TZ-ACS
Flight / Schedule
TZ-ACS
Aircraft
Britten-Norman IslanderRegistration
TZ-ACS
MSN
910
Year of Manufacture
1981
Operator
Air MaliDate
May 15, 1985 at 12:00 AM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Crash Site
Plain, Valley
Crash Location
Mali All Mali
Region
Africa • Mali
Narrative Report
On May 15, 1985 at 12:00 AM, TZ-ACS experienced a crash involving Britten-Norman Islander, operated by Air Mali, with the event recorded near Mali All Mali.
The flight was categorized as scheduled revenue flight at a plain, valley crash site.
0 people were known to be on board, 0 fatalities were recorded, 0 survivors were identified or estimated.
Crew on board: 0, crew fatalities: 0, passengers on board: 0, passenger fatalities: 0, other fatalities: 0.
Crashed in unknown circumstances somewhere in Mali in May 1985 (exact date unknown). There were no casualties.
Aircraft reference details include registration TZ-ACS, MSN 910, year of manufacture 1981.
Fatalities
Total
0
Crew
0
Passengers
0
Other
0
Crash Summary
Crashed in unknown circumstances somewhere in Mali in May 1985 (exact date unknown). There were no casualties.
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
0
Passengers On Board
0
Estimated Survivors
0
Fatality Rate
—
Known people on board: 0
Operational Details
Operator
Air MaliFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Crash Site
Plain, Valley
Region / Country
Africa • Mali
Aircraft Details
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