Airbus A300-600

United Parcel Service - UPS

On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer non precision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time. A notice to airmen in effect at the time of the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT. Because the flight's scheduled arrival time was 0451, only the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.

Saudi Arabian Airlines - SAUDIA

On 1 May 2012, aircraft TC-OAG, an Airbus A300-605R was performing a commercial flight for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SVA) as SVA2865. SVA 2865 departed from Prince Mohammed Bin Abdulaziz International Airport (PMAI) Madinah at 08h50 en-route to the King Abdulaziz International Airport (KAIA) Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. SVA 2865 was on a positioning flight with 10 crew members and no passengers. No discrepancies were noted on this aircraft prior to departure from Madinah. The visibility at Jeddah was good with a few clouds present. During the initial ILS approach to runway 16 Right (16R), while at 8 nautical miles (nm) and 2600 feet (ft), the landing gear handle was lowered. Both main landing gear extended and locked down and, the nose gear doors opened but the nose landing gear did not lower. The Captain who was then the Pilot Monitoring (PM) took over the controls and carried out a missed approach. The First Officer (FO) became the Pilot Monitoring (PM). SVA 2865 was then given an area to the northeast of Jeddah to carry out attempts at lowering the nose gear. The flight crew attempted to manually free fall the nose landing gear at least ten (10) times. The nose landing gear would not lower into the locked position, but the nose gear doors remained open during all those attempts. As a precautionary measure, SVA 2865 performed a fly-by of runway 16R at 500 ft. The air traffic controller confirmed that the nose landing gear (NLG) was not down. SVA 2865 was vectored over the Red Sea to lower the fuel load, thus reducing the landing weight. During this period, the Fire & Rescue Services (FRS) at Jeddah foamed a portion of runway 16 Left (16L) between taxiway Kilo 5 (K5) and K2. The majority of the FRS vehicles were standing by at the junction of taxiways K4 and K3. SVA 2865 was vectored for an instrument approach for Runway 16L. The Auto Pilot and the Auto Throttle Systems were OFF. The surface winds were from 220° at 12 knots (kt), gusting to 19 kt and the temperature was + 37 Celsius (°C). The flight crew used the "Landing with Nose Landing Gear Abnormal" checklist ensuring the aircraft was properly prepared and configured for the approach, the before landing, the flare and the touchdown sequences, including when the aircraft stopped and the necessary procedures to secure the aircraft before evacuation. The aircraft landed on its main landing gear 4000 ft past the threshold of runway 16L. The nose of the aircraft was slowly lowered to the runway with the nose landing gear doors touching the runway within the foamed area 4500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The front of the fuselage then touched the runway within the last portion of foam, 3500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The nose area of the aircraft slid on the runway, where sparks were present until the aircraft came to a full stop 1500 ft prior to the end of runway 16L. As soon as the aircraft passed by the position of the FRS vehicles, the FRS vehicles gave chase to the aircraft and reached it within 30 seconds after it came to a full stop. Although there was no post-crash fire, the FRS personnel applied water and foam to the nose area of the aircraft. All of the crew members were evacuated from the aircraft by ladder provided by the FRS. The crew was taken to the airport clinic as a precautionary measure. All were released the same day. The accident occurred at 14h49 on runway 16L at the KAIA - Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

American Airlines

On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane's engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

China Airlines

Following an uneventful flight from Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Airport, the aircraft was approaching Taipei-Taoyuan Airport by night and marginal weather conditions with a limited visibility of 2,400 feet, an RVR of 3,900 feet and 300 feet broken ceiling, 3,000 feet overcast. On final approach to runway 05L in light rain and fog, at the altitude of 1,515 feet, the aircraft was 1,000 feet too high on the glide so the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. The automatic pilot system was disconnected but for unknown reasons, the crew failed to correct the pitch up attitude. The aircraft passed the runway threshold at an altitude of 1,475 feet, pitched up go around thrust was applied. The aircraft rapidly pitched up, reaching +35° and climbed through 1,723 feet at an airspeed of 134 knots. The gear had just been raised and the flaps set to 20°. The aircraft continued to climb to 2,751 feet when the speed dropped to 43 knots. At this point, the aircraft stalled, entered an uncontrolled descent (pitched down to 44,65°). The crew was apparently able to regain control when the aircraft rolled to the right at an angle of 20° 2-3 seconds prior to final impact. The aircraft struck the ground 200 feet to the right of the runway 05L centerline and 3,7 km from its threshold and eventually crashed on 12 houses. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 196 occupants were killed, among them five US citizens, one Indonesian and one French. On the ground, seven people were killed.

Garuda Indonesian Airways

On 26 September 1997 the Garuda Indonesia Flight GA 152, PK-GAI Airbus A300-B4 departed from the Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International Airport at 04:41 UTC. The aircraft was on a regular scheduled passengers flight to Polonia International Airport of Medan, North Sumatera with estimated time of arrival 06:41 UTC. Flight GA 152 was flying under Instrument Flight Rules during daylight. Before the flight, the flight crew reported to Garuda Indonesia Flight Operations office to receive flight briefings, including Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), weather conditions and forecast en-route, at destination and alternate airports, as well as the flight plan. The NOTAM stated that the MDN VOR was overdue for maintenance and advised to use the facility ‘with caution', although the Medan VOR has been calibrated with both ground and flight calibration on 14 June 1997 and valid until 14 December 1997, the use of Medan VOR was classified as “restricted due to radial course alignment at 270 degrees radial”. At the time of flight-planning, the visibility from Medan TAFOR (26 September 1997, 00.00 UTC – 24.00 UTC) was 1000 meters in smoke. The dispatcher stated that he received information through company channel that the actual visibility at Medan was 400 meters in smoke, which was below the minimum required visibility for runway 05 ILS of 800 meters. At 06:12:51 GA 152 requested a descend clearance to Medan Control. Medan Control cleared the aircraft to descend to FL 150. On passing FL 150, GA 152 was informed that the aircraft was in radar contact, at a distance of 43 nautical miles from MDN VOR/DME. The crew was then instructed to descend to 3000 ft for a landing on Runway 05 and to reduce the speed to 220 knots to allow Bouraq flight BO 683 to takeoff from Runway 23 at 06:20:47. GA152 requested a speed of 250 knots below 10000 feet which was approved. At 6:27:12, Medan Approach instructed GA 152 to maintain altitude on heading to Medan VOR/DME. GA 152 confirmed this instruction at 6:27:21. At 06:27:50 Medan Approach transmitted an instruction “Merpati one five two you er .. turn left heading two four zero vectoring for intercept ILS runway zero five from the right side traffic now er.. rolling”. There was no response by any aircraft to this transmission. At 06:28:06 Medan Approach enquired “Indonesia one five two do you read”. GA 152 asked the ATC to repeat the message. At 06:28:13 Medan Approach instructed GA 152 to “Turn left heading er.. two four zero two three five now vectoring for intercept ILS runway zero five”. This instruction was acknowledged by GA 152. At 06:28:52 the PIC asked the Medan Approach whether the aircraft was clear from the mountainous area northwest from Medan. This was confirmed by Medan Approach, and GA 152 was instructed to continue turning left on heading 215°M. At 06:29:41, GA 152 was instructed to descend to 2000 ft and the crew acknowledged it. Recorded FDR information indicates the aircraft is essentially wings level, heading approx 225M° and passing through 3000 feet on descent. Then at 06:30:04 GA 152 was instructed to turn right heading 046 degrees, and to report when established on the localizer. This was acknowledged by GA 152, but misread the heading “Turn right heading zero four zero Indonesia one five two check established”. Meanwhile recorded FDR information indicates the aircraft commences a roll to the left, heading reducing indicating a left turn and passing through 2600 feet on descent. At 6:30:33, while turning left, First Officer reminded the Captain to turn right. Two seconds later GA 152 queried Medan Approach whether the turn is to the left or to the right onto heading 046 degrees. At 6:30:39 Medan Approach replied “Turning right Sir”, which was acknowledged by GA 152. FDR data shows that the aircraft began to roll to wings level. At 06:30:51 Medan Approach asked whether GA 152 was making a left turn or a right turn. Recorded FDR information indicates the aircraft was wings level and rolling to the right, heading approximately 135°M and increasing, at 2035 feet pressure altitude on descent. GA 152 responded “We are turning right now”. At 06:31:05 Medan Approach instructed GA 152 to continue turning left. Recorded FDR information showed that at this point the aircraft had passed the assigned 2000 ft altitude and continued descending. GA 152 replied “Err...confirm turning left we are starting to turn right now”. During the interview, the controller stated that it was around this time that he recognized that the aircraft went below the required altitude (1800 ft and descending). Recorded FDR information indicates the aircraft reduced right roll from approx 24.3º to 10.2° and then rolled right again to approx 25°, while heading was increasing indicated a right turn was being maintained and the aircraft continued descending. At 06:31:32 the sound of tree impact is recorded. The elevation of the initial impact with the trees was at about 1550 ft above sea level. The final impact on the bottom of a ravine approximately 600 meters from the first tree impact destroyed the aircraft, and 234 people on board of the aircraft perished. There were no ground casualties.

Korean Air

The descent and approach to Jeju Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with turbulences and heavy rain falls as typhoon 'Doug' was passing over. On final approach, flaps were deployed at 15°/20° as the captain was suspecting windshear and microburst conditions. Twice, the copilot informed the captain about the approach speed of 147 knots which was acknowledged. The captain continued the approach but too high on the glide, the aircraft landed too far down the runway, about 1,773 metres past its threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (1,227 metres remaining), overran at a speed of 104 knots and eventually collided with a concrete wall and military barracks, bursting into flames. All 160 occupants were quickly evacuated, among them seven were slightly injured.

China Airlines

China Airlines' Flight 140 (from Taipei International Airport to Nagoya Airport), B-1816, took off from Taipei International Airport at 0853 UTC (1753 JST) on April 26, 1994 (hereinafter all times shown are Coordinated Universal Time, unless otherwise specified), canying a total of 271 persons consisting of 2 flight crew members, 13 cabin crew members and 256 passengers (including 2 infants). The flight plan of the aircraft, which had been filed to the Taiwanese civil aviation authorities, Zhongzheng International Airport Office, was as follows: Flight rule: IFR, Aerodrome of departure: Taipei International Airport, Destination Aerodrome: Nagoya Airport, Cruising speed: 465 knots, Level: FL330, Route: A1 SUCJAKAL-KE-SIV-XMC, total estimated enroute time: 2 hours and 18 minutes, Alternate Aerodrome: Tokyo International Airport. DFDR shows that the aircraft reached FL330 about 0914 and continued its course toward Nagoya Airport in accordance with its flight plan. DFDR and CVR show that its flight history during approximately 30 minutes prior to the accident progressed as follows: The aircraft which was controlled by the FIO, while cruising at FL330 was cleared at 1047:35 to descend to FL210 by the Tokyo Area Control Center and commenced descent. For about 25 minutes from a few minutes before the aircraft began its descent, the CAP briefed the F/O on approach and landing. At 1058:18, communication was established with Nagoya Approach Control. The aircraft began to descend and decreased its speed gradually, in accordance with the clearances given by Approach Control. At 1104:03, the aircraft was instructed by Nagoya Approach control to make a left turn to a heading of 010". Later, at 1107:14, the aircraft was cleared for ILS approach to Runway 34 and was instructed to contact Nagoya Tower. After the aircraft took off from Taipei International Airport, from 0854 when the aircraft had passed 1,000 feet pressure altitude, AP No.2 was engaged during climb, cruise and descent. At 1107:22, when the aircraft was in the initial phase of approach to Nagoya airport, AP No. 1 was also engaged. Later, at 1111:36, both AP No. 1 and 2 were disengaged by the FIO. The aircraft passed the outer marker at 1112:19, and at 1113:39, received landing clearance from Nagoya Tower. At this time, the aircraft was reported of winds 290 degrees at 6 knots. Under manual control, the aircraft continued normal LS approach. At 1114:05, however, while crossing approximately 1,070 feet pressure altitude, the F/O inadvertently triggered the GO lever. As a result the aircraft shifted into GO AROUND mode leading to an increase in thrust. The CAP cautioned the FIO that he had triggered the GO lever and instructed him, saying "disengage it". The aircraft leveled off for about 15 seconds at approximately 1,040 feet pressure altitude (at a point some 5.5 km from the Runway). The CAP instructed the F/O to correct the descent path which had become too high. The F/O acknowledged this. Following the instruction, the F/O applied nose down elevator input to adjust its descent path, and consequently the aircraft gradually regained its normal glide path. During this period, the CAP cautioned to the FIO twice that the aircraft was in GO AROUND Mode. At 1114: 18, both AP No.2 and No. 1 were engaged almost simultaneously when the aircraft was flying at approximately 1,040 feet pressure altitude, a point 1.2 dots above the glide slope. Both APs were used for the next 30 seconds. There is no definite record in the CVR of either the crew expressing their intention or calling out to use the AP. For approximately 18 seconds after the AP was engaged, the THS gradually moved from -5.3" to -12.3", which is close to the maximum nose-up limit. The THS remained at -12.3" until 1115: 1 1. During this period, the elevator was continually moved in the nose-down direction. In this condition, the aircraft continued its approach, and at 1115:02, when it was passing about 510 feet pressure altitude (at a point approximately 1.8 km from the runway), the CAP, who had been informed by the FIO that the THR had been latched, told the FIO that he would take over the controls. Around this time, the THR levers had moved forward greatly, increasing EPR from about 1.0 to more than 1.5. Immediately afterwards, however, the THR levers were retarded, decreasing EPR to 1.3. In addition, the elevator was moved close to its nose-down limit when the CAP took the controls. At 1115:11, immediately after the CAP called out "Go lever", the THR levers were moved forward greatly once again, increasing EPR to more than 1.6. The aircraft therefore began to climb steeply. The F/O reported to Nagoya Tower that the aircraft would go around, and Nagoya Tower acknowledged this. The aircraft started climbing steeply, AOA increased sharply and CAS decreased rapidly. During this period, the TI-IS decreased from -12.3" to -7.4", and SLATS/FLAPS were retracted from 30/40 to 15/15 after the F/O reported "Go Around to Nagoya Tower. At 1115:17, the GPWS activated Mode 5 warning "Glide Slope" once, and at 1115:25, the stall warning sounded for approximately 2 seconds. At 1115:31, after reaching about 1,730 feet pressure altitude (about 1,790 feet radio altitude), the aircraft lowered its nose and began to dive. At 1115:37, the GPWS activated Mode 2 warning "Terrain, Terrain" once, and the stall warning sounded from 1115:40 to the time of crash. At about 1115:45, the aircraft crashed into the landing zone close to the El taxiway. The accident occurred within the landing zone approximately 110 meters east-northeast of the center of the Runway 34 end at Nagoya Airport. It occurred at about 1115:45. Seven passengers were seriously injured and all 264 other occupants were killed.