Mohéli - Ouani
Flight / Schedule
Mohéli - Ouani
Aircraft
Fokker 50Registration
D6-AIB
MSN
20335
Year of Manufacture
1997
Operator
Unknown
Date
May 5, 2024 at 10:00 AM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Region
Africa • Comoros Islands
Coordinates
-12.2266°, 44.4107°
Narrative Report
On May 5, 2024 at 10:00 AM, Mohéli - Ouani experienced a crash involving Fokker 50, operated by an operator, with the event recorded near Africa, Comoros Islands.
The flight was categorized as scheduled revenue flight and the reported phase was takeoff (climb).
52 people were known to be on board, 0 fatalities were recorded, 52 survivors were identified or estimated. This corresponds to an estimated fatality rate of 0.0%.
Crew on board: 4, crew fatalities: 0, passengers on board: 48, passenger fatalities: 0, other fatalities: 0.
Aircraft reference details include registration D6-AIB, MSN 20335, year of manufacture 1997.
Geospatial coordinates for this crash are approximately -12.2266°, 44.4107°.
Fatalities
Total
0
Crew
0
Passengers
0
Other
0
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
4
Passengers On Board
48
Estimated Survivors
52
Fatality Rate
0.0%
Known people on board: 52
Operational Details
Schedule / Flight
Mohéli - Ouani
Flight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Region / Country
Africa • Comoros Islands
Aircraft Details
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