5N-BDC
Flight / Schedule
5N-BDC
Aircraft
BAc 111Registration
5N-BDC
MSN
111
Year of Manufacture
1967
Operator
Eagle Aviation - NigeriaDate
August 28, 2001 at 12:00 AM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Landing (descent or approach)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Crash Location
Libreville Estuaire (Libreville)
Region
Africa • Gabon
Coordinates
0.3718°, 9.4608°
Crash Cause
Technical failure
Narrative Report
On August 28, 2001 at 12:00 AM, 5N-BDC experienced a crash involving BAc 111, operated by Eagle Aviation - Nigeria, with the event recorded near Libreville Estuaire (Libreville).
The flight was categorized as scheduled revenue flight and the reported phase was landing (descent or approach) at a airport (less than 10 km from airport) crash site.
0 people were known to be on board, 0 fatalities were recorded, 0 survivors were identified or estimated.
Crew on board: 0, crew fatalities: 0, passengers on board: 0, passenger fatalities: 0, other fatalities: 0.
The listed crash cause is technical failure. After landing at Libreville-Léon M'Ba Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest few dozen metres further. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Aircraft reference details include registration 5N-BDC, MSN 111, year of manufacture 1967.
Geospatial coordinates for this crash are approximately 0.3718°, 9.4608°.
Fatalities
Total
0
Crew
0
Passengers
0
Other
0
Crash Summary
After landing at Libreville-Léon M'Ba Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its nose gear and came to rest few dozen metres further. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Cause: Technical failure
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
0
Passengers On Board
0
Estimated Survivors
0
Fatality Rate
—
Known people on board: 0
Operational Details
Operator
Eagle Aviation - NigeriaFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Landing (descent or approach)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Region / Country
Africa • Gabon
Aircraft Details
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Crashed shortly after takeoff from Libreville Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all seven occupants were injured.
British Aircraft Corporation
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The aircraft took off at 1017 hours GMT from runway 10, at Wisley Aerodrome on its fifty third test flight. It was to carry out stalling tests in all configurations with the centre of gravity at 0.38 SMC (standard mean chord), the furthest aft limit for which the aircraft had then been cleared. Based on the radio-telephony conversations recorded in the Wisley Tower and the flight recorders carried aboard the aircraft, the flight was reconstructed. Following take-off the aircraft climbed in visual meteorological conditions on a westerly heading to 17 000 ft while monitored by Wisley radar. At 1026 the co-pilot reported that they were about to commence tests at flight level 170. By 1035, four stalls had been completed with the undercarriage and flaps up. The co-pilot acknowledged a fix from Wisley at 1036 hours and nothing further was heard from the aircraft. The flaps were then lowered to to investigate the stalling characteristics in this configuration. The stall was initiated about two minutes after the last contact, when the aircraft was between 15 000 and 16 000 ft. Approach to the stall appears to have been normal. When attempting recovery, the elevators responded initially to the control movement but subsequently floated to the fully up position in spite of a large push force on the control column. The aircraft then descended in a substantially horizontal fore and aft attitude at about 180 ft/sec (54 meters per sec). During the descent it banked twice to the right and once to the left and at one stage the engines were opened up to full power. This action resulted in a large nose-up pitch which was followed by a pitch down when power was taken off. The aircraft then assumed the substantially horizontal attitude in which it made impact with the ground. The final portion of the flight was observed by numerous eye witnesses who commented on the low level of engine noise and a sharp report from the aircraft which was heard while it was in the air. The aircraft had approached from the southwest, in a stable stalled condition, and crashed at about 1040 hours in a flat attitude. Following impact, the aircraft moved forward about 70 ft and some 15 ft to the right before coming to rest. It exploded and caught fire. All seven crew members, four engineers and three test pilots, were killed.
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Flight 250 was a scheduled domestic passenger/cargo flight from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Minneapolis, Minnesota, with intermediate stops at Shreveport, Louisiana, Fort Smith, Arkansas, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Kansas City, Missouri, and Omaha, Nebraska. The flight departed from New Orleans at 1835 hours CST and arrived at Kansas City without reported incident. It departed from Kansas City at 2255 hours on an IFR clearance to Omaha via Jet Route 41 at FL 200. Just prior to take-off, the flight was restricted to 5 000 ft due to conflicting traffic. When the flight was about 12 miles north of Kansas City, control of the aircraft was transferred to the Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC). Radar contact was confirmed and the flight was cleared to climb to and maintain FL 200. After some discussion with ARTCC about the weather the flight crew advised that they would like to maintain 5 000 ft to Omaha. They reported they were at 6 000 ft and ARTCC cleared the flight to maintain that altitude until 5 000 ft was available. At 2303 hours the Kansas City ARTCC initiated a transfer of control of the flight to the Chicago ARTCC but before the transfer could be accomplished the flight requested and received permission from the Kansas City controller to deviate to the left of course. At 2306 hours the Kansas City controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 5 000 ft and contact the Chicago ARTCC. After some discussion of the weather as it was displayed on the Chicago controller's radar, the flight was advised that another Braniff flight, Flight 255, was on the same frequency and was at 10 000 ft climbing to 17 000 ft after departing Omaha. The crews of the two aircraft exchanged weather information and the crew of Flight 255 advised that they had encountered light to moderate turbulence from about 15 miles southeast of the Omaha airport and that it appeared they would be out of it in another 10 miles based on their radar observations. Flight 250 terminated this conversation at approximately 2308:30 hours. This was the last transmission received from the flight. Ground witnesses stated that they observed the aircraft approach and either fly into or over a shelf of clouds preceding a line of thunderstorms that was approaching frbm the north and northwest, and that shortly thereafter they saw an explosion in the sky followed by a fireball falling out of the clouds. The aircraft crashed at approximately 2312 hours, 7.6 statute miles on a true bearing of 024.50 from Falls City, Nebraska, at an elevation of 1 078 ft AMSL. All 42 occupants have been killed.
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British United Airways - BUA
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On 14 January 1969 the crew flew from Gatwick to Rotterdam and return, following which they departed on a scheduled international flight Gatwick-Genoa-Gatwick. For this flight Captain A occupied the left-hand seat as pilot-in-charge, Captain B the right hand seat as co-pilot and Captain C the centre supernumerary seat as pilot-in-command, ultimately responsible for the correct operation of the aircraft. Before leaving Gatwick Captain A briefed Captain B concerning the co-pilot duties assigned to him. Although Captain C, as pilot-in-command, did not himself formally brief Captains A and B there was no doubt that they were aware of their respective tasks. On the flight from Gatwick to Genoa the aircraft was forced, due to unfavourable weather conditions at Genoa, to divert to Milan-Linate Airport where it landed at 1430 hours. Before commencing the return flight to Gatwick the crew had to await the arrival of the passengers from Genoa. This took place at 1930 hours. 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