due to rain falls. After landing on runway 04/22 which is 1,350 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a paddy field. All 38 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. Aquaplaning may be a factor.

Paukn Air

Following an uneventful flight from Málaga-Pablo Ruiz Picasso Airport, the crew initiated the descent to Melilla Airport in marginal weather conditions. After being cleared to descend to 7,000 feet from Sevilla ATC, the crew contacted Melilla Tower and was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet. Melilla Tower then reported that runway 33 was in use and reported wind at 270° at 5 knots, visibility 8 km with few clouds at 1,000 feet. At 0645LT the copilot reported that they were at 22 nm at an altitude of 3,000 feet. From this point, the crew descended below the minimum safe altitude of 4,000 feet and crossed the coast line in limited visibility due to low clouds. At 0749 and 52 seconds, the GPWS alarm sounded twice in the cockpit. Few seconds later, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near Cap de Trois Fourche. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 38 occupants were killed.

China Northwest Airlines

During the takeoff roll on runway 36 at Yinchuan Airport, at Vr speed, the pilot-in-command pull up the control column to rotate but the aircraft failed to respond. Following a lack of crew coordination and inappropriate decisions, the crew failed to abort the takeoff procedure. After a long roll, the nose gear lifted off but the aircraft entered a high nose attitude, causing the tail to struck the runway surface. The aircraft then overran runway 36, collided with various obstacles and eventually crashed in a lake. 58 occupants were injured while 55 others were killed, among them one crew member. Weather conditions were good with OAT +27° C and an excellent visibility. Runway 36 is 2,160 metres long.

LAN Chile - Linea Aérea Nacional de Chile

Following an uneventful flight from Punta Arenas, the crew was cleared for a VOR approach to runway 26. After the wind component changed, the crew decided to perform a straight-in approach to runway 08. The aircraft landed too far down the runway (427 meters past the runway threshold) and at a speed of 112 knots (Vref was 110 knots with a target touchdown speed of 103 knots). Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, plunged in the Beagle Canal and came to rest about 20 meters from the shore. 17 occupants were wounded and 35 other occupants escaped uninjured. 20 passengers were killed in the accident.

Pacific Southwest Airlines - PSA

A recently discharged USAir employee boarded PSA flight 1771 after having left a goodbye message with friends. He bypassed security and carried aboard a borrowed 44 caliber pistol. A note written by this passenger, found in the wreckage, threatened his former supervisor at USAir, who was aboard the flight. At 1613, the pilot reported to Oakland ARTCC that he had an emergency and that gunshots had been fired in the airplane. Within 25 seconds, Oakland control controllers observed that PSA 1771 had begun a rapid descent from which it did not recover. Witnesses on the ground said the airplane was intact and there was no evidence of fire before the airplane struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude. The cover tape revealed the sounds of a scuffle and several shots which were apparently fired in or near the cockpit. The pistol was found in the wreckage with 6 expended rounds. FAA rules permitted airline employees to bypass security checkpoints. All 43 occupants were killed.